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ABSTRACT 
The education of intellectually disabled (ID) people is constructed within mass education 
systems as a problem requiring specialised intervention, separation from “normal” school 
contexts and the application of professional expertise. A social model of disability resists 
these practices from a human rights perspective and underpins an inclusive education 
approach. In this study, a post-structuralist disability studies theoretical framework, drawing 
particularly on the work of Foucault, was used to examine discourses that construct the 
intellectually disabled person as a subject of education. The study was conducted in Buffalo 
City, South Africa at a time when an inclusive education policy is being implemented in the 
country. The research questions were: What discourses are deployed in the representation 
and educational practices of those identified as ID? What are the effects of these discourses 
in constructing the ID subject and associated educational practice? 
 
The study utilises Q-methodology, a factor analytic method that yields whole patterns of 
responses for analysis. A process of sorting selected statements along the dimension of agree 
to disagree was completed by three groups of participants, namely adults with ID, parents of 
people with ID and professionals working with ID. Discourses of representation and of 
educational practice were identified through statistical and interpretive analysis, following 
the discourse analysis school of Q-methodology.  
 
The findings of this study reveal the operation of power in a medico-psychological gaze that 
makes ID visible and supervises disability expertise within education. Representations of ID 
suffused with religious notions support the exercise of pastoral power by disability experts. 
Human rights discourses in education can marginalise ID people if applied uncritically. 
Fixed notions of impairment constrain an intellectually disabled subject who is vulnerable 
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and incompetent. This study argues instead for a theory of (poss)ability, underpinned by an 
understanding of the situational and shared nature of competence and a fluid conception of 
impairment. Human rights should be supplemented by an ethics of care and belonging in the 
community (ubuntu). A research agenda supporting this effort would examine the ways in 
which ID people work on themselves as subjects (subjectivisation) and explore the potential 
for resistance in this process.  
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APPENDIXES 
For the purposes of examination, the appendixes are presented in a separate book. This is for 
ease of reference as the reader will need to refer to the tables in the appendixes to understand 
the results sections in chapters 6 and 7 as well as to refer to factors summaries in chapter 8.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
We believe and proclaim that:  
• every child has a fundamental right to education, and must be 
given the opportunity to achieve and maintain an acceptable level 
of learning,  
• every child has unique characteristics, interests, abilities and 
learning needs,  
• education systems should be designed and educational 
programmes implemented to take into account the wide diversity 
of these characteristics and needs,  
• those with special educational needs must have access to regular  
schools which should accommodate them within a child centred 
pedagogy capable of meeting these needs,  
• regular schools with this inclusive orientation are the most 
effective means of combating discriminatory attitudes, creating 
welcoming communities, building an inclusive society and 
achieving education for all; moreover they provide an effective 
education to the majority of children and improve the efficiency 
and ultimately the cost-effectiveness of the entire education 
system. (Salamanca Satement, 1994, pp. viii-ix) 
 
The Salamanca Statement quoted above is an endorsement and a public acceptance of 
inclusive education. It was declared in the international arena as the most effective response 
to the educational needs of children who had previously received segregated or no education 
on the basis of disability or other forms of difference. This international trend was adopted 
(with disclaimers) by the South African Department of Education in the Education White 
Paper 6: Special needs education: Building an inclusive education and training system 
(Department of Education, 2001). The White Paper presents the response to learners within 
the education system who are classified as experiencing barriers to learning, including those 
caused by disability.  
 
As a parent and professional, I have been part of the exciting process of developing inclusive 
education in South Africa. I have given input to policy development, implemented inclusive 
education projects, seen my son through inclusive and special schooling, and trained 
teachers in inclusive education. In so doing I was struck by the different understandings of 
disability amongst people involved in the project of education for disabled people. Positions 
that were taken regarding inclusive education, special schooling and the nature of disability 
seemed resistant to change. Discussions generally shed more heat than light when opposing 
views were adopted in the numerous education forums set up to support these changes. 
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Reasoned argument was futile as advocates of inclusive education lined up against the 
special school lobby. No sooner was some ground gained, on either side, than it became 
apparent that completely different meanings were attached to concepts about which we 
thought we had agreed. In my particular focus on intellectual disability, I realised that 
educational practices could not be agreed upon insofar as we had different conceptions about 
what it means to be intellectually disabled. I therefore embarked on the current project to 
understand better how the way in which disability is understood interacts with views on 
educational practice. In this introductory chapter, I shall give an overview of the project and 
outline the main points that have emerged from the research.  
 
Intellectual disability within educational practice forms the key focus of this research.  From 
the start I wish to acknowledge that terminology is politically loaded.  Given this, I shall, for 
the purpose of this study, use the term intellectual disability, as the British term “learning 
disability/difficulty” has different connotations in the South African context.   The term 
“mental retardation”, which is in common use in the United States, is considered to be 
pejorative in the South African context.  There is an ongoing debate about the use of “people 
first” terminology, that is “people with intellectual disability” as opposed to the term 
“intellectually disabled people”. While the former is preferred by people who are categorised 
as intellectually disabled (Central England People First Limited, 1996-2000), the latter has 
the advantage of foregrounding social practices, which disable the individual, rather than 
placing the emphasis on the person him- or herself and reifying the disability as something 
that a person “has”. I have decided to use both terms interchangeably, thereby 
acknowledging both sides of the debate. I make a crucial terminological distinction between 
intellectual impairment and intellectual disability in a discussion of the social model of 
disability in chapter 2. I also note the use of derogatory labels such as “idiot” and “imbecile” 
in chapter 3 within the historical context in which they occur.  
 
Research questions 
The focus of this research is educational practice, as it moulds and shapes understandings of 
intellectual disability as a problem for education. It explores the ways in which discourses of 
representation of intellectually disabled people and associated educational practices make 
possible certain ways of doing and being and restrict other possibilities. The project 
undertaken in this study is framed by three research questions: 
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1. What discourses are deployed in the representation of those identified as intellectually 
disabled in Buffalo City, South Africa? 
This question seeks to explore the ways in which intellectual disability is figured in the study 
context. It arises from a theoretical perspective that rejects assumptions about the essential 
nature of intellectual disability and seeks to examine the way in which the object of 
intellectual disability comes to be understood within discourse (see chapter 2). In addition, 
this question approaches all discourses of intellectual disability as epistemologically 
equivalent, removing the privilege of a bio-medical discourse and seeking to delineate 
submerged discourses.  
2. What discourses are deployed concerning the practices of education of those identified as 
intellectually disabled in Buffalo City, South Africa? 
Arising from the same theoretical commitment as for question 1, this question is not 
concerned with a comprehensive account of forms of educational practice and adjudicating 
upon their relative effectiveness. Rather it aims to identify discourses that describe and 
prescribe educational conduct and to consider the power effects of such discourses.  
3. What are the effects of these discourses in constructing the intellectually disabled subject 
and associated educational practice? 
 The third question is based on the understanding that representation and practice are not 
distinct from each other. The way in which an object is understood is both a product and 
productive of the practices associated with it. As such the separation between questions 1 
and 2 is an artificial one, intended as an analytic tool. This third question collapses the 
representation/practice divide and examines the effects of discourses identified in the first 
two questions.  
 
The focus of these questions arises from a specific theoretical framework adopted in this 
study, that of critical pos-structuralist disability studies. I shall provide a brief introduction to 
this framework below.  
 
Critical post-structuralist disability studies 
The current study is located within the discipline of Disability Studies, a relatively new 
academic field that is closely tied to a political project of disability rights (Meekosha, 2004). 
Fundamental to the project is a rejection of essentialist views of disability as a biological 
determinant of social status and the adoption of what is termed a social model of disability 
 15 
(Oliver, 1990). This model breaks the link between the biological (the impairment or organic 
defect of the body) and the social (the disability or social barriers maintained by society). 
Since impairment is viewed as individual and idiosyncratic, it is the experience of disability, 
arising from society’s inability to adapt for people with impairments, that forms the basis of 
political activism (Oliver, 1996). Disability Studies (in its broadest sense) is aligned with the 
emancipatory intent of the disability rights movement, based on a rejection of biological 
determinism and the centrality of the participation and voice of disabled people in disability 
research. However, the binary of impairment and disability that is adopted in the social 
model is critiqued within a critical post-structuralist approach.  
 
While this binary opens up disability for social action, impairment is figured as an individual 
property that has a fixed, biological nature, subject to medical authority (Hughes & Paterson, 
1997). This forced dichotomy, between the individual impairment and the socially 
constructed disability, led disability scholars to ignore impairment as unimportant or to view 
it as of little theoretical or political interest. Concerns relating to impairment, such as the 
lived experience of impairment, the different effects of impairment types and the uneasy 
relationship with the medical profession, were minimised in the interests of a politically 
expedient solidarity based on a shared experience of disablement by society (Shakespeare, 
2006).  
 
At its core the binary of disability/impairment poses questions about the relationship 
between the individual and society.  Is the individual impairment prior to and causal of the 
condition of disability? If so, then the focus of action is to minimise the impairment, largely 
though bio-medical and therapeutic intervention, so as to maximise social participation. If, 
on the other hand, it is society that creates the disability through disabling practices, then 
participation in society should be achieved through social pressure. Either of these 
approaches taken to their logical extremes creates an absurd situation of either biological 
determinism in a medical focus or the disappearance of impairment in a political project.  
 
In order to avoid these extremes, I theorise the disability/impairment debate within the 
theoretical framework of a post-structuralist understanding that draws on Foucauldian theory 
of the individual as a subject constructed within discourse. In this way the relationship 
between the individual and society is reformulated as mutually constructive. This 
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perspective requires a decentreing of the rational self as an autonomous agent, free to act 
upon the world. Rather the subject is viewed as a product of power and knowledge. 
 
Within a post-structuralist, Foucauldian frame, the notion of knowledge as the progressive 
revelation of a truth that is already present, but hidden within the object under investigation, 
is rejected. Knowledge is not viewed as orderly, continuous, progressive and sequential but 
rather as productive of the subject and inextricably linked with  power (Popkewitz & 
Brennan, 1998). In this frame, the notion of an integrated, unitary self is destabilised and the 
self is seen rather as a particular construction of subjectivity made possible within certain 
conditions (Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn, & Walkerdine, 1998). These conditions are 
manifest in discourse that “speaks” the subject into being. Thus, for example, a eugenic 
discourse enables certain ways of constructing the intellectually disabled subject (as possibly 
threatening, with a dangerous sexuality) and forbids others (for example, as a citizen with 
rights). In this post-structuralist view the focus moves toward understanding the 
intellectually disabled subject as a contingent social construction, changing over time and 
space, formed by (and which in-forms) educational practice, making up people in certain 
ways that constrains their field of action. Knowledge, therefore, cannot be dissociated from 
power.  
 
In developing an understanding of how power operates to make up the intellectually disabled 
subject I draw heavily on the work of Michel Foucault (see chapter 2). Utilising his insights, 
I discuss how the intellectually disabled subject is made visible through the disciplines of 
Medicine, Psychology and Special Education. Procedures of definition, diagnosis and 
prescriptions of the correct course of action to be taken figure the intellectually disabled 
person in certain ways. For example, intelligence testing defines a norm against which the 
individual is ranked. The intellectually disabled person is deemed to be lacking in the 
essential quality of intelligence and therapeutic procedures are invoked. However, there is 
nothing inherent in a condition of intellectual disability that requires that it be described in 
this way. The test scores are not part of a material object of intellectual disability but rather 
they serve to construct a particular category of person on whom it is incumbent to respond in 
certain ways. In this way a certain kind of person is constructed (Hacking, 1999), in our 
discussion, the intellectually disabled person. 
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Viewed in this light, the practice of education for intellectually disabled people cannot be 
seen as the neutral application of scientific evidence to a known entity. Rather it is a practice 
that constructs the object that it seeks to govern. The practice of special schooling, for 
example, constructs two categories of children — those that belong in a regular school and 
those that require different forms of placement. This division is authorised and given a moral 
justification by claims to knowledge of the truth about intellectual disability by the medico-
psychological authorities, who are responsible for the diagnosis and management of the 
condition (Rose, 2007). In educational practice for intellectually disabled people, this 
expertise is constituted into the discipline of Special Education.  
 
Given the strong claims to truth exercised by the medico-psychological gaze, the operation 
of power becomes obscured. Certain forms of practice become taken-for-granted as being in 
the best interests of the individual with an ethical and moral rationale. The expert is required 
to know the individual in detail — their thoughts, habits and what they may become — and 
the individual comes to know him- or herself in this way, thereby owning to the identity 
offered by this detailed knowledge in the practice of pastoral power (Foucault, 1982), which 
will be further discussed in chapter 2.  
 
Discourse and language are central to the method of study of the mechanism whereby the 
object of intellectual disability and subjects of educational practice are formed. Discourse, in 
this understanding, does not serve to describe a pre-existing reality ‘out there’ but rather it 
constructs a field of action in which certain ways of acting, being and understanding are 
made possible and others are restricted (Macleod, 2002). Thus, to understand intellectual 
disability discourse is taken as the object of study. The methodology used in this study 
allows for distinguishing the domain of discourse of intellectual disability and within this, to 
identify specific, distinct discourses that are deployed to different effect in social intercourse.  
 
Noting that the notion of discourse is contested, I shall make explicit the understanding 
adopted in this study. Discourse is not only about language that describes a particular object. 
Rather it encompasses language, social practices and material arrangements. This is not to 
deny materiality or to suggest that there is no reality outside of discourse but rather to 
recognise that the material world can only be understood through discourse. Discourse 
imposes a grid of understanding of reality. It allows for certain possibilities and makes others 
unthinkable because they fall outside of available discourse. In this way discourse is more 
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than what is said about something that exists in the real world — rather it makes up the 
object that is under discussion.  
 
The project of understanding the object of intellectual disability requires a recognition that it 
is not an unproblematic thing in the world that has always remained constant over time 
(Rapley, 2004). One way of  destabilising this claim is to view it through an historical and 
cultural lens by means of a review of the literature (see chapter 3). What comes into view is 
an object that is increasingly regulated, differentiated and brought under disciplinary control. 
Educational practice both governs and sustains representations of intellectual disability in 
ways that are often not immediately apparent from the rhetoric. This does not occur in a 
vacuum but in a certain historical and political context, which in this study is the relatively 
young post-apartheid democracy of South Africa in the district of Buffalo City.  
 
Context of the study 
This study takes place in the context of a recent history of apartheid and human rights abuses 
on the grounds of race. Issues of social justice are central to South African democracy and 
extend to its entire people. The purpose of the South African Constitution, as stated in the 
Preamble, is to:  
• Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, 
social justice and fundamental human rights;  
• Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based 
on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law;  
• Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person; and  
• Build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a 
sovereign state in the family of nations. (Republic of South Africa, 1996, p. 1243) 
 
Educational policy deriving from the Constitution requires compulsory (though not free) 
education for all children. The initial challenge that this posed was the integration of a 
fragmented system that provided separate education for different race groups, with Africans 
being the least well provided for, into a single education system. The goal of educational 
policy was to develop a just and equitable system that would provide good quality education 
for all (Mothatha, 2000). The history of exclusion of disabled children from education 
necessitated a specific policy development process, focusing on special educational needs 
and school support services (Department of Education, 1997). This culminated in the 
publication of Education White Paper 6. Special needs education: Building an inclusive 
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education and training system (Department of Education, 2001). This document adopts an 
inclusive education policy that will proceed incrementally and will continue to make use of 
special schools and professional expertise, distributing this more widely than occurred under 
apartheid (see chapter 4). The 20 year implementation timetable adopted in the White Paper 
is massively behind schedule but a national strategy for screening, identification, assessment 
and support has been developed and is being incrementally implemented. Pilot projects have 
been completed in 30 districts country wide and these districts continue to be developed to 
improve their capacity for delivering inclusive education.  
 
A parallel and supportive process has been that of the disability rights movement within 
South Africa that was able to make significant gains for disabled people in the new 
democracy. The strategy of the leading organisation of the disability rights movement of 
South Africa, Disabled People South Africa (DPSA), was to align the struggle of disabled 
people with that of liberation for racial discrimination (Howell, Chalklen, & Alberts, 2006).  
As a result the movement was successful in ensuring that disability issues are included in a 
whole range of policies. The human rights aspect of disability has also been bolstered by the 
recent adoption at the United Nations of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
disabilities and its ratification by South Africa (United Nations, 2006). Thus the context for 
disabled people in South Africa is one of a strong human rights support base and a great deal 
of enabling policy and legislation.  
 
Despite these gains, South Africa is experiencing numerous  problems with the 
implementation of ambitious policy. This is reflected in current concerns of government with 
enhancing service delivery in an attempt to close the gap between policy and 
implementation.  Poverty and unemployment remain a reality for a large section of the South 
African population, most of whom are black (Southall, 2007). In many areas of the Eastern 
Cape families are dependent on remittances from the urban areas and the monthly social 
grants that the State provide for pensioners and disabled people (Nattrass, 2007).  The 
provision of quality education for all South African children remains an elusive goal, despite 
massive expenditure to this end (Kanjee, 2007). Issues of poverty and poor quality education 
in regular schooling provide the background within which the education of intellectually 
disabled people must be located. In this context, inclusive education continues to be 
contested as a means for educating children with intellectual disability (Engelbrecht, 2006). 
The specific context of Buffalo City will be discussed in chapter 5.  
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Methodology Used in this Study 
In this study a discourse analytic methodology was sought that would delineate a range of 
discourses deployed in the study area of Buffalo City. Such a method, in a post-structuralist 
frame, should not depend on pre-defining the object of intellectual disability but rather 
should allow for multiple ways of constructing it as an object of knowledge to emerge 
through participant engagement. An additional methodological requirement was that it 
should enable the participation of intellectually disabled people themselves, taking into 
account the disability studies framework of this study and the imperative to engage disabled 
people themselves in research (Goodley, 2004; Scior, 2003; Walmsley, 2001, 2004). This 
study makes use of Q-methodology for this purpose, adapting the method in line with a 
discourse analytic school of the method (W. Stainton Rogers, 1998). 
 
Q-methodology was originally developed by William Stephenson, a researcher in the 
psychological laboratories of Spearman and Burt in the United Kingdom in the 1920s and 
1930s (S.R. Brown, 1997).  These researchers made use of factor analytic techniques (in 
what Stephenson termed R-methodology) that allowed for the identification of groupings of 
highly inter-correlated tests or variables (termed factors) that were then theorised as 
underlying latent psychological variables, such as intelligence. Subsequent individuals could 
then be tested with respect to this variable and ranked relative to statistical norms (S.R. 
Brown, 1980).  
 
Stephenson made two innovations to this method in his development of Q-methodology. 
Firstly, the data gathered differs from R-methodology in that it consists of evaluations, such 
as “agree with” or “disagree with”, by the participants of items with which he or she is 
presented. This requires an active decision-making process by the participant as he or she 
constructs meaning through interaction with the research instrument (Watts, 2002). 
Secondly, the data is analysed as a whole pattern as opposed to seeking individual 
differences (Kitzinger, 1999). In keeping with the notion of discourse as constructing a field 
of possibility it is anticipated that the range of patterns that are constructed by individuals 
will cluster together in a finite range of diversity. In this study it is argued that these 
clustered patterns can be viewed as accounts or as discourses.   
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In this study, two Q-sets were developed, namely a) Q-set A, a set of statements concerning 
representation of intellectually disabled people and b) Q-set B, a set of statements 
concerning educational practices for intellectually disabled people. Participants were then 
asked to sort these statements along the dimension of relative dis/agreement, ensuring that 
every statement is allocated a slot on the scale (-3 to +3 in Q-set A and -6 to +6 in Q-set B). 
The data for analysis consisted of a sorting pattern for each individual, termed a Q-sort, and 
the participants’ explanatory comments.   Three sets of participants, a) intellectually disabled 
adults, b) parents of intellectually disabled people and c) professionals working with 
intellectually disabled people completed Q-sorts for Q-set A. The definition of an 
intellectually disabled person for the purpose of participant selection was simply a person 
who has been an ongoing recipient of services addressed toward intellectual disability. Four 
Q-studies were conducted with the data. Q-set B was completed by parents and professionals 
only and analysed as a whole, forming Q-study B.  
 
Through the application of the statistical analysis of Q-methodology, factor analytic patterns 
were derived. Factor solutions for each Q-study were adopted on the basis of a) providing 
clear factors (with an eigenvalue greater than one) and b) allowing the greatest number of 
participants to load onto any one of the factors (see chapter 5). Eighteen accounts (termed as 
such because of their relative variability and instability, see chapter 5) and four discourses of 
representation of intellectual disability were identified using Q-set A. Six discourses of 
educational practice resulted from participant interaction with Q-set B. These were then 
interpreted and related to each other and analysed in the light of the theoretical framework 
and the literature. This analysis supports the arguments made below. 
 
Contributions of this Study and Central Arguments 
An analysis of discourses deployed in the Buffalo City district reveals a distinction between 
a) a medico-psychological gaze and b) disability expertise. The former is the gaze that makes 
intellectual disability visible and reveals its the hidden truth about intellectual disability 
through diagnostic techniques. Armed with this superior form of knowledge, the medico-
psychological authority is empowered to prescribe the appropriate educational, 
psychological or medical intervention. The gaze is exercised by doctors, psychologists and, 
to some extent, therapists, and fixes impairment by means of diagnostic mastery. Disability 
expertise, on the other hand, is exercised by teachers with knowledge of special education, 
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who practice under the authority of the medico-psychological gaze. This expertise 
incorporates an understanding of disabled people in terms of their habits, their needs and 
their overall nature as well as the necessary love and compassion. I argue that disability 
expertise is deployed within educational settings in such a manner that renders education of 
disabled people outside of the expected area of competence of the regular school and 
teacher. Thus inclusive education intent can be undermined by a dependence on disability 
expertise that holds impairment as a static property of the individual. The notion that 
expertise can only be exercised under the sanction of the medico-psychological gaze 
excludes the regular classroom teacher from legitimate, effective engagement with 
intellectually disabled learners.  
 
The operation of human rights discourses is noted in this study as serving a range of 
educational practice from full inclusion to separate care and protection. I argue that a 
struggle for human rights for intellectually disabled people should not be an uncritical one. 
The construction of the individual as rational, autonomous and an active agent implied 
within a discourse of human rights poses certain problems for intellectually disabled people. 
The notion of competence as situational and shared and the development of an ethics of care 
are proposed in this study as productive avenues for supporting rights based struggles. 
 
The saturation of many of the representational discourses with Christian ethics is reflected in 
the exercise of pastoral power in educational practice. Practices of differentiation, exclusion 
and expertise are deployed in the best interests of the child. These practices depend upon a 
thorough knowledge of the individual by the professional. The disabled person is then called 
upon to own this identity. In this way, the disability professional exercises a pastoral power 
in caring for and knowing their flock of disabled learners. In the current study, this 
professional form of pastoral power is bolstered by Christian ethics that are adopted by 
parents, professionals and intellectually disabled people themselves. A potentially positive 
form of identity is found in parents’ view of their intellectually disabled children as a 
blessing, as this is one of the few accounts that acknowledges the potential contribution of 
the intellectually disabled person to the caring relationship.  
 
Ultimately this study has examined practices of power — the power to define intellectual 
disability and its government. However, as Hook (2007) reminds us Foucault saw power as 
diffuse and located at multiple points and this allows then for resistance at multiple points. 
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What then are the possibilities for resistance to the power effects of a fixed reified view of 
disability?  
 
I propose that there is a need for more research and a better understanding not only of 
subjectification (whereby individuals are made subjects) but also subjectivisation (the work 
that individuals do on themselves to make themselves governable). This would entail the 
engagement of intellectually disabled people themselves in exploring their own subjectivity. 
However, in the context of poverty, abuse and discrimination against disabled people, such a 
research agenda should be complemented by work that seeks to improve the material 
conditions of disabled people.  
 
In terms of educational practice, fluidity, uncertainty and the notion of competence as both 
situational and distributed between participants are promising avenues to explore within the 
burgeoning field of disability studies in education (Gabel & Peters, 2004; Goodley, 2007; 
Ware, 2001). This line of inquiry should be based on an understanding of impairment within 
discursive context, rather than as a biologically static entity. Finally I argue for a watchful 
eye to be cast on inclusive education policy in South Africa lest it be found to reduplicate the 
very practices of exclusion and special education that it was set up to address in the first 
place.  
 
I conclude my dissertation by arguing for what I term a theory of (poss)ability as opposed to 
(in/dis)ability. Such a theory would abandon a concept of impairment as a fixed static entity 
and adopt a stance of fluidity, uncertainty, hope and potential. It would  construct 
educational practice as dealing with intellectual disability as an element of diversity that 
requires certain forms of support. The contexts of support become the focus rather than the 
static individual impairment of the learner. In an understanding of (poss)ability the potential 
of the individual is linked to the ways in which competence can be shared and distributed in 
caring relationships. It requires an ethics of care that supports the development of 
interdependence and belonging in the community.  
Chapter Outlines 
Chapter 2 explicates the theoretical framework adopted in this study. A background is 
provided to an understanding of disability within a social model of disability.  The binary of 
disability/impairment is scrutinised from a post-structuralist feminist understanding of the 
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similarly constructed sex/gender binary. A review of Foucault’s understanding of power, 
with particular reference to the relationship between the individualising power of the 
disciplines to the description of populations in the deployment of bio-power, underpins a 
discussion of the practice of the medico-psychological gaze and expertise. Pastoral power is 
unpacked as an apparatus of governmentality that is particularly relevant to the government 
of disability. Given the centrality of discourse to a Foucauldian understanding of power and 
knowledge, the understanding of discourse adopted within this study is clearly set out. In 
cognisance of critiques of post-structural theorising as unhelpful to emancipatory projects, a 
discussion of the possibilities for resistance and human rights is presented. This chapter 
concludes with a consideration of the application of theoretical insights on representation 
and subjectivity derived from feminist disability studies.  
 
In chapter 3, key moments that have informed current understandings of intellectual 
disability are identified. These moments are not presented in a chronological progression 
toward an ever more enlightened understanding of intellectual disability. Instead it is argued 
that they constitute points where fundamental shifts in understanding took place and that 
have traces in the present in a taken-for-granted knowledge of intellectual disability. The 
events that are considered are the confinement of the insane, the development of the 
philanthropic institution, the practice of eugenics, and the implementation of service delivery 
models based on the normalisation principle. The origins of these moments are largely 
located in Western contexts and their development in the South African context, with its 
particular racial colouration, is traced.  
 
In chapter 4 significant practices in the education of intellectually disabled people are 
identified. Practices of exclusion, differentiation, special education and professionalisation in 
educational provision are examined. The South African context is considered as a highly 
racialised arena for the ordering of individuals for the education system. Practices of 
advocacy that adopt a human rights view are also identified in mainstreaming and inclusive 
education practices. This chapter  contains a discussion of South African inclusive education 
policy that promotes inclusion of disabled learners in regular schools and a changing 
function for special schools.  
 
The methodology of this study is set out in chapter 5, starting with a discussion of the 
connection between the theoretical framework of this study as the rationale for the choice of 
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Q-methodology. The Discourse Analytic (DA) school of Q is distinguished from the 
Scientific Study of Subjectivity (SSS) school and the DA variant is adopted in the current 
study. The method for this research project is described in detail including the research 
questions, the development of the research instrument, the selection of participants, the 
conducting of interviews, the statistical analysis and the analysis and interpretation of the 
data. This is followed by a description of the ethical procedures followed, noting especially 
considerations for a vulnerable group, that is, intellectually disabled adults. This chapter is 
concluded with a brief description of the study area.  
 
The results of these studies are presented in response to the first two research questions in 
chapter 6 (representation) and chapter 7 (educational practice). The findings show that there 
are a multiplicity of discourses of representation in which the understanding of competence, 
organic impairment and difference are variously patterned. The relative significance of 
social inclusion, spirituality, autonomy and the family are also noted. Ultimately four major 
discourses of intellectual disability were identified and these were named as: 
A4.1: Interactive discourse 
A4.2: Social model/ human rights discourse 
A4.3: Medical model/religious discourse 
A4.4: Community/religious discourse 
Six discourses of educational practice were identified for Q-study B and these were named: 
B1: Inclusion is a human right.  
B2: Special needs require special provision.  
B3: Inclusive education is a dream of the future.  
B4: No expense should be spared in providing the highest level of special education. 
B5: Effective education must be tailored to the child’s needs. 
B6: Special education keeps children safe. 
 
The third research question concerns the effects of the discourses and requires a closer 
examination of the discursive context in which these specific discourses of representation 
and educational practice occur, as well as an examination of the relationship between them.  
This task is undertaken in chapter 8 where representational discourse is related to the 
theoretical framework and thematic categories identified in chapters 3 and 6. Similarly 
educational discourse is reviewed with respect to educational practices highlighted in chapter 
4 and the thematic categories used in presentation of the findings in chapter 7. The key areas 
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that are identified concern the operation of power exercised in professional practice and the 
imbrication of religious discourse within representation of pastoral power. The deployment 
of human rights to different educational ends is also noted and the figuring of family and 
community in these discourses is highlighted. The construction of impairment and the 
intellectually disabled subject is explored in the final section of this chapter.  
 
In chapter 9 I conclude my dissertation by reviewing some of the methodological insights 
gained in the course of this research project. Future research directions are identified 
regarding the ways in which an individual works on him- or herself to become an 
intellectually disabled subject and the possibilities for resistance that can be exploited in this 
process. It is noted that education policy might not always have its intended effects and 
critical examination of policy might assist in teasing out these effects. Finally, in arguing for 
a theory of (poss)ability, I make a plea for ensuring that the difficult material conditions and 
everyday life circumstances of intellectually disabled people should not be neglected within 
discourse-based research. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: POST-
STRUCTURALIST CRITICAL DISABILITY STUDIES 
What varieties of men and women now prevail in this society and in this period? And 
what varieties are coming to prevail? In what ways are they selected and formed, 
liberated and repressed, made sensitive and blunted? What kinds of 'human nature' are 
revealed in the conduct and character we observe in this society in this period? And 
what is the meaning for 'human nature' of each and every feature of the society we are 
examining? (Wright Mills, 1959/2000, p. 7) 
 
The education of intellectually disabled people has, for the most part, been constructed as a 
problem requiring the development of a distinct discipline of Special Education in 
contemporary education systems. Within this discipline intellectual disability is viewed as an 
individual, organically based condition that requires a specialised response in terms of 
curriculum, location of education and professional expertise. Drawing on a medical model of 
disability, intellectual disability is understood as a naturally occurring phenomenon that can 
be best explained through the application of positivist scientific method. The progressive 
accumulation of knowledge about the true nature of intellectual disability can then inform 
the specialised approaches that constitute professional special educational knowledge 
(Thomas & Loxley, 2001).  
 
In this thesis, I adopt an alternative approach to the education of intellectually disabled 
people. I do not examine the truth claims made within medical and special educational 
disciplines as to what the causes of intellectual disability are, what the means of diagnosis 
are, and what treatments are most effective. My focus is not on intellectual disability as an 
object of medical knowledge but rather on how it emerges as a discursive object and imposes 
a certain identity and truth on those who are so classified. Following Wright Mills in the 
opening quotation, I ask what variety of human beings are being formed within the practice 
of education, as it constructs intellectual disability in the particular form and shape that it is 
understood in contemporary discourses.   
 
In order to carry out such an investigation, I adopt a framework aligned with the academic 
discipline of disability studies, arising from the resistance of disabled people to being 
defined and excluded by rigid applications of a medical model of disability. However, the 
notion of disability studies as a single coherent field must be dispelled from the outset as the 
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label covers a range of approaches (Shakespeare, 2006). I adopt a critical disability studies  
approach (Tremain, 2006) that draws on post-structuralist theorising. In so doing I base my 
analysis on an examination of the nexus of power and knowledge that constructs the 
intellectually disabled subject within educational practice.  
 
In explicating my theoretical framework within this chapter, my starting point is a brief 
overview of the social model of disability, which has informed the disability rights 
movement and has had a significant impact on the academic field of disability studies. I shall 
then offer a critique of this model with particular emphasis on its application to intellectual 
disability. This will entail highlighting some of the problems that a simplistic binary model 
of impairment (as biological) and disability (as social) poses and will lead into an argument 
for collapsing this binary within a discursive understanding of disability. I shall then explore 
the post-structuralist conceptions of power and government of the population as they relate 
to the intellectually disabled subject. In recognition of the centrality of discourse in a post-
structuralist theoretical framework, I shall offer a clarification of the understanding of 
discourse adopted in this study. In the subsequent section, I consider the criticism of this turn 
to discourse as eroding possibilities for resistance. At this point, I offer a critical discussion 
of disability activism and human rights from a post-structural perspective. Noting that 
feminism and critical disability studies have many common concerns I shall conclude this 
theoretical chapter by examining useful connections between the two disciplines.  
The Social Model of Disability 
The social model of disability has its roots in a rejection by disabled people of their 
segregation into institutions, and a call for their full participation in society by the Union of 
the Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS) (1974/5).  The model was an attempt 
to move away from an understanding based in biological determinism that justified the 
restriction of participation of disabled people in the community on the grounds of their 
perceived physical deficit.  It was argued that this resulted in inhumane and abusive practices 
such as institutionalisation and “systematically shunting disabled people into apartheid-like 
facilities” (Finkelstein, 2005, p. 1).  With the growth of technology, many of the physical 
problems associated with impairment could be overcome. The need for segregated facilities 
was therefore reduced, but was nonetheless continued as a form of oppression of disabled 
people as a minority group.  Institutions were viewed as a source of oppressive practices that 
were replicated in society as a whole: 
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Physically impaired people will never be fully accepted in ordinary society while 
segregated institutions continue to exist, if only because their [segregated institutions] 
unnecessary survival today reinforces out of date attitudes and prejudices. (UPIAS, 
1974/5, ¶ 13) 
 
UPIAS also firmly rejected the biomedical tradition of dealing with disability on the grounds 
that it granted power over the lives of disabled people to medical professionals: 
But the imposition of medical authority, and of a medical definition of our problems of 
living in society, have to be resisted strongly … Our Union rejects entirely any idea of 
medical or other experts having the right to tell us how we should live, or withholding 
information from us, taking decisions behind our backs. (UPIAS, 1974/5,  ¶ 14) 
 
An activist stance was adopted where disabled people strongly asserted their leading role in 
liberation from their oppressive exclusion and insisted that professionals were only relevant 
insofar as “they build on and encourage the self-help and activity of disabled people 
themselves.” (UPIAS, 1974/5, ¶16). The major grievances of this group were the segregation 
of disabled people, the medicalisation of disability and the deployment of charitable 
discourses around disability. They sought to refigure disability as a public, rather than a 
purely personal, issue and laid the foundations for what came to be known as the social 
model of disability.  
 
The social model of disability makes a firm distinction between impairment and disability. 
The Disabled People’s International definition is cited by Oliver (1996): 
IMPAIRMENT: is the functional limitation within the individual caused by physical, 
mental or sensory impairment. 
DISABILITY:  is the loss or limitation of opportunities to take part in the normal life 
of the community on an equal level with others due to physical and social barriers. (p. 
31) 
 
The distinction is made between the limitations that people with physical impairments face 
arising from the physical impairment itself, as against barriers generated by an uncaring and 
oppressive society. The logical response within this understanding is collective political 
action of disabled people. There is a rejection of medicalisation of disability since it is not a 
disease but rather a social condition, the treatment of which the medical profession has 
arrogated to themselves (Oliver, 1990). In this configuration, the disabled person is 
transformed from an object of charity — who must be both deserving and grateful — to an 
active agent with rights that impose obligations on the wider society. In its drive to be 
inclusive, the social model incorporated all impairment types, including intellectual 
disability (Chappell, Goodley, & Lawthorn, 2001). 
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This “big idea” (Hasler, 1993, cited in Shakespeare & Watson, 2002, p. 3) of the disability 
movement  then opened the way for collective action  to address societal barriers to 
participation. The recognition of the common experience of disabling environments 
validated and connected the experiences of disabled people: 
The social model of disability has given us [disabled people] the language to describe 
our experiences of discrimination and prejudice and has been as liberating for disabled 
people as feminism has been for women. (Morris, 2001, p. 4) 
 
As has been noted by even its strongest proponents, the social model of disability was never 
intended to be an all-embracing social theory but rather a political intervention that provided 
a basis for collective action (Shakespeare, 2006). In this respect “The disability movement 
was following a well-established path of de-naturalising forms of social oppression, 
demonstrating that what was thought throughout history to be natural was actually a product 
of specific social relations and ways of thinking” (Shakespeare, 2006, p. 30). The academic 
partner of disability activism, disability studies, reflects to a large degree the strongly activist 
force of the social model. However, the conception of disability and the form that activism 
or resistance should take varies considerably. I shall discuss some of the differences below.  
Disability Studies 
The field of disability studies, while a relatively new one, has developed considerably since 
its early formulation based on the social model of disability. Meekosha (2004) distinguishes 
between two major strands of disability studies, the one arising from the United Kingdom 
(UK) and the other from the United States of America (USA) and notes that these variants 
are grounded in the different intellectual/political milieus of these countries. She traces a 
development of disability studies similar to that of feminist scholarship: 
Women’s studies also demonstrate culturally-determined stands — where the British 
involvement has focused more on issues of equality in political and material 
participation (Phillips, 1993, 1995). US scholars have been more concerned with issues 
of psychology, identity, personal affirmation and moral development. (p. 722) 
 
According to Meekosha (2004), the origins of disability studies in the USA were concerned 
largely with processes of the creation of ‘deviance’ and its critique was focused on these 
processes. There is a strong tradition of disability studies in the humanities, embracing 
literary studies, history, philosophy and cultural studies. The UK strand, on the other hand, 
reflects the “close relation between sociology, social policy and the politics of the welfare 
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state in Britain” (p. 729). It was developed more in the context of social services within a 
radical critique of a social welfare state and a broader liberation struggle based on a class 
analysis of oppression. The USA form of resistance can be viewed more as an expressive 
form that focuses on identity and every day power relations, whereas the UK activism is 
more instrumental with its emphasis in the broader economic and political spheres 
(Stammers, 1999).  
 
However, it is the British variant of the social model that has been drawn upon in South 
Africa as a framework for social change for disabled people. This is specifically spelt out in 
the Integrated National Disability Strategy, which sets the tone for all disability related 
policy: 
The social model is based on the belief that the circumstances of people with 
disabilities and the discrimination they face are socially created phenomena and have 
little to do with the impairments of disabled people. The disability rights movement 
believes, therefore, that the 'cure' to the 'problem' of disability lies in restructuring 
society … The social model therefore emphasises two things: the shortcomings of 
society in respect of disability, and the abilities and capabilities of people with 
disabilities themselves. (Office of the Deputy President, 1997, p.11) 
 
In the South African academic context disability studies is still in its infancy. However, the 
British variant is evidenced more strongly, within the only disability studies programme in 
the country at the University of Cape Town. This programme describes disability studies as: 
an independent academic field within health and social sciences. Disability studies 
aims to build a new body of knowledge that sees disability as social oppression where 
otherness, discrimination, systematic exclusion and oppression are the appropriate foci 
of critical analysis. (Lorenzo, Toni, & Priestley, 2006) 
 
At the same time, there is recognition that a uniquely South African and African 
understanding of disability needs to be developed. Lorenzo et al (2006) stress the importance 
of research directed at understanding the particular forms of disability oppression evident in 
the South African context. Given the dominance of the British variant in the South African 
context of political action and the discipline of disability studies, I shall expand on the 
British model below.  
 
Oliver (1996) expands on the disability/impairment distinction in his defence of the social 
model. He rejects a causal link between disability and impairment since disability is wholly 
socially created, while impairment is purely biological. This allows him to distinguish 
 32 
between those aspects of the disabled person’s experience that are amenable to medical and 
therapeutic attention (impairment) and those aspects that call for a political response 
(disability). The physical reality of the impairment is viewed as an essentially unimportant 
biological attribute of the individual that is stigmatised through negative labelling practices 
and the tyranny of the norm that underpins “the assumption that disabled people want to 
achieve this normality” (p. 34). He posits the need for “the development of a politics of 
difference” (p. 35) that resists normalising tendencies in pursuit of a positive identity. This 
identity is constructed not on a common experience of impairment but rather on the shared 
oppression that causes the disablement of people with impairments in society. In order to 
move towards this politics, disabled people themselves must seek a common identity based 
on disability, rather than impairment. This identity can be achieved through greater control 
of services and by research that is directed toward disability.  Personal experiences arising 
from different impairments are minimised in “a pragmatic attempt to identify and address 
issues that can be changed through collective action rather than medical or professional 
treatment” (p. 39).  
 
Within the British variant of the social model expressed by Oliver (1996), a strongly 
historical materialist conceptualisation is adopted. He rejects post-modernist thinking on the 
grounds that it locates oppression in “society’s hatred of us [disabled people]” (p. 41). He 
maintains that post-modernism does not therefore challenge the status quo and argues that 
“our [disabled people’s] oppression is ultimately due to our continued exclusion from the 
processes of production and not because of society’s hatred” (p. 41).  
 
Abberley (1997) similarly adopts a materialist analysis but argues that impairment, and not 
only disability, is a social phenomenon in some respects. In his discussion of the concept of 
oppression with respect to disability, he bases his argument on three premises: 
1. Disabled people are an inferior group in society. 
2. The disadvantages they suffer are related to ideologies that perpetuate this situation, 
rather than natural ways of the world. 
3. Somebody is benefiting from this state of affairs. 
For disabled people the biological difference leads to justificatory oppressive theories and 
the naturalisation of impairment blocks the development of a political consciousness. In 
contrast to Oliver’s view of impairment as purely biological, Abberley views it as social in 
its origin, caused within relations of production and consumption and by economic 
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inequality. However, he maintains a firm distinction between biological “reality” and social 
processes, since his explanations are:  
directed at the explication of the social origin of what are material and biological 
phenomena and should be understood not as dissolving these material elements into 
attitudes or ideas but rather as pointing to the inextricable and essential social elements 
in what constitutes a material base for ideological phenomena. (Abberley, 1997, p. 
170) 
 
Thus impairment itself is viewed as a purely physical, organic deficit within a theory of 
oppression that makes the “claim that historically specific categories of ‘disabled people’ 
were constituted as a product of the development of capitalism and its concern with the 
compulsion to work” (p. 175).  The physical reality of impairment enables the construction 
of social categories of disabled people.  Resistance to this oppressive categorisation entails 
the participation of disabled people themselves as researchers or in setting the research 
agenda (Shakespeare, 2006). This is strongly evidenced in the South African disability 
studies programme, which has as an explicit aim the development of a cadre of disabled 
researchers who will be able to further the disability agenda (Lorenzo et al., 2006). 
 
The application of the social model as a tool for activism and a basis for disability studies 
has been unsatisfactory for people with intellectual disabilities (Chappell, 1997; Chappell, et 
al., 2001; Goodley, 2001; McClimens, 2002).  In part, this lack of success is due to the 
incomplete application of the social model to intellectual disability. Chappell (1997) notes 
that “learning disability” (the British term for what is termed intellectual disability in the 
South African context) is neglected within the social model. She argues that it needs to be 
considered both in the pursuit of inclusivity of the model and for theoretical coherence. 
Within the disability studies movement intellectual disability is viewed as a late and tenuous 
addition. In this sense intellectual disability is marginalised from a social model account that 
emphasises a collective experience of disability and a united front in facing the oppression of 
a disabling society. Goodley (2004) notes that this is more evident in the UK version of 
disability studies than in the USA where “mental retardation” (the common American term 
in use) was conceived of as a social construction in the early days of disability studies.  
 
In the light of these reservations, I shall adopt a disabilities studies perspective that critiques 
the social model while retaining an emancipatory intention. In so doing, I begin to take up 
the challenge posed by Goodley (2001): 
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The aim now is to move from the social model of disability to mutually inclusive 
social theories of disability and impairment that are open and inclusive to people who 
have been labeled as having ‘learning difficulties’. (p. 225) 
 
A critical disability studies adopts a discursive view of disability as constructed through 
social relations. It is an interdisciplinary pursuit that is concerned with issues such as 
identity, education, representation and sexuality (Ware, 2001). It departs from earlier 
versions of disability studies in a reworking of the binary between impairment and disability 
as articulated in the social model of disability, and frames impairment itself as part of the 
discursive space (Tremain, 2006). However, the emancipatory project that informs the social 
model is retained: 
Disability theorists ought, however, to assess the value and merit of these theoretical 
contributions (arising from the social model) in terms of the extent to which, and even 
whether, they can improve the circumstances of disabled people’s lives. After all, 
disability studies is married (for better or for worse) to the movement for the 
emancipation of disabled people.(Hughes, 2005, p.79) 
 
This implies that an adequate theory of disability should include a recognition of the 
continued oppression of disabled people and acknowledge the need for political action to 
address inhumane material conditions. It is essential therefore that the participation and 
views of disabled people are an integral part of theorising and researching disability as part 
of this political agenda (Reid & Knight, 2006). It is for this reason that the views of 
intellectually disabled people were sought in the current study (see chapter 5).  
 
 I adopt a post-structuralist framework within critical disability studies as it has been noted 
as a rich though underutilised approach (Goodley & Rapley, 2006; Hughes, 2005; Tremain, 
2005). The areas of focus are a) the impairment/disability binary, b) the operation of power, 
c) governing the population, d) the nature of discourse, e) the possibilities for resistance, and 
f) feminist disability studies. Each of these aspects is discussed below.  
 
The Impairment/Disability Binary 
Hughes and Paterson (1997) find the binary distinction between impairment and disability 
within the social model untenable and note that its effect is to concede “the body to medicine 
and understand impairment in terms of medical discourse” (p. 326). In this sense there is “a 
powerful convergence between biomedicine and the social model of disability with respect 
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to the body. Both treat it as a pre-social, inert, physical object, as discrete, palpable and 
separate from the self” (p. 329).  
 
This tendency is reflected in the disability studies literature on intellectual disability where 
there is a tacit acceptance that intellectual impairment is naturalised (Rapley, 2004). 
However, what remains underexplored is the specific nature of impairment in intellectual 
disability. Is this impairment located in the mind or in the brain? Does it have biological 
correlates and how could these correlates be identified and measured? I shall explore some 
of these issues further in chapter 3. For the moment, suffice it to say that rather than trouble 
with marking the divide between the impairment and the disability, there has been a 
tendency to focus on the impairment rather than the disability in understanding intellectual 
disability. Goodley (2001) notes a reluctance to accept the fundamentally social nature of 
intellectual disability within the social model and a persistent view of intellectual disability 
as a naturalised impairment. Impairment is constructed as “a stable and oppositional 
category to ‘normalcy’” (Goodley & Roets, 2008, p. 244). As long as the impairment 
remains untheorised, it remains personal and the political dimension of intellectual disability 
is driven underground.  
 
Hughes and Paterson (1997) argue for a social understanding of impairment that will 
collapse the disability/impairment dualism in much the same way that feminist scholarship 
has sought to undo the sex/gender binary. I shall make use of insights from post-structuralist 
feminist theory, regarding the sex/gender distinction to begin theorising intellectual 
impairment.  
 
Perhaps the most fundamental convergence between feminism and disability studies has 
been the recognition that bodies are constructed in certain ways with ensuing power 
relations. The distinction made between sex and gender in the feminist movement and 
between disability and impairment in the disability movement both attempt to distinguish 
between physical bodies and social arrangements. Where disability rights activists 
distinguished between impairment as a physical deficit and disability as social barrier, the 
early feminists made the distinction between sex as a natural category and gender as 
culturally specific and socially constructed. The sex/gender binary was recognised as 
problematic in the early phases of the feminist movement but was found to be too useful a 
tool in tackling biological determinist accounts of sex differences to be easily abandoned 
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(Tremain, 2006). However, this expediency came at the cost of conceding physical sex to the 
domains of medical and biological explanations.  
 
A post-structuralist analysis of sex and gender gained currency by referring to an analysis of 
the relationship between sex and sexuality in Foucault’s History of Sexuality: Vol.1. 
(1976/1998). Here the argument is made that physical, naturalised and anatomical sex should 
not be seen as prior to or causal of configurations of sexuality. Rather it is sexuality that 
groups together these anatomical elements into a configuration that we then come to 
recognise as sex: 
the notion of “sex” made it possible to group together, in an artificial unity, anatomical 
elements, biological functions, conducts, sensations, and pleasures, and it enabled one 
to make use of this fictitious unity as a causal principle, an omnipresent meaning, a 
secret to be discovered everywhere.” (Foucault, 1976/1998, p. 154) 
 
 Foucault further argues that it is not sex that is the precursor to the operation of sexuality, 
but rather it is sexuality which inscribes sex on bodies, generating a power that is productive 
of possible ways of being and doing and that forbids others. 
 
Within such an understanding of sexuality, Tremain (2006), drawing on Butler, concludes 
that sex differences cannot be seen as anatomical but rather they are a function of discursive 
practices that depict sex as a gendered category: 
For what counts as ‘sex’ is formed through a series of contestations over the criteria 
used to distinguish between two natural sexes which are alleged to be mutually 
exclusive. (Tremain, 2006) 
 
This has important implications for the issue of impairment in disability studies. The 
parallels are obvious. A politically useful distinction between natural impairment and 
socially constructed disability is formulated in an attempt to move away from the biological 
determinism of impairment. In so doing the terrain of impairment is conceded to a 
biomedical discourse. Impairment is figured as prior to disability as a naturally occurring 
entity. The effect of this deployment of bio-power (see discussion of power below) is to 
construct impairment as a pre-discursive, natural entity, which serves to “legitimise the 
disciplinary regime that generated it in the first place” (Tremain, 2006, p. 43). 
 
In similar fashion to the collapsing of the sex/gender distinction, the challenge for post-
structuralist critiques of disability studies is to recognise impairment and disability as one 
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and the same thing. Tremain (2006) argues therefore that impairment should no longer be 
portrayed as a biological entity: 
Instead, those allegedly ‘real’ impairments must now be identified as the 
incorporated constructs of disciplinary knowledge/power that they are. As effects of 
an historically specific political discourse — bio-power -— impairments are 
materialized as unitary and universal attributes of subjects through the iteration and 
reiteration of rather culturally specific regulatory norms and ideals about human 
function and structure, competency, intelligence and ability. (p. 42) 
 
Hughes and Paterson (1997) draw on Butler in their understanding of impairment as: 
a product of discursive practices; like sex it is an effect, rather than an origin, a 
performance rather than an essence. The re-iterative power of discourse perfects the 
performance so that the body not only becomes the materialisation of its diagnostic 
label but also its own set of constraints and regulations. In this post-structuralist 
view, impairment is no longer a biological fact, but a discursive product. (p. 333) 
  
This identification of disability with impairment differs greatly from a biomedical, positivist 
view of disability. While the positivist view is that both impairment and disability are 
biological, the post-structuralist perspective sees them both as discursively constructed. In 
this light the distinction between disability and impairment is collapsed to enable “a view of 
the world which does not separate impairment and disability as binary oppositions but 
throws both into the dynamic world of discourse and practice” (Goodley & Rapley, 2006, p. 
139) 
 
Thus the understanding of impairment in this thesis reflects a discursively constructed entity. 
This is not to say that I object to, deny or minimise biological data that enhances an 
understanding of intellectual disability. Wilson (1999) makes an argument for feminist 
theory to engage more closely with biological data in order to enrich the understanding of 
the body. She critiques the current tendency of feminist analysis to seal off the biological as 
“reductive materiality stripped of the animating effects of culture and sociality” (Wilson, 
2004, p. 3) and argues for establishing a continuity, rather than an opposition, between the 
biological and the cultural. This continuity, she describes as a conversation or 
communication between what is internal and what is external to the body. Thus a hysterical 
conversion of psychic conflict into bodily symptoms, such as pain or paralysis, provides an 
example of social and emotional experience manifesting upon the physical, biological body. 
What are the mechanisms that enable this conversion to occur? In terms of disability studies 
such a line of questioning would require a reformulation not only of the ways in which 
impairment creates disability but also allows for a conception of a counter-communication 
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where disability creates impairment. Should such mechanisms be clearly identified, the static 
nature of impairment as the inert biological given becomes transformed into a more fluid 
understanding of impairment. This offers an intriguing avenue of exploration for disability 
studies, which has been particularly virulent in its rejection of biological explanations that 
are considered the domain of biomedical models, but it will not be specifically followed in 
this thesis.  
The Operation of Power 
An additional difficulty of the social model lies in a rigid application of an historical 
materialist analysis as noted above and a rejection of post-modernist theorising as 
descriptive rather than explanatory (Abberley, 1997; Oliver, 1996). While the value of a 
Marxist analysis is recognised in explaining the operation of exclusion and oppression, it 
restricts the understanding of power. As Hughes (2005) notes: 
The Marxist tradition that has dominated disability studies in the United Kingdom 
promotes a view of power that construes it as unitary, centralized and primarily 
coercive. (p. 81) 
 
Tremain (2006) notes that the post-structuralist theorising of Michel Foucault has been 
underutilised in disability studies relative to its use within feminism, gay and lesbian studies, 
post-colonialism and other what she terms “oppositional discourses” (p. 32). She attributes 
this to the conception of power as juridical underlying the social model as a basis for 
disability studies, especially in the British variant. Juridical power is described by Foucault 
(1976/1998) as deductive and “essentially a right of seizure: of things, time, bodies, and 
ultimately life itself” (p. 136). Such power is the possession of individuals through 
inalienable right, and functions through “prohibition, censorship and denial” (p. 10). 
However, in his analysis of sexuality, Foucault argues that the uses of juridical power are 
limited and have been displaced by new forms of power that do not repress, prohibit and 
deduce action, but rather act to incite, order and produce forms of conduct. This is “a power 
bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated 
to impeding them or making them submit” (Foucault, 1976/1998, p. 136). In the discussion 
below, I shall draw on the work of Michel Foucault, specifically in terms of disciplinary 
power, bio-power and the construction of the intellectually disabled subject.  
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Disciplinary Power 
In his work Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1975/1995) explores the transition of 
punishment from a spectacle of torture acting upon the body to a more hidden part of a larger 
penal process.  He rejects a view of this process as an enlightened progression from 
excessive power, displayed in the application of brute force on the body of the criminal, to 
more humane forms of punishment. Rather he traces the development of a more effective 
and comprehensive exercise of power through the progressive development of knowledge 
about the individual in the form of disciplinary power.  
 
Foucault (1975/1995) traces the move away from punishment, as revenge of the sovereign in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, toward a new form of punishment that 
does not serve to punish the offence alone but also to “supervise the individual, to neutralize 
his dangerous state of mind, to alter his criminal tendencies, and to continue even when this 
change has been achieved” (p. 18). The nature of the crime came under scrutiny: “It is no 
longer simply ‘Who committed it?’, but: ‘How can we assign the causal processes that 
produced it? Where did it originate in the author himself? Instinct, unconscious, 
environment, heredity?’” (Foucault, 1975/1995, p. 19). These questions required an 
investigation of the individual outside of the juridical process. What are their intentions and 
habits, so that “experts might come to know and predict the behaviours of deviant subjects” 
(Hook, 2007, p. 12). In so doing the object of punishment moved from the body to the soul 
of the criminal, constituting a form of power exercised over a much wider range of 
humankind than the criminal: 
It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the 
contrary it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the 
body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished and in a more 
general way on those one supervises, trains and corrects. (Foucault, 1975/1995, p. 29) 
 
Ultimately Foucault argues that all the human sciences have their roots in the structuring of 
punishment as a concern with improvement of individuals. As such they are part of the 
mechanisms of disciplinary power.  
 
Foucault (1975/1995) traces the operation of disciplinary power through the production of 
“docile bodies” wherein bodies are distributed according to their value in the system of 
production and controlled through the careful arrangement of activity, time and the 
combined application of bodies in a unitary force. Within the classroom pupils can be 
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ordered and become known along a multitude of dimensions: “Thus, the classroom would 
form a single great table with many different entries, under the scrupulously ‘classificatory 
eye’ of the master” (Foucault, 1975/1995, p. 147) 
 
Within such a structure each individual must be assigned his or her own place, in terms of a 
certain rank within the order. This “art of distributions” (Foucault, 1975/1995, p. 141) can 
result in physical divisions (such as those of asylums or, in the case of intellectual disability, 
special schools and institutions) or the enclosure of the individual in conceptual spaces such 
as the category of “severely mentally handicapped”. At the same time pupils are subject to a 
rigid training system that controls both time and activity, the purpose of which is to make the 
individual knowable and useful in production. It is within this system that intellectual 
disability becomes set apart as a problem to be solved (see chapter 4).  
 
The means of correct training constitutes a further play of power in the creation of docile 
bodies. The instruments of correct training, namely, hierarchical observation, normalising 
judgement and the examination are all evident in the operation of mass education. Through 
hierarchical observation, as manifested in the architecture as well as in the disciplinary 
arrangements of the school, all pupils are made visible.  For example, classrooms located 
along a passageway make for easy visibility. The pupil then becomes subject to surveillance 
by a supervisory system under the direction of the teacher who may delegate supervision to 
other pupils where necessary (Foucault, 1975/1995). Surveillance is not only a physical but 
also a psychic exercise that requires “maximal and penetrating knowledge about the subject” 
(Hook, 2007, p. 30).  Hence, detailed assessments and recordkeeping also serve purposes of 
surveillance.  
 
The normalising judgement is the form of punishment favoured within disciplinary power. It 
has as its purpose the comparison of the individual to the norm and allows individuals to be 
differentiated in terms of their relation to the average. Since this judgement measures in 
quantitative terms, it designates a value to the person’s abilities or nature. It specifies the 
conformity that needs to be achieved as well as “traces the limit that will define difference in 
relation to all other differences, the external frontier of the abnormal” (Foucault, 1975/1995, 
p. 183). In so doing it is not only the individual who is placed within a hierarchy but also a 
comparative structure is established as a backdrop to the individual ranking. In this way the 
individual is both a subject of their own placement within the ranking and an object of 
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knowledge for further differentiation and normalisation that delineates the boundaries of the 
norm and the beginnings of deviance. Thus the practices that were developed in disciplinary 
contexts are preserved and are not confined to the control and rehabilitation of difficult 
individuals: 
The real goal of rehabilitative and punitive endeavours is thus not the complete 
elimination of deviances and regressions, but rather the tactical use, the strategic 
deployment of such problems as a means of justification for ever greater schedules of 
control and surveillance. (Hook, 2007, p. 39) 
 
The diagnosis of intellectual disability is in itself based upon a normalising judgement. The 
following widely used definition of intellectual disability, from the International Statistical 
Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems Disabilities Tenth Revision (ICD-
10) developed by the World Health Organization (WHO), illustrates this point: 
A condition of arrested or incomplete development of the mind, which is especially 
characterized by impairment of skills manifested during the developmental period, 
skills which contribute to the overall level of intelligence, i.e. cognitive, language, 
motor, and social abilities. Retardation can occur with or without any other mental or 
physical condition. (WHO, 2007) 
 
In such a way the intellectually disabled person is compared to the norms of intellectual, 
language, motor and social abilities, differentiated from the average, found to be lacking in 
value and ultimately cast beyond the norm into the realm of the abnormal. This process does 
not only impact on the intellectually disabled but serves to illustrate for all the centrality of 
the norm, since: “The Normal is established as the principle of coercion in teaching with the 
introduction of standardised teaching” (Foucault, 1975/1995, p. 184). 
 
The examination is a technique that combines the strategies of hierarchical observation and 
normalising judgement.  It is usually highly ritualised and invested with the trappings of 
power (Hook, 2007). The examination is a measure of potentiality – the subject’s future 
capability. It translates the single act into a stable trait and a particular way of being. Rembis 
(2008) explores the application of the examination in records of intelligence testing in an 
early  twentieth century American setting. He concludes that, in this context, it was the 
examination ritual with the IQ test as instrument that constructed intellectual impairment as a 
means to deal with young women who were deemed for whatever reason to be sexually 
threatening.  
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The examination can be likened to the “assessment”, which is described as follows in the 
ICD- 10: 
Degrees of mental retardation are conventionally estimated by standardized 
intelligence tests. These can be supplemented by scales assessing social adaptation in a 
given environment. These measures provide an approximate indication of the degree of 
mental retardation. The diagnosis will also depend on the overall assessment of 
intellectual functioning by a skilled diagnostician. (WHO, 2007)  
 
 
Rose (1998a) describes the process of differentiating between individuals as a progressive 
project of disciplining difference. The capacities, skills and potentialities of individuals are 
examined and described in detail in an effort to sort humans into the type of regime they 
would best be suited for and where they would contribute most and disrupt least the 
processes of production. In terms of intellectual disability, intelligence tests and 
developmental scales served both to test individuals relative to the norm and construct the 
norm through testing. These tests enabled a much finer distinction of classes of intellectually 
disabled children and allowed for the prescription of educational practices. This will be 
discussed more fully in chapter 4.  
 
While the process described by the WHO has all the trappings of a scientific and objective 
gathering of information about the individual, Foucault’s description of the examination 
casts it in an entirely different light, which has not been fully explored with respect to 
intellectual disability. This is where power and knowledge are manifest as one: 
People write the history of experiments on those born blind, on wolf-children or under 
hypnosis. But who will write the more general, more fluid, but also more determinant 
history of the ‘examination’ – its rituals, its play of questions and answers, its systems 
for marking and classification? For in this slender technique are to be found a whole 
domain of knowledge, a whole type of power. (Foucault, 1975/1995, p. 185) 
 
The operation of disciplinary power forms part of a mechanics of power that operates at the 
level of individual bodies. However, with the development of new forms of state government 
that took population as its target, it comes to be aligned with the knowledge of populations in 
a configuration of bio-power.  
Bio-power 
In the final chapter of The History of Sexuality: Vol. 1. Foucault (1976/1998) crystallises a 
bipolar concept of bio-power in which the one pole focuses on the body as individual 
anatomy, “an anatamo-politics of the human body” (p. 139),  and the other pole operates at 
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the level of the body as species with its biological patterns of morbidity, reproduction and 
other mechanisms of life. In so doing he forges a link between the techniques of power 
operational on the body to the exercise of power at a broader social level — a linking of the 
micro and macro levels of power. Power over the anatomical body is exercised through 
disciplinary technologies that configure the body as a productive machine. Power over the 
body as species is exercised through the description and regulation of the population through 
the development of sciences such as demography and economics. The population is 
described in terms of numbers to be used in political and administrative debates and 
decisions (Rose, 1990).  
 
The operation of bio-power is more dependent on the norm than on the exercise of juridical 
law: 
It is no longer a matter of bringing death into play in the field of sovereignty, but of 
distributing the living in the domain of value and utility. Such a power has to qualify, 
measure, appraise, and hierarchize, rather than display itself in its murderous splendor. 
(Foucault, 1976/1998, p. 144) 
 
This new form of power over the biological species emerged and embedded itself within 
disciplinary power in the second half of the eighteenth century. It differs from disciplinary 
power in that it deals with the population “as political problem, as a problem that is at once 
scientific and political, as a biological problem and as power’s problem” (Foucault, 2003, p. 
245). Through the use of statistics, forecasts, predictions and estimates, it targets the 
unpredictable and establishes an equilibrium based on averages that regulate these random 
events, bringing them under control of government. These forms of power can be 
distinguished from each other as different series of concepts: 
1. Disciplinary power — body — organism  — discipline — institutions (organo-
discipline). 
2. Bio-power — population — biological processes — regulatory mechanisms — State  
(bio-regulation) (Foucault, 2003, p. 250). 
Medicine can be understood in relation to these forms of power as having an application to 
both the anatomical body of the patient and the regulation of the population through controls 
over diet, sexuality, hygiene and a whole range of behaviours. The element that circulates 
between these two is the norm. The norm can be applied at the level of an individual body as 
a disciplinary technology and at the level of the species as a mechanism of regulating the 
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population. A normalising society covers both the biological and the organic since the norms 
that exist at different levels of power operation intersect with each other.  
 
In the case of intellectual disability, at the level of the anatomical body, procedures of 
assessment, diagnosis and rehabilitation are instituted (see chapter 3). The limited success in 
making the intellectually disabled person conform to the norm constitutes intellectual 
disability as a problem to be solved through the application of therapeutic technologies in the 
form of specialised training or rehabilitation (see chapter 4). At the level of the biological 
species, the distribution around the norm is effected through the normal distribution curve 
used in the application of intelligence testing, a normalising process that informs the 
decisions of the authorities.  
The norms that are established within bio-power have come to be understood as the essence 
of humanity and therefore as the right of the individual: 
The “right” to life, to one’s body, to health, to happiness, to the satisfaction of one’s 
needs … this  “right” … was the political response to all these new procedures of 
power which did not derive, either, from the traditional right of sovereignty. (Foucault, 
1976/1998, p. 145) 
 
Bio-power complements the exercise of power over the individual body within the 
administration of the state in a developing practice of governmentality that constructs 
subjects in such a way as to make them governable. 
 
Governing the Population  
The conception of governmentality is central to Foucault’s theorising of power as the means 
by which the individual is made governable as a useful and productive member of the state. 
By the term governmentality he refers to: 
The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses, and reflections, the 
calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex 
form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge 
political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security. 
(Foucault, 2002, pp. 219-220). 
 
The population is figured not as a group of individuals but rather as an entity in and of itself 
with its own specific birth, death and fertility rates, and a range of other variables, that are to 
be understood through the science of statistics  (Foucault, 1976/1998, discussed further in 
chapter 3). With this conception of population, the economy assumes reality as the specific 
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deployment of resources for the well-being of the population as a whole. The economy is 
that “specific sector of reality” (Foucault, 2002, p. 219) that concerns the relationships 
between populations and the material world. Political economy then is the science and 
technique of intervention of government within this domain of truth.  
 
Apparatuses of security are the technical means of governmentality as they form the link 
between power exercised at the individual level and that exercised by the State or 
governments. In this respect governmentality represents an extension of Foucault’s efforts to 
link the micro-physics of power operating on individual subjects to a macro-physical level of 
the government of nations, states and populations (Hook, 2007). Fundamental to the concept 
of governmentality is the science of police, a term Foucault used to delineate practices that 
order and administer a population in such a way as to maximise the development of a sound 
political economy (Dean, 1994).  
 
In order to govern there must be a knowledge of what it is to be governed. This knowledge  
is not merely a knowledge of existing objects, it is rather:  
a positive knowledge of the domain to be governed, a way of rendering it into thought, 
so that it can be analysed, evaluated, its ills diagnosed and remedies prescribed. Such 
representation has two significant aspects: the articulation of languages to describe the 
objects of government and the invention of devices to inscribe it. (Rose, 1998a, p. 70) 
 
In this sense the logic of governmentality creates the very objects that it seeks to govern 
through their elaborate description with reference to the norm. Thus, governmentality refers 
to a complex deployment of power and knowledge such that it establishes a taken -for -
granted truth as the rational basis for government of the population. To this end the science 
of police is complemented by the operation of pastoral power (see discussion below) that 
renders the individual knowable, linking the technology of government of populations to the 
government of the self.  
 
The operation of governmentality does not merely describe an external reality but rather it 
creates objects that are amenable to government. As Tremain (2005) puts it, with respect to 
disability, “the category of impairment emerged and, in many respects, persists in order to 
legitimize the governmental practices that generated it in the first place” (p. 11).  In the 
present discussion, the construction of the intellectually disabled subject as a product of and 
a problem for education will be explored in greater detail below. The central role of the 
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medical and psychological disciplines in delineating the object of intellectual disability and 
associated practices is foregrounded in this discussion. I shall identify three aspects that are 
evident in the government of populations that are essential to the understanding of the 
construction of the intellectually disabled subject  of medical and educational intervention as 
a problem for the education system. These are a) the medical gaze, b) pastoral power, and c) 
the development of expertise. 
The Medical Gaze 
In one of his earliest works, The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault (1963/2003) traces the 
development of the practice of clinical medicine. In the early eighteenth century, disease 
could be viewed as a botanical entity – something to be classified, observed and known in its 
natural state as far as possible. Its effects would then be known and predictable, bearing in 
mind that the body in which it became manifest might obscure some of these effects. From 
the late eighteenth century a series of shifts occurred in which the body became 
commensurate with disease; disease was inserted within the individual body. The health of 
the body came to be seen as relative to a norm (rather than as the overall vitality of the 
organism) and was viewed through the normal/pathological prism. The power to make the 
determination of normality was invested in the authorised professional who was controlled 
by various regulatory structures. The doctor, through observation of the patient, was seen as 
able to penetrate the body's secrets just by looking, and to diagnose and to speak wisely 
about its treatment.  This constituted the medical gaze that assumed the status of knowledge 
of truth about the health of the individual.  
 
However, Foucault argues that this gaze, far from revealing what is already there, actually 
serves to construct the human body in certain ways and to regulate its actions through the 
concern with the norm and the desirable state of health that individuals should achieve. Rose 
(1998b) notes the development of lines of visibility, that “arranged bodies, spaces, gazes, 
inscriptions within a certain regime of light that sickness — and with it health — became 
relocated in a thoroughly empirical domain of observable events and mathematical 
regularities”(p. 61). It has been the task of clinical medicine to make the invisible visible 
through a variety of means, beginning with the bedside observation and including the 
detection of signs, such as pulse and temperature. The differences between individuals 
became regulated under the authoritative medical gaze of the physician. As long as the 
difference could be made visible it “makes the person stable through constructing a 
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perceptual system, a way of rendering the mobile and confusing manifold of the sensible into 
a cognizable field” (Rose, 1998a, p. 106).   
 
Intellectual disability posed its own particular difficulties in this respect as only the most 
severe forms could be detected in an uncomplicated manner  in the body. However, with the 
advent of the need to classify and differentiate the feeble-minded from the norm and those 
more severely affected, a norm referenced mathematical solution was found in the 
intelligence test (see chapters 3 and 4). This tool expanded the authority of Psychology and 
granted to psychologists the authority to pronounce on the truth of intellectual disability 
(Rose, 1985). 
Pastoral Power 
In the operation of governmentality, individual apparatuses of power are exercised. I have 
noted above that the operation of police serves to administer bio-power in such a way as to 
maximise the state’s controls over its citizens, through regulation of the relationships 
between individuals within a political economy.   This apparatus is complemented by a more 
individualised operation of pastoral power. Foucault (1979) traces this form of power to the 
Judaeo-Christian conception of the shepherd/pastor caring for his flock as an intermediary of 
a greater power or knowledge, typically God. Thus there is an unquestionable authority that 
comes to characterise his leadership.  
 
The pastor gathers and guides the flock, assuring their health, safety and protection through a 
constant benevolent supervision. To fulfil this responsibility, the pastor needs to know “of 
the needs and deeds, the sins and wishes, the contents of the soul, of each member of the 
flock” (Hook, 2007, p. 238). The members of the flock, in return for this protection, must 
exhibit obedience, self-renunciation and personal submission. They must acquire the habits 
of confession to the pastoral representative as well as thorough self-examination, the 
outcome of which is a developed form of conscience in its subjects (Hook, 2007).  
 
While this technique has its origins in the Christian tradition, it now serves as a tool for the 
creation of individuals within the modern state. In this changed strategy, pastoral power has 
as its object, not eternal salvation, but rather a good quality of life, health and security. In the 
shift toward a secular form of pastoral power, the officials who exercised this form of power 
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multiplied to include those in the disciplines of Medicine, Welfare, and Psychology and even 
extended to within the family structure (Foucault, 1982).  
 
At the same time, the objectives of pastoral power have changed to facilitate the exercise of 
bio-power by allowing for the links to be made between the totalising knowledge of the 
population and an analytical knowledge of the individual.  The new form of pastoral 
guidance underpins caring treatment, motivated by a heart-felt duty or calling. Members of 
the disciplines act through a love for their charges, judiciously dispensing their expertise in 
the best interests of these individuals who need only to respond in the correct way to 
improve on themselves and attain a better quality of life (Hook, 2007). The effect of this 
power is critical in the creation of the subject: 
This form of power applies itself to immediate every day life  which categorizes the 
individual, marks him (sic) by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, 
imposes a law of truth on him  which he must recognize and which others have to 
recognize in him. It is a form of power which makes individuals subjects.  There are 
two meanings of the word “subject”: subject to someone else by control and 
dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. (Foucault, 
1982, p.781) 
 
The double meaning of subject usefully encapsulates the dual processes of becoming a 
subject — the subject is created from without (subject to) by surveillance and discipline and 
from within (subject of) by confession and self-examination (Durrheim, 1997). The external 
process can be usefully described as subjectification where the individualising disciplinary 
knowledge locates the subject with respect to the norm and applies normalising techniques. 
The internalising process where the subject comes to understand themselves in terms of 
these notions is termed subjectivisation as a reflexive process (Hook, 2007). The interaction 
of these two processes can be detected in the application of psychological expertise in the 
assessment, diagnosis and treatment of intellectual disability. 
The Development of Expertise 
Rose (1998a) examines psychological expertise as a form  of pastoral power for the 
production of governable subjects. He distinguishes expertise from professionalisation, as 
psychological expertise extends beyond the practice of the profession of psychology. 
Whereas professionalisation refers to the ways in which the experts of a particular discipline 
mark out their territory and establish a monopoly on the services that they provide, expertise 
operates in more diffuse ways. It coalesces an assemblage of techniques and strategies that 
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are bound together more by pedagogy (in the form of text books, courses and credentials) 
than by a unifying theory. Psychological expertise has been particularly successful in 
attaching itself to forms of practice other than psychology – doctors, nurses, social workers, 
therapists and special educators draw upon this expertise freely in “reformulating their ways 
of explaining normality and pathology in psychological terms, giving their techniques a 
psychological coloration” (Rose, 1998a, p. 87).  
 
This psychological gaze renders individuals calculable through the application of technology 
as exemplified in the test. While the intelligence test comes first to mind, special education 
and its therapeutic allies have at their disposal a plethora of tests of language skills, reading 
ability, sensorimotor integration, auditory analysis and synthesis, problem solving skills and 
so forth. Rose (1998a) argues that these technologies are neither measures of an objective 
quality of the individual nor are they merely administrative controlling practices. Rather the 
technologies and organisational practice of expertise make knowledge  “a matter of 
technique, rooted in attempts to organize experience according to certain values” and in this 
manner “truth becomes effective to the extent that it is embodied in technique” (p. 89).  
 
Expertise makes individual difference a technical matter that allows distinctions to be made 
between individuals not on the basis of prejudice, but according to objective criteria of the 
inherent worth of the individual. Subjectivity becomes visible to authority and guides its 
decision-making processes. In this way authority is legitimised as a practice exercised by 
those with knowledge of the subjects who are governed. Significantly, this is not only a 
rational authority but also an ethical one that acts in the best interests of individuals. The 
exercise of authority becomes a therapeutic practice based on knowledge of the inner nature 
of the subject.  The relationship between the expert and client becomes a discipleship (Rose, 
2007).  
 
In terms of intellectual disability, the disciplines of Medicine, Special Education, 
Rehabilitation, and the Care industry as a whole circumscribe what it is to be intellectually 
disabled (see chapter 3 and 4). The relationship of the caring professions is couched in the 
“best interests of the child” within a loving relationship that carries the weight of expertise, 
in such a way as to obscure the operation of power (see chapter 8).  The extent to which the 
intellectually disabled subject recognises him- or herself as a confessing, self-examining 
subject is not clear within the current study and relates to forms of resistance. This aspect 
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remains underexplored and suggestions are made on how to advance this in future (see 
chapter 9).  
 
I have argued against an understanding of impairment as a natural organic difference that 
exists prior to and distinct from the social ramifications of disability. The above discussion 
takes this understanding further through the use of post-structuralist theorising to understand 
impairment as both the product and the effect of power, since “Power thus operates through 
the production and deployment of discursive categories whereby individuals must recognise 
themselves and through which they must be recognised by others” (Durrheim, 1997, pp. 33-
34). The operation of power is concealed from view through the notion of a natural object 
(impairment), scientific truth (disciplines of Psychology, Medicine, Special Education) and 
the need for care and protection (professional concern and love). In order to cast light on 
these processes, discourse analysis acts as “a practice that aims to unhinge and explicate the 
ideological/power relations that are established in the manner in which ‘objects’ are 
systematically represented and subjects are ‘interpellated’” (Durrheim, 1997, p. 33). It is for 
this reason that I undertake a discourse analysis of the object of intellectual disability and the 
practices of special education, as elaborated in my methodology presented in chapter 5. In 
this theoretical chapter I present below the understanding of discourse that underpins the 
method.  
The Nature of Discourse 
There are many different ways of understanding discourse and it is therefore useful to 
position my approach within this study.  Macleod (2002) delineates three features of 
discourse around which contestation occurs. These are a) the underlying regularity of 
discourse, b) the constructive effects of discourse, and c) implications in terms of meanings 
and practices. I shall discuss each of these below. 
The Underlying Regularity of Discourse 
The regularity of discourse refers to the way in which “statements in a discourse cluster 
around culturally available understandings as to what constitutes a topic” (Macleod, 2002, p. 
18). In its most general terms, discourse can be understood as an accepted way of talking 
about, understanding and delineating a specific phenomenon. However, the extent to which 
it can be viewed as coherent and stable remains an issue of contestation.  A conception of 
discourse as highly regularised poses the danger of constructing discourse as an autonomous 
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entity that is prior to the individual subject and wholly constructive of ways of acting and 
thinking (Curt, 1994). Macleod (2002) notes that the variability of discourse, within a system 
of dispersion over time and context, reflects the contested nature of discourses and their 
instability. However, regularity is to be found in that discourse consists not only of text but 
also of the rules and procedures for constructing text and a whole system of exclusions and 
inclusions (both material and textual) that limit what it is possible to say or do at any 
particular time relating to specific objects (Hook, 2001).  As such there is a finitude to 
discourse that disallows certain formulations and permits others.   
 
According to Foucault (1969/1972), the delineation of a specific discourse requires the 
dispersion of the initial apparent unities within a topic area or within a specific discipline. 
For example, intelligence testing should not be considered as a discourse bounded by the 
limits of the discipline of psychology itself but rather in the effects of discourse on relations 
of power and resistance between those who test and those who are tested. 
The Constructive Effects of Discourse 
A distinction can be made between strands of discourse work that focus on a) subjects as 
discourse users or b) as constituted in discourse (Bacchi, 2005). In the former, discourse can 
be seen as a tool that can be used by individuals to “do things in conversations (micro-
contexts) for example, criticize, blame or present themselves in particular ways” 
(Wilbraham, 2004, p. 494). In this instance, it is the individual subject who has constructive 
effects through the use of discourse as a tool.  
 
The second strand is more theory driven and looks to social processes in a macro-context 
with regard to ideology, power and subjectivity (Wilbraham, 2004). Foucault, with his 
concern with the operation of power in the construction of the subject is more closely 
aligned with the latter in seeing discourse as “practices that systematically form the objects 
of which they speak” (Foucault, 1969/1972, p. 49). Hacking (1999) elaborates on this 
process as it impacts on intellectual disability. He states that classification systems are not 
merely verbal descriptions but they have consequences reflected in the institutions, practices 
and interactions associated with those so classified. He goes on to describe how interactive 
kinds of classification are those where the object that is classified responds and reacts to the 
classification and adapts their behaviour in response. People within a classification can adopt 
or adapt ways of living so as to fit in with or defy classifications. Whatever the response, 
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there is no way out of the classification system. This has consequences for the group, the 
kind of people, that is invoked in what Hacking (1999) terms: “the looping effect of human 
kinds” (p. 34).  
Implications in Terms of Meanings and Practices 
There is a range of views on the relationship of discourse to both text and to the extra-
discursive (Macleod, 2002). These views engage with the questions: Is discourse confined to 
language or the text? Can it be distinguished from the context in which it occurs? If 
discourse is separate from the context, then, which is prior to the other – does discourse 
construct the material possibilities or is it the other way round? To what extent does 
discourse construct the subjects of which it speaks? All of these questions speak to drawing a 
line between discourse and the material world.  
 
In this study, I adopt the view of discourse as being much broader than language alone, and 
including all objects that carry social meaning or can be given “interpretive gloss” (Parker, 
1990, p. 193). However, this does not take away from the physical status of the objects that 
are included in this network of meaning. What it implies is that there is no way of knowing 
an object in the world without recourse to meaning or discourse – the perception of an object 
is always-already imbued with social meaning (Curt, 1994). Thus I do not make or contest 
truth claims about the neurological, organically based reality of intellectual disability as 
existing outside of discourse. Rather, I view claims made about intellectual disability as 
discursive events.  
 
Within the discursive event, it is not language/text alone that deserves our attention. These 
events are located within the wider network of material power relations with multiple causes 
and effects. Thus it is not a matter of distinguishing between what we say about intellectual 
disability and what the truth/reality of intellectual disability really is. The concern lies in 
understanding how biological differences, language, technologies and social practices come 
together in specific discursive formations. This results in asking different questions about 
intellectual disability than those relating to its reality as a biological entity: 
How is it [intellectual disability] defined, and by whom? What kinds of individuals 
does it pick out? Does it refer to some "natural kind"? Is it simply a category created 
for specific political purposes, grouping together individuals who are deviant and 
undesirable? How is it that mental retardation became a unified category in the first 
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place? What practices contributed to the constitution of the classification and classified 
subjects? (Carlson, 1998, p. 2)  
 
The nature of these questions raises questions of agency and the ability of the individual to 
resist classification that I discuss further below. 
Possibilities for Resistance 
It is not the place within the current discussion to offer a detailed critique of Foucault’s 
understanding of power and resistance as this is not a major focus of this study. However, I 
wish to highlight two points of contestation between post-structuralist theory and a 
materialist based social model of disability, notably a) the problem of agency (Hughes, 
2005), and b) disability activism and human rights (Oliver, 1996). I shall discuss each of 
these below. 
The Problem of Agency 
With regard to agency, Hughes (2005) argues that the conception of disciplinary power as 
continuous and productive of individuals through processes of supervision and surveillance 
makes of the disabled subject an empty shell, an object in the circulation of power and 
knowledge. S/he is over-determined by the diffuse operation of power that makes certain 
ways of acting and thinking possible and excluding others. Such a view of the subject can be 
viewed as arising from Foucault’s project of “de-individualizing, de-agenting, de-
structuring” (Hook, 2007, p. 92). The rational, autonomous, unitary self is factored out of 
processes of resistance and in its place is situated the subject, as a product of power and 
knowledge.  
 
The role of the autonomous self in resistance to disabling practices has, in itself been 
questioned. Erevelles (2002) notes that the uncritical positioning of resistance within the 
humanist mould of agency, autonomy and individual rights relegates the intellectually 
disabled person back to the margins from whence they came. By laying claim to a humanist 
subjectivity, the very reasons for exclusion (limited autonomy and agency by virtue of 
mental defect) are reinforced. The consequence of this for Epp (1999) is that a division 
within advocacy groups is created between those that are more capable of assuming 
rationality than others and excluding those who are deemed to be most defective.  
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The possibilities for resistance for intellectually disabled people appear to be greater where a 
diversity of views and discourses, which tell different stories, can be exposed. The notion of 
subjugated voices that represent the product of meticulous archaeological work and the 
careful attention to the voices of those who are disqualified from speaking represents an 
opportunity for resistance by the mere fact of bringing into knowledge that which was 
hidden by dominant discourses (Foucault, 1984). This is particularly useful in contexts 
where assumptions about the pre-discursive reality of the object of intellectual disability are 
so common as to make it a matter of little interest for social investigation (Quibell, 2005).  
 
What is important to acknowledge here is that researchers into the field of intellectual 
disability accept that an understanding of the nature of agency for intellectually disabled 
people is not at all clear and is complicated by different styles of communication (Erevelles, 
2005), restricted access to literacy (Kliewer, Biklen, & Kasa-Hendrickson, 2006), and 
assumptions about the naturalisation of impairment (Carlson, 2001).  
 
Disability Activism and Human Rights 
Intellectually disabled people are recognised as a specifically vulnerable group not least 
because of their ascribed inability to speak on their own behalf. A human rights approach is 
therefore invoked in consideration of their best interests. However, the notion of human 
rights bears some scrutiny. The aspects that will be considered are a) the universality of 
rights, b) the conceptualisation of the subject, and c) the power effects of rights.  
 
An argument for the universality of human rights appeals to a common understanding of 
what it is to be human and what a person is entitled to by the very fact of their humanity with 
no other qualification than this (Sen, 2004). This humanity is portrayed as a timeless entity 
that is based upon appeals to reason and absolute truth. As such it minimises diversity and 
draws on what are deemed to be common or universal values. However, this position is 
undermined by a cultural critique, such as the position taken by representatives of Saudi 
Arabia at the United Nations, who contested the basic tenets of human rights, as articulated 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, from an Islamic perspective (Otto, 1999). A 
Marxist critique, on the other hand, questions why political and civil rights are deemed as 
universal whereas economic and social rights are excluded from this domain and considered 
to be second order rights. Neither of these critiques questions the nature of absolute truth and 
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argues instead for the superiority of their own version of the truth (Otto, 1999). A post-
structuralist view of human rights begins, then, with a decentring of the universal subject. 
 
The conceptualisation of the subject from a humanist perspective is based on an 
understanding of the individual as possessing an essence that precedes entry into human 
relations. This essence is that of a pre-constituted, rational individual entering autonomously 
into power relations.  In contrast, post-structuralists view the subject as discursively 
constructed within relations of power and knowledge as I have discussed above. Otto (1999) 
argues that the humanist subject of universal claims is not an essence of humanity but rather 
is “always-already masculine, European, heterosexual middle class” (p. 23) and, I might add, 
physically and intellectually able. This subject then becomes the centre of rights, the norm 
relative to which excluded groups must stake their claim. The assumption of incompetence 
of the intellectually disabled allows them only weak claims relative to this norm. In the 
absence of rationality, a humanist view places the onus on those who know the best interests 
of the intellectually disabled to fight for their rights. However, this removes an essential 
component of human rights as reflecting choice and agency: 
a ‘right’, by definition, is concerned with agency, with the ability of an individual to 
make judgements and engage unimpeded in activities intimately associated with 
personal volition and an understanding of the possibilities. (Young & Quibell, 2000) 
 
The question of whether the intellectually disabled person is served by a human rights 
agenda remains an open one, which will be further discussed in chapter 8.  
 
The juridical nature of human rights can also obscure the operation of power. Otto (1999) 
notes that legal power is becoming increasingly disciplinary. Thus the granting of human 
rights can be accompanied by a plethora of disciplinary practices that institute a greater 
surveillance and pressure toward conformity. The complementary operation of legal and 
disciplinary power minimises the possibility of using the one to limit the other (Otto, 1999).  
 
Finally it should be recognised that rights can serve to bolster the legitimacy claims of those 
who have won certain struggles. As such they are used to consolidate power relations rather 
than the more traditional view of human rights as a challenge to existing power structures. 
Stammers (1999) argues that once human rights become institutionalised in the form of law 
and policy, they serve to sustain power. It is for this reason that he argues for a critical view 
of human rights that balances the usefulness of an appeal to human rights against a careful 
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scrutiny of what is being achieved through such an appeal.  In this view it is not the case that 
human rights are inimical to social struggles but rather that everything is dangerous. This is 
particularly the case when those whose rights are being fought for are deemed unable to 
advocate for themselves, as is the case with intellectually disabled people (see chapter 8).  
 
In concluding the discussion of a theoretical framework for this study I find it useful to draw 
on the feminist tendency within disability studies in order to make use of the insights that are 
offered from those considered to be marginalised or deviant from the white, male 
heterosexual, able-bodied norm. 
Representation and simultaneity of subjectivities 
The usefulness of feminist theorising for disability studies has been noted in the discussion 
on the disability/impairment binary. While there is a growing literature on feminist disability 
studies (cf. Garland-Thomson, 2005; Gerschick, 2000; Morris, 1993; Rohrer, 2005; Shildrick 
& Price, 1996) it is not within the scope of the current thesis to provide a full discussion of 
these developments. I shall focus on two specific aspects that are pertinent to the aims of this 
study, representation and the simultaneity of subjectivities. In chapter 8, I shall draw on 
feminist theorising of the ethics of care I order to understand better the data generated by this 
study.  
Representation  
Disabled people are subject to stereotyping that casts them as defective, dependent and 
vulnerable (Garland-Thomson, 2002). The popular understanding of intellectual disability is 
so stigmatised that numerous attempts have been made to change the label in order to alter 
the negative representation that goes with it (Loebenstein, 2005). The struggle against 
negative representations of intellectually disabled people as reflected in derogatory labels 
has been a focus of the self-advocacy movement in the UK and USA. Chappell et al. (2001), 
observing this trend, offer the following explanation: 
It also indicates a frustration regarding the terminology which non-disabled people use 
to describe people with learning difficulties; the lack of respect afforded to those who 
are defined by labels that others impose; and the difficulties in attempting to self-
define when one exercises little control over one’s environment.  (p. 47) 
 
The issues of representation of intellectually disabled people are therefore central and will be 
discussed further in chapters 3, 6 and 8.  
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Subjectivity 
The identity of devalued subject categories, such as women or disabled people, has been 
plagued by a tendency toward forced homogeneity within the category. While biologically 
deterministic accounts of disability and sex within a biomedical model tended to stereotype 
women and disabled people, the binary configurations of disability/impairment and 
sex/gender had the effect of emphasising disabled/female identity at the expense of others. 
This early view has been challenged by a recognition of the differences between women in 
terms of race, class, sexual practice and disability to name but a few (Garland-Thomson, 
2002). 
 
Similarly, the category of disability can be understood as a porous social category that is 
fluid and heterogeneous (Rohrer, 2005). At the one level, this accounts for the different types 
of impairment that occur and the differences that relate to severity of the disability, age of 
onset as well as socio-economic conditions, gender, and sexual orientation that are not 
disability related categories.  In terms of intellectual disability, there are indications that a 
shift toward what Rohrer (2005) terms “simultaneity of subjectivities” has not yet occurred 
for intellectually disabled people, whose every action is ascribed to the intellectual 
impairment. As Rapley (2004) puts it, “in practice the hypothetical construct ‘intellectual 
disability’ continues to be reified as a core, or essential, aspect of personhood… an 
unambiguous identity that individuals have, whether they confess it or not” (p. 196). The 
struggle for the recognition of subjectivity that is not wholly biologically determined by 
notions of organic impairment is one that is far from over for intellectually disabled people 
(see chapters 5, 8 and 9). 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have outlined a theoretical framework for examining the construction of the 
intellectually disabled person in educational practices. My theoretical framework is one of 
post-structuralist disability studies where the binary of disability/impairment is broken down 
in such a way that both are viewed as discursively constructed. I examined a post-
structuralist understanding of power with regard to intellectual disability, noting that the 
operation of disciplinary power in assessment and diagnosis links to norms of intellectual 
ability at the level of the population, in an exercise of bio-power. The government of 
disability is underpinned by the authority of the medical gaze that makes the truth of 
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intellectual disability visible and establishes a positive knowledge about its nature. The 
subjectifying effects of pastoral power for the intellectually disabled subject were noted with 
a distinction made between subjectification as an external process,  and subjectivisation as 
an internal one of working on the self. The role of discourse in the exercise of power is 
recognised as central and I argued that discourse should not be understood as merely relating 
to language, as distinct from the material world. Rather it should be seen as reflecting 
discursive formations where language, social practices and material elements are arranged in 
such a way as to make possible or constrain what it is possible to say and do in these 
contexts.  
 
The post-structuralist conception of subjectivity is often viewed as problematic for 
understanding agency and resistance. I unpacked the notion of agency, centred on the notion 
of the rational, unitary self, raising some issues with regard to intellectual disability. This 
provided a background to a critical examination of a human rights perspective, which is 
frequently adopted within disability activism.  Finally, I noted areas of interest from feminist 
disability studies that will prove to be particularly germane to an understanding of the 
discourses that are presented in chapters 6 and 7.  
 
The framework presented here provides a background for my examination of the object of 
intellectual disability as a contingent social construct in chapter 3 and an analysis of 
educational practice in chapter 4. It is consistent with the methodology that I use in 
identifying discourses of intellectual disability and concomitant educational practice (chapter 
5), frames the presentation of results (chapters 6 and 7) and is extended in the interpretation 
of results (chapter 8).  
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CHAPTER 3: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 
 
In the past we used to be called labels like mentally handicapped, mentally retarded, 
intellectually handicapped, or mentally subnormal. We didn't like these labels as they 
kept us down. We choose to use 'learning difficulties' ourselves. It is a label which 
doesn't hurt us as much as those above. Jars should be labelled not people!  (Central 
England People First Limited, 1996-2000) 
 
It could be argued that whilst the disability movement has fought the colonisers of 
disability (e.g. the medical and allied professions) for the right to define disability on 
their own terms, the fight against the colonisers of learning difficulty is of a different 
order; it is a fight against the denial of humanity itself; hence, this group insistence on 
being perceived as people first. (Gillman, Swain, & Heyman, 1997, p. 690) 
 
In chapter 2, I elaborated my theoretical framework that draws on a post-structuralist, critical 
disability studies understanding of disability. Crucial to this framework is the undoing of the 
disability/impairment binary where the former is social and the latter organic/biological. 
While biomedical discourses of intellectual disability view it as an individual property, based 
in organic deficit, the above quotes highlight the contested nature of the category of 
intellectual disability as a “human kind” (Hacking, 1999). At the same time these quotes  
emphasise both the power to make, and the resistance to break, this particular classification.  
 
In this chapter, I contend that intellectual disability has largely been located within a medical 
or special educational frame as a problem to be studied, solved and treated, grounded within 
a positivist scientific approach. In much of the current literature intellectual disability is 
portrayed as “an historically continuous, clinico-medical, thing-in-the-world that can be 
‘diagnosed’” (Rapley, 2004, p.31).  In South Africa there is an understanding, explicit or 
implicit, that intellectual disability exists out there waiting to be identified and treated: 
Establishing the real prevalence [italics added] of intellectual disability is difficult 
because factors such as the identification system used, the level of technological 
development of the community and the socio-economic level of the particular group 
should all be taken into account. (Jooste & Jooste, 2005, p. 381)  
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Within such an approach, social factors are considered as extraneous variables that obscure 
the hidden truth of intellectual disability. The recognition that the disability itself might be 
socially constructed does not find a place in this frame, despite a growing recognition of this 
in the literature (cf. Goodley, 2001; Hacking, 1999; McClimens, 2002; Rapley, 2004).  
 
This review will examine the conditions of possibility that created the problem of intellectual 
disability and the ways in which the dominant understanding of intellectual disability, “was 
hardened into an unalterable form in the long baking process of history” (Foucault, 1984, p. 
79). I shall therefore focus on what I have designated as key moments in the construction of 
the problem of intellectual disability. While many of these events have their roots in Western 
Europe or the United States, I shall trace their transfer to the South African context, as the 
similarities and differences in their implementation are instructive. In the subsequent 
chapter, I shall elaborate on how these representations are deployed within the educational 
field. These two literature review chapters are fundamental to the methodology, Q-
methodology that I shall describe in detail in chapter 5.  
Key Moments in the Construction of Intellectual Disability 
In undertaking this discussion, it is noted that the use of certain terminology from different 
historical periods is considered to be insulting to people who are currently classified as 
intellectually disabled. The rejection of these labels forms a major thrust of the self-
advocacy movement, as is noted in the opening quote of this chapter. While I respect this 
plea in the current context, I maintain the use of offensive terms in a discussion of the 
historical development of the notion of intellectual disability. This is because I reject the 
view that intellectual disability is the same objective entity existing in the world out there 
over time and it is merely the labels that have changed. What we understand as intellectual 
disability today cannot be seen as identical with idiocy, mental retardation, imbecility and 
other similarly offensive terms. The terms are used in keeping with their times in my 
discussion, not because terminology is not important but rather because it is crucially 
important. The use of the term idiot or imbecile in a certain period indicates certain ways of 
thinking and acting that I highlight as leaving their traces in the present.  
 
My focus in this chapter is on the construction of intellectual disability though broad social 
practices which constitute the (in)educable subject that presents as a problem for the 
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education system. In order to do this I have identified several key points in the way in which 
intellectual disability is configured. These are a) confinement and the asylum, b) the 
philanthropic institution, c) the problem of degeneracy and eugenics, d) the development of 
the institution in South Africa, e) normalisation, and f)  normalisation in South Africa. 
This is by no means a comprehensive discussion but is rather a focus on those events that I 
have noted from the literature that are instructive with regard to the educational practices 
that are discussed in chapter 4. My purpose is not to review long forgotten events in the past 
but rather to explore accounts of intellectual disability within social and historical context in 
order to tease out the complex configurations of social and biological understandings that 
have come to be grouped together under the contemporary classification of intellectual 
disability.  
Confinement and the Asylum 
Whereas idiocy was  recognised as a condition long before the  
 
 nineteenth century, the 
institutionalisation of those so labelled only appeared much later. In this section I shall 
examine what made this response possible and its constitutive effects for the problem of 
intellectual disability.  
In his work Madness and Civilisation, Foucault (1967/ 2006) traces the history of the 
increasing differentiation and segregation of those who were identified as unfit for the 
changing social order. In a process that he terms the Great Confinement, up to 1% of the 
French population was confined into poor houses in the late  
 
seventeenth  century. At this 
point there was no medical connotation to the confinement and these poor houses could in no 
way be associated with the function of a hospital. The confinement of this group was largely 
a response to failed exclusionary measures to keep the poor out of the cities, replacing these 
measures with confinement. The contract entered into between the state and the individual 
was one in which the state would provide for the physical requirements of the pauper who 
would offer in exchange their liberty, accepting “the physical and moral constraint of 
confinement” (Foucault, 1967/2006, p. 45). It is this contract that informs the  
institutionalisation of those who were later differentiated from a relatively undefined mass, 
through a progressively finer division of people into different kinds, such as idiots, mental 
defectives and feeble-minded.  
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In the course of the eighteenth century, the understanding of poverty moved away from 
being a moral issue of indigence toward recognition of the economic value of the pauper if 
his or her labour was put to good use. The purposes of confinement changed. Those who 
were confined for moral flaws such as family transgressions, indigence, sloth and similar 
failings, were released from confinement to provide labour and those that remained were the 
insane and the criminal: “Confinement is thus definitively reserved for certain categories of 
convicted criminals and for madmen” (Foucault, 1967/2006, p. 224). Further differentiation 
then takes place between the insane and the criminal through the drive to place the mad in 
hospitals and created the “New Division” (p. 210) where the divide was claimed to “free the 
mad from a lamentable confusion with the felonious, to separate the innocence of unreason 
from the guilt of crime” (pp. 210-211). Thus the construction of the asylum became 
necessary. Within the asylum, idiocy was an identified condition but did not have specific 
practices attached to it.  
 
According to Rose (1985), the undifferentiated nature of the asylum came under the medical 
gaze as the hospital gained ground as the site of treatment for physical illness. As patients 
were treated in the institution of the hospital, it became possible to compare and contrast 
their symptoms, diagnoses and prognoses across large numbers of people. The individual 
became an object of study and healing through consideration of their deviancy or conformity 
to these norms. Pinel, one of the earliest physicians concerned with mental illness, 
introduced these methods into the asylum. While this might be seen as the application of 
medical knowledge in the asylum, Foucault cautions that medical knowledge had little to 
contribute. Rather it was the moral authority of the doctor, symbolising the values of 
bourgeois society that was invoked through the medical presence in the asylum. The medical 
control of the asylum moved away “from a transparent and clear moral practice, gradually 
forgotten as positivism imposed its myths of scientific objectivity; a practice forgotten in its 
origins and its meaning, but always used and always present.” (Foucault, 1967/2006 , p. 
262). 
 
To the extent that the asylum relied on coercion and chains, it was ineffective in the 
treatment of madness. The mythic intervention of Pinel in casting off the chains of the insane 
reflects a certainty of authority rather than a lessening of control (Rose, 1985). Such an 
approach depended on a moral treatment of the insane that presupposed that at the core of 
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madness there remained a moral sensibility that could be drawn upon to affect a cure. This 
sensibility could be awakened through work and the application of religious principles.  
 
According to Rose (1985), Pinel proposed four categories of mental illness: dementia, 
melancholia, mania and idiocy. Idiocy was set apart as having a relatively less complex set 
of symptoms (marked by absence of intellectual faculties) with an organic basis, and as 
being incurable. While the category posed interesting legal problems, it remained marginal 
to mental medicine, which centred on a therapeutic practice that appealed to a core of reason 
or humanity that remained in the insane, but was considered to be absent in the idiot. This 
conviction made idiots impervious to treatment according to Esquirol and Pinel (Rose, 
1985).  
The Philanthropic Institution 
It was the method of moral treatment that was applied to Victor, the Wild Boy of Aveyron, a 
feral child found in France at the beginning of the   
Itard, not believing idiocy curable, … undertook this education. In devoting himself to 
this case, his object was not to improve or cure an idiot; it was “to solve the 
metaphysical problem of determining what might be the degree of intelligence and the 
nature of the ideas in a lad, who, deprived from birth of all education, should have 
lived entirely separated from the individuals of his kind”[no reference supplied for 
quote, presumably Itard]. (Seguin, 1907, ¶ 40) 
 nineteenth century, that initiated a 
change in understanding of the treatment of idiocy (Rose, 1985).  Victor’s education was 
undertaken by Itard who was at pains to distinguish between the case of a child who had 
been deprived of all normal socialisation and the case of the idiot:  
  
The work of Itard with Victor was based on awakening the child’s moral sensibilities, an 
approach that Seguin endorses as being appropriate for a child who has been deprived of 
social contact. The practice of moral treatment was, at this stage, aligned with social, rather 
than organic, causes of incompetence. However Seguin (1907) notes: 
For more than a year Itard followed this psychological programme, perfectly well 
adapted to the education of a savage. But he seems, after this time, to have suspected 
that there were other impediments besides savageness in his pupil; for, though he never 
formally acknowledged it, he framed, in about 1802, an entirely new programme, more 
fitted for an idiot than for a savage, whose foundation was physiology…  (¶ 46). 
 
The members of the French Academy attributed the progress that Itard was able to make 
with Victor to the brilliance of his moral and physiological methods and the limit of progress 
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was ascribed to the biological limitations of the child, who, it was finally agreed within the 
Academy, was in fact an idiot:  
This class of the Academy acknowledges that it was impossible for the institutor to put 
in his lessons, exercises, and experiments more intelligence, sagacity, patience, 
courage; and that if he has not obtained a greater success, it must be attributed, not to 
any lack of zeal or talent but to the imperfection of the organs of the subject upon 
which he worked. (Dacier quoted in Seguin 1907, ¶ 64) 
 
If the boy had been a savage, he would have provided Itard with an opportunity to 
demonstrate the importance and effectiveness of his philosophical method in educating even 
the most difficult cases, but idiocy was beyond this scope.  
 
Seguin, on the other hand, took the opinion of the Academy in a positive light, as a sign that 
the idiot could, in his view, be educated. Once the physiology was awakened, the higher 
functions could then begin to be taught as Seguin (1907) describes: 
The general training embraces the muscular, imitative, nervous, and reflective 
functions, susceptible of being called into play at any moment. All that pertains to 
movement, as locomotion and special motions; prehension, manipulation, and 
palpation, by dint of strength, or exquisite delicacy; imitation and communication from 
mind to mind, through languages, signs, and symbols; all that is to be treated 
thoroughly. Then, from imitation is derived drawing; from drawing, writing; from 
writing, reading; which implies the most extended use of the voice in speaking, music, 
etc.( ¶ 76) 
 
Families could not undertake this task as they did not have these special skills. This laid the 
groundwork for the establishment of institutions specifically directed toward the education 
of the mentally defective. Philanthropists and medical doctors worked together to establish 
institutions both in Europe and in the United States where the idiot could be housed and 
educated (cf. Armstrong, 2002; Goodheart, 2004; Seguin, 1907).  
 
Seguin (1907) quotes extensively from a speech by the Rev. Samuel J. May on the occasion 
of the opening of the first school for idiots in the USA in Syracuse in 1854. The Rev. May 
ponders on what the purpose of evil is in a world where God is in control and he agonises 
over the challenges posed by idiocy: 
But there was idiocy —idiocy so appalling in its appearance, so hopeless in its nature; 
what could be the use of such an evil? It were not enough to point to it as a 
consequence of the violation of some of the essential laws of generation. If that were 
all, its end would be punishment. I ventured, therefore, to declare with an emphasis 
enhanced, somewhat, perhaps, by a lurking distrust of the prediction, that the time 
would come when access would be found to the idiotic brain.  
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Two or three years afterwards I read a brief announcement that in Paris they had 
succeeded in educating idiots. I flew to her who would be most likely to sympathize in 
my joy, shouting, ‘Wife, my prophecy is fulfilled! Idiots have been educated!’ (May 
quoted in Seguin, 1907, ¶ 8,9) 
 
Indeed it is the physiological method, as the correct means of training, that “provides access 
to the idiotic brain”. The philanthropic argument is then based on the rejection that idiocy 
can be sent by God as a punishment and concludes that the hidden purposes of this affliction 
are to challenge human ingenuity and to provide an opportunity for charity. Thus Seguin 
(1907) expresses great optimism on the roles that the institution could play in the 
development of physiological methods for the treatment of idiocy, while at the same time 
enhancing anthropological knowledge of humanity. As such these institutions were 
“monuments of philanthropy” (Seguin, 1907, ¶20)  which served the dual purpose of doing 
good to individuals and furthering the study of the mind. According to Trent (1994),  Seguin 
saw the aim of education for the idiot as being to “attain a respectable mediocrity” (p. 53) 
that would allow him or her to function in the community.  Purely custodial care should be 
reserved for the lower functioning imbecile. However, the distinction between the custodial 
and educational functions of the institution was to change with increasing industrialisation 
and a social concern with the limited usefulness of idiots.  
 
Goodheart (2004) traces the changes in the purpose of the institution in a case study of one 
of the first schools for imbeciles in the United States. These early institutions were 
established mainly for the wealthy, who could afford to place their children there, and the 
problem of idiocy tied to poverty and idleness loomed large with the growing concern with 
the overall fitness and productivity of populations. This was to find its expression in the 
combined medical and social project of eugenics.  
 
The Problem of Degeneracy and Eugenics 
Eugenic thinking was made possible through certain shifts in thinking that occurred with the 
industrialisation of Europe in the mid- eighteenth century, where individuals came to be 
conceived of as members of populations. Foucault (1978) describes this development:  
Governments perceived that they were not dealing simply with subjects, or even with a 
“people” but with a “population”, with its specific phenomena and its peculiar 
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variables: birth and death rates, life expectancy, fertility, state of health, frequency of 
illnesses, patterns of diet and habitation. (p. 25) 
 
The construction of a well-ordered political machine with enlightened administration 
depended on knowledge of the population through statistics, the science of the state (Rose, 
1985). As noted in chapter 2, intellectual disability became not only a concern of individual 
bodies, requiring diagnosis and treatment, but it was also constructed as a problem of the 
biological species in the exercise of bio-power in the newly emergent rationale of 
governmentality.  
 
By the end of the  nineteenth century, social and medical science came together to formulate 
the concerns of degeneracy. The understanding that mental pathology (as manifest in anti-
social behaviour) was organic and inheritable, with the possibility of acquired characteristics 
being passed from one generation to the next, was developed through medical science. The 
social concerns with the control of populations made this a matter of public importance to be 
addressed through public policy. Moral judgements of vice, corruption and threat were 
provided with a medico-psychological rationale. This was complemented by the view that 
deviations from the norm were accentuated from one generation to the next, thereby leading 
to further degeneracy and ultimate extinction of the race. Through the application of a social 
Darwinism, it was not merely the degeneration of a lineage that was a concern but rather the 
degeneration of the species as a whole. It became a matter of public concern and regulation 
to ensure that the bloodline was improved through facilitating the breeding of those who 
were deemed socially useful and preventing further generations of moral degenerates being 
born (Rose, 1985).  
 
In terms of intellectual disability, there was a transfer of judgement of fitness of the 
individual from the ethical/religious domain to the domain of medical science. While idiots 
would now require care as unproductive members of society, this care was as much a 
protection of society from their degenerate genes and immoral behaviour as it was for their 
own protection. The institutional practices and overcrowding of the early institutions 
bolstered the belief that the condition was incurable and could not be mitigated:  
The high expectations for education of his father’s [Dr. Henry Knight – founder of the 
Connecticut School for Imbeciles] generation were not warranted. The best the asylum 
could do was to contain the mentally retarded, prevent their procreation, and train 
some to self-sufficiency within the institution. (Goodheart, 2004, p. 107) 
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Whereas the first generation of philanthropic institutions was motivated by religious 
benevolence and the desire to instil middle class, Protestant norms amongst this unfortunate 
group, the second generation was more motivated through fear of difference and its impact 
on the genetic stock of the population and strongly influenced by the new science of 
eugenics developed in the early  twentieth century (Goodheart, 2004).  
 
The urgency of the need to contain the mental defective is reflected in the following 
statement by Fernald before the American Association for the Study of the Feeble-Minded in 
June 1912. He begins by stating the biological fact of idiocy: 
The fact that feeble-mindedness is the result of pathological conditions of the brain, 
either gross lesions caused by faulty development or by the destructive results of 
disease, or perhaps numerical deficiency or imperfect evolution of the ultimate cortical 
cells, makes it obvious that the resulting mental defect is incurable and permanent. (¶ 
5) 
Fernald (1912) then expounds upon the social consequences of this pathological condition, 
noting the dire effects on the population if this menace is allowed to go unchecked:   
The social and economic burdens of uncomplicated feeble-mindedness are only too 
well known. The feeble-minded are a parasitic, predatory class, never capable of self-
support or of managing their own affairs. The great majority ultimately become public 
charges in some form. They cause unutterable sorrow at home and are a menace and 
danger to the community. Feeble-minded women are almost invariably immoral, and if 
at large usually become carriers of venereal disease or give birth to children who are as 
defective as themselves. The feeble-minded woman who marries is twice as prolific as 
the normal woman. (¶ 14) 
 
In this perspective the feeble-minded person is entirely lacking in agency or responsibility. 
The social ills that befall them are due to their biological deficit, which is incurable. They 
are portrayed as impervious to socialisation and their elimination, if not of the current 
generation, then at least of future generations, is seen as a viable course of action. The 
feeble-minded person is entirely constructed by their possible impact on those who are not 
so labeled, such that the ‘unutterable sorrow’ that they cause is of greater concern than their 
lives. Dr. Thomsen Von Colditz expresses this view below, in an expert comment on the 
acquittal of Dr. Haiselden for withholding treatment from the disabled Bollinger baby in the 
United States in1915: 
The baby has not the beauty of a plant. It would be a sorrow for the parents to look 
upon so long as the child lived and a burden. I think such a person that lives like a 
plant or an animal in the human family should not be allowed to give unhappiness by 
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living. (Dr. Haiselden And The Bollinger Baby - Does Humanity Demand The Saving 
Of Defective Babies?, 1915) 
 
While these extreme views would not find favour in current times, Erevelles (2002) notes 
that in the case of severe cognitive disability, “these death invoking discourses constitute 
disability as marking the outermost limits of human existence” (p.6).  
 
Representation of idiocy within a eugenic understanding proceeded on gendered lines. The 
feeble-minded woman was identified variously as immoral, a carrier of venereal disease, a 
bearer of defective children, prolific (Fernald, 1912), sexually vulnerable (Goodheart, 2004), 
a dangerous symbol of degenerative procreation, in need of protection, a danger to society 
(Carlson, 2001) and many other restrictive and constitutive labels. McDonagh (2000) 
describes the representation of feeble-mindedness in  nineteenth century Britain through 
examinations of literary representations of that period. The feeble-minded woman is almost 
totally identified with a threatening sexuality and excessive bodily appetites that are either 
absent or controlled in the normal woman. At the same time, she is represented as a sexual 
innocent, requiring masculine protection. The male idiot is largely represented as being 
incapable of managing money. He is represented as a debased form of masculinity that is 
sexually diminished, incapable as he is of passing on his assets and his name. By the end of 
the nineteenth century, these representations serve to validate a eugenic conception of 
degeneracy – the feeble-minded man must be prevented from becoming a criminal and the 
feeble-minded woman must be prevented from corrupting more valued lives with her 
indiscriminate sexuality. Both must be prevented from breeding.  
 
A complex picture of the social evil of the mental defective emerges, interweaving 
innocence and immorality. The concern is less for the impact that their immoral behaviour 
will have on the mental defective him or herself but rather the disruption that they are 
capable of causing in more valued lives. The problem of feeble-mindedness is no longer one 
that is located in individual bodies but is a degenerate property of society as a whole, insofar 
as idiocy is biological, heritable and cumulative over generations. The institution serves the 
role of protecting the current generation of mental defectives and preventing them from 
causing disruption. It protects future generations and society as a whole through the control 
of fertility of defective individuals. In this sense the detailed description of the individual has 
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a totalising effect that links with the mechanisms of bio-power in the government of the 
subject.  
 
A significant aspect of institutionalisation is the necessity of separating the child from the 
family. Since the heredity nature of mental defect places the cause of the defect within the 
family, there can be no chance for improvement without removal from the cause. The cause 
was not only seen as genetic but, given the overall degeneracy of such families with 
defective genes, it was also evident in their childrearing. Professional descriptions identify 
families as being incapable of caring for their child as a confirmation of the heredity nature 
of degeneracy:  
In addition to documenting egregious abuses of the retarded in Connecticut, the survey 
also identified parental ‘bad habits’ — a moral Lamarckianism — as a major cause of 
retardation… In addition to consanguinity, intemperance, licentiousness and filthiness 
were implicated. (Goodheart, 2004, p. 96) 
 
 On the other hand, there are descriptions of how parents needed to be persuaded and 
informed of the need for institutionalisation, where this was the correct treatment identified 
by the professionals:  
At the proper time the parents should be informed of the condition of the child, of the 
necessity for life long supervision and of the probable need of institution treatment. 
Sooner or later the parents will probably be willing to allow their child to be cared for 
in the institution. The parents who are not willing should be allowed the custody of 
their child, with the understanding that he [sic] shall be properly cared and provided 
for during his life, that he shall not be allowed to get into mischief and that he shall be 
prevented from parenthood. Whenever the parents or friends are unwilling or incapable 
of performing these duties, the law should provide that the child shall be forcibly 
placed in an institution, or otherwise legally supervised. (Fernald, 1912, ¶ 28) 
 
The medical profession and the law intervene in the family relation between parent and the 
feeble-minded child. Their role with respect to their mentally defective child is a different 
one to that prescribed for the ‘normal’ child. The child becomes the concern of the state 
rather than that of the family and the views of parents and families themselves are hidden 
from view, drowned out by professional voices (Read, 2004). 
Development of the Institution in South Africa 
The early approach to the problem of intellectual disability in South Africa is similar to that 
described in Europe and in America. Indigenous societies in South Africa had no equivalent 
to the asylum at the start of colonisation (Swartz, 2008). While there can be the temptation to 
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romanticise this lack of segregation, where the mad are prophets and the village idiot an 
accepted feature of daily life, Swartz (2008) warns that there are also accounts of ostracism 
and extermination of the mentally disordered/defective.  
 
According to Foster (1990), the object of idiocy did not emerge as a concern prior to 1800. 
The process of differentiation described in Europe is reflected in colonial South Africa, with 
Somerset Hospital in Cape Town serving as a catch-all institution for the insane, the 
physically ill, paupers and lepers (Swartz, 2008). Subsequent to this, there is only indirect 
mention through records in general hospitals of mental disorder/defect until 1846 when the 
first asylum was formally set up on Robben Island. At this point, there was no distinction 
made between mental handicap and mental illness, similar to the lack of differentiation 
evidenced in the early European poor houses. Foster (1990) records a litany of reports 
decrying the appalling conditions on the island stretching from 1848 to its final closure in 
1920. The recommendations of these reports identify the inhumane conditions of the asylum 
as reasons for closure but clearly this was not sufficient grounds for effective action. It was 
here at Robben Island that the early racialisation of services was evident in a report from 
1861 that noted the separation of “coloured” (a term used in the South African context to 
denote a person of mixed racial origin) from white men.  
 
In the period 1876-1895 one lunatic asylum was established in each of the future provinces 
of South Africa. In terms of this process Foster (1990) identifies 5 important characteristics: 
Institutionalisation in the form of the asylum was established as opposed to philanthropic 
institutions that offered some form of education. 
1. The asylums, as in Europe and the United States, fell under the jurisdiction of the 
medical profession “due to the fact that the Cape inherited conceptions of dealing 
with the insane directly from the British. The majority of medical superintendents of 
South African asylums had been educated in Britain.” (Foster, 1990, p. 29). 
2. Lunatics came to be seen as a certain class of patients with the need for their own 
segregated provision. Within this class, there was initially little recognition of mental 
deficiency or idiocy, which was largely classed as a form of lunacy. The lines of 
segregation within the class of lunatics focused on the distinction to be made between 
violent and non-violent patients, paying and non-paying patients, men and women 
and between racial categories. Only in the later part of the  nineteenth century did a 
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rudimentary classification of types of insanity and a distinction between the feeble-
minded and the insane begin to emerge.  
3. The control of mental disorder was racialised from the 1860s when inmates on 
Robben Island were recorded by gender and race. All the asylums have records 
indicating that segregation by race and gender was more significant than by category 
of mental disorder. While separate asylums were not usually established, strict 
segregation was maintained within the asylum. White patients received better food, 
treatment and accommodation, while black patients experienced harsher conditions 
and were often expected to provide labour for the maintenance of the white inmates 
(Swartz, 2008). 
4. Legislation concerning mental disorder proceeded at the same time as the process of 
institutionalisation. They could be seen as part of the same process.  
 
The rise of the institution in the colonial setting of South Africa bears some similarities to 
the situation in Britain and America, occurring some 40 year later and with less 
comprehensiveness (Foster, 1990). The institutions would also seem to differ to the degree 
that the early European institutions had a partly philanthropic and scientific agenda in the 
early, elitist years. An exception to this would be schools such as the Institute for Imbecile 
Children, established in 1894 in Grahamstown, which was the first of its kind in Africa and 
reserved only for white children (Swartz, 2008).  
 
By 1916, the mentally defective were defined as follows in the Mental Disorders Act no 38 
of 1916 as belonging in one of three categories: 
1. An idiot was regarded as ‘so deeply defective in mind from birth, or from an early 
age, as to be unable to guard himself [sic] against common physical danger’. 
2. An imbecile was regarded as capable of guarding against common dangers, but not 
capable of ‘managing himself or his affairs, or if a child of being taught to do so’. 
3. A feeble-minded person was defined as incapable of competing on equal terms with 
his normal fellows or of managing himself and his affairs with ordinary prudence’. 
Such a person required ‘care, supervision and control for his own protection and that 
of others.’ (Foster, 1990, p. 39) 
 
Whereas (white) idiots and imbeciles, according to this classification, were only catered for 
in institutions such as Alexandria and Witrand,  (white) feeble-minded children were to be 
found in special classes within the regular schooling system (Malherbe, 1932). It is this 
group of feeble-minded children that assumed a huge importance in psychological and social 
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research in the colonial setting, as they blurred the significant features of the racial divide. 
The dangers of feeble-mindedness were highlighted, as Western concerns with degeneracy 
(similar to Fernald in 1912 in the USA, cited above) filtered into the colony after about 1913 
and were used to bolster racial divides. The dangers are enumerated by Dunston, 
Commissioner of Mental Hygiene from 1916-1932, who foresaw dire consequences if 
mental deficiency was not properly dealt with, since (white) mental defectives would 
become: 
more degraded and more useless and swell the ranks of the criminal, poor white, 
inebriate and prostitute classes thus leading to enormous unnecessary expenditure, not 
only by the state, on prisons, mental hospitals, charities but also by church, public and 
private charitable organizations. (Cited in Foster, 2008, p. 97) 
 
 
The threat of having to include certain forms of behaviour that belonged to the racial “other” 
within one’s own race was overwhelming and the response was to uplift the poor white so as 
to restore the proper distance between the races. For these reasons considerable energy and 
resources were directed toward the problem of mental deficiency during the period of union 
of South Africa in 1910 to the beginning of the apartheid era in 1948. This will be discussed 
further in chapter 4. 
 
The construction of intellectual disability in the early  twentieth century reflected a 
specifically racial concern borne out of the colonial enterprise. The lines of division were set 
between levels of severity (imbecile, idiot and feeble-minded) within the white race group. 
The black group remained undifferentiated and was not identified as a problem until much 
later when educational provision was brought into consideration (see chapter 4 for further 
discussion). While the full range of the complexities of the intersection between race and 
disability in the colonial context are beyond the scope of the current discussion, it is notable 
that there is very little recognition in the literature of the ways in which apartheid and 
colonialism constructed disability differently for the colonising population and the native 
population. Foster (1990) suggests that the repressive controls placed on the movement and 
rights of the native population were considered sufficient to discipline this group. However, 
the dangerous elements of the white population (those who would blur the absolute racial 
boundaries through poverty, miscegenation and behaviour outside of the Western norms) 
required more subtle and productive forms of control. It is perhaps because of this 
disjuncture between the colonial and the  colonised that the concept of normalisation, which 
I shall discuss below, never really took root in South Africa.  
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Normalisation 
Normalisation with respect to intellectual disability must be distinguished from the way that 
the term is used in the Foucauldian sense —that is of regulation through the application of 
hierarchical judgement and measurement. Specifically applied to delivery of services for 
intellectually disabled people, normalisation is an approach that attempts to undo the work 
achieved by the normalising judgement, by making normal again that which has been 
regulated as abnormal. It has its roots in Denmark with the work of Nirje who advocated that 
the life of the retarded person should be as similar as possible to that of the normal person. 
This would involve normal rhythms to the day, normal respect and normal experiences of the 
life-cycle amongst others (Lea, 1990).  
 
The principles of normalisation were further articulated by Wolfensberger (1969) and have 
been very influential in the planning and delivery of services for intellectually disabled 
people in Britain, Europe and the United States. Wolfensberger later adopted the term 
“social role valorisation” (SRV), emphasising the thrust to integrate devalued individuals 
into society in normal jobs and education so as to enable them to engage in socially valued 
activities and to develop a positive social role and image. Normalisation or SRV continues to 
be a position of orthodoxy in the provision of residential care and employment for 
intellectually disabled people in these countries (Yates, Dyson, & Hiles, 2008).  
 
Normalisation has its basis in the understanding of stigma put forward by Goffman (1963) as 
“an attribute that is deeply discrediting” (p.3). He notes that the attribute itself is arbitrary 
and functions in different ways at different times, since stigma is a relationship between an 
attribute and a stereotype rather than an entity in itself (Goffman, 1963). The fact that this 
relationship is arbitrary implies that it can be manipulated and it is this potential that is 
exploited in the normalisation principle by ensuring that the stigmatised person associates 
with more socially valued people who are perceived as normal. As Chappell (1997) puts it: 
The normalisation principle argues that people with learning difficulties are devalued 
by society and have stigmatised identities. A vicious circle of devalued identities 
reinforced by poor quality services is created. Putting into practice the normalisation 
principle will transform the vicious circle into a virtuous circle of high quality services 
which will create high quality lifestyles and enable people with learning difficulties to 
mix with those who have socially valued identities. (Chappell, 1997, p.45) 
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This approach was closely associated with a move to de-institutionalise intellectually 
disabled people and was thus seen as a progressive movement at its inception. Such was the 
belief in its potential to liberate people with intellectual disability, and the hostility that this 
engendered amongst those who held more traditional views at the time, that it became very 
difficult to critique the principle. At the same time it offered an inspiring vision of what 
services could or should be like for intellectually disabled people (Chappell, 1997). Trent  
(1994) notes the zeal with which Wolfensberger  and his acolytes implemented assessments 
of community life in terms of the extent to which they  “succeeded in reaching 
Wolfensberger’s vision of normalization, social integration, and dignity” (p. 263).  
 
Simpson (1998) points out the links between normalisation and a redefinition of mental 
retardation in the 1960s. At this time, the American Association on Mental Deficiency 
proposed a definition of mental retardation that elevated ‘impairment in adaptive behaviour’ 
to the level of a diagnostic criterion as opposed to a secondary symptom. This gave rise to a 
new optimism about the education of intellectually disabled people in that changes in 
behaviour could not only ameliorate but also go some way to curing the condition itself. It 
also granted an extensive role to psychologists as agents of behavioural supervision.  
 
Simpson (1998) further examines the relationship of normalisation to sociological theory as 
it is predicated upon the work of Goffman with regard to total institutions and stigma. The 
anti-institutional impetus of Goffman’s work provided powerful arguments, which could be 
directed at the largely medical control of these organisations. However, the adoption of a 
largely behaviourist psychology with its positivist epistemology was at odds with the 
interactionism in sociology that adopted a more idealist bent. The connection between the 
sociological and psychological was therefore lost.  
 
The behaviourist tendency in psychology resulted in a weakening of a human rights 
perspective within normalisation. In the case of the mentally retarded, the significance given 
to social competence meant that it became a professional responsibility to modify behaviour 
in such a way that it became more normal. The intellectually disabled person was seen as not 
being competent to behave appropriately and therefore, his or her behaviour became the 
therapeutic responsibility of the professional as part of the management of the intellectually 
disabled person. As the responsibility for competence passed to the professional, it created 
the possible conditions for “‘detaching’ behaviour from the transcendent human essence of 
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the retarded individual” (Simpson, 1998, p. 6). The notion of agency, so essential to a human 
rights perspective, was therefore replaced with disciplinary powers of the psy-complex.  
 
Normalisation/SRV has been criticised  in that it establishes the devalued identity of the 
stigmatised person and reinforces existing social patterns of  stigmatisation without 
challenging the very basis for discrimination and inequality. As Chappell (1997) notes, 
normalisation: 
demonstrates an unquestioning acceptance of the concept of stigmatised identities. 
There is no recognition of stigma itself as a social construct: a mark imposed by an 
economically, socially and politically powerful group on one which is economically, 
socially and politically disempowered. (Chappell, 1997, p. 49) 
 
It is also an approach that developed in the context of service provision rather than in terms 
of identity formation and as such has the effect of casting its subjects into a perpetually 
dependent role of receiving services.   
 
When the concept of counteracting stigma is used as a basis for service provision, the 
normative force (akin to the Foucauldian sense of normalisation) of normalisation is 
apparent. It focuses on developing normal behaviour without questioning what this 
behaviour is and whose interests it might serve. The insidious nature of this discourse is that 
it is couched in terms of the best interests of the intellectually disabled person while 
fundamentally denying this person their agency through the focus on social competence. 
However, it remains a powerful influence on policy development in Britain to this day and 
can be seen to be the determinant behind a whole range of community services (Simpson, 
1998). These arrangements, many of them perceived to constitute positive changes, remain 
unexamined as to their power effects.  
 
Yates, et al. (2008) call for a Foucauldian deconstruction of normalisation that focuses on 
the relationship between the social and the individual in the vein of critical disability studies 
noted in chapter 2. They identify a paradox within normalisation where the social is seen as 
prior to and constructive of intellectual disability and yet the presence of organic impairment 
is tacitly accepted.  This preserves the notion of the individual (impairment)/social 
(disability) binary that I have noted in chapter 2 as a problematic distinction in 
understanding disabled subjectivity. This paradox precludes an exploration of how social 
processes operate in constructing subjectivity of one kind or another and obscures the 
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operation of power in the principle of normalisation to prescribe rather than describe 
behaviour.  
Normalisation in South Africa 
Foster (1990) noted that the influence of normalisation or SRV was negligible at the time of 
writing in South Africa. A review of current South African literature would indicate that this 
remains the case today, 19 years later. Literature searches on disability and intellectual 
disability in South Africa reveal a focus on inclusive education, health issues and 
employment but there is no discussion of the concerns of the intellectually disabled adult 
with respect to services and social inclusion. This situation in South Africa is in sharp 
contrast to many Western countries where intellectually disabled adults are enmeshed in 
complex systems of community care and self-advocacy (cf. Braddock, Emerson, Felce, & 
Stancliffe, 2001; Central England People First Limited, 1996-2000; Quibell, 2005), many of 
which are based on principles of normalisation. However, normalisation deserves our 
attention in the discussion of intellectually disabled people in South Africa for two reasons. 
Firstly, it is instructive to consider why this approach has not been imported in the same way 
as the eugenic and philanthropic trends and secondly, because the conception of 
normalisation informs the educational practice of mainstreaming which has been contrasted 
with inclusion.  
  
In terms of the relatively insignificant uptake of normalisation, Lea (1990) advocated for its 
use in apartheid South Africa, asserting its potential to affirm the value and worth of the 
intellectually disabled person as part of an overall human rights project that should inform 
South African policy making. However, she was pessimistic about its usefulness in South 
Africa at the time of her writing, since in line with all other policy regarding mental 
handicap, it would only be implemented for white people. She predicted that community 
integration within normalisation would be more widely adopted where there were well-
developed services, and that institutions would continue to be motivated for where there are 
large numbers that require services. She also singled out the apartheid imperative to 
segregate on lines of difference, most notably race, as a negative force for normalisation. 
The massive changes that have taken place in South Africa since 1990 have invalidated these 
predictions but it would be unwise to disregard the conceptual underpinnings that are still 
evident to this day in terms of discourses around disability. This is especially clear in certain 
conceptions of education for disabled children, which brings us to the second issue that 
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relates to normalisation, that of educational ‘mainstreaming’. This will be discussed further 
in chapter 4.  
 
Underlying Tensions 
What has become apparent in the above discussion is that there are complex interactions 
between organic/biological and social conceptions of intellectual disability. Thus an organic 
account of intellectual disability can be combined with one that sees the intellectually 
disabled person as incapable of development (such as Itard’s view) or with a more optimistic 
view that strives for improvability within the limitations imposed by organic defect (as 
espoused by Seguin). In the eugenic movement the organic defect of the individual is linked 
to the biological health of the species and becomes implicated in the exercise of bio-power 
for regulating subjects. Within normalisation approaches, the organic is ignored but has a 
tacit presence as a property of the individual that determines their perceived value in society. 
The complexity of these interactions is often glossed over in analyses that adopt simple 
binaries, such as the social model of disability as discussed in chapter 2. My aim is to 
provide a complex and nuanced account of social and biological discourses of intellectual 
disability through analysing underlying tensions between oppositions.  
 
In order to do this, I have found it useful to draw on the type of oppositional analysis 
developed by Carlson (1998) in her Foucauldian analysis of the institutional world of mental 
retardation. Such an analysis undermines the impression that there is an historical, orderly 
process in our understanding of intellectual disability: 
There is a tendency to present the history of mental retardation as a series of decisive, 
temporal and conceptual shifts. I argue that, though these seem to be discontinuous 
moments in this history, they rely upon a series of underlying tensions which are 
internal to the classification itself. (Carlson, 1998, p. 10) 
 
The importance of these dimensions is that they structure the debates that can take place and 
circumscribe what it is possible to say and do about intellectual disability. The oppositions 
that Carlson (1998) identifies are discussed below.  
Qualitative and quantitative difference: The concern here is to what extent is the 
intellectually disabled person different from others in terms of degree or in kind. Accounts 
that draw on qualitative difference  emphasise disjuncture between the ‘normal’ and the 
‘retarded’, a difference in kind whereas a quantitative account would consider intellectual 
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disability as a difference in degree of competence. Normalisation is based on a quantitative 
conception of difference whereas early notions of idiocy such as those held by Itard indicate 
a qualitative understanding of difference.  
Organic vs. non-organic: The tension that exists within this dimension is between organic 
explanations of behaviour as opposed to accounts that include environmental considerations. 
A distinction can usefully be made here between organic (at the level of the individual) and 
biological (at the level of the species). All of the approaches described above are predicated 
on an organic understanding of intellectual disability to the extent that it is viewed as a 
defect in the individual. The eugenic understanding adopts a strongly biological perspective 
relative to other approaches.  
Static and dynamic definitions:  This dimension relates to the cure or improvability of the 
intellectually disabled person. Custodial accounts draw on the static nature of intellectual 
disability to justify continued incarceration of the intellectually disabled. Educational and 
improvement projects (such as the philanthropic institution and normalisation) are more 
likely to draw on dynamic accounts to inform their practice.  
 
At this point, I would like to add two additional dimensions that will be useful in analysis. 
Dependence/independence: The amount of care and support that the intellectually disabled 
person requires is an ongoing debate. This relates to the cost to society and the family at an 
intersection of understandings of severity and attributed (in)competence. The custodial 
institution is justified by claims of continued dependence and normalisation seeks to foster 
independence through integration in the community. This dimension is relational in nature 
and touches on the ethics of care and the deployment of pastoral power as discussed in 
chapter 2.  
Competence/incompetence: The notion of intellectual disability is predicated upon 
individual competence. The extent to which the individual is judged to be (in)competent in 
social adaptation and intellectual function forms the basis for current diagnosis (American 
Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, 2008). In all of the above 
approaches incompetence is the central issue that defines intellectual disability.   
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have not presented a traditional history of intellectual disability as a series of 
ordered events and a progressive movement towards a more sophisticated and enlightened 
understanding of a phenomenon that was always there, waiting to be uncovered through the 
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application of reason. Rather I have used this exploration to understand better the traces of 
the past that are alive in the present in the subjectification of the intellectually disabled 
person.   
 
I noted the early beginnings of dividing practices in the poor house with the increasing 
differentiation of problematic individuals into the insane, the criminal and the idiot. The 
educability of the idiot becomes both a charitable and scientific concern through the 
philanthropic institution but these concerns are superseded by problems of populations and 
the species in a eugenic project. Normalisation serves as a corrective to the institutional 
impetus and institutes disciplinary, normalising regulation rather than removal from society.  
Running through these approaches are tensions between the organic/biological and the social 
that are configured differently but have in common an explicit or tacit acceptance of an 
essential organic deficit that accounts for socially observed differences. In the South African 
context, issues of colonialism and race further complicate the social practices aimed at 
addressing the problem of intellectual disability. I argue that all of these alternative 
constructions noted above are present in current discourses of intellectual disability to 
greater or lesser degrees and are reflected in educational practice for intellectually disabled 
people, which I shall discuss in chapter 4.  
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CHAPTER 4: EDUCATIONAL PRACTICES FOR 
INTELLECTUALLY DISABLED PEOPLE  
Of equal significance is the unexamined assumption about the taken-for-granted 
category of disability in educational discourse—one shaped by ideologies, history, 
medicine, and social and political assumptions whose central binary is ability-
disability. (Ware, 2001, p. 112) 
 
In Chapter 3, I reviewed key moments in the construction of intellectual disability as a 
category of disability that, as Ware (2001) notes above, is too often presented as an 
unproblematic entity in educational discourse. In this chapter, I undertake an exploration of 
educational practice as applied to the intellectually disabled person. In so doing I do not 
adjudicate on the best or most effective methods of education, nor do I attempt to provide a 
history of special education. Rather I focus on education as a particularly significant arena in 
which conceptions of intellectual disability arise that, in turn, necessitate or make possible 
certain forms of educational practice.  
 
This discussion moves from a consideration of the ways in which intellectual disability is 
addressed as a general problem (see chapter 3) to the context of education. Specifically I 
focus on the implementation of mass compulsory education and schooling in the late  
nineteenth and early  twentieth centuries. It was this development that created a new set of 
conditions within which the problem of education of intellectually disabled people had to be 
managed. According to Rose (1985), the introduction of compulsory education created a 
field for the: 
inspection and evaluation of conducts, capacities and behaviours. It created a site 
within which that evaluation could occur, a common standard of evaluation, a set of 
norms and expectations tied to the functioning of the techniques of pedagogy in the 
schools, and a group of agents whose daily activity depended upon the ability of 
individual children to display appropriate capacities and conducts. (pp.98-99)  
 
Driven by the twin imperatives of a eugenic project (with racial overtones in the South 
African setting) and the focus on economic productivity, education systems had to be 
developed that would distinguish between those who would ultimately be useful and 
productive citizens and those who posed a potential drain on productivity. This called for 
new technologies of ascertainment and pedagogy that were grouped together within the 
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discipline of special education. My review will not provide a chronological, comprehensive 
and ordered account but rather I shall highlight key points in the development of educational 
practices. I shall also leave aside for the present any discussion of the philosophical debates 
around education as my concern in this study is with practice as it relates to intellectually 
disabled people. 
 
Although certain practices arose in specific historical and social contexts they leave their 
traces on subsequent, supposedly more progressive practices, in subtle and complex ways. 
The practices that I have identified as outstanding, without claiming to be comprehensive, 
are a) practices of exclusion, b) practices of differentiation, c) practices of special education, 
d) practices of advocacy, and e) practices of professionalisation and the application of 
expertise. I shall discuss each of these below. 
Practices of Exclusion 
In discussing practices of exclusion, I make a distinction between disciplinary practices that 
are brought to bear within mass education generally and their specific application in the 
South African context. The first section sets a theoretical background for the specific 
deployment of these practices in South Africa presented in the second section.  
Disciplinary Practices of Exclusion 
Foucault scrutinises the practice of compulsory education as an instance of the operation of 
disciplinary power. The application of constant supervision made it possible to 
accommodate large numbers within a classroom in such a way that:  
A relation of surveillance is inscribed at the heart of the practice of teaching, not as an 
additional or adjacent part, but as a mechanism that is inherent to it and which 
increases its efficiency. (Foucault, 1977, p. 176)  
 
The establishment and maintenance of correct behaviour is ensured through normalising 
judgements that function in place of repressive forms of punishment. Foucault (1975/1995) 
describes the operation of this judgement as referring action to a field of comparison that not 
only describes but also prescribes the correct behaviour. In terms of our discussion, this 
could be seen as academic achievement. Within this field, individuals are differentiated from 
each other in terms of their value and their inherent nature. This value is measured in 
quantitative terms, allowing a hierarchical arrangement of worth. As noted in chapter 2, this 
ranking defines the difference between the normal and the pathological, establishing the 
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normal as the regulatory mechanism for governable subjects. Armstrong (2002) notes that 
the implementation of mass education from the late  nineteenth century in England created 
the conditions where children who did not conform to the prescribed ideal had to be dealt 
with such that: “It was against this background that an organized and structured system of 
special education designed to ‘relieve’ ordinary schools of difficult pupils as well as being 
intended to ‘meet their needs’ emerged.” (p. 451)  
 
Erevelles (2000) sees special education as a response to “unruly bodies” whose forms of 
difference render them impervious to the disciplinary practices designed to inculcate the 
values of rationality and productivity. Their disruption of the ordered functioning of the 
school necessitated their removal from the learning site into special education programmes 
with the purpose of preserving the smooth running of schooling. In terms of intellectual 
disability, a group was identified who were not responsive to surveillance and who acted as 
markers of the outer limit of the regulatory norm. The exclusion of these was achieved 
through the application of the ritual of the examination, whether this was intelligence testing, 
behavioural assessment or classroom tests. The individual truth of these tests could be used 
to provide a supposedly objective measure of innate capacity which located reasons for 
failure or non-participation in individual deficit (Erevelles,  2000). The prescribed treatment 
of this group was segregation and special forms of education or care.   
 
The need to distinguish between those that belonged in the general education classroom and 
those that would be best placed in special schools was the motivation behind the first tests of 
intelligence developed by Binet and Simon so as to effect an exact distribution of children in 
their appropriate educational placement (Binet, 1905). Initially only a crude distinction could 
be made between the normal and relatively low functioning children but the test was further 
refined in processes of differentiation discussed in the next section of this chapter.  
 
Exclusionary practice is not confined to the early days of compulsory education but 
continues as a device to increase certainty and decrease diversity. Skrtic (2005) sees schools 
as normalising social institutions that construct disability as a means for ensuring 
conformity. He argues that in the context of increasing diversity and bureaucracy within the 
education system, disability gives a medicalised, supposedly objective basis for exclusion 
and facilitates the smooth operation of the bureaucracy. Disability, as an objective, medically 
defined deficit, legitimates the failure of this bureaucracy to teach children. The inclusive 
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education movement has challenged the physical exclusion of learners categorised as 
disabled but has not fully undermined the logic of exclusion or taken into account the ways 
in which bureaucratic institutions produce disability. As such, exclusionary practices appear 
in new forms in what are supposedly inclusive settings (Slee, 2001). This will be discussed 
further below but I note it here as an indication of the complexity and persistence of 
exclusionary practices beyond physical exclusion. 
 
Application of Practices of Exclusion in South Africa 
Within the South African context, exclusion of intellectually disabled people has operated 
differently according to race, imposing layers upon layers of exclusionary pressures. To 
understand the complexity of exclusion in this context, a broader view of social exclusion is 
adopted following Sayed et al (2007). Exclusion is not merely about presence or absence in a 
particular place, but rather lack of access to socially valued processes that are designed to 
increase participation in economic, social and political life. For black South Africans the first 
layer of exclusion was from an education for participation in the political and economic life 
of the country.  
 
In the colonial setting the provision of education was of a different order for the colonisers 
and the colonised. Kliewer and Fitzgerald (2001) note the development of sub-standard 
separate systems of education in the colonies set up specifically for indoctrination of the 
children of the colonised. A separate system existed for those of the elite who could expect 
to rule. The development of Bantu Education provides a prime example of this most 
fundamental form of exclusion within education in South Africa.  
 
Education for black children in South Africa came under intense scrutiny (Molteno, 
2006)with the appointment of the Eiselen commission in 1949-1951. Soudien (2006) 
examines the racial discourses in the evidence presented to the commission. Within what he 
terms the “race supremacist discourse” (p. 45) that came to underlie the practice of Bantu 
education, he presents the following quotations taken from evidence presented to the 
commission:  
“[The native] is … dead slow, imitative (except in terms of speed and intelligence), 
superstitious and primitive ... He has a tendency to sing, ... make beer. He is short-
sighted, careless and stupid. His music is monotonous ... He has mainly bad 
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characteristics ... It will take education, at its best, 2 000 years to bring him to the level 
of whites today ...’ [Soudien’s translation] (IS Steyn, Memorandum 73) 
• ‘[Despite everything] they still remain kaffirs ... Their particular characteristic is 
laziness ... Their social heritage is ... to have as many children as possible. It is that 
which stamps him as a noteworthy individual.’ [Soudien’s translation] (JM Potgieter, 
Memorandum 78) 
• ‘[H]e has weaker intellectual ability and ... is incapable of thinking analytically.’ 
[Soudien’s translation] (OFS University College, Memorandum 85) 
• ‘His logic is negative, particularly when it comes to ideas which are European. Most 
cultivated habits are, in the native, still raw ... and uncontrolled. The analytic ability of 
intelligence of a 23-year-old is equal to that of a normal white child of about 14 years.’ 
[Soudien’s translation] (J Taljaard, Memorandum 95)”. (Soudien, 2006, p. 51) 
 
While considerably more sophisticated and humane presentations were made to the 
commission, Soudien argues that it is this white supremacist account that wins the day. 
These quotes bear a striking resemblance to the eugenic discourse of feeble-mindedness. The 
logic of exclusion from full participation in the affairs of the community is bolstered by 
recourse to the discourse of feeble-mindedness. This makes of the Bantu an object requiring 
the same care and protection accorded to the feeble-minded. By this logic a separate system 
of education is justified.  
 
The black child who was classed as mentally defective was subject to another form of 
exclusion, that is exclusion from specialised services. In the early 1960s legislation was 
passed separately for the different race groups to bring education under the control of the 
different departments of Coloured Affairs, Indian Affairs and Bantu Education.  The Bantu 
Special Education Act no 24 of 1964 specifically addressed special schooling for disabled 
children classed as Bantu and expressly excluded service provision to black children with 
mild mental handicap (Foster, 1990). Molteno ( 2006) notes a paradox in that this resulted in 
the inclusion of black children with mental handicap into the mainstream but without any 
service being provided. Thus, exclusion at one level resulted in inclusion at another. 
However, in the context of an inferior and poorly resourced education system with no 
support, this did not always result in a situation of full participation.  
 
Thus the black child was not subject to exclusion through normalising judgement but was 
rather excluded by means of curriculum and social stigma attached to disability. Foster 
(1990) attributes their exemption from normalising types of disciplinary processes, which 
were so evident for the white feeble-minded child, to the fact that there were numerous other 
mechanisms for social control of black people, such as segregation, surveillance and the 
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stripping of land rights. I would also suggest that “scientific” evidence as to the inferiority of 
the intelligence of the Bantu based on extensive intelligent testing by state psychologists, 
such as Fick (Foster, 1990) and the conclusions of the Eiselen Commission established a 
tacit understanding that inferior intellectual ability was a racial property and therefore not 
amenable to intervention. Similarly, Erevelles (2000) notes in the United States that the logic 
of disability was used to underpin political and economic inequity of African-Americans.  
 
For black children, intellectual weakness is a property of the race and therefore requires a 
separate education system. While this was not stated in a crude, racial form within Bantu 
education, Soudien (2006) points out that the use of culture as an explanation made such a 
racial view more acceptable without altering its impact. Physical and sensory disability 
remained an individual property of the person and therefore required segregation, but there 
was not an independent recognition of intellectual disability. For more severe intellectual 
disability, which necessitated extensive care and could not be seen as a racial property, there 
was a lack of allocation of resources for service provision for the majority of the South 
African population.  Minde (1975) noted at the time of his writing that there were no 
facilities for “non-White defectives” other than for “coloureds” at Westlake.  
 
The forces of exclusion operated differently for the white population (including to some 
extent the “coloured” and “Indian” racial classifications). The Vocational Education and 
Special Schools Act no 29 of 1928 recommended compulsory education for all (white) 
retarded children up to the age of 16 in special schools or classes. This education was to be 
provided for a child:  
who in the opinion of the Secretary [of different departments] is capable of deriving 
appreciable benefit from a suitable course of action, but deviates to such an extent 
from the majority of children in mind, body and behaviour that he [sic]: 
• Cannot derive sufficient benefit from the instruction normally provided in the 
ordinary course of education 
• Requires special education in order to facilitate his adaptation to the community  
• Should not attend an ordinary class in an ordinary school because such 
attendance may be harmful to himself or other pupils in the class. (Cited in 
Foster, 1990, p. 56) 
 
The operation of the normalising judgement is evident here and in fact it was especially 
strong with regard to the feeble-minded white child, given the concern with racial 
superiority. The notion of harm is redolent of eugenic discourses discussed in Chapter 3.  
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This Act distinguished between retardation due to remedial causes as the responsibility of 
the provincial education departments, and retardation due to birth defect which fell under the 
Union (nationally provided) education. The cut off point for distinguishing between the two 
was an IQ of 80. Below this point, education would be provided in special schools and 
would be based on the development of practical skills. Provision was also made for the care 
and protection of the more severely affected category of the mentally defective as the 
responsibility of the Department of the Interior (Foster, 1990). Thus two classes of white 
mentally defective children were subject to different forms of exclusion. The mildly 
handicapped were excluded from the mainstream and the severely handicapped were 
excluded from education entirely and offered care and protection in its stead. This was to 
undergo further differentiation with the advent of mental testing as will be discussed below.  
 
In inclusive education debates that focus on issues of disability, it is frequently only the 
exclusion from the mainstream of education that receives attention, with other levels of 
exclusion receiving little attention. However, Sayed et al (2007) note that these debates 
around exclusion are becoming broader, figuring disability as but one form of exclusion. 
This impetus is evident in South African inclusive education policy, which will be discussed 
below.  
Practices of Differentiation  
In examining practices of differentiation, I shall first examine their origins in the 
development of intelligence testing and then explore their application in the South African 
context. Whereas the origins of intelligence testing are to be found in Europe and the United 
States, their application in South Africa retained many essential features while introducing a 
particularly racial overtone to the practice.  
Differentiation and Intelligence Tests 
In the application of mass education in England in the early  twentieth century, the moral 
panic regarding the dangers of feeble-mindedness of the social reformers was combined with 
concerns of productivity and cost as the motivation for social action with respect to the 
feeble-minded. The fact that feeble-mindedness presented a danger to the population as a 
whole, that it required special forms of education and institutionalisation and that it 
threatened a drain on economic productivity made it a matter of some urgency to ascertain 
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the existence of this deficit at an early stage (Rose, 1985).   The task of the psycho-eugenic 
movement at this point was to forge a “link between the biological, heritable, variable basis 
of mental characteristics and the criteria of social worth” (Rose, 1990, p. 138) and to show 
how these characteristics varied across the population  in a statistically normal distribution. 
Far from being an objective, scientific tool that reveals innate qualities, Rose (1985) 
describes the intelligence test as an administrative practice in support of an educational 
technology. 
 
While the early practices of the intelligence test operated at a gross level to govern 
exclusionary practices, they soon became more refined with norms for different age levels. 
The test was taken up enthusiastically in the USA and in 1916, Lewis M. Terman published 
the first Stanford-Binet test of intelligence, which was based on the Binet-Simon, but  
standa(Smith, 1999)rdised on American children (White, 2000). 
 
Terman (1916) highlighted the usefulness of the intelligence test in streamlining educational 
practice for the grading of the feeble-minded: 
We are beginning to realize that the school must take into account, more seriously than 
it has yet done, the existence and significance of these differences in endowment. 
Instead of wasting energy in the vain attempt to hold mentally slow and defective 
children up to a level of progress which is normal to the average child, it will be wiser 
to take account of the inequalities of children in original endowment and to 
differentiate the course of study in such a way that each child will be allowed to 
progress at the rate which is normal to him, whether that rate be rapid or slow. (¶ 1) 
 
In addition, Terman (1916) saw a number of additional uses for the intelligence test. It could 
be used to identify delinquents (noting as he did “the frequent association of delinquency 
and mental deficiency” (¶ 14)) and even superior children. The intelligence test could further 
support the educational enterprise by ensuring that children were placed in the correct 
grades, and a future use for intelligence testing in determining the vocational fitness of its 
subjects was also proposed. He also extended the role of the intelligence test to a research 
agenda which would examine factors that influence mental development and address 
questions of environmental and heredity influences on intelligence. Thus the intelligence test 
came to be a central tool to the differentiation and classification of a previously amorphous 
class of individuals. It provided the tool for the normalising judgement par excellence as it 
allowed for comparison and differentiation between children and established the norm to 
which all must conform within a hierarchy of value. The scientific claims of the test 
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bolstered the notion that it measured an inherent property of the individual. Sanctions could 
also be imposed on those who did not conform in the form of a range of exclusionary 
measures.  
 
The intelligence test became an essential defining structure for what we understand to be 
normal or not (Rose, 1990). Within the ambit of one number a child can be graded and 
normalised with respect to other children. Smith (1999) likens this process of differentiation 
to a cartographic exercise:  
In effect, Western positivist science is driven to compare people to a standardized 
norm, bound by the restrictions of linear progress and unifying explanation. … In this 
cartography, persons with mental retardation and other developmental disabilities are 
described using surveying tools such as intelligence quotients and adaptive behavior 
measures, reflecting the authorization of statistics and numbers in modern Western 
culture, providing a scale for measuring its territory and serving the needs of some 
while devaluing others. (p.124) 
 
Differentiation in the South African Context 
In the South African context, the Binet-Simon, Terman and other tests were used in a flurry 
of mental testing aimed at detecting the incidence of feeble-mindedness in the early 
twentieth  century (Foster, 1990). These tests were found to be inadequate for the South 
African population and it fell to Dr. M.L. Fick, the psychologist appointed by the National 
Bureau of Educational and Social Research, to develop relevant tests (Minde, 1975a). In the 
1920s standardised tests were developed for the (white) South African population and these 
were applied extensively in the testing of 28 000 white children. The results of these tests 
informed the van Schalkwyk Commission on Mental Deficiency. A consequence of this 
survey was the greater differentiation of categories of mentally deficiency. This was further 
developed, as a result of the Van Wyk report, which informed the Mentally Retarded 
Children’s Training Act no. 63 of 1974, into the  classification system illustrated in Table 1. 
 89 
 
Table 1: Classification System Used in South Africa for Grading Mental Handicap  
IQ Range Grade Category Placement 
50-75 Mild Educable Special/adaptation classes and special schools 
35-49 Moderate Ineducable, but 
trainable 
Training centres 
20-34 Severe Ineducable or  
untrainable 
Training centres or special care, residential or day care 
centre 
0-19 Profound Untrainable  Special care, residential or day care centre 
Note: Table adapted from Grover, 1990, p. 164. 
 
This classification system makes the distinction between practices of education, training and 
care. It therefore establishes the rationale for intelligence testing as a means of discerning 
differing innate abilities to determine the correct educational placement, with its concomitant 
educational practices. In terms of Foucault’s understanding of the subject and power, the 
subject of schooling is objectified through a mode of inquiry (psychological testing) that 
operates through dividing practices that distinguish between the grades of intelligence.   
 
Davidson and Dickman (1990)  note that intelligence tests were based on problematic 
assumptions in South Africa. Firstly, there was an assumption that they contribute to 
rehabilitative processes, in which placement was the main priority. For black children few 
placement options existed thus negating even this limited approach to rehabilitation for the 
majority of the population. Secondly, the tests informing the above classification were 
standardised on white children only. However, the consequences of this form of 
classification for people with mental handicap were very real as Davidson and Dickman 
(1990) indicate: 
These problems notwithstanding, placement of people with mental handicap is 
governed by IQ scores in South Africa. People are admitted to special/adaptation 
classes (in regular schools), training centres, special care facilities or wards in 
institutions on the basis of IQ scores, sometimes obtained on a single administration of 
an intelligence test.  This is the authors’ experience. (p. 139) 
 
Foxcroft (1997) notes that the development of intelligence tests was racialised within 
apartheid South Africa such that the response to the dilemma posed above was to develop 
separate tests based on culture and language. Alternatively, tests developed for white people 
were used with norms developed for the race group to which they were applied. However, 
since there were many more tests available for white children, it was common practice to 
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use these tests normed on whites and to note that the results should be “applied with 
caution”. This caution would include qualitative assessment and the use of multiple tests. 
Since the late 1980s there has been pressure to develop a common test that could be used 
across cultures, a goal that remains elusive (Foxcroft, 2004).  
 
The consequences of this differentiation process were, as can be expected, different for 
black people. While the general trend was to ignore the class of mentally handicapped black 
children, any extension of services to this group was undertaken within this classification. 
Their poor performance on intelligence tests would then expose them to exclusionary 
placements to a greater degree.    
Practices of Special Education 
Within contexts of mass compulsory education, processes of exclusion into special 
schools/classes or care centres were predicated upon a belief that this was in the best 
interests of the child. It was in this environment that the child would be able to benefit from 
education, largely because of the small class sizes and the specialised skills and equipment 
located within this setting. Exclusion from the regular school was framed as being beneficial 
to the child. It was not merely a case of making ordinary classrooms run more smoothly but 
of providing the disabled child with the “right kind” of education.  A new kind of technology 
had to be developed for this purpose. Whereas in the case of physical or sensory disability 
this technology depended on adapting the environment through assistive devices and 
alternative communication systems, for the intellectually disabled child, the curriculum itself 
constituted the problem. Thus specialised attention was given to this aspect.  
 
It would not be in the scope of this discussion to undertake a comprehensive overview of the 
many complex debates and the plethora of research into the most effective specialised 
educational technologies applied to intellectually disabled children. I have therefore chosen 
to zone in on the views of Professor Vera Grover since she was an enormously influential 
figure in South Africa in the education of mentally handicapped children, both in the fields 
of education and psychology. According to Grover (1990),  the following principles underlie 
the education of mentally handicapped individuals: 
1. An emphasis on social adaptation taught in real life situations including routines such 
as toileting and eating in the teaching curriculum. 
2. A cognitive developmental approach based on Piagetian principles. 
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3. A detailed understanding of the child’s relative strengths and weaknesses to 
formulate realistic goals. 
4. Freedom from the formal curriculum in regular schools, based on the teachers’ sound 
theoretical knowledge.  
In addition she notes that the application of behaviour modification techniques has been 
found to be valuable.  
 
Grover (1990) describes specific curriculum needs for the different developmental stages. 
She does this through a comparison between the normally developing and the mentally 
handicapped child. Whereas in the early years the normally developing child has intrinsic 
motivation to learn, the mentally handicapped child needs to be taught this, at the same time 
as avoiding developing a fear of failure. To this end she recommends: 
The normal nursery school model is not suitable since the child is not ready to use such 
a degree of freedom meaningfully. There is greater possibility of achieving the desired 
results by introducing short periods of highly structured finely graded, intensive 
individual training into the child’s daily routine which will elicit responses which can 
be selectively reinforced and which will ensure that success is experienced more often 
than failure. (p. 174) 
 
In the middle years the normally developing child is focused on acquiring academic skills. 
However, since the mentally handicapped child is not expected to have the cognitive ability 
for this, “any attempts to imitate the curriculum and methods or goals of ordinary school are 
seen to be absurd and unproductive” (p. 175). Rather he or she should be exposed to a range 
of music, drama and art, and games can be used to develop important skills. At the heart of 
this approach is grading as “a step-by-step progression, always building on already well-
mastered components, gradually leads the child to meet new challenges, incorporate new 
learning and develop feelings of self competence” (p. 175). Communication is a skill area 
that requires particular attention. She notes that highly skilled and qualified teachers, 
supported by a multi-disciplinary team that includes therapists, are best placed to deliver this 
curriculum.  
 
In the senior years, the focus is on the transition from the training centre into the sheltered 
workshop.  Some young adults might at this stage be able to benefit from limited formal 
learning if they have reached the necessary level of cognitive development. 
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This approach requires an entirely separate placement and curriculum with a focus on skills 
acquisition. While it draws on theories of cognitive development, this is merely to 
distinguish the mentally handicapped from the normal. Teaching strategies are largely 
behaviourist in practice, depending on reinforcement, grading and stimulus response 
technology.  The message is that children with mental handicap learn in a qualitatively 
different way from normal children. They therefore require a different teaching method and 
this can only be delivered by personnel who are highly trained. These messages permeate the 
practice of special education.  
 
In the context of the developed world (upon which special education in South Africa is 
largely modelled), the overall progress of special education is described as disappointing by 
Thomas and Loxley (2001). They argue that special education was set up as a service 
industry to the mainstream and it has managed to survive and grow stronger despite its 
unimpressive achievements. They maintain that the legacy that segregated education leaves 
is one of mystification of learning breakdown where the ordinary teacher feels unqualified 
and reluctant to deal with children labelled in some way as requiring special education.   
 
The overall provision of special education in South Africa was examined by the National 
Commission on Special Needs Education and Education Support Services (Department of 
Education, 1997), a body set up to inform policy development aligned with the new 
democratic South African constitution. This report noted the strengths of special education in 
responding to the needs of children excluded from the mainstream because of physical, 
sensory and intellectual disabilities.  In some cases special schools offered an enriched 
curriculum and they also had a significant role to play in helping learners access the 
curriculum through the provision of adaptive technology. Their contribution to the 
development of sport and cultural activities was also noted within the context of dedicated 
teachers and support from sponsoring bodies.  
 
However, the criticisms of special education by the Commission include the following: 
• the negative effects of large institutions in contrast to smaller, localised units of 
learning;   
• the scaling down of the general curriculum leading to restricted career choices;  
• the over-emphasis on a medical-deficit approach in the support provided;  
• over-spending on specialist intervention;   
• lack of facilities in rural and disadvantaged areas; and   
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• the fact that these centres only provide for a very small percentage of learners 
with ‘special needs’ to the  detriment of thousands of learners who are totally 
excluded. (p. 21)  
 
In response to these criticisms of the professionalised system of special education as well as 
the adoption of a human rights discourse of disability, practices of advocacy arose. 
Practices of Advocacy 
I have termed this section ‘practices of advocacy’ since the practices discussed below draw 
strongly on a human rights discourse to advocate for disabled people, including those with 
intellectual disability. I discuss mainstreaming and inclusive education separately as they 
have different conceptions of what these rights are and how best to achieve them to the 
extent that they are often framed as opposed practices.  
Mainstreaming  
Swart & Pettipher (2005) note that mainstreaming is the educational equivalent of 
normalisation. As noted in chapter 3, normalisation is predicated upon the provision of 
normal life experiences for the intellectually disabled person. The appeal of mainstream 
education is obvious since it is the normal context in which children learn. As normalisation 
requires the acquisition of normal behaviour as a prerequisite for participation, so too does 
mainstreaming. This is an approach which recognises that the disabled person should receive 
education in the mainstream as far as possible, within the limits set by the capability of the 
disabled person to “cope” in the mainstream classroom. The school is not expected to change 
the way that it functions and support services are not set up in such a way as to follow the 
child. In a well-resourced community, the opportunity to access the mainstream is earned by 
the disabled person who completes the necessary therapeutic hurdles. This would be the 
case, for example, where a deaf child with a cochlear implant, learns to talk and then attends 
a regular school. In less well-resourced communities mainstreaming can occur where there is 
no other alternative. This is referred to as “mainstreaming by default”, ‘mainstream 
dumping’ or ‘dump and hope’ according to Swart and Pettipher (2005, p. 7).  
 
The relevance of mainstreaming to the education of intellectually disabled children is that it 
is figured as an approach where the onus is on the child to fit in as best they can.  The 
rationale for this, based on principles of normalisation, are that it will reduce stigma, it will 
increase community integration and that it is the human right of the intellectually disabled 
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person to be placed within the mainstream. However, this right is a limited one since it 
depends on the disabled child’s ability to operate within the norms of the existing system. 
Participation is consequent upon the child achieving a level of competence that will not 
disrupt the normal functioning of the classroom and school (Department of Education, 
2001). There is therefore only one response within this understanding – the application of 
identification technologies and placement in special schools/classes with the aim of making 
the child more normal until they can earn this place. Thus within a mainstreaming discourse, 
segregated education comes to be a logical response to the lack of fit between the 
intellectually disabled child and the mainstream school.  
 
Human rights within this understanding are figured as being the right to access appropriate 
services. Alston (2006)  provides us with an exposition of this view. He starts from the 
premise of the South African Constitution that all children are entitled to an education. He 
argues that this refers to equality of value and notes that in order for the intellectually 
impaired child to realise their right to dignity and freedom, they need to be provided with 
education fitting their ability and needs. For such children, who would require adaptation of 
the curriculum, he espouses a human rights view that portrays inclusive education as a 
violation of children’s and teachers’ rights. The teacher is unfairly treated by having to deal 
with large classes, diverse learning populations and inadequate support. His or her rights are 
violated within the current South African policy of inclusive education: 
Inclusive education has every possibility of making demands on the expertise and 
skills of a generalist teacher that s/he does not have to deal with children s/he may 
have in the classroom. The demands on teachers may be well beyond the level of 
training to the point where either a child or teacher or both may be at risk. This gives 
rise to the serious question as to whether a teacher could, or even should, legitimately 
refuse to take a class in such a situation. (Alston, 2006, pages not numbered) 
 
At the same time, the rights of children without disabilities are violated since they will not 
get the time and attention that they merit from the teacher. Children with disabilities will be 
deprived of access to appropriate services. In this sense, mainstreaming practices make a 
sharp distinction between disabled and non-disabled children as separate learning groups. 
The child must be able to cope within the existing curriculum to earn their place in the 
mainstream. The problem is firmly located within the child, who has a biological deficiency, 
and the human rights perspective is a narrow one, primarily focused on access to specialised 
services. This view of human rights is largely about rights to services and sees rights as 
protection of one from the other. In Alston’s view the rights of the intellectually disabled 
 95 
person to an appropriate, segregated education are compatible with other parties’ rights. 
Their right to inclusion is incompatible with others.  
Inclusive Education 
With the advent of democracy in South Africa a flurry of lawmaking and policy 
development took place in education to serve a nonracist, non-sexist democracy within a 
unitary system (Donaldson, 2001). Before going into detail on the development of policy for 
disabled learners it is important to note that schools have gone through tremendous changes 
in the past 15 years, both in the demographics of their learners and the curriculum that they 
are required to deliver. The curriculum is based on Outcomes Based Education (OBE) that 
specifies the outcomes to be reached for each learning area but allows a considerable amount 
of flexibility as to how they are achieved. It is this flexibility that is exploited in inclusive 
education policy, emphasising as it does the adaptation and tailoring of the curriculum to the 
individual’s needs in different paths to successful outcomes (Naicker, 1999).  
 
The practice of inclusive education is aligned with the development of a social model of 
disability in which the disabling environment, rather than biological disability, becomes the 
focus of attention. It proposes that change should be directed at schools, which need to 
become more welcoming and inclusive through the provision of necessary support and 
adaptation of the environment and curriculum (Peters, 2004). Within this broad 
understanding there are a range of different conceptions, which deploy practices of 
exclusion, differentiation and  professionalisation to differing degrees. I shall focus on the 
South African version of inclusive education, examining firstly, its origins and the resulting 
policies and secondly, the implementation of these policies.  
Inclusive Education Policy in South Africa 
The struggle for democracy in South Africa was rooted in the struggle for education and as 
such educational reform was at the top of the democratic government’s agenda. The earliest 
policy documents  recognise the need to address the fragmentation of the education system 
on racial lines and the disparities in access of the different racial groups. The topic of 
education support services (or what was termed psychological services) and special 
schooling formed part of this overall policy development process (Howell, 2000).  
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The National Education Policy Investigation (NEPI) was a body set up by groups concerned 
with educational reform in a democratic South Africa (Howell, 2000). At this early stage the 
need to overhaul the system for education support was recognised. Howell (2000) points out 
that in their understanding of special educational needs this group made a distinction 
between “intrinsic” deficits, based in an organic root of a physical or neurological nature and 
“extrinsic” deficits,  arising from educational or social disadvantage. By this understanding, 
a staggering number of the South African school population (over  4 million) were identified 
as having special needs.   
 
The policy agenda was set to provide access and equity for all South Africans. The limited 
provision of  specialised education was concentrated in urban areas and largely limited to 
primary schools, with access to high school or further education being especially limited 
(Naicker, 1999; Stofile & Green, 2006). Given that most services for disabled children were 
delivered through special schools, the lower provision of special schools for other than white 
race groups, as illustrated in Table 2 below, was seen to be indicative of poorer service 
provision.  
 
Table 2: Provision of Special Schools in South Africa in 1990 
 
Race group No. of special schools No. of pupils in special education  
Whites  89 14 969 
Indians 20 5 580 
Coloureds 60 6 558 
Africans 71 9 811 
Total 240 36918 
Note. Adapted from Stofile & Green 2006, p.53  
 
While there was an extensive process of consultation and numerous documents released on 
the topic of special needs education, I shall focus on two of these documents for the purposes 
of the present discussion. The first of these is the Report of the National Commission on 
Special Needs in Education and Training (NCSNET), National Committee on Education 
Support Services (NCESS): Quality Education for All: Overcoming Barriers to Learning and 
Development.(Department of Education, 1997) and the second is Education White Paper 6: 
Special needs education: Building an Inclusive Education and Training System (Department 
of Education, 2001).  
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NCSNET/NCESS Report. 
The NCSNET/NCESS Report is the result of commissions appointed with the following 
purpose: 
The National Commission on Special Needs in Education and Training (NCSNET) 
and the National Committee for Education Support Services (NCESS) were appointed 
by the Minister and Department of Education to investigate and make 
recommendations on all aspects of ‘special needs’ and support services in education 
and training in South Africa. The focus of the investigation is on the development of 
education to ensure that the system becomes more responsive to the diverse needs of 
all learners. (Department of Education, 1997, p.2) 
 
The report explicitly adopts a human rights model of educational failure that sets as its aim 
addressing barriers to learning and development:  
Provisions in the Constitution also ensure that all citizens, including learners who 
experience barriers to learning and development, have access to all other fundamental 
rights such as the right to human dignity, the right to equality before the law, the right 
to just administrative action, the right to access of information, the right to language 
and culture and other rights. It is imperative that in building a new system of education 
which will meet the needs of all learners and accommodate diversity, respect for all 
these fundamental rights should form the basis of all policy and legislation. (p. 34) 
 
These barriers include physical, mental or sensory impairments as well as social 
disturbances, poverty and an inflexible curriculum among others. Thus no longer is the cause 
for failure to be sought only in the deficit in the child but rather it opens the educational and 
social system up for examination as well. The Commission’s report adopts the social model 
of disability in line with the Integrated National Disability Strategy.  Armed with this 
understanding, the report makes the following key recommendations: 
1. There should be a single integrated education system.  
2. All schools should expand their capacity to meet the needs of all children through the 
introduction of a flexible curriculum.  
3. Learning and teaching support should be integral to the education system and reach 
all learners when they need it.  
4. There should be appropriate human resource development to meet these 
requirements. 
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5. An appropriate funding mechanism needs to be provided that will allocate funding in 
an effective manner through phasing in the new approach with monitoring and 
evaluation (Howell, 2000).  
There is a significant shift to a systemic understanding of learning break down: 
The shift away from a predominantly ‘individualistic’ approach to a ‘systemic’ 
approach to understanding and responding to learner difficulties and disabilities would 
result in the  assessment of learning and other problems, including an analysis of 
factors in the context of the learner which contribute to the problems experienced by 
her/him. … Furthermore, responses or interventions emerging from this assessment 
would include responses appropriate to the levels at which the problems are situated. 
(Department of Education, 1997, p.45) 
 
In the South African setting, barriers to learning can be at any level of the system and 
therefore interventions to address barriers to learning can also be at any level of the system. 
It is consistent with the policy to place an emphasis on supporting orphans or poverty 
alleviation, as a means to addressing barriers to learning. The report identifies a need for the 
continued existence of special schools for disabled children. At the same time these 
‘specialised learning contexts’ would serve a different purpose in an inclusive education and 
training system:  
Specialised learning contexts would not be defined by category of disability but by the 
curriculum and support offered. Emphasis should be on functioning as a resource base 
providing consultative support to educators and withdrawal for small group learning 
opportunities. (p. 47) 
 
Thus in terms of intellectual disability, the report proposes that children be educated in the 
mainstream depending on their support needs.  
Education White Paper 6. 
EWP 6 (Department of Education, 2001) is a plan for implementation that accepts the basic 
tenets of the NCSNET/NCESS report and fits these to departmental structures and time 
frames. The policy identifies six key levers for change: 
1. The qualitative improvement of special schools to become resource centres. 
2. The ‘mobilisation’ of 280 000 out of school youth.  
3. The phased in conversion of ordinary schools to what are termed full-service 
schools that would be developed to meet a progressively wider range of support 
needs.  
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4. General orientation to inclusive education and training in all schools and early 
identification of disabilities in the Foundation Phase. 
5. The establishment of district based support teams as structures that will provide 
support to schools, teachers and learners within mainstream and specialised 
contexts. 
6. A national advocacy campaign around inclusive education for parents, learners, 
and other stakeholders. 
 
A fundamental principle of the inclusive education policy is support, which is directed not 
only at the learner but also at teachers, schools and parents.  
Inclusion is about supporting all learners, educators and the system as a whole so that 
the full range of learning needs can be met. The focus is on teaching and learning 
actors, with the emphasis on the development of good teaching strategies that will be 
of benefit to all learners. (p. 17) 
 
The provision of this support is to increase schools’ capacity to respond to an ever-widening 
range of diversity. It is envisaged that this support will be provided through a departmentally 
mandated structure, the district based support team, which will pool local expertise to 
address identified barriers to learning. Special schools will be part of this team and will cater 
to learners with high support needs as well as acting as a resource to the district in terms of 
expertise in barriers to learning. Full service schools will be targeted in the initial stages as 
nodes for the development of within school support development (entailing human resource 
and infrastructure development). These schools will also serve as a resource to surrounding 
ordinary schools. Within ordinary schools, the institutional level support team will make use 
of expertise within the school community and access support from the district. The intent of 
this vision is to move expertise from a specific location, the special school/class, into a wider 
range of settings. At the same time, it aims to empower regular teachers, parents and those 
who fall outside of the special education profession to participate in providing support.  
 
Practices of exclusion and differentiation according to disability type are eschewed in favour 
of identifying levels of support needs. The intent of this move is to focus on an examination 
of systemic factors, rather than individual deficit. Within this vision practices of exclusion 
and differentiation occur at the level of support needs rather than severity of disability. 
Educational provision is not made according to category of disability but rather according to 
the level of support required.  
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Differentiation also applies to the curriculum. In contrast to the development of a separate 
and appropriate curriculum tailored to the child’s needs, the same curriculum applies to all 
children. It is adapted by ordinary teachers with the support of structures such as the 
institution level support team and the district based support team.  
 
As a public policy EWP6 cannot be perceived as neutral in its intent. Peters (2007) notes: 
Every written policy document deploys a particular discourse as both tactic and theory 
in a web of power relations. (p. 100) 
 
Van Rooyen and Le Grange (2003)  unpack some of these power relations in a 
deconstruction of EWP6 and identify a ‘business discourse’ that is concerned with cost-
effectiveness that drives toward self-sufficiency of the objects of the policy in an attempt to 
reduce the fiscal burden that they pose in their dependent state. This then leads these authors 
to consider whether inclusion may be constructed as too expensive and therefore not feasible 
for implementation. They also identify a ‘pioneering discourse’ that constructs an ambiguous 
position for special schools. The exclusionary pressures exerted by special schools are not 
acknowledged despite the portrayal of separation and exclusion as “decadent and immoral” 
(p.11). This leads van Rooyen and Le Grange to question the central role of special schools 
that are to be strengthened rather than abolished and to ask whether this discourse reflects in 
the implementation of the policy. 
 
A voice at the margin of the ‘pioneering discourse’ is that of inclusion before the 
development of inclusive education policy in what is termed “inclusion by default” or 
“maindumping” (p. 11). The experience of learners who attended regular schools in spite of 
disability and reported positive experiences within rural communities is ignored.   
 
Thus it is only once the inclusion process is brought under the monitoring and control of the 
experts that it really counts as inclusion. The power/knowledge implications are clear. The 
disabled child is constructed as an object for inclusion through the disciplinary procedures of 
the ‘experts’, often members of the psy-complex or the medical profession. This will be 
further discussed under the section on professionalisation below.  
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Implementation of Policy. 
In the implementation of the policy up to this point, the material effects of these discourses 
can be detected. Firstly, the Department of Education itself notes with concern the growing 
enrolment in special schools since the publication of the policy: 
There is an increasing number of learners being unnecessarily referred to special 
schools from their local mainstream schools. In the space of three years (2004 to 
2007), the number has increased by more than 15 000 learners (from 77 752 to 93 
000). (Department of Education, 2008, p. 6) 
 
The rapid increase in the numbers of pupils in special schools and the number of schools 
belies the inclusive intent of the policy and perhaps indicates an overemphasis on the 
development of special schools as compared to the other key levers of change identified in 
Education White Paper 6.  
 
Wildeman and Nomdo (2007) examined implementation at a provincial level where the 
responsibility lies for enacting the policy. They note the slow progress of implementation 
and attribute this to the following: 
1. The policy was not properly funded, depending largely on donor funding. 
2. A shared understanding of inclusive education has not been established, both within 
the implementing directorates of the Department and between other stakeholders who 
are deemed to be essential, for example parents. 
3. There was a lack of educational provision and planning for out-of-school youth who 
were identified but could not be accommodated. 
4. There has been an ad hoc development of district based support teams which operate 
very unevenly within and across provinces. 
5. Policy implementation for inclusive education has been isolated from mainstream 
development. This relates specifically to the location of inclusive education in the 
directorates concerned with special needs rather than as a transversal policy across all 
directorates. 
 
The professionalisation of inclusive education within a medical model of disability is also 
evident in the difficulty encountered with a move toward the social model. Engelbrecht 
(2006) notes that despite the commitment to values of inclusivity that are evident within 
education policy making, the changes in understanding of, and behaviour toward, difference 
within the school and classroom setting remains a challenge. She states that the development 
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of over-arching policies is insufficient to address traditionally entrenched discourses around 
difference.  
Practices of Professionalisation and the Application of Expertise  
The role of the professional in the differentiation processes described above is central. It is 
the professional who measures, grades and informs decisions of educational placement, 
which have far reaching effects for the individual so classified and placed. Considerable 
power therefore lies with the professional in determining what was good for the child. This 
process is highlighted in chapter 2 with reference to the exercise of psychological expertise. 
The conventional history of special education as the progressive development of knowledge 
and expertise obscures the operation of this power and renders families and classified 
individuals invisible. I therefore adopt a more critical perspective that examines the effects 
of professional practices. 
 
As I have noted above, the process of differentiation specified different locations for 
different categories of mental handicap. Whereas the medical profession laid claim to the 
work of the custodial institution, psychology gained a firm foothold in the field of education 
in large measure due to the technology of the intelligence test. The zeal with which Cyril 
Burt (in Great Britain) and Terman (in the United States) approached the task of bringing 
education under the discipline of psychology, was matched by that of Dr. Fick and his 
colleagues in South Africa (Rose, 1985; Foster, 1990). What happened after placement was 
then the domain of teachers and therapists in the specialised settings. The role of the 
psychologist in special education was largely to identify mental handicap in all its forms and 
to prescribe placement. Once the child was placed in special education or care, their role was 
minimal, largely supervisory or that of consultant (Barton, 1997). However, the physical 
absence of psychologists from the special education classroom does not imply the absence of 
psychological expertise. This expertise bolsters the authority of the special educator (both 
relative to the parents and to the regular educator) such that they are in possession not only 
of scientific and technical knowledge but they also carry ethical weight by virtue of their 
knowledge of the best interests of the individual (see chapter 2). The regular classroom 
teacher is barely visible in the process, despite the fact that he or she would frequently report 
the initial signs of failure.   
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Practices of professionalisation have been heavily criticised within a social model of 
disability (see chapter 2) for medicalising disability, and resistance to the authority of the 
medical gaze forms a corner stone of disability activism. In the case of intellectually disabled 
people in education systems the effects of professionalisation and the application of 
expertise have been described for regular educators in the mainstream and for parents of 
these children. I shall discuss each of these below.  
Expertise and Regular Educators 
The early exclusion of problematic children from the mainstream and the subsequent 
development of the discipline of special education has rendered the teaching of such children 
as an extraordinary skill that is not encompassed within the general tenets of sound 
pedagogy as it applies to the “normal” child (Schoeman & Schoeman, 2002). The regular 
educator is lacking in the special skills that are required to teach a certain class of children – 
those that are classified as disabled in some respect. Should they be required to teach such 
children they will require training and support from professionals with the requisite expertise 
(Department of Education, 1997, 2001). In the absence of such training, the requirement that 
they teach the full range of learning needs can, in some views, be seen as an abuse of their 
rights (Alston, 2006). The lack of expertise in the regular school introduces the element of 
conditionality on the participation of disabled learners in the mainstream. The participation 
of disabled children in regular schools is conditional on capacity building aimed at ensuring 
the requisite levels of expertise. 
  
Within this frame, the pressure for exclusion remains potent even where supposedly 
progressive practices of inclusive education are implemented (Slee, 2001). The practices of 
expertise are grounded in a medical, positivist understanding of disability that sets  it as a 
thing apart, a property of an individual that requires special knowledge (Reid & Knight, 
2006). Only the expert has the deep, penetrating knowledge of this form of difference from 
which they are able to exercise authority over educational decision-making.  
Expertise and Parents 
The exclusion of parents as decision-makers for their disabled children is noted in chapter 3, 
grounded in the knowledge of experts about the nature of intellectual disability. In the 
process of professionalisation, the voices of the experts came to carry more weight than 
those of the family. An early expression of this is found in Binet (1905): 
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The organization of methods is especially important because, as soon as the schools for 
subnormals are in operation, one must be on his guard against the attitude of the 
parents. Their sincerity will be worth very little when it is in conflict with their 
interests. If the parents wish the child to remain in the regular school, they will not be 
silent concerning his intelligence. "My child understands everything," they will say, 
and they will be very careful not to give any significant information in regard to him. 
If, on the contrary, they wish him to be admitted into an institution where gratuitous 
board and lodging are furnished, they will change completely. They will be capable 
even of teaching him how to simulate mental debility. One should, therefore, be on his 
guard against all possible frauds. (¶ 8) 
 
The above passage is instructive as it pits the objective truth of the child’s capability against 
“parents’ interests”. The best interests of the child are a matter of objective truth to which 
parents do not have access as they lack the deep knowledge of the professional.  
 
Within the context of education in South Africa, parents are encouraged to become involved 
in the education of their children and EWP 6 specifically promotes a collaborative approach 
between parents and teachers in addressing their children’s needs (McKenzie & Loebenstein, 
2006). This is expressed as the desire for partnership between parents and professionals. 
However, the intuitive, subjective knowledge of the parent is no match for the disciplinary 
powers of the professional, especially when it is couched in the language of the child’s best 
interest (McKenzie & Muller, 2006).  
 
In the absence of service provision, parents have come together in support of human rights 
for their disabled children (Howell, et al., 2006). Thus there are organisations such as Down 
Syndrome South Africa (DSSA), Disabled Children’s Action Group (DICAG) and Autism 
SA among others that promote the rights of their members. Their practices of advocacy vary 
considerably with the major thrusts being toward inclusion in education (DSSA, see 
McKenzie & Loebenstein, 2006) and broader claims to social justice and human rights for 
disabled children (DICAG, see Howell, et al., 2006). The degree to which either special 
schools or inclusive education are advocated for by parents’ organisations depends to a large 
degree on the functionality of the regular education system in their community and the 
degree of poverty with which they have to contend. However, the need for more expertise, 
whether this is training teachers in regular schools or building new special schools, is a 
recurring theme.  
 105 
Conclusion 
The discussion above serves to highlight significant practices in the education of the 
intellectually disabled person. Practices of exclusion arose within the context of mass 
education in order to facilitate the smooth process of developing productive citizens. 
Provision for intellectual disability came later than physical and sensory disability, reflecting 
doubts about the viability of any such education. The configuration of intellectual disability 
as an organic deficit of the individual for white children and as a racial/cultural property for 
black children also impacted on provision. The beginnings of special education were 
predicated upon the need to identify and divide in order to provide for separately. 
 
Devised as a tool for making gross distinctions between those who could be educated within 
compulsory schooling and those who required separate provision, intelligence testing came 
to be used for the greater differentiation of pupils in schools. It was justified on educational 
and economic grounds as a predictive tool that could prevent wastage through the early 
identification and proper treatment of defect or even exceptional talent. Differentiating 
practices constituted a powerful mechanism for establishing the norm as a defining principle 
of worth in the education system. IQ scores formed the basis of educational placement 
decisions in the South African context. The application of the technology of the test 
enhanced the power of the professional with respect to parents through its supposed 
objectivity in informing the ‘right’ decisions for the child. In the South African context the 
use of the IQ test as an instrument for buttressing racial inferiority claims has been noted.  
 
The subsequent adoption of human rights discourses with respect to disability created an 
impetus to integrate intellectually disabled children into regular schools. This took two 
different forms. The first, mainstreaming, was based on a service provision model of 
normalisation.  The second, inclusive education, drew on claims to equality and human 
rights for all within a non-racial democracy.   
 
The move toward inclusive education is firmly adopted within the South African policy 
framework. Within this view the learner may experience barriers that are organic or social, 
with organic barriers being associated with disability. The organic is mediated through social 
process in line with the social model of disability and contributes to disability insofar as the 
needs created by the organic deficit are accommodated. This is achieved through systems of 
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support. In the absence of support, participation  in the mainstream is construed in a negative 
light as ‘main-dumping’.  
 
Practices of professionalisation are predicated upon the notion of expertise and the impact of 
these practices on both parents and regular educators was noted. The lack of expertise in the 
regular school sets inclusive education up as a process of capacity building in the regular 
school, in the absence of which it is not fair to include disabled children in the mainstream. 
Parents are excluded from decision -making about their children because of their lack of 
knowledge about the truth of intellectual disability.  
 
Thus far in this thesis, I have located intellectual disability within a theoretical framework 
and explored representations and educational practices with respect to intellectual disability 
through the lens of  critical disability studies. My task now is to identify discourses of 
representation and education in the specific context of Buffalo City and examine how these 
discourses are deployed in the light of my theoretical framework and the literature that I 
have reviewed. In Chapter 5 I shall present the methodology used to examine representation 
and educational practice within the context of Buffalo City, South Africa.   
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CHAPTER 5: Q-METHODOLOGY AS A METHOD FOR 
ANALYSING DISCOURSES OF REPRESENTATION AND 
EDUCATION OF INTELLECTUALLY DISABLED PEOPLE 
We had been, for some time, looking for a way of explicating – locating, identifying 
and describing – the multiplex of accounts, understandings, representations and policy 
positions we assumed were there to be found in effectively any aspect of collective life 
one cared to focus upon. In Q we discovered such a means for exploring a whole 
plethora of images, ideas, debates and explanations. (R. Stainton Rogers & W. 
Stainton Rogers1990, p. 4) 
 
Inherent in the philosophy behind the method (Q-method) is that no one understanding 
is superior or objective. The approach is particularly suited to exploring topics where a 
particular discourse has tended to dominate other available viewpoints. (Bryant, Green, 
& Hewison, 2006, p.1190) 
 
 
In planning this research I sought a methodology that would provide a technique to expose 
multiple ways of understanding intellectual disability and its concomitant educational 
practice.  I noted that the dominance of a biomedical discourse around the topic obscured 
many different and equally valid understandings of the topic (see chapter 2). I was thus 
persuaded, like the authors quoted above, to  utilise Q-methodology for my purpose. It is a 
technique that they have found useful in exposing a diversity of views that are often 
obscured by dominant discourses. My examination of representations of intellectual 
disability and educational practices presented in chapters 3 and 4 convinced me that there are 
a multitude of discourses operating in this complex field. A simple linear progression toward 
an ultimately enlightened understanding of intellectual disability and increasingly effective 
educational practices does not fit the reviews that I presented. Rather it is the deployment 
and dispersal of discourses, some contemporary and some apparently long since discarded 
but with powerful traces in the present, that constructs the object of intellectual disability and 
the intellectually disabled subject. In this chapter, I explain why my choice of methodology 
is relevant to the research questions I have posed and how it was implemented in the study of 
education of intellectually disabled people.  
 
I shall begin this discussion by reviewing my theoretical framework with respect to Q-
methodology. In this discussion, I shall look at post-structuralism as a starting point. I shall 
then focus on the major thrust of my theoretical framework – a critical disability studies 
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approach. In order to make the link between this theoretical framework and Q-methodology 
it will be necessary to explicate in detail the particular understanding of the method that I 
adopt, with specific reference to how the methodology can be used with different 
conceptions of discourse, subjectivity and the understanding of the pattern analytic factors 
that result from application of the method. This discussion will allow me to locate my 
theoretical position explicitly within these debates. Once the link between method and theory 
is established, I shall then focus on the application of Q-methodology to the current research.  
 
Post-structuralism 
As discussed in chapter 2, the theoretical framework of this study aligns itself with a broad 
post-structuralist view that rejects the possibility of viewing intellectual disability as a fixed 
entity ‘out there’ in the real world that can be objectively defined and measured. Rather 
intellectual disability is understood as being located within social practice and subject to the 
power relations that construct knowledge as truth. This is not to deny the materiality and 
very real consequences of intellectual disability, some of which are ameliorated through 
useful biomedical applications. It would be unhelpful (mostly to intellectually disabled 
people themselves) to argue away forms of impairment that severely restrict the individual’s 
ability to participate in society in the absence of supports and adaptations. However, it is also 
to recognise that impairment is always-already imbued with social meaning and cannot be 
viewed in a natural, unmediated way. That is to say, the impairment, not only the disability, 
is contingent on cultural, historical and social meaning at any one time or place.  
 
In the case of intellectual disability, biomedical accounts have claimed the status of truth and 
hence have silenced other alternative conceptions. Wendy Stainton Rogers (1996) notes how 
the biomedical discourse is granted the status of : “‘fact’, in contrast with the status of 
‘belief’ accorded to all other forms of knowledge” (p. 73).  The objects of the biomedical 
discourse are given status as things in the world, such as ‘intelligence’ or ‘social adaptation’.  
However, Q-methodology has the potential to disrupt this claim, firstly by  identifying 
alternative discourses, and secondly, by treating them as epistemologically equivalent to 
each other.  
 
The truth status of the biomedical discourse is built on the adoption of a scientific method 
that is based in hypothetico-deductive thinking, which proceeds by fixing a concept, such as 
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intelligence, a priori,  theorising about the object and then instituting various measures or 
tests to ascertain whether the object varies as predicted or not (Watts, 2002). However, in a 
post-structural approach the object of study is not defined as a fixed entity at the start of 
research. Rather it is viewed as a contested and constructed entity.  Through the research 
process of this study, a sophisticated, nuanced and discourse-based understanding of 
intellectual disability and associated educational practices will be configured from the 
available ways of speaking in the social context of the study. The chosen methodology 
should be able to tell us: “What is this thing called intellectual disability?” and “What are the 
understandings of educational practice for this category of person?” as understood by 
members of the culture who make use of available ways of speaking, knowing and acting. I 
shall now give an overview of the method before highlighting how it is applied differently 
according to distinct theoretical frameworks and aligning my approach with critical 
disability studies.  
Q-methodology and Critical Disability Studies 
The methodology used in this study is Q-methodology. It was originally developed by 
William Stephenson, a researcher in the psychological laboratories of Spearman and Burt in 
the United Kingdom in the 1920s and 1930s. In this section I relate Q-methodology to 
critical disability studies by providing a brief overview of the method, identifying two 
schools within this method and locating my current research within the debates between 
these schools in a way that is consistent with my theoretical approach.  
 
The innovations that Stephenson proposed were two fold: 
1. The data consists of subjective rankings of items through what he termed ‘self-
reference’. 
2. The data is analysed in terms of whole patterns of responses, rather than looking for 
similarities and differences between individuals in performance across items or tests 
(Kitzinger, 1999, p. 267). 
Each of these aspects will be discussed below. 
 
Stephenson termed the methodology Q in order to distinguish it from what he called R 
methodology. In R-methodology the person is tested with respect to a pre-defined concept 
and their score is ranked relative to other people’s scores. R factor analysis identifies 
grouping of highly inter-correlated tests or variables. In so doing it attempts to reduce visible 
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variation of phenomena by proposing an underlying, invisible cluster of variation, a factor 
(S.R. Brown, 1980). An R methodological factor tells us simply that a particular group of 
variables have displayed a similar pattern of variation in a certain population. Subsequent 
individuals can be tested against this abstraction to see how they differ from each other with 
respect to it. This has become intimately associated with the individual differences tradition 
of psychology as it tells us about variation across a population of persons with respect to 
their performance on a test measuring this latent variable (Stenner, Watts, & Worrell, 2008).  
 
The data for Q-method, on the other hand, consist of sorting patterns of relative and 
subjective evaluations of carefully selected items (usually but not always statements). In 
most Q studies a different person creates each pattern; but sometimes people sort on two or 
more occasions (for example, as ‘me as I am’ and then ‘me as I would like to be – these are 
called different ‘conditions of instruction’).  Each sorting pattern is treated as a single, 
gestalt entity for analysis. Q-method aims to maximise the expression of qualitative variation 
and to record it in numerical form so that it “makes qualitative variation mathematically 
tractable” and in so doing “The qualitative dimension shifts from being ‘noise’ to ‘signal’” 
(Stenner, et al., 2008, p. 216).   
 
The process of conducting a Q-study has been variously described in the literature (see S.R. 
Brown, 1980; S.R. Brown, 1997; R. Stainton Rogers, 1995; Watts & Stenner, 2005) as a 
pattern analytic technique that can be used to study: “..ordered patternings of cultural 
understanding” (R. Stainton Rogers, 1995, p. 180). While there is a fair degree of agreement 
on what Q-method is, what it can achieve and how to conduct Q studies, there are two key 
areas of dispute between what are, effectively, two “schools” of Q theorists and researchers. 
One, led by Professor Stephen R Brown in the USA, takes a “scientific study of subjectivity” 
(SSS) position; the other, originating from the UK with Rex and Wendy Stainton Rogers as 
key proponents, views Q research as a means to conduct research within a social 
constructionist framework and as a form of discourse analysis (DA).  I shall use the 
acronyms SSS and DA to refer to these approaches in further discussion.  
 
The general area of disagreement concerns the location by the DA school of Q-methodology 
within post-structuralist, discursive methods and within critical psychology. I shall engage 
with this aspect in order to explicate the relevance of my chosen methodology to my 
theoretical framework and research questions. I shall therefore present below a fairly 
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standard and non-controversial account of the method before moving into a discussion of 
some of the theoretical debates that concern my current study. After that, I shall explain the 
application of Q-methodology to my study of the education of intellectually disabled people.  
The Q-methodological Study 
The terms used for the application of a complete process of Q-methodology is a Q-study. It 
involves the following steps:  
1. Delineation of the concourse and the selection of the Q-set, 
2. Selection of participants,  
3. The Q-sort, 
4. Statistical analysis, 
5. Factor interpretation. 
Each of these will be discussed below. 
Delineation of the Concourse and the Selection of the Q-Set. 
The starting point for a Q-methodological study is the assumption that every topic or concept 
has its own concourse that contains all that it is possible to say about this topic. William 
Stephenson defines the concourse thus: 
A universe of statements for any situation or context is called a concourse, and refers 
to conversational and not merely informational possibilities, and is arrived at 
empirically for every concept, every declarative statement, every wish, every object in 
nature when viewed subjectively. (1986a, p. 37) 
 
Thus the concourse for intellectual disability consists of all that can be said about this topic, 
whether it be factual (informational) or informal knowledge (conversational), providing a 
field of investigation that locates subjective views (in Stephenson’s understanding of 
subjectivity, which will be discussed further below) in an observable domain – 
communication. Curt (1994) describes the concourse as “the bounded universe of possible 
elements … from which … discourses are configured” (p. 90). The concourse for any one 
topic is diverse and multi-voiced but remains bounded because it is located within place and 
time in terms of what it is possible to say or do.  The concourse itself is situated within a  
“field of communicability” (Stephenson cited in Watts & Stenner, 2003b, p. 159), which can 
be seen  as the universe of discourse on all topics that is culturally available to social actors 
in a particular cultural or sub-cultural location.  
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The Q-methodological study thus starts with an attempt to delineate the concourse relating to 
the topic under study. First of all, the concourse is surveyed by drawing on a whole range of 
documents, academic and lay, public and private as well as making use of different media-
resources and interview data. For example, Barry and Proops (1999) make use of interviews 
and academic and popular literature in their study of environmental policy. Bryant et al. 
(2006) draw on focus groups, interviews, data from previous studies, information pamphlets, 
academic literature and websites to examine accounts of Down Syndrome. It is not clear 
from the literature how the limits of the concourse are set, but Stenner et al. (2008) note that 
the researcher should gain a familiarity with the topic. Rex Stainton Rogers (1995) likens the 
process to preparation for a questionnaire or a thematic analysis. He emphasises the need to 
draw on the researcher’s own cultural knowledge.  
 
From this concourse, the researcher then proceeds to spend considerable time noting down 
and building up a body of statements that, as far as possible, express the full range of “what 
can be said” about the topic. From this large body of material, a sample of statements is then 
selected with a view to achieving adequate representativity of all culturally possible 
perspectives on the topic.  
 
The final stage in the selection of the Q-set is where the researcher identifies a much smaller 
sample of statements (this needs to be of a manageable size for people to sort – usually 
between about 40 and 80 statements). The aim is to arrive at a set of statements (the Q-set) 
that is representative of the diversity and range contained within the concourse and which is 
manageable for participants to engage with in a sorting task (Watts & Stenner, 2005).  
Selection of Participants.  
The participants are not chosen to reflect a representative slice of the population on various 
criteria. Participants are rather selected purposively in such a way as to reflect the range of 
diversity that is anticipated in the discourses under study. Sampling is strategic insofar as it: 
typically places its Q-sets [the research instrument of Q-methodology] in a multiplex 
of person-locations or subject-positions, ones where the researchers expect, through 
their own cultural knowledge, to hear varied stories, accounts or discourses. (R. 
Stainton Rogers, 1995, p. 182)  
 
The guiding principle for the selection of participants is that of “finite diversity” (R. Stainton 
Rogers, 1995, p. 182). The participants are selected to reflect diversity in their accounts, but 
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it is not anticipated that this diversity will be endless. Rather it is expected that there will be 
several distinct accounts in play. In Q-method just one person who patterns their responses 
to express a particular account will be sufficient to substantiate the existence of the type (R. 
Stainton Rogers, 1995). 
The Q-sort 
The participant in the study is presented with the statements in the Q-set and is requested to 
position him or herself in terms of a specific condition of instruction, (such as ‘most strongly 
agree with’ and ‘most strongly disagree with’) with respect to each statement.  This task 
takes the form of a ranking procedure where each participant slots each item in the set into a 
specific ranking point. Usually the response pattern takes the form of a forced quasi-normal 
distribution. (Brown, 1997; Watts & Stenner, 2005). The purpose of the quasi-normal 
distribution is to ensure that participants engage with the data in a thoughtful way as well as 
facilitating the statistical analysis. The forced distribution does not appear to affect the 
factors which emerge, since distribution effects are virtually nil (Watts & Stenner, 2005). It 
is merely a pragmatic device that aids data collection and yields equivalent patterns for all 
(R. Stainton Rogers, 1995).  
 
This procedure yields a pattern of responses — termed the Q-sort — that is then subject to 
statistical analysis. The ranking task is supplemented by demographic information and 
responses by participants to open-ended questions. The purpose of collecting these open-
ended statements is to aid interpretation of factors that are identified by the study (Watts & 
Stenner, 2005). 
 
Although the researcher selects the statements, he or she does not seek to predict the way in 
which the statements are patterned through the different actions of the different participants. 
The patterns of meaning are derived through the participants’ actions upon them. 
Participants construct their own meanings, since a specific statement is not assumed to have 
a fixed meaning independent of the pattern in which it occurs. Within a post-structural 
framework, meaning is created (and created differently) through different readings of the 
statement in question. Hence meaning only becomes apparent through the patterning of 
items that emerge as the person engages with the set of statements (R. Stainton Rogers, 
1995; Watts & Stenner, 2005).  
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Statistical Analysis 
The statistical technique employed in Q-methodology is a by-person correlation and factor 
analytic technique. The overall configurations obtained from the sorting tasks are each 
correlated with every other sort.  Thus, the initial correlation matrix reflects the relationship 
of each Q-sort with every other Q-sort. This matrix is then factor analysed to produce a set 
of factors onto which participants load according to the configuration of their individual Q-
sort. Dedicated computer software completes this part of the process, allowing data input, 
generating the initial matrix and making processes of factor extraction and rotation 
straightforward. Within Q-methodological studies centroid factor extraction techniques are 
preferred, because this technique does not yield only one statistically correct answer, as 
would be the case with a principal components analysis.  The centroid technique yields an 
infinite number of solutions, which are all mathematically correct. In this way the decisions 
of the researcher come into play rather than a purely mathematical process (Stricklin & 
Almeida, 2004). This level of indeterminacy provides greater latitude for the researcher to 
address specific theoretical concerns while not changing the data as such. For further 
elaboration, S. R. Brown (1980) provides a detailed discussion of the technical aspects of 
factor extraction.  
 
The output of the factor analysis is a range of factors, each representing a reduction of data 
from the individual Q-sorts configured by the participants. Factor rotation simpliﬁes the 
factor structure so as to make factors distinct from one another and therefore make 
interpretation easier and more reliable. This can be achieved through Varimax or 
judgemental (hand) rotation but Varimax is generally the “house standard” according to R. 
Stainton Rogers (1995, p. 188). The best estimate of the factor is derived from a weighted 
average of the Q-sorts according to their loading on to the factor. This maximises the amount 
of variance explained by the extracted factors by ensuring as far as possible that loadings are 
“large on one factor and trivial on the other” (p. 187).  
 
While it is possible statistically to have a huge range of patterns, the principle of finite 
diversity and the constraints on what it is possible to say or do within any one time or culture 
means that a limited set of factors can be expected to be suitable for interpretation, although 
there is some debate as to how these factors are selected and described. The researcher is 
thus faced with the decision about how to demarcate which factors merit further analysis. 
The DA school (R. Stainton Rogers & Stainton Rogers, 1990) of Q-methodology accepts a 
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larger number than the three or four suggested as standard by Stephenson (1986b). Criteria 
for interpretable factors will be discussed in the methodology for the current study.  
 
Each factor is represented by a factor array which indicates a score for each item/statement 
arrived at through a procedure where the scores of the most significantly loading Q-sorts are 
weighted higher than those of others on the factor.  The factor array takes the form of an 
idealised, individual Q-sort constructed from the aggregation of closely related Q-sorts 
rather than reflecting any one individual’s sorting pattern. In this sense it is inter-subjective 
rather than subjective, reflecting a particular account or, in my emphasis on the role of 
language, a discourse.  
Factor Interpretation 
Interpretation of factors is not well described in the literature (Kitzinger, 1999) but usually it 
begins with an analysis of the extreme poles of the factor array and then moves toward more 
neutral scoring statements. Through consideration of within-factor variation and 
comparisons with other factor arrays, a narrative,  summarising account of each factor is 
built up (Curt, 1994). Apparent contradictions and confusions are considered in the light of 
the open-ended comments of the respondents as well as their biographical details. Where 
there is difficulty in interpreting the factor, the researcher can go back to participants loading 
onto the factor and seek clarification. Generally, a name is given to each factor that is 
descriptive of the orientation that it illustrates.  Theory and literature is also brought to bear 
on factor interpretation (R. Stainton Rogers, 1995; Watts & Stenner, 2005).  
 
Q-methodology and Critical Approaches 
Having presented an outline of Q-methodology, I shall now engage with some of the debates 
that arise when the method is placed in the context of post-structuralist, critical disability 
studies as argued for in my theoretical framework. The position that researchers take on 
these issues has fundamental implications for the nature of the understanding that is 
produced through the application of the method. I shall discuss the following issues:  
1. The relationship of the field of communicability and the concourse to discourse  
2. The understanding of subjectivity and the self 
3. The status of factors  
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The Relationship of the Field of Communicability and the Concourse to Discourse  
Watts and Stenner (2003b) provide an extensive discussion of Stephenson’s understanding 
of the concourse and identify different readings of the concept between the so-called DA and 
SSS schools of Q-method.  They argue that the conception of the concourse put forward by 
Stephenson relies on an understanding of the concourse around any particular topic as being 
devoid of normative force. In this reading of the concourse, the individual is free to choose 
and make meaning from his or her own perspective: 
Stephenson’s cultural/psychological field is hence reduced to the status of a passive 
reference library — a mere repository of shared knowledge — which individual 
persons can accept or reject with complete freedom, on the basis of their own 
perspectives of existence. The participant is under no pressure to conform or to uphold 
any normative standards of understanding or behaviour. (Watts and Stenner, 2003, p. 
162). 
 
In this understanding there is a clear divide between culture (available discourse) and subject 
(individual persons), which places the subject as the active constructor of meaning. 
However, within a post-structuralist framework we have noted the constructive effects of 
discourse. Discourse is productive in the way that it constructs the subject (who in turn has 
constructive effects on discourse) and constrains or permits action in certain ways. The 
operation of discourse is saturated with power/knowledge and cannot be distinguished from 
a supposedly neutral concourse in terms of productive power. I follow Watts and Stenner in 
the recognition of the effects of what they term a “cultural field” but which I would rather 
term the conditions of possibility, within a DA understanding of Q-methodology:  
Our understandings, imaginings, the stories we tell, the accounts we find plausible, the 
nature of our interactions, and so on, are all shaped by the pre-existent narrative and 
conceptual structures of our cultural field or pool of information. (Watts & Stenner, 
2003b, p.168) 
 
 
The Understanding of Subjectivity and the Self 
Stephenson promoted Q-methodology as a technique for the study of subjectivity by 
scientific, operant means.  His aim in undertaking such a study was to include within the 
domain of psychology those experiences that reflect individual subjectivity. Given that these 
experiences are not amenable to direct investigation he proposes rather to focus on the overt 
activity of “conscriring”, whereby subjective views are placed in the domain of the social 
and thereby become amenable to investigation: 
The theory of subjective communicability (Stephenson, 1986a) dispenses with 
consciousness and its various surrogates as “non-essentials” replacing them with what 
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is “essential”, namely, conscriring, the “sharing of knowledge”. (Stephenson, 1982, p. 
240) 
 
In this sense, his approach represents a turn to language, or more broadly and in his own 
terms, communication, as the object of study. This reflects the turn to text within critical 
psychology approaches as well as a decentering of the self (Henriques, et al., 1998). 
However, the extent to which subjectivity is a property of the individual, on the one hand, or 
a cultural construction, on the other, is at issue between the SSS and DA schools of Q-
methodology (cf. S.R.  Brown, 2003; Good, 2003; Watts & Stenner, 2003b). The issue at 
stake relates to the understanding of the inner (subject) and outer (culture) relationship. 
Watts and Stenner (2003a) argue that the SSS school, by following Stephenson in this 
respect, is led into the position of accepting the agency of the individual self as prior to, and 
the originator of, social action.  A corollary of this perspective is that factors identified 
through Q-method come to be seen as reflective of individual subjectivity as in more or less 
stable points of view or attitudes, that is they are phenomena existing “in the head”. In 
contrast, the DA school of Q describes factors as accounts or discourses that reflect 
culturally available ways of talking and acting with respect to social phenomena without the 
compunction to situate these understandings within individuals. In adopting this perspective, 
I follow Wendy Stainton Rogers (1998):  
we view factor analysis as “merely a tool”  — not as a means of revealing some 
psychic “essence of subjectivity” but as a convenient technique for gaining access to 
the way ideas, arguments, explanations and representations may be “knowledged into 
being”. (p. 11) 
 
As such I am concerned with the views of the participants only to the extent that they 
provide an account, which can be interpreted and located within a social context. It is not the 
aim of this study to identify points of view of intellectually disabled people or their teachers 
or their parents. Rather it is to understand better what discourses are deployed and with what 
effect in the education of intellectually disabled people. In this respect it is the construction 
of subjectivity within a dynamic of power and resistance as effected through discourse, 
rather than individual subjectivity or consciousness that is the object of study.   
The Status of Factors  
The status of a factor in Q-methodology varies across different applications of the method. 
What does a factor represent? An electronic database search on EBSCO Host in the 
Academic Premier database yielded 105 abstracts in a search of studies using  Q-
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methodology. These studies used a multitude of terms for the factors. These included: forms 
of identity, accounts, discourses, types of world view, beliefs, styles, constructions, choices, 
characteristics of the user and many more besides. I do not intend to provide an analysis of 
the positions that these naming practices might reveal but only to highlight that there is 
indeed a huge range of understandings of what a factor is — a range worthy of a Q-study in 
itself! Given this diversity I feel that it is important to be explicit about what my view of a 
factor represents. In particular it must be placed within the context of discourse.  
 
The statements that are presented in the Q-set are texts, which are organised in coherent and 
regular ways through the process of Q-sorting.  Q-methodology is a pattern analytic tool that 
reduces the data from individual Q-sorts of the statements provided in the Q-set through 
identifying regularities across multiple Q-sorts by means of the pattern analytic technique of 
factors analysis. In chapter 2, I noted that texts are more than language and include a range 
of artefacts that can be given “interpretive gloss” (Parker, 1990, p. 193). I consider the 
factors to require further interpretation noting with Parker (1990a) that: “We have to bring a 
knowledge of discourses from outside onto any example or fragment of discourse for it to 
become part of a coherent system in our analysis” (p. 192). This accords with the practice of 
the DA schools of Q-methodology where it is noted that the initial description of a factor 
must be complemented “by a more thorough cultural analysis” (Curt, 1994, p. 125). Thus 
factor descriptions need to be distinguished from discourses. Further analysis is required to 
situate these accounts within the discursive context of representation and education of 
intellectually disabled people in Buffalo City. This is achieved through an examination of 
the discursive context in which representation and education of intellectually disabled people 
takes place.  
 
The various accounts are not viewed as a fixed property of one individual or of a group of 
individuals who could be clustered together as a type or category of persons. The Q-method 
factor can be viewed as part of a cyclical process of discourse analysis in which the 
participants and researcher play more, or less, salient roles in determining what is analysed 
and how.  This cyclical process can be represented in the form of successive steps: 
1. The delineation of the concourse can be seen as the first discourse analytic step, 
which draws from culturally available ways of doing or saying. This can be through 
the direct involvement of participants of the Q-study, where the Q-set is derived from 
participant interviews and the same participants sort the statements (such as in 
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Kitzinger’s (1985) study of lesbianism). It can also be indirect where the concourse is 
drawn from a wide range of textual sources. For example, Bryant et al. (2006) 
include data on previous studies and interviews, which may include the Q-study 
participants or others assumed to have important similarities to the study participants. 
The researcher’s role is to draw the line as to what is deemed relevant. 
2. The selection of Q statements for the Q-set involves a form of thematic analysis, 
where discursive themes that can be expressed through particular statements are 
delineated from the concourse.  This is most often carried out by the researcher alone 
(but see Billard (1999) for alternatives that include participants more in the process).  
3. The participant takes centre stage in the ranking of statements in a Q-sort. As they 
pattern the statements within the Q-set, they are working with statements to fashion 
available discourses into useable patterns.  
4. The researcher then relies on quantitative analysis through the use of a statistical 
software package to reduce the variation presented by the participants. The objective, 
quantitative position adopted here is enriched by the researcher decisions made in 
factor rotation, which have an impact on the ultimate factor structure.  
5. In the analysis stage the researcher is the main “giver-of-meaning” to the data 
through describing and interpreting the factors. The participants can be involved in 
elucidating and supporting factor interpretations.  At this stage, the researcher’s view 
of discourse as descriptive or constructive will determine the level to which the 
description of factors goes.  
6. The constructive effects of discourse require, in my view, a further level of analysis 
where the researcher brings a range of cultural knowledge to bear upon factor 
interpretation and aims to foreground the power/knowledge effects of different 
discourses. This interpretation of factors is researcher led again but allows the 
opportunity to draw on other texts and practices to relate factors to textual and social 
practices outside of the factors delineated. In this respect the interpretation employs 
the analytic of tectonics described by Curt (1994) which seeks to understand how 
power and knowledge is constructed through this interplay.  Wendy Stainton Rogers 
describes Q as a method of discourse analysis insofar as it is used to: 
gain insight into what is being  “knowledged into being. Our primary concern 
is to find out about the purposes to which the text …is being used: what ideas 
are being peddled? What ideologies are being promoted? What  is being 
covered up and who is being silenced? Who gains and who loses? (1998, p. 
12) 
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In terms of my theoretical perspective, these questions are framed as the conditions of 
possibility that constrain and produce the intellectually disabled subject within educational 
practice. It is this application of Q-methodology, which looks at the interplay of discourses, 
that marks out a critical, political agenda for Q-methodology as opposed to a liberal pluralist 
approach that treats all accounts as merely expressions of different points of view (R. 
Stainton Rogers, 1995; W. Stainton Rogers, 1998). The epistemological equivalence of 
discourses does not imply that there is a moral or political equivalence of different 
discourses.  
 
While recognising the inextricable relationship between representation and practice, I have 
adopted within Q-methodology an analytic that teases out what Curt (1994) terms different 
“moments” of discourse. I shall make an explicit distinction between representation of 
intellectual disability and the practices of education of people so categorised, using this as an 
analytic tool to highlight the mutually constitutive nature of the way we understand a type of 
person (a “human kind” in Hacking’s terms (1999, p.34)) and the practice that is followed or 
is deemed to be desirable. I take this approach not because these “moments” of discourse are 
separate but rather for the opposite reason — they are intimately related and it therefore 
becomes important to examine the interaction between them (Curt, 1994). The effect of this 
distinction is threefold: 
1. It recognises that the objects of discourse that are constructed through 
representational work are deployed in particular ways in social practices.  Thus, for 
example, the biomedical construction of intellectual disability enables certain 
practices (such as assessment) and disallows others (such as independent decision-
making).  
2. This distinction serves to tease out the different processes involved in knowing an 
object from the proper associated practices accorded that object. This distinction 
undermines the taken-for-granted information — the ‘facts’ about intellectual 
disability — that construct obvious and desirable forms of action. Once the 
representational work is revealed as contingent and socially determined, the obvious 
course of action can also be interrogated with respect to the effects that it achieves. 
3. The distinction acknowledges that representations, images or portrayals of a category 
of individuals seem to be more resistant to change than policy development toward 
this group. As Curt (1994) puts it: “As new stories are told around old 
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representations, new flesh may be formed on the bones of the old, but the bones 
themselves go marching on, and remain archivally accessible” (p. 93). The persistent 
marginalisation of intellectually disabled people, despite the development of 
progressive policies that aim toward inclusion in society, bears testimony to the 
enduring “bones of the old”.  
 
Thus, for the purpose of this study the constructive effects of discourse for the intellectually 
disabled subject are unpacked through a methodology that distinguishes between different 
“moments” of discourse in representation and practice.  
The Application of Q-method in the Current Study 
In the previous section, I have outlined my reasons for using Q-methodology in this study 
and noted my specific orientation to the method. In this section, I present the application of 
Q-methodology in the current study of intellectual disability. I shall begin by showing how 
the methodology will be used to address my research questions before moving on to a 
detailed description of the application of the method in the current study.   
 Research Questions 
My first question is:  
1. What discourses are deployed in the representation of those identified as intellectually 
disabled in Buffalo City, South Africa? 
In order to address this questions I developed Q-set A, which was drawn from the concourse 
of statements used in representation of intellectual disability. I carried out four Q-studies 
with this Q-set. The participants were drawn from three groups – intellectually disabled 
adults, parents of intellectually disabled children or adults and professionals working with 
intellectually disabled people. The studies for each of these groups were done separately and 
formed Q-studies A1, A2 and A3, as noted in Table 3.  
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Table 3: Number of Q-studies and Participants in Each Study for Q-set A 
 
Q-study Q-set  Participants 
A1 A 22 intellectually disabled adults 
A2 A 301
A3 
 parents of intellectually disabled children 
or adults  
A  33 professionals involved in education of 
intellectually disabled people 
A4 A Factors derived from Q-studies A1, A2 and 
A3 as Q-sorts. (See below) 
 
Q-studies A1, A2 and A3 were analysed separately resulting in the identification of 14 
factors. Q-study A4 includes all of these factors in a second-order study as a summarising 
and comparative exercise, resulting in four factors. This study is what is termed a second-
order factor analysis (Watts, 2002) and it makes use of the factors derived from Q-studies 
A1, A2 and A3  as the Q-sorts, which are then subject to factor analysis. I chose to undertake 
these two levels of analysis in order to pay detailed attention to the accounts of the different 
groups. As has been noted in chapters 3 and 4 the accounts drawn on by non-professionals 
have been dominated by the discourses of expertise.  However, due to the variability of these 
accounts, I have not described them as discourses but rather refer to them as accounts and 
only refer to them in the discussion in chapters 8 and 9 where there is a particular point of 
interest to be noted. The factor descriptions that resulted from Q-study A4 were considered 
to be a coherent summary of the component studies (A1, A2 and A3), yielding what I would 
term discourses in the critical framework that I have adopted.  
 
My second research question is: 
2. What discourses are deployed concerning the practices of education of those identified as 
intellectually disabled in Buffalo City, South Africa? 
In order to address my second research question I developed Q-set B drawn from the 
concourse on education of intellectually disabled children in the Buffalo City district. This 
study included 63 participants, 31 parents of intellectually disabled children or adults and 32 
professionals involved in education of intellectually disabled people. Intellectually disabled 
adults were not included in this study because of the complexity of the research instrument 
                                                 
1 While there are 30 participants, there are 31 Q-sorts due to the  fact that I, as the researcher, completed two Q-
sorts. 
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and the research task (this will be discussed further below). From this study, six factors were 
identified for interpretation as discourses of education of intellectually disabled people.  
 
My third question is as follows: 
3. What are the effects of these discourses in constructing the intellectually disabled subject 
and associated educational practice? 
The analysis of the factors identified in the first and second questions is based on an analytic 
that separates “moments of discourse” into representation and practice. My third question 
examines how the interplay between these discourses of representation and practice support 
each other and delineates areas of contestation between different discourses. In order to do 
this I make connections between representation and practice on conceptual grounds and 
through reference to demographic information of the participants. I shall explain the research 
methodology for the current study in detail below.  
 Research Method   
In this section, the detailed research method for the current study is presented taking into 
consideration the following:   
1. Participant sampling. 
2. Generation of the Q-sets: Item sampling. 
3. The ranking procedure: Q-sorting.  
4. Statistical analysis. 
5. Interpretation of the factors (Watts, 2002). 
Participant Sampling 
Given the notion of a finite diversity of views, sampling of participants is directed at 
ensuring that the range of views is represented through their selection. The selection of 
participants is theory driven to the extent that variation is seen to be distributed across any 
given population (Robbins & Krueger, 2000). Participants are selected who seem, on the 
basis of the researcher’s knowledge of the topic, to provide access to distinctive points of 
view.  I, as the researcher, consider myself to be qualified in this respect, having worked in 
the field of education for disabled children for over 20 years as a researcher, teacher trainer 
and community facilitator. I also have personal experience as the mother of an intellectually 
disabled child. From this experience I have noted that parents, intellectually disabled adults 
and professionals can be expected to approach the issue of education from different angles. It 
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was for this reason that three groups of participants (for studies A1, A2 and A3), who were 
anticipated to draw on different understandings, were identified. I also made every attempt to 
gain a diversity of racial groups since in the South African context the significance of race 
cannot be ignored. However, a caution is made here that the selection of participants is not 
intended to allow for extrapolation of a particular discourse to racial, disability or gender 
categories. Rather these dimensions of diversity are traced as they interact in the deployment 
of discourses in particular enabling or constraining contexts.  
 
It was  noted that the expression of the views of intellectually disabled people themselves is 
an important consideration of a disability studies approach (see chapter 2) and therefore 
ways were sought to ensure their inclusion. Informal networking on the Q-method list 
reveals that Q has been used with intellectually disabled people with some success. Wolf 
(personal communication, 25 July 2007) noted that working with intellectually disabled 
adults was a rewarding experience in her study of the views of sickness and invalids’ benefit 
clients in a Q-methodological study in New Zealand. The participants were grateful for the 
opportunity to participate and they appeared to engage in a satisfying manner with the Q-
sorting exercise. Van Exel (personal communication, 18 July 2007)  noted in his research 
that Q-methodology was a useful and rewarding tool to use in planning services for 
intellectually disabled people and found it helpful in accessing the rarely studied views of 
intellectually disabled people. In order to ensure genuine expression within the methodology 
the views of intellectually disabled people must be included in the concourse and the Q-set. 
In addition, the Q-sorting process should be accessible to intellectually disabled people. The 
demographic details of participants for each of the studies is described below.  
Q-study A1. 
The definition of intellectual disability used for participant selection was a recipient of 
services directed toward intellectually disabled people. However, the participants were also 
given the opportunity to self-identify. Six identified as having an intellectual disability, 
seven reported a physical disability, five said they had a disability but were not sure how to 
describe it and four reported no disability at all. Twenty-two participants were selected 
through the assistance of the following organisations: 
1. Down Syndrome Association Amathole. This is a local branch of a national 
organisation, Down Syndrome South Africa, which aims to support people with 
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intellectual disabilities and their families. Parents of intellectually disabled children 
and adults run the organisation.  
2. McClelland Adult Centre for the Intellectually Impaired, a residential centre for 
intellectually disabled adults with a sheltered workshop on the premises. The 
workshop also caters for non-resident adults. 
3. Parkland Special School. This is a special school for learners with intellectual 
disability that is run by the Eastern Cape Department of Education. It is housed in 
brand new, state of the art buildings in a suburb of East London, Beacon Bay. It was 
developed as a merged entity from two schools —McClelland School and Parkside 
Centre. The learners and staff come from a diverse range of racial groups. 
 
These organisations provided the names of adults who met the criteria set for intellectual 
disability and whom they felt would be competent in the sorting task. They were then 
contacted individually to request interviews and set a time, place and date for the interview. 
Some requested the presence of their parents during the interview and others did not specify. 
At McClelland Centre no parents were present as the interviews were conducted at the 
centre. All of these participants were based in Buffalo City. My previous experience in the 
field ensured trust and cooperation. 
 
The participant sample displayed the following demographic characteristics: 
Ages: Ranged from 18-60 years, with an average of 32 years and a standard deviation of 
11.83 years. 
Gender: 11 males and 11 females.  
Race: 17 participants were white, three black and two coloured 
Employment: 11 participants were employed in a sheltered workshop, 8 in the open market 
and 2 had no employment. 
 
The racial composition of this participant group was largely white. The reasons for this are 
mainly due to the language issues. The pool of black intellectually disabled adults who 
would have sufficient command of English to complete the Q-sorting task appeared to be 
very small on investigation. If a Xhosa translation had been available this issue could have 
been addressed but it was not within the scope of the current study to develop such a 
translation.  
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Q-study A2. 
Parents of children and adults who were identified as being intellectually disabled (either 
because they received their education in a special school for intellectually disabled learners 
or because they were placed in sheltered employment or hostel facilities for intellectually 
disabled people) were the participants in this Q-study. This consisted of 30 parents who were 
recruited through: 
1. Down Syndrome Association Amathole. 
2. Canaan Care Centre, a day care centre that describes itself as “a safe place for brain 
injured children”. It is privately funded through donations.  
3. REHAB Organisation for Persons with Disabilities, founded in 1997, when the 
Societies for Mental Health, Physical Disability and the Blind disbanded to form one 
organisation to provide an integrated service to all people with disabilities and to 
extend services to the rural areas. 
4. Parkland Special School.  
 
As for Q-study A1 these organisations provided me with names of parents whom I then 
contacted to arrange individual interviews (occasionally two were interviewed at the same 
time). All were based in East London and were selected to reflect a range of diversity on the 
following dimensions: 
1. Age of child.  
2. Inclusive or segregated employment or educational settings for their child. 
3. Race and language groups. 
As the researcher and a parent, I did a repeated Q-sort with both Q-sets. My own Q-sorts 
therefore account for two of the participant sorts, thus making 31 Q-sorts available from 30 
participants. This was both to make explicit my location as a researcher (S. Brown, Undated; 
S.R. Brown, 1997; Curt, 1994) and to explore any changes in perspective that I might have 
undergone through the research process. This will be discussed in the results section.  
 
Demographic information on the participants is as follows: 
Ages: Ranged from 27 to 64 years, with an average of 43 years and a standard deviation of 
13. 6 years. 
Gender: 22 female and 8 male. 
Race: 15 participants were black, 14 were white and one was coloured. 
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Employment: Seven participants worked in administrative positions, one in sales, two in 
outreach to disabled people, six were self-employed, two were teachers, four were in 
medical professions, and eight were unemployed.  
Q-study A3. 
The 33 participants in this study are professionals who work with intellectually disabled 
people. They include psychologists, teachers in ordinary and special schools, district 
officials and a medical doctor. Participants were recruited from: 
1. Parkland Special School (six participants). This school was described for Q-study 
A1. 
2. Khayalethu Special School (five participants). This is a special school for children 
with intellectual disability. It falls under the Eastern Cape Department of Education. 
It was previously, under apartheid, a school for black children and continues to serve 
this population exclusively.  Similarly the staff is all black. It is much less well-
resourced than Parkland Special School. 
3. Inyathi Primary School (four participants). This is a primary school in Duncan 
Village, one of the poorest areas of East London. The staff have had little or no 
training in inclusive education and operate under difficult conditions. For example, 
they have large classes and the toilets at the school have been out of operation for an 
extended period.  
4. Ebotwe Full Service School (four participants). This school has been identified as the 
full-service school for the district. As such teachers have been trained in inclusive 
education and the school is being upgraded physically to meet a wider range of 
learning needs (see chapter 4 for an explanation of full-service schools). It is situated 
in Mdantsane, a formerly black “township” of East London now incorporated in the 
municipality of Buffalo City.  
5. Hudson Park Primary School (two participants). This school previously served white 
children only and now caters for all races. However, the composition of the staff, 
which is largely white, does not match the diversity of the student population. Both 
of these participants have had some experience in teaching intellectually disabled 
children in the mainstream. 
6. Members of the district based support team (two participants). This team is a critical 
support structure for inclusive education and includes a range of education support 
staff and district officials (see chapter 4).  
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7. Staff from REHAB (four participants) involved in inclusive education projects.  
8. Practitioners in private practice (two participants) who deal with disabled children 
and support their parents in making educational decisions.  
9. The director of Canaan Care Centre (one participant). 
10. Past and current Masters in Education students at the University of Fort Hare and 
Rhodes University (three participants). Their current research was not focused on 
education of intellectually disabled children.  
Permission was sought and gained from the East London Education District Manager (see 
Appendix A) to interview teachers and district officials in the East London education 
district. I wrote a letter to these schools, with a copy of the district director’s consent 
attached (see for example, Appendix B), requesting their participation and offering to visit 
them to arrange suitable times. Interviews were then set up by the school principals at the 
schools’ convenience, in such a way as not to disrupt learning and teaching activities. 
Similarly interviews were arranged with the district officials. Additional teachers beyond 
those at the designated schools participated as individuals outside of the school jurisdiction 
but were aware of the district director’s consent. For those professionals who worked at 
REHAB the consent of the organisation’s director was sought and gained. The private 
practitioners gave their own consent. I received enthusiastic cooperation  from the schools 
and the individual participants. Interviews were arranged in advance telephonically with an 
explanation of the nature of the research, the time it would take and the kind of task that it 
entailed. The demographic information for this group of participants is presented below. 
 
Ages: Ranged from 30 to 61 years, with an average of 44 years and a standard deviation of 
7.8 years. 
Gender: 29 female and four male.  
Race: 17 participants were black, 12 were white, three “coloured” and one Asian.  
Employment: Seven participants were teachers in special schools and 12 in regular schools. 
There was one teachers’ aide from a special school. Four principals, three of them from 
special schools or centres, and one from a regular school participated in the study. Three 
participants were psychologists (two of these were district officials). There was one medical 
doctor, two therapists and one inclusive education consultant. There were also two 
community development facilitators.  
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Q-study A4. 
As noted above Q-study A4 was a second order study. Thus there were no direct participants 
in the study. The factors that were entered as Q-sorts in this study derived from the 
participants in Q-studies, A1, A2 and A3.  
Q-study B. 
For Q-study B, the same participants as for Q-studies A2 and A3 completed the task. In Q-
study B there are 63 Q-sorts (62 participants, see above) rather than 64 as expected if all 
participants from Q-studies A2 and A3 took part in Q-study B. This is because one of the 
participants in Q-study A3 (a black, female teacher at a regular school) declined to complete 
the second Q-sort due to another pressing engagement. This was her prerogative as agreed 
upon in the consent form. As noted above, intellectually disabled adults did not complete the 
second Q-sort due to the complexity of the material and the sorting task. I believe that a 
different methodology, which I have not been able to explore here, would be better suited to 
eliciting the very important contribution that this group would make to discussions of 
education for intellectually disabled people.  
 
As a token of my appreciation to the organisations (not individuals) that arranged interviews, 
I made a small donation to their running costs and assisted with networking opportunities. 
Their participation was not dependent on this as they did not know about it prior to making 
arrangements. At Khayalethu Special School I was invited as a guest speaker for a school 
function, a duty that I was happy to perform.   
 
Generation of the Q-sets 
Two different Q-sets were developed and these were selected from different, but 
overlapping, concourses of statements:   
1. Q-set A concerned the representation of intellectually disabled people in response to 
a general question: “What do you think an intellectually disabled person is like?”  
2. Q-set B concerned the practice of education for intellectually disabled people in 
response to the general question: “What do you think about education for 
intellectually disabled people?” 
The concourse for each of these Q-sets was delimited with consideration to sampling what it 
is possible to say and do with regard to any social phenomenon (Stenner, Watts, & Worrell, 
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2008). In my view, care needs to be taken to avoid replicating dominant accounts and 
ensuring that the concourse will be sufficiently broad to allow culturally devalued accounts 
to be identified. For the purposes of addressing the research questions a comprehensive 
development of the concourse was called for. However, it could include all that there is to 
say and do on the topic. For example, the views of severely and profoundly intellectually 
disabled people were not accessible to the researcher at this point due to practical and time 
constraints. These did not form part of the concourse and therefore did not feature as an 
option in the ranking procedure. Furthermore, this category of persons did not undertake the 
ranking task due to the intellectual barriers that the task poses. While constitutive discourses 
about this category can emerge through the patterning process, discourses of resistance that 
might be deployed by this group will, most likely, be absent.   I  recognise this as a limitation 
in the current study and see it as a future research direction. The precise delineation of the 
concourse for this study will be elaborated on below. 
 
Although there were two different concourses for the different Q-sets, there was an overlap 
between the documents used in each concourse. As Eden, Donaldson and Walker (2005) 
point out, the delineation of the concourse is not a simple task and is extremely time 
consuming. I had the advantage in the current study of being immersed in the field of 
education for intellectually disabled people for most of my working life. I was therefore able 
to identify salient accounts and documents that should be included in the concourse.  
 
A major concern was with setting criteria as to whether the concourse is sufficiently 
complete. I followed the approach of Eden et al.  (2005), which was to draw on grounded 
theory principles by attempting to reach a saturation point where statements start to be 
repeated. In addition completeness was sought in a deliberate and focused effort to ensure 
that accounts originating from marginalised groups, specifically of intellectually disabled 
people, women and black South Africans are represented in the concourse.  The range of 
documents used is presented below with specific details provided in Appendix C.  
1. Transcripts of interviews already conducted by myself and co-researchers for 
Inclusion International (II), which is a global federation of family-based 
organisations advocating for the human rights of people with intellectual disabilities 
worldwide ( ://www.inclusion-international.org/en/index. ). Permission was granted 
to make use of these transcripts by the lead researchers.   
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2. Transcripts of interviews already conducted for an evaluation of Disabled Children’s 
Action Group for Norsk Forbund for Utviklingshemmede (NFU) in 2006 by co-
researchers and myself. Permission was granted to make use of these transcripts by 
the lead researchers.  
3. Documents within the public domain including a) policy documents, b) South 
African text books that deal with education of intellectually disabled people, and c) 
media reports on intellectual disability from the local newspaper (the Daily Dispatch) 
over the past three years. 
4. Literature review conducted in chapters 3 and 4 of this study 
5. Presentations and reports from intellectually disabled self-advocates for Inclusion 
International, all of which appear in the public domain 
 
By sifting through these documents I developed two separate sets of statements from which 
to draw the Q-sets. There were 205 statements for Q-set A, and 300 for Q-set B. I then 
proceeded to cut down the number of statements. Unfortunately, as was noted by Eden et al. 
(2005), there is not a great deal of guidance in the literature on how specifically to approach 
this task and I developed my own procedure utilising pointers from the existing literature. 
These were: 
 
Step 1: I reviewed each concourse and eliminated statements that were in direct repetition.  
 
Step 2: Themes were identified for each Q-set, using a thematic analysis as a preliminary 
procedure to feed into a theoretical model aligned with discourse theory and Q-methodology. 
As such I engaged in the following process based on the procedure described by Braun and 
Clarke ( 2006), leaving out the more analytic processes as these are undertaken in the 
application of Q-method.  Firstly, I familiarised myself with the statements through repeated 
readings and noted down initial ideas at each reading. I then grouped the statements, 
generating initial codes and applying codes to sets of data that cohered together in a 
systematic fashion.  From here, I proceeded to collate codes into potential themes. 
For Q-set A, the following themes emerged: 
1. (In)dependence. 
2. Family vs. state responsibility. 
3. (In)competence. 
4. (In)visibility. 
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5. Static or dynamic nature. 
6. Issues of voice and identity. 
7. Exclusion/inclusion. 
8. Qualitative difference vs. quantitative difference. 
For Q-set B, the themes were as follows: 
1. Individual issues. 
2. Parent issues. 
3. Community issues. 
4. Departmental/management issues.  
5. School issues. 
6. Teacher issues. 
7. State level/policy/economic issues. 
8. Care vs. education.  
9. Nature of the curriculum for intellectually disabled people. 
10. Segregation and inclusion and degrees in between. 
 
Step 3: The statements in each of the themes were reviewed again for repetition and positive 
and negative versions of the same proposition. They were adapted in consideration of Rex 
Stainton Rogers’ (1995) criteria in the following manner: 
1. Balance — the statements were sorted for a balance between positive and negative 
and neutral propositions. This is in order to give sufficient opportunity for 
participants to populate the most agree to most disagree continuum.  
2. Intelligibility and simplicity — these aspects were especially important for 
intellectually disabled adults and were addressed by attempting to use simple clear 
language.  
3. Appropriateness to the issue — consideration of the theoretical framework and the 
research questions ensured a focus on relevant information.  
4. Comprehensiveness — a sufficiently wide range of statements, reflective of the finite 
diversity of the concourse should be addressed without repetition occurring.  
Through this process, Q-set A was reduced from 205 to 133 statements. Q-set B was reduced 
from 300 to 228.   
 
Step 4: Both Q-sets were presented to a range of experts, one an expert in Q-methodology, 
one in intellectual disability and two in education of children with disabilities. Their 
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comments guided further adjustments with regard to Rex Stainton Rogers’ (1995) criteria 
above. At this stage, the decision as to how much to change the statements from their 
original form had to be taken. While there is recognition that statements should be replicated 
as closely as possible to their original occurrence, there was also the need to meet the 
demanding criterion of intelligibility for intellectually disabled adults in Q-set A. Most 
reviewers expressed concern about the complexity of the material for Q-set A. At this stage 
the number of statements was reduced to 40 for Q-set A and 80 for Q-set B with a balance 
sought between simplicity and comprehensiveness.  
 
 
Step 5: Piloting of the sets developed in Step 4 was undertaken with two intellectually 
disabled adults for Q-set A and with five professionals and parents for Q-sets A and B. This 
indicated that for Q-set A the language and ranking procedure needed to be simplified but 
the content was found to be useful and comprehensive.  The conversion of the statements to 
a simpler and easy read format was commissioned.  An organisation based in the United 
Kingdom, Inspired Services, converted the statements, the letter of information, the consent 
form and the task instructions into an easy to read format that incorporates both clear and 
understandable language and the use of pictures to aid understanding. This modification was 
applied only for the intellectually disabled adult group. 
 
In terms of Q-set B, it was noted that it was too long, particularly since the participants were 
required to do both Q-set A and Q-set B in the same sitting. Reduction in this case was 
achieved by going back again to the research questions and removing more peripheral issues. 
These were largely from the State level/policy/economic issues and the 
Departmental/management issues. The language used in the statements also had to be 
adapted somewhat to meet the needs of English second language speakers.  
 
As a result of these steps, two Q-sets were developed, Q-set A with 40 statements presented 
in two formats (the easy to read version with pictures and the text version) and Q-set B with 
60 statements. Each statement was printed onto a laminated card that could be moved around 
as the participant deliberated on the ranking of the statement for his or her own Q-sort. These 
complete Q-sets are presented in chapters 6 and 7 in a discussion of the findings.  
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The Ranking Procedure: Q-sorting 
The procedure will be discussed below in detail for Q-set A and additional information for 
Q-set B will then be provided.   
Q-set A. 
S. R. Brown (1980) states that Q-sets of 40 statements or less can safely use a scale of +4 to 
– 4. From the pilot study with intellectually disabled adults it became apparent  that this was 
too complex and a simpler than usual ranking system was required.  Watts (personal 
communication, 6 March, 2008) warns against a scale that is too simple since there will not 
be room to express difference and Q-sorts will therefore correlate with each other very 
highly. He suggests a compromise of a 7-point scale (from +3 to-3), which was ultimately 
adopted. The compromise was made in order to include intellectually disabled adults.  The 
finding of statistically significant factors in all studies suggests that there was sufficient 
expression of variation.  
 
The responses were grouped in a quasi-normal distribution that is illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Numbers of Responses that Participants Can Make at Each Level of Dis/Agreement for Q-set A 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
       
       
       
       
 [4] 
 
     [4] 
 
 
[5]    [5]  
     
[7]  
 
[7] 
 [8] 
 
 
Note. The numbers in square brackets at the bottom of each column indicate the number of statements that 
should be placed in each column. Thus for-3 and +3 there should be four statements in each column and for 0 
there should be eight items.  
 
In line with Stenner et al. (2008), items, each printed on its own card, were sorted by 
participants and moved around and exchanged until their best expression was obtained. The 
participants were then asked if there was any change that they would like to make before the 
statement numbers were recorded into the matrix provided. Intellectually disabled adults 
completed the task in a one on one situation with the ongoing support of the researcher in 
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terms of reading, writing and comprehension of the sorting task. This was based on a 
relationship of trust and allowing plenty of time for responses.  
 
Each participant was given an extra page where they could comment on any single one of 
the statements if they wished. In addition, they were asked, orally, their reasons for choosing 
the items that they agreed with or disagreed with the most. They were also asked to express 
their general understanding of intellectual disability after completing the Q-sort.  These 
comments were used to support factor interpretation.  
 
Participants with intellectual disability were given the explicit instruction:  
“There are many people with disabilities. Some people have a physical disability. 
Some people cannot see well. Some people cannot hear. Some people have an 
intellectual disability and have difficulty in learning. I want us to talk about people 
who have an intellectual disability, like the people in this picture. People say many 
things about people with intellectual disability. We have written down some of the 
things people say about people with an intellectual disability. Please read or listen to 
these. For each one please tell me if you agree, disagree or don’t know. I will then ask 
you to decide which ones you agree with more than others and which you disagree 
with more than others.” 
 
These instructions and the statements were presented orally in the easy read format including 
pictures for the intellectually disabled adults. See Figure 2 for an example of the statement 
cards. Inspired Services, based on their experience with intellectually disabled adults in the 
UK, recommended the use of pictures (http://www.inspiredservices.org.uk/). In the selection 
of the pictures they paid attention to diverse representations according to race age and 
disability. They recommended the use of line drawings as being easier to understand than 
photos. 
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Figure 2: Example of easy to read version of statements 
 
 
 
The ranking procedure was carried out in one to one personal interviews. Where the 
participant was unable to read the interviewer read the statements for him or her. Sometimes 
further explanation was required both for those who could and could not read in such a way 
as to encourage the participant to make their own judgement.  
Interviews were conducted in the residential facility at McClelland Centre for the 
Intellectually Impaired, at the participants’ homes and in coffee shops or places of work. All 
of the participants were very keen to participate and all gave consent after a detailed 
explanation of the purpose of the study (see letter of information in Appendix E). 
 
A consideration for Q-study A1 is that the respondents themselves have been classified in 
some way or another (either through attending special school or being in sheltered 
employment or residential placement) as having an intellectual disability. However, they 
were not asked to complete the Q-sort from their own position but rather to express their 
views on intellectual disability in general. This was done in order to ensure that statements 
that might seem derogatory or stigmatising when applied to oneself can rather be seen as 
“what some people say”. There was no requirement to identify personally with these 
statements.  
 
There were some difficulties encountered in the Q-sorting process with intellectually 
disabled adults, including the following: 
 
 
15. They can have a long-term relationship or get married 
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1. Inability to read the statements (only about half of the participants were literate). I 
overcame this by reading to them and explaining the meaning in as neutral a fashion 
as possible. 
2. Tendency to focus on the picture provided. This only applied to some participants 
who felt that they were commenting on the picture rather than the statement. This 
was very difficult to counter and fortunately was only evident in two cases. 
3. Difficulty with rating one statement above another. I overcame this by going through 
the statements one by one saying: “Do you dis/agree with this a lot or a little?” and 
then sorting them into piles until they fitted into the forced distribution. 
 
However, the analysis derived is sufficiently coherent and convincing to demonstrate that the 
technique was used effectively to gain accounts of intellectual disability from intellectually 
disabled adults (see chapter 6).  
 
Participants from the professional and parents’ groups were given the following instructions: 
“On these cards I have recorded statements that people make about people with 
intellectual disability. Read these statements and sort them into three piles  – one pile 
for those statements you agree with, one for those you disagree with and one for those 
about which you feel neutral, do not know or feel would need some sort of 
qualification before you could state your views. Once you have done this I will ask you 
to sort them into the ones you agree or disagree with more than others. There is no 
right or wrong answer. I am interested in your own point of view.”  
 
For the parents, interviews were conducted at their homes, at the Down Syndrome Amathole 
offices or at REHAB, according to whichever was most convenient for them. Professionals 
were interviewed at the schools, in their offices, homes or coffee shops as requested.  
 
A completed grid is illustrated in Figure 3 below. The numbers in the first and last rows 
indicate the level of (dis)agreement from -3 to +3.  This was the same ranking system as 
used for intellectually disabled adults so that the Q-studies would be comparable.  
 
 
 
 
 138 
Figure 3: A Completed Q-sort Entered Into a Grid. 
-3  
Strongly disagree 
-2 
Disagree  
-1 
Disagree somewhat 
0 
Neutral, do not 
know 
1 
Agree somewhat 
2 
Agree 
3 
Strongly agree 
2 5 4 1 12 14 15 
10 6 9 3 19 21 18 
16 7 13 11 20 22 25 
33 8 17 24 23 28 35 
[4] 40 26 27 30 29 [4] 
 
 
[5] 34 32 31 [5]  
 36 37 39  
[7] 38 [7] 
 [8]  
Note. The numbers in square brackets indicate the number of statements that are required in each column. 
Numbers in the remaining cells indicate the number of the statement that is placed in that position. The order of 
numbers in the column has no significance. 
 
Q-set B. 
In Q-set B the complexity of the ranking procedure was less of an issue as this did not 
include intellectually disabled adults.  I made use of the 13-point scale for 60 items in line 
with recommendations made by S. R. Brown (1980). This is illustrated in Figure 4 below.  
 
Figure 4: Numbers of Responses that Participants Can Make at Each Level of Dis/Agreement for Q-set B  
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 
             
             
[2]            [2] 
 [3]          [3]  
 [4]        [4]  
 [5]      [5]  
 [6] [6]  [6] [6]  
  [7]   
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 
Note. The numbers in square brackets at the bottom of each column indicate the number of statements that 
should be placed in each column. Thus for -6 and +6 there should be two items in each column and for 0 there 
should be 8 items.  
 
The statements for each Q-set were printed and laminated and cut up into cards with one 
statement per card. 
The instructions for this task were as follows; 
“On these cards I have recorded statements that people make about the education of 
people with intellectual disability. We will do the same task as we did with the first set 
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of cards, except that there are more cards in this set and you will have more choices 
about how strongly you agree or disagree with the statements. Read these statements 
and sort them into three piles  – one pile for those statements you agree with, one for 
those you disagree with and one for those about which you feel neutral, do not know or 
feel would need some sort of qualification before you can state your views. Once you 
have done this I will ask you to sort them into the ones you agree or disagree with 
more than others. There is no right or wrong answer. I am interested in your own 
point of view.”  
 
Q-set B was completed in the same interview as Q-set A except in one case where we were 
not able to finish in one session and the second set was completed at a later date. As for Q-
set A, participants were asked to explain their reasons for the statements that they agreed 
with the most and those that they disagreed with the most and to express their general 
understanding of education for intellectually disabled people. They were also encouraged to 
note any comments that they might have on a separate page or ask the researcher to note 
them down.  
 
All participants were given a letter of information about the research and asked to sign a 
consent form if they agreed to be interviewed, which they all did. Most were extremely 
helpful and cooperative. They engaged seriously with the task and found it valuable and 
thought provoking.  
Statistical Analysis   
Each individual Q-sort was entered into PCQ for Windows (Stricklin & Almeida, 2004). An 
initial correlation of each Q-sort with every other Q-sort was performed and a centroid factor 
analysis was applied to the correlation matrix. While there are many debates about the 
usefulness of hand or judgemental rotation as opposed to the mathematically motivated 
Varimax rotation, I shall not enter into the debate here but rather refer the reader once again 
to S.R. Brown (1980) for a detailed discussion. For my purposes, I followed Watts (2002) in 
choosing a factor rotation solution that maximises a) the amount of variance accounted for 
by the factor and b) the number of Q-sorts significantly loading onto factors. Factors were 
subject to Varimax rotation with additional hand rotation to maximise the number of 
participants loading onto factors and the amount of variability accounted for by the factor 
solution.  
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The “strength” of a factor in terms of the percentage of variance that this factor accounts for 
is of limited significance for the following reasons: 
1. Participant selection does not claim to be representative of the entire population. 
Thus it would be making too strong a claim to assume that the factor strength (as 
evidenced by the amount of variation it accounts for) represents a position that is 
descriptive of the general population.  
2. The intention of this Q-methodological study is not to identify the strength of the 
factor but rather to identify the range of accounts that are available. As such each 
factor is equally significant from a theoretical perspective. The significance of the 
factors is not a function of its statistical weight (Kitzinger, 1999). 
 
The factors that were selected for interpretation were chosen on the basis that they have an 
eigenvalue in excess of one and each factor had at least two Q-sorts loading onto it. The 
eigenvalue is the sum of squared factor loadings onto that factor. As such it is a guide to the 
amount of variance that a factor accounts for. An eigenvalue greater than one indicates that 
the variance accounted for by that factor is greater than can be accounted for by any single 
Q-sort (S.R. Brown, 1980; Watts & Stenner, 2005). In the case of bipolar factors, where 
participants load either positively or negatively onto the same factor, thereby representing 
opposite views to each other, a criterion of one participant loading was accepted (see 
discussion of bipolar factors below).  
 
The sorts that load significantly onto a factor are termed factor exemplars (Stenner, et al., 
2008). All Q-sorts loading onto the factor are merged into one interpretable best estimate, 
which resulted in a score in each factor for each item (R. Stainton Rogers, 1995). The 
software does this automatically. In producing the merger of factors greater weight is given 
to the Q-sorts with higher factor loadings since they are better approximations of the factor 
being loaded. At least one item must be assigned to every ranking position (Stenner, et al., 
2008; Watts & Stenner, In press). Confounded Q-sorts that load onto more than one factor 
are excluded from the weighting procedure. The output of the statistical procedure is when 
each factor is represented by its own best estimate Q-sort or factor array (Watts & Stenner, 
2005). The factor array presents the items/statements that cluster together in a significant 
way with a rating score for each factor. This is the data that is then subject to interpretation 
in a more traditionally qualitative manner.  
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A further useful output of the statistical analysis is the identification of consensus and 
distinguishing statements. Consensus statements are those that achieve statistically 
significant agreement across all the factors within a Q-study. As such they indicate areas of 
agreement between the factors and such statements are not very discriminatory. On the other 
hand, distinguishing statements serve to highlight rankings within a factor that are 
statistically different from the rankings given in other factors within the same Q-study.  
These distinctive statements provide a useful key to interpretation as they highlight the way 
in which any one factor differs from others in the Q-study.  
 
For Q-study A1, a six-factor solution was adopted as accounting for the highest percentage 
of variance with significant factors. Factor A1.2 in this study, is bipolar, with each loading 
reflecting the opposite account of the other. Thus they are in fact, two separate factors with 
only one participant loading onto the factor. In this case the theoretical interest of retaining 
these factors with only one significant loading overrides the above stated criterion of at least 
two loading participants for a factor (S.R. Brown, September 8, 2008). For Q-studies A2 and 
A3 the same procedure of orthogonal varimax rotation and hand rotation was followed, 
resulting in six factor and five factor solutions respectively. 
 
Q-study A4 is what is termed a second order study. In this procedure, the factors that were 
identified in the three studies A1, A2 and A3 are entered as individual Q-sorts and a factor 
analysis is performed on these factors. This is possible because the same Q-set (Q-set A) and 
the same ranking scale (+3 to – 3) were used for all the participants in each of the three 
groups. The bipolar factors from Q-study A1 discussed above were excluded from the 
second-order study on the grounds that they did not meet the criteria for significant factors 
and matters of theoretical interest had been noted in Q-study A1. Thus 16 Q-sorts were 
entered (five factors from Q-studies A1 and A3 and six factors from Q-study A2). A four-
factor solution was adopted, accounting for the highest percentage of study variance with 
valid factors (eigenvalue greater than one with at least two significant loadings) and allowing 
all Q-sorts to load significantly. For Q-study B, a six-factor solution was adopted as 
accounting for the largest amount of variance with clear factor structure. 
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Interpretation of the Factors  
For each study a factor array is presented which indicates the weighted scores for each factor 
on every item. The factor arrays for the results that are presented for chapters 6 and 7 have 
been included in the Appendixes in the format illustrated in Table 4. This format was chosen 
so that the reader can refer to the factor array while reading the factor interpretations.  
 
Table 4: Structure of Tabular Presentation of Factor Arrays 
Statement Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
1.They are hidden away from the community. 
 
0 0 1 
2. Their disability is the fault of their mother because of something that 
she has done wrong. 
 
-2 1 0 
3. They are more likely to be poor than other people. 
 
1 -3 +2 
4. They have not had enough of the right chances to learn. 3 2 1 
Note. The numbers in the factors columns represent the weighted average ranking score of loading participants. 
 
For each Q-study, the statistically significant distinguishing and consensus statements are 
noted to review areas of commonality and difference. The statements themselves (not just 
the numbers of the statements) for each factor were placed into the response grid factor 
recreating an idealised Q-sort for that factor, as illustrated in Appendix D. For Q-studies A1, 
A2, A3 and A4, there were very few statistically significant distinguishing and consensus 
statements (possibly due to the limited rating scale of -3 to +3, as noted above). I therefore 
decided on an arbitrary criterion of two ranking points between the highest and lowest 
ranking given to a statement on a specific factor as reflecting a degree of consensus. In 
addition, I adopted the criterion of five points or more separating the highest and the lowest 
ranking score as a useful guide to factor interpretation, indicating a degree of disagreement. 
This is not of statistical significance but reflects rather the interpretation process where 
comparisons are made across factors in the process of constructing a narrative description of 
the factor (Stenner, et al., 2008). The significance of these disagreements will be highlighted 
in the factor summaries in chapter 6 and used to support factor interpretation. For Q-study B, 
there were sufficient statistically significant consensus and distinguishing statements to aid 
interpretation and this procedure was not deemed necessary.   
 
While ranking scores are compared in factor interpretation, it must be noted that the rank 
given in one factor is not directly comparable with that given on another factor. A ranking of 
-1 might indicate a greater degree of disagreement for one factor than for another. This is 
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because each factor is interpreted as a whole and the rank accorded to any one statement 
must be considered in the light of rankings given for other statements within that factor.  
 
Each factor was then described by building a narrative account of the factor by: 
1. Examining the items given the extreme scores (3, 2 and -3, -2 for Q studies A1, A2, 
A3 and A4 and 6, 5, 4 and-6, -5 and -4 for Q studies B1 and B2).  
2. Noting the differences between factors in scores. For example, while a score of +1 
might not be extreme, it is noteworthy where all the other factors have rated that item 
at-6.  
3. Linking the comments of the participants to factors in order to describe the factor 
more clearly. 
 
I looked for evidence in support of this interpretation in the comments made by participants. 
There were three sources of comments: 
1. Comments on the items that they most strongly agreed and disagreed with. 
2. Additional comments made on statements where participants felt that they would like 
to clarify their views. 
3. Comments on their general understanding of intellectual disability and education of 
people with intellectual disability. 
These comments were used to clarify the interpretation and to include participant voices in 
the researcher’s narrative. The comments of the participants were, in addition, useful for 
illuminating apparent discrepancies within a factor. What the researcher might see as a 
discrepancy might in fact reveal a subtlety that is being expressed by the participants. For 
example, in one account of intellectually disabled people, the statement “38. It does not 
matter what you call these people, intellectually disabled or mentally retarded, because the 
disability is still there.” was rated very positively. While at first it would indicate that this 
account portrayed negative labeling as unimportant, the comments revealed that there was a 
great deal of concern about this practice but that one should attempt to ignore it. In this sense 
labelling does not matter because the individual should not allow himself or herself to be 
intimidated by this practice. These subtle distinctions are not readily observed from the 
factor analysis alone. Paying close attention to these subtleties allows the researcher to listen 
more carefully to the participants and to adopt the participant perspective even if it seems to 
be contradictory at first.  
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At some point in building up the narrative, I named each factor with great caution. Kitzinger 
(1999) notes that the labels that are used for factors are contestable. Following her caution, I 
have presented the full factor arrays and the sets of Q-sort items for each Q-study in the 
Appendixes. This permits scrutiny of the ways in which factors have been described here.   
 
For both Q-sets, a set of thematic categories to organise the data was constructed, both for 
ease of presentation and analytical purposes. These categories are not identical with those 
that were used in the Q-set development process, nor with categorical distinctions that were 
made in chapters 3 and 4 regarding intellectual disability and educational practices. They 
are, however, informed by these categorical distinctions and reflect a reconstruction of 
themes within the particular context of this study. This accords with R. Stainton Rogers’ 
(1995) view that a thematic analysis can be used as a tool for developing the Q-set but 
should not fix categories for analysis as this has the possible effect of fixing the participants’ 
understanding a priori. 
Notational Conventions 
In factor description, certain notational conventions have been adopted. The Q-studies are 
labelled A1, A2, A3 and A4 for Q-set A. There is only one study of Q-set B. Each factor 
within the Q-study was labelled as well. Thus the factors in Q-study A1 are A1.1, A1.2, 
A1.2A, A1.3 and so forth. In Q-study A2, they are labelled A2.1, A2.2, A2.3 in similar 
fashion. While these factors are also given verbal names, they are often referred to in 
discussion by these shortened numerical forms.  
Each statement in both of the Q-studies is numbered and the statements in the Q-sets can be 
found in the factor arrays, presented in the Appendixes. In discussion of factors, the 
statement number and the rank that it is allocated appear as a reference for any claims made 
about the relative significance of that statement for the factor. For example, a ranking of +6 
on Statement 35 in Q-study B might be noted as important and would be referred to as (S35: 
+6). When participant comments relating to a specific statement are quoted to substantiate a 
claim made about a factor, this is noted in the following manner (S35: +6, P21). However, 
this does not mean that this participant necessarily gave the quoted ranking to the statement 
since the rating is drawn from a weighted average in the factor array. The participant serves 
as an advocate or spokesperson for the account identified by the factor, not as merely 
expressing his or her own idiosyncratic view. In some cases the participant’s comment might 
not relate to a specific statement (such as when it is drawn from comments of most agree 
 145 
with and least agree with or a general understanding); in this case it is referenced with the 
participant number alone as in (Comment, P21).  
 
Once the factor descriptions were derived from the data, a more in depth process of 
interpretation specifically aligned to the research questions was undertaken. In chapter 8, an 
analysis of the construction of the intellectually disabled subject in the light of the theoretical 
framework presented in chapter  two and literature review undertaken in chapter 3 is 
presented. This aspect of the research moves away from the application of Q-methodology 
and seeks to identify the effects of the discourses identified through Q. 
Research Methods to Identify the Effects of These Discourses 
In addressing the third question, regarding the constructive effects of discourses of 
intellectual disability and associated educational practices, I focused on the relations 
between Q-study A and Q-study B. It is not possible to make a direct statistically significant 
comparison between the factors of Q-study A4 and Q-study B since they have different 
participants and Q-sets. I therefore made the connections at a conceptual level where there 
appears to be valid reason to associate two factors, one from Q-study A4 and one from Q-
study B, on the grounds of conceptually similar understanding of intellectual disability.  In 
this section, I relate the discourses arising from the current study to the literature and locate 
them in a social and historical milieu. This analysis is presented in chapter 8 as an 
interpretation of the findings.  
Ethical Considerations 
There has been much debate within the disability movement as to who should do research 
around disability issues (Duckett, 1998). The experiences of people with disabilities have 
understandably led to some suspicion on the part of disabled people for non-disabled 
researchers. This suspicion is exacerbated when the research ignores the experience and  
theorising of disabled people (Shakespeare & Watson, 1996).  
 
One way of building trust is through transparency where the researcher is clear about his or 
her role, experiences and expectations (Scior, 2003). To this end I shall present a brief 
overview of my position and my reasons for undertaking this research. I have been a 
practitioner in the field of disability for the past 32 years, beginning with my qualification as 
a speech and hearing therapist in 1976. I became involved in the educational aspects of 
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disability in my work in the rural areas of South Africa in the late 1980s through working on 
community based rehabilitation programmes that highlighted the lack of opportunity 
afforded young people with disabilities. My specific focus on intellectual disability arises 
from the birth of my son with Down Syndrome 15 years ago. I am a white middle class 
woman who has primarily worked in non-racially aligned or largely black, African contexts. 
While I remain sceptical about concepts of race and their continued deployment within the 
South African context, it would also be foolhardy to deny the impact of racial classification 
through apartheid policies on myself and in my relations with other cultural or racial groups. 
In my working life I have always been engaged in supporting non-governmental and 
voluntary associations for the support of disabled people, both in a paid and voluntary 
capacity. To describe my position with respect to the current research, I would say that I am 
widely known in the research community as an advocate of disability rights, most especially 
in terms of access to education in mainstream settings.  My perspective is made clear within 
this research since I have followed R. Stainton Rogers (1995) by including my own views as 
a participant in the Q-sorting process. Unlike for any other participant I have identified my 
factor loadings and I can therefore be directly positioned with respect to the various accounts 
or discourses presented in this study. However, I have made every attempt to honour the 
views of all participants by presenting their views dispassionately and respectfully.  
 
The Department of Psychology Research Projects Review Committee of Rhodes University 
gave the ethical clearance for the research. I am committed to ensuring that the results of the 
research will be freely disseminated through the following processes: 
1. Inviting all participants to a meeting to give feedback on the research and its possible 
relevance to them. This dissemination will include consideration of ways in which 
the results can be made accessible to intellectually disabled participants.  
2. Presenting aspects of the research at academic conferences. To date I have presented 
two papers on the topic (McKenzie, 2005, 2008). 
3. Publication of results in academic journals. This will be done subsequent to the 
successful completion of this thesis.  
 
According to Mouton (2005), research with human subjects needs to take into account the 
person’s right to privacy, to anonymity and confidentiality, to full disclosure of the nature of  
the research in the form of informed consent, the right not to be harmed, and special rights 
for vulnerable subjects. I shall discuss each of these below.  
 147 
Right to Privacy 
Interviews were conducted in privacy except where the participant specifically requested the 
presence of a trusted person, which happened in only two cases of intellectually disabled 
people. Participants are anonymous in the research write-up as they are identified only as 
numbers.  
Full Disclosure of the Nature of the Research  
Each participant was given a letter outlining the nature of the research. This was both in a 
standard and easy to read format (see Appendixes E and F). Where participants were unable 
to read, the researcher read through the letter with them. They were given the opportunity to 
ask any questions at this point.  
Informed Consent  
After reading the information letter, participants were asked to sign a letter consenting to 
participate in the study, presented both the in easy to read and regular formats (see  
Appendixes G and H). Where consent was required from a guardian or an institution, this 
was obtained. Specifically consent was sought and gained from the Department of 
Education, management of the McClelland Centre for the Intellectually Impaired and 
REHAB.  Each individual also gave his or her own consent. All other participants were 
given a letter of information and a consent form to sign agreeing to be part of the study.  
The Right not to be Harmed  
There was no indication that any harm to an individual could result from participation in this 
research. It required participation in a 30-60 minute interview with no further obligation, 
except that they might be asked to give consent for a further interview at a later date. The 
researcher did not take up this option and only one set of interviews took place for each 
participant. Given the attention paid to anonymity, confidentiality and privacy, they could 
not be penalised at a later stage for any comments they made.  
Special Rights of a Vulnerable Group  
Intellectually disabled people can rightly be termed a vulnerable group and thus I paid 
particular attention to possible concerns around their participation. I shall therefore discuss 
this in some detail below.  
 
While it could be assumed that persons with intellectual disability might not have the legal 
capacity to give informed consent, this is not a simple matter. The matter hinges on  
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1. The capacity of the person to understand what the research is about 
2. The likelihood of harm to the person concerned. 
3. The autonomy of the individual to make their own decisions from a human rights 
perspective. 
4. The role of the parent where the person is still dependent on the parents.    
My reasoning on each one of these is presented below. 
The capacity of the person to understand what the research is about. 
I interviewed persons categorised as having an intellectual disability who have had 
experience of education specifically addressed toward intellectually disabled people and who 
gave some indication that they were able to understand the purpose of the research. A 
systematic strategy was adopted in order to present the information in an accessible format 
to the participants.  This entailed an easy to read format, reading the information letter when 
participants were unable to read it themselves and clarifying their questions as well as using 
my judgement as to whether they needed further simplified information. Ultimately the 
decision as to whether they fully understood was a judgement call. I drew on my extensive 
experience in the field to make this judgement. In most cases there was every indication that 
they wanted to participate and appreciated the opportunity to make their views known. Some 
participants expressed anxiety about their capacity to complete the task and others were 
concerned as to whether they would need to be involved beyond the interview. I was able to 
reassure them on both counts. There was only one participant who wanted her mother to 
agree to her participation and to explain to her what was required. Once this was done she 
was willing to participate.  
The likelihood of harm to the person concerned. 
In my considered opinion, participation in the study posed very little risk of harm. The 
participants were required to rate statements according to whether they agree with them or 
not. There was no invasive procedure or highly sensitive information involved. Indeed, one 
of the advantages of Q-methodology is that it does not seek for personal or intimate 
information about any person’s experiences or feelings (W. Stainton Rogers, personal 
communication, 12 August 2008). Procedures of confidentiality in the interview were strictly 
adhered to.  Anonymity in this thesis is preserved since their names are not used and the 
discussion of responses is structured  to ensure that anonymity is preserved. The information 
was processed according to acceptable academic standards and the outcome of the study is 
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expected to make a positive contribution to the lives of intellectually disabled people.  In one 
case a participant reported a history of sexual abuse. Noting my duty to report any form of 
abuse, I reported this to her mentor at school. She informed me that when the participant was 
at school, they had been made aware of these issues and had worked with the family to 
prevent further abuse. There was no prosecution but I was assured that she was no longer in 
danger from the abuser.  
The autonomy of the individual to make their own decisions from a human rights 
perspective. 
The current situation with regard to legal capacity of intellectually disabled people is not 
very clear due to numerous changes in the law. The submission by Disabled Children's 
Action Group (2004) on the Children’s  Bill emphasises the need for granting decision- 
making powers to disabled children while taking into account the developmental stage of the 
individual: 
There is a tendency for parents of children with disabilities and chronic illnesses to 
take decisions on behalf of their children. These children are rarely consulted or given 
opportunities to participate in decisions that affect their lives. Parents tend to feel pity 
and as a result over-protect their children, not transferring skills or equipping them to 
lead independent lives. There is a need to meaningfully involve the child in all 
decisions affecting their lives, taking into account their developmental stage (as 
opposed to chronological age). (Disabled Children's Action Group, 2004, p.15) 
 
The view of the disabled child as unable to make decisions for themselves continues to be 
applied to the intellectually disabled adult. This view is challenged when they are given the 
opportunity to give informed consent.  
 
Lack of mental capacity cannot be seen as an unproblematic concept according to the South 
African Law Reform Commission (SALC):  
It has been said that a legally and medically usable definition of capacity that is both 
sufficiently specific to avoid false positives and broad enough to avoid false negatives 
is probably impossible.  Work done by law reform commissions in other jurisdictions 
reflects the difficulties in attempting to achieve a precise, easily measurable and easily 
applied legal definition of decisional incapacity. (South African Law Commission, 
2003, p.46) 
 
Capacity to make decisions is also not a blanket capacity that applies to every situation:  
In spite of difference of opinion on the suitability of specific standards of evaluation, it 
seems to have been uniformly accepted that capacity to make personal choices must be 
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judged on a decision-specific basis as opposed to a global all-or-nothing basis. (SALC, 
2003, p. 47) 
 
In addition, there is no legislation that regulates the determination of incapacity but decisions 
are made through common law principles with the assumption that incapacity needs to be 
proved by the courts:  
The tests for legal capacity and the effects of incapacity of persons with mental 
deficiency are determined by common law principles as extended by the Courts and 
are not regulated by legislation. (SALC, 2003, p. 49) 
 
The present mechanisms to identify incapacity for legal purposes are based on the 
premise that a person is presumed to have the requisite capacity.   A lack of capacity 
must be alleged and proved before a Court in order that it may decide the issue.  The 
onus is upon the person alleging lack of capacity to prove this allegation. (SALC, 
2003,  p. 52) 
 
Thus, there can be no automatic assumption of mental incapacity. In addition, there are 
sound reasons for obtaining informed consent from a human rights perspective where the 
individual is able to appreciate the nature and consequences of the act in question.  
The role of the parent where the person is still dependent on the parents.   
Whereas the intellectually disabled person might have the capacity to decide on their 
participation in research, there is little chance of their being entirely independent. In most 
cases they were partially or wholly dependent on their parents or guardian or an institution. 
It was considered a courtesy, and an acknowledgement of the significant role that the parents 
or guardian plays, to ensure that they are informed as to the purpose of the research and that 
they agree to their son/daughter/ward’s participation in the research.    
 
In consideration of all these aspects, I took the following approach with intellectually 
disabled participants.  
1. The intellectually disabled participants were all recruited through reputable and 
trusted advocates, their schools, service providers and parents. I explained the 
purpose of the research to these agencies, all of whom gave their full support to their 
participation.  Interviews were booked well in advance.  
2. Intellectually disabled participants were informed of the purposes of the research 
through a verbal explanation accompanied by an easy to read document for those 
with adequate levels of literacy.  
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3. They were asked three questions to check their understanding of the purpose of the 
research. Where they were unable to respond to these questions correctly, the 
relevant information was given to them again. After this, all participants were able to 
answer the questions and were then asked to sign a consent form, either with their 
name or a cross if they were unable to write. 
Context of the Study 
This study was conducted in Buffalo City in the Eastern Cape province of South Africa. 
According to Stats SA, the Eastern Cape has the second highest poverty levels in the country 
with 47% of households below the poverty line. It also has the highest provincial 
unemployment rate at 55% in the age group of 15-64. Over one third of the population, 37% 
(more than 2 million people) are under the age of 15 and therefore of school going age. 
Twenty three percent of the population aged 20 years or older had no formal education 
according to the 2001 census (Statistics South Africa, 2003). Thus intellectually disabled 
children in the Eastern Cape are disadvantaged through poverty, unemployment of their 
parents, a huge pressure on the education system and, to some extent, parents or 
grandparents who have not had the benefit of formal education.  
 
HIV/AIDS is the leading cause of death in the province. Mortality statistics indicated in 
2000 that this disease accounts for 17% of male deaths and 23% of female deaths. Philpott 
(2004) notes that the urgency of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the context of limited resources 
has the effect of placing disability as a low priority for service  provision.  
 
The study was conducted in Buffalo City, the new municipal structure that came into 
existence after the 2000 local government elections.  It includes East London, King Williams 
Town and Bisho, and many surrounding smaller communities. There were about 880 000 
people living in Buffalo City according to the Quality of Life survey conducted in 2001 
(Morrow, 2002).  Of these more than 80% are black African, about 10% are white, 6% are 
coloured and fewer than 2% are Asian. Almost one third of Buffalo City’s adults are 
unemployed with an average monthly income in 2001  of about R2 655 (USD265).  There is 
a large disparity in income per household between racial groups (Morrow, 2002). It is in this 
setting that intellectual disability is problematised, largely around issues of exclusion – 
exclusion from education, exclusion from social interaction and exclusion from economic 
activity (Philpott, 2006). 
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In terms of provision for disabled children in the district, the implementation of progressive 
policy has been far from unproblematic. Philpott (2004) highlights the barriers that disabled 
children still face, in particular: 
1. There is still a high level of exclusion from education and early childhood 
development (ECD) services. 
2. There is some improvement for provision of health services within primary health 
care but access to rehabilitation services remains poor. 
3. There is insufficient protection for children with disabilities from abuse within the 
family and the community.  
 
This study focused on the education district of East London within the Buffalo City 
municipality. In this district,  there are two schools (Khayalethu and Parkland) run by the 
Department of Education specifically for intellectually disabled children. There are several 
informal centres for disabled children including those with intellectual disability that are run 
by parents in the informal settlements and former townships in Buffalo City. There is also a 
more formal centre (Canaan Care Centre) for severely disabled children in the city centre. 
Other children are accommodated with difficulty in the mainstream and many are kept at 
home in the absence of any suitable provision for them.  
 
In 2008, parents of disabled children sent a memorandum to the East London district 
manager for the Education Department outlining the following grievances: 
1. Regular schools do not want to admit children with intellectual disability and if they 
do they are reluctant to promote them.  
2. Special schools have long waiting lists and do not want to admit children with more 
severe or “difficult” disabilities. Some children wait so long for admission that they 
are  eventually excluded on the grounds that they are overage for admission after 13 
years old.  
3. Teachers in regular schools must be well trained in working with learners who 
experience barriers to learning. They should be able to draw up, implement and 
monitor individual support plans for such learners.  
4. There should be awareness about disability in schools and in the community to 
combat the negative attitudes.  
5. Schools should be physically accessible to learners who make use of wheelchairs.  
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6. Parents should start with early intervention so that when the child comes to school he 
or she is well-prepared.  
7. There should be health services in schools to assist disabled children. (REHAB & 
DSAA, 2008) 
These concerns reflect a situation where inclusion in the mainstream is both difficult and 
perceived as not necessarily helpful if the teachers are not trained. The alternative to 
mainstream is special schools, which are also difficult to get into and favour the less severely 
disabled child. Barring these two options, the child faces exclusion from schooling 
altogether, which is not an uncommon occurrence in Buffalo City (McKenzie, 2007).  
 
These parental concerns were expressed at a time when the Department of Education, 
through the District Based Support Team (DBST), is training schools in processes of 
screening, identification, assessment and support. As part of this process the DBST  has 
taken over the control of admission to special schools from the special schools themselves so 
that there is a centralised decision -making process.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have presented my rationale for choosing Q-methodology as my research 
method. I have indicated that the method is suited to the exploration of diverse accounts of 
any topic and I have applied it to intellectual disability and the education of those who are 
labelled as such. I have argued for a discourse-based use of Q-methodology, drawing on the 
DA school of Q-method. I have outlined the specific method used in this study, including the 
research questions, research method and ethical considerations. In so doing I have given the 
background for the presentation of findings in chapters 6 and 7.  
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CHAPTER 6: DISCOURSES OF REPRESENTATION OF 
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 
Basically intellectual disability is like, nothing to do with speech, but being sidelined 
as something of an outcast and not being involved in anything. If people are having a 
conversation, you try to contribute but you end up being turned away like what you say 
doesn’t matter to them. (P17: Q-study A1) 
 
They [intellectually disabled children] are children that need love, care and 
development in areas of need. They are disadvantaged more than being disabled. 
Generally they are also human beings that have rights to be considered. Patience, love 
and care can bring good results. (P18: Q-study A2) 
 
Intellectual disability is when someone is not reasoning normally, cannot make sound 
decisions due to brain damage. It can be described as malfunctioning of the brain 
affecting his/her thinking skills and also it can be caused by slow development of the 
brain during pregnancy. (P30: Q-study, A3) 
 
The above quotes from participants in the current study illustrate that the category of 
intellectual disability is by no means a simple unproblematic one that is generally agreed 
upon. In recognition of this multiplicity of meanings I posed the question:  
1. What discourses are deployed in the representation of those identified as intellectually 
disabled in Buffalo City, South Africa? 
 
In this chapter I address this research question, through the findings from Q-studies A1, A2, 
A3 and A4, all of which are derived from Q-sorting processes of Q-set A. These findings 
identify accounts of representation of intellectually disabled people through the factor 
analysis from three different groups of people in four Q-studies.  These groups have been 
noted in chapter 5 and are repeated here: 
1. Q-study A1: Adults with intellectual disability. 
2. Q-study A2: Parents of people with intellectual disability. 
3. Q-study A3: Professionals who work with people with intellectual disability.  
As noted in chapter 5, the factor descriptions from the Q-studies A1, A2 and A3 will be 
referred to as “accounts” rather than “discourses” as they are considered to represent variable 
accounts. The regularity of discourse is sought in the fourth Q-study, A4, as a second-order 
study. Subsequently, in chapter 7, I shall examine discourses of educational practice for 
those categorised as intellectually disabled. 
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Results 
The reporting of factors arising from Q-studies A1, A2 and A3 is kept to a brief description, 
with the focus on the identification of their distinguishing features and areas of consensus. 
Each factor is named with a descriptive phrase or sentence that highlights the outstanding 
features of the factor. The tables referring to factor loading and factor arrays are presented in 
the  appendixes since the reader may want to refer to them repeatedly and this makes for 
ease of reading. Finally, the factor descriptions for Q-study A4 are presented and more 
generalised discourses of intellectual disability are identified.  
 
For each Q-study a summary table is presented. The summaries of factor descriptions are 
presented in thematic categories for conceptual clarity and consistency. These themes are not 
separated out as analytical elements but rather they form part of the fabric of any one 
account as they weave in and out with each other in ways that construct meaning differently 
as a synthetic whole for each factor. These themes are presented below: 
Organic impairment – this refers to the notion of intellectual disability as an organic defect 
of the brain that imposes limits on intellectual functioning and cannot be cured.  
Difference – in this category aspects that relate to the existence of difference and the 
significance of difference from the norm are noted.  
Spirituality – this is a broad category that covers the notions of disability as a gift from God 
that can be either a blessing or a trial as well as the social inclusion of disabled children 
within religious spheres.  
Competence – within this category, I have grouped concerns with being able to do things in 
the world, whether it be looking after money or taking responsibility. 
Social inclusion – this category relates to the extent that the disabled person is, or should be, 
included in every day community activities. 
Autonomy – this category relates to the degree to which the disabled person is, or should be, 
able to make decisions for themselves. 
Family – this encompasses family relations and their importance in the lives of disabled 
people.  
 
As an aid to factor descriptions, the comments made by participants loading onto a factor are 
used to enhance and support the interpretation of that factor. The sources of these comments 
are: 
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1. Responses to the question: “What is your general understanding of intellectual 
disability?”  
2. Explanations of their choices of the statements that they most agreed with and least 
agreed with. 
 
 
 Q-study A1: Intellectually Disabled Adults 
The eigenvalues and percentage of variance accounted for by each factor is given in Table 5 
below. The six-factor solution accounts for 48% of the variance with 19 of the 22 
participants loading significantly at p < 0.01 onto a factor.  
 
Table 5: Variance Accounted for by Factors and Factor Loading of Participants in Q-Study A1 
Factors 1 Eigens % variance accounted for by 
factor 
Number of Q sorts loading onto factor at 
significance level 0.41 and participant numbers 
of loading participants in brackets 
A1.1 2.32 11% 5  (3, 6, 14,16,20) 
A1.2 1.06 5% 2 (12, 22) 
A1.3 1.43 7% 2 (11, 18) 
A1.4 1.22 6% 2 (2, 4) 
A1.5 2.60 12% 5 (1,9,15,17,19) 
A1.6 1.68 8% 3 (7,10, 13) 
Totals 10.31 49% 19 
 
I have named the factors as follows, according to the way the intellectually disabled person 
is viewed: 
A1.1:  A competent person. 
A1.2:  A person dependent on their family.  
A1.2A: A vulnerable person.  
A1.3:  A person requiring special care and love.  
A1.4:  An (ir)responsible person.  
A1.5:  A person discriminated against.  
A1.6:  A stereotyped person.  
 
The factor loading for each participant is indicated in Table 1 in Appendix I for easy 
reference. The factor array for Q-study A1 is presented as Table 2 in Appendix I. This factor 
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array does not present with any statistically significant consensus statements. There is one 
statement that distinguishes Factor A1.2 from all the others, noted in Table 6 below. 
 
Table 6: Distinguishing Statement for Factor A1.2  
Statement A1.1 A1.2 A1.2A A1.3 A1.4  A1.5 A1.6 
20. They are always made welcome in church and at 
religious places. 
1 -3 3 2 2 3 1 
 
This statement is rated at -3 compared to all positive ratings on the other factors. This 
contrasts with the overall positive rating of church involvement evident in the other factors. 
In the interpretation of Factor A1.2 below, it will be seen that the mediation of the family for 
social inclusion is valued much more highly than community mediation.  
 
Using the criterion of  two ranking point’s difference between statements, as discussed in 
chapter 5, the following statements represent a degree of consensus across the factors. The 
ranking of Factor A1.2A (which is the opposite of that presented in the factor array above) is 
presented as a separate factor in Table 7 and subsequent tables below: 
 
Table 7: Statements that Reflect Substantial Agreement Across Factors for Q-Study A1 
Statement A1.1 A1.2 A1.2A A1.3 A1.4  A1.5 A1.6 
17. They are very likely to be abused or treated badly. -1 0 0 -1 -2 -1 -2 
34. They can be thought of as children in many ways. 0 1 -1 1 0 -1 1 
36. They are the same as other people in the way they act. 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 
 
 
These statements reflect a mild rejection of the likelihood of abuse and a neutral view on 
whether intellectually disabled people can be thought of as children. There is a neutral to 
mild agreement that intellectually disabled people are the same as others in the way that they 
act.    
 
Those statements that indicate a degree of disagreement with five or more ranking points 
separating them, as discussed in chapter 5, are presented in Table 8.  Since Factor A1.2 is 
bipolar, each ranking statement is the opposite of the other and by the criterion of five 
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ranking points difference between the highest and lowest ranking, all of the most positive 
and most negative rankings of A1.2 will indicate disagreement2
 
.  
Table 8: Statements that Reflect Substantial Disagreement Across Factors for Q-Study A1 
Statement A1.1 A1.2 A1.2A A1.3 A1.4  A1.5 A1.6 
8. They often find it hard to behave or act in the right way. -1 3 -3 0 -1 -1 1 
10. They do not know how to stand up for their rights – 
things that all human beings should be allowed to do or 
have. 
-3 -3 3 -1 0 -2 0 
12. They need speech therapy, physiotherapy and other 
kinds of help to be able to live a normal life. 
-2 2 -2 3 0 3 1 
16. They are scared of failing in learning. -1 -3 3 0 1 -3 0 
19. When parents and teachers plan for their future, they 
do not include the disabled persons dreams or wishes.  
-3 -1 1 -2 -2 -1 2 
22. They should be brought up within their families no 
matter what special needs they might have. 
2 3 -3 3 2 1 0 
23. They will always need a lot of help from their 
families. 
0 3 -3 2 3 2 1 
24. They bring something into the family because they can 
get a disability grant. 
1 3 -3 -1 3 -1 -2 
27. They look the same as other people. 2 1 -1 -3 -1 0 0 
28. They are a gift from God.  3 -2 2 3  0 2 3 
29. Their parents stop them from doing things because 
they are worried about what might happen to them. 
2 -3 3 0 -1 -1 -1 
30. Other people, like parents and doctors should not 
decide what makes their life happy and worthwhile. 
-2 -2 2 -3 -3 0 -1 
32. They treat other people with respect. 3 -1 1 2 -2 1 1 
35. They can learn to do most things for themselves with 
time and patience. 
0 -2 2 0 3 1 3 
Note. The shaded cells represent the highest and the lowest rankings of the statement. 
 
This table will be referred to in the findings below in support of factor interpretations. I shall 
now examine each of the factors below and give a narrative account of the emerging pattern.  
Factor A1.1: A Competent Person 
Factor outline.  
Factor A1.1 explains 11% of the study variance and has five significantly loading 
participants and an eigenvalue of 2.32. These participants reflect a range of demographic 
                                                 
2 In terms of the narrative account of the factors the bipolar factors, A1.2 and A1.2A are considered 
independently as separate factors. However, PCQ for Windows analyses it as one factor with positive and 
negative loadings on the factor. This means that only one pole of the bipolar factor (A1.2) is analysed for 
statistically significant distinguishing statements. If factor A1.2A were included in the analysis, the chances of 
more statistically significant distinguishing statements occurring is high since between these two factors alone 
there is a high degree of differentiation since they are opposites.  
 159 
variables since they are from all race groups across a range of ages from 19 through to 60 
years of age, although four are under the age of 34. Three of them are employed in the open 
labour market and the other two are in sheltered employment. Their general understanding of 
intellectual disability, reflected by participant comments, indicates a fairly non-specific 
concept of experiencing difficulties in every day life that do not necessarily relate to 
intellectual ability.  
Factor description. 
For this factor, an intellectually disabled person is competent to meet the challenges of social 
inclusion in normal life. Intellectual disability is a part of life that poses a challenge but does 
not prevent a person from living a full life:  “I have brain damage but just because I have 
this it does not bother me because I can still have a normal life. I can eat, I can walk, I can 
talk” (S5: -1, P14 comment3
 
). The distinctive statements (see Table 8) for this factor are 
S10: -3, S12: -2, S19: -3, S27: +2, S28: +3, S32: +3. The view that this shapes is that 
intellectually disabled people can stand up for their rights and they do not require therapeutic 
help in order to live  a normal life. The involvement of parents is seen to support the 
intellectually disabled person who is an asset to society as they are a gift from God, and not 
substantially different from others. They treat others with respect.  
Competence is highlighted in this account, since intellectually disabled people are able to 
enjoy music and dance (S31: +3), they are seen as being able to engage in relationships 
(S11: +1) and to earn (S39: +1) and manage (S40: -2) their own money. This competence 
extends to being able to stand up for their rights (S10: -3). Intellectually disabled people 
have a desire to learn both academic skills, such as reading and writing (S15: +3) as well as 
life skills (S13: +2). Within this factor, there is a strong rejection of the notion that there can 
be a limit to learning: “That's where the problem comes. I was in my school for many years 
but then it gets to the point that you have to leave. If you could carry on with school, then 
you would learn more” (S14: -3, P14 comment). Intellectually disabled people are not 
hidden from the community (S1: -2). Social inclusion and competence go hand-in-hand since 
                                                 
3 The notational conventions are described in Chapter 5. The first number (prefixed with ‘S’ indicates the 
number of the statement and the second number is the score given to this statement in the factor array. The 
participant number is given last, prefixed with ‘P’. 
 160 
it is through social engagement that competence is enhanced. Overprotection is unwarranted 
since they are able to stand up for their rights themselves (S10: -3). 
 
The family is of central importance in that it is important for parents to help with making 
decisions (S19: -3) and intellectually disabled people should always be within the family 
(S22: +2), but families can be overprotective (S29: +2). This factor is similar to Factor A1.5 
but differs in a greater emphasis on the unimportance of difference and the slightly greater 
degree of autonomy and independence from the family.  
Factor A1.2 and A1.2A 
Factor A1.2 as presented in the results section is a bipolar factor. This means that the ranking 
of a statement by participants that load positively onto the factor are mirror images of the 
rankings of the negatively loading participants. Each represents a different position that is in 
an oppositional relation to the other. Since the account that emerges from each end of the 
opposition is likely to be very different to the other, the bipolar factor must be interpreted as 
two separate factors (Watts & Stenner, 2005).  
Factor outline. 
Factors A1.2 and A1.2A together explain 5% of the study variance and have two 
significantly loading participants, both female; P12 is white (30 years old) and P22 is 
“coloured” ( 22 years old). P12 loads positively onto the factor (A1.2) at 0.61. P22 has a 
negative factor load of -0.59 (A1.2A). The situations of these two individuals are disparate. 
P12 is in residential care and works in the sheltered workshop. She has a very close 
relationship with her middle class family, whom she visits on weekends. P22 works in the 
open labour market and lives with her mother in a low-income household where her income 
makes a sizable contribution to the family. P22 on Factor A1.2A describes herself as having 
an intellectual disability that means that she cannot read and write and she describes 
intellectual disability in general: “It is when you struggle to do something and it takes longer 
for you to do it than the other children who are quick. That is the only difference” 
(Comment, P22). Participant 12, on the other hand, notes that she has a disability because 
she gets a disability grant.  
Factor A1.2: A Person Dependent on their Family 
In this account, the intellectually disabled person is incompetent and their family mediates 
their social inclusion. The roots of difference lie in an organic impairment that prevents 
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normal engagement with the world (S5: +2). This deficit causes the intellectually disabled 
person to be incompetent in running their own lives and therefore dependent on the family to 
make decisions for them. Individual autonomy and competence is less valued than the 
protection of the family. The distinctive statements for this account (see Table 8) indicate 
that intellectually disabled people can stand up for their rights (S10: -3) and are not afraid of 
failure in learning (S16: -3) as they are protected within the family (S29: -3) that will always 
be needed to give them support (S23: +3). They will always belong within the family (S22: 
+3) and can contribute by means of their disability grant (S24: +3). An intellectually 
disabled person finds it hard to act in the right way (S8: +3), and is not considered to be a 
gift from God (S28: -2). He or she has limited potential to learn (S35: -2). These limitations 
are more important than strengths (S37: -2). Since the intellectually disabled person is 
always treated well and fairly (S21: +2), competence is of little concern (S25: -2). Factor  
A1.2 expresses a distance from difficulties experienced by disabled adults and credits little 
competence: “They do the wrong thing, not the right thing” (S10: -3, P12). There is a lack of 
confidence and self-worth evident in this factor as they often find it hard to behave in the 
right way (S8: +3) and require therapeutic intervention to live a normal life (S12: +2). They 
are seen to be incompetent in that they are not able to do more than people think they can 
(S25: -2) and they are only able to work where they are kept safe (S33: +2). In this account 
support is solely from the family and they are not necessarily made welcome outside of this 
charmed circle (S20: -3). They are not even made welcome in the church, a distinguishing 
statement for this factor, which is rated at -3 (see Table 6).   
Factor A1.2A: A Vulnerable Person 
 The factor scores quoted in this summary are the opposite of those listed in the factor array 
in Table 2 in Appendix  I since this factor is the polar opposite  of the Factor A1.2. An 
intellectually disabled person is vulnerable to abuse where family support is absent.  The 
distinguishing statements of this account give an overall picture that acknowledges the 
difficulties encountered in everyday life (S16: +3) but these difficulties do not, per se, 
prevent an intellectually disabled person from living a normal life (S12: -2). The position of 
the individual with respect to the family and the community is more important. This factor 
illustrates a struggle with being independent in the absence of family support. Their parents 
tend to limit their choices (S29: +3) and others make decisions for them (S30: +2).  
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The factor expresses a high degree of vulnerability and fear of exploitation of intellectually 
disabled people in that they do not know how to stand up for their rights (S10: +3): 
“Sometimes it is difficult to talk when something is wrong or happening to you. Then you are 
scared to talk” (S10: +3, P22). Church and religion is very important for this account as it 
represents a site of acceptance and acknowledgement of worth for intellectually disabled 
people: “In church they don't worry, they welcome everybody. It is God's place. They are 
friendly and you can make friends there. They mustn't judge themselves because it is just a 
small problem that they have” (S28: +2, P22).  
 
There is confidence in the ability to live a normal life (S5: -2) in spite of organic impairment 
but it requires a lot of effort: “You can't help it when you forget things but you can live a 
normal life if you try” (S5: -2, P22). There is evidence of a painful degree of awareness of 
the difficulties experienced: “You try to pretend but its very hard. Sometimes you do wrong 
things and you have to fit in with [be responsible for] those things” (S8: -3, P22) and “You 
try and try and you can’t really do it – maybe you come right but then you forget” (S4: -1, 
P22). The overall impression here is that the acquisition of skills is not enough if one has to 
live in a society where the intellectually disabled person does not know how to stand up for 
their rights (S10: +3) and where they are not always treated fairly (S21: -2). An additional 
burden is that of teasing: “People call you names all the time. They say you go to a mad 
school” (S38: +1, P22). If there were a more positive view of intellectual disability their 
participation in society would be greater (S37: +2). 
 
There is a distance from the family. Contribution to the family through a disability grant is 
linked with exploitation: “The child can't help it. The child was born like that. The child 
should get it (the disability grant) but sometimes the mother takes it and she drinks” (S24: -
3, P22) and abuse is indicated: “It is not nice being beaten. I was abused by my oupa 
[grandfather]” (S21: -2, P22).  
Factor A1.3: A Person Requiring Special Care and Love 
Factor outline. 
Factor A1.3 explains 7% of the study variance, with an eigenvalue of 1.43. It has two 
significantly loading participants, one male (P11) aged 32 and one female (P18) aged 23. 
P11 is resident in the hostel and P18 lives in a flat with her boyfriend and works as a 
 163 
machine operator. She identifies as having a hearing disability but does not mention 
intellectual disability.  
Factor description. 
Regardless of difference, an intellectually disabled person should be socially included by 
families and communities in the light of common humanity and religious values. The 
distinguishing statements, as indicated in Table 8, emphasise the importance of therapeutic 
intervention  (S12: +3) for living a normal life. The family is central (S22: +3) and offers the 
right kind of support in decision- making (S30: -3) in the presence of  difficulties associated 
with intellectual disability:“Because they have got problems so they need the help of the 
family” (S22: +3, P18).  
 
This account is similar to that of Factor A1.5 but differs in an acceptance of the existence of 
difference as something that is unproblematic:“People can't look the same, do the same 
things” (S27: -3, P18). They must not try to be like other people (S6: -3) because they are 
fine as they are: “They are nice people” (S6: -3, P18). Difference is given a positive value by 
calling on family values and a philosophy of sharing and helping each other: “People should 
not hide themselves away. They should talk with one another” (S1: -2, P18) and: “People 
must enjoy one another and appreciate one another” (S31: +3, P18). The value of difference 
is couched in spiritual terms: “We can't be the same we are each different. God made us 
different” (S27: -3, P11) and: “I believe in God. He made us and God is love. He made us 
all different” (S28: +3, P11). 
 
There is also less emphasis on autonomy as family and community are generally seen to be 
supportive. This account is similar in some respects to that given in Factor A1.2 in the strong 
role of the family in mediating social inclusion. However, in A1.3 difference is given a 
positive value as opposed to the negative light cast on difference in Factor A1 .2.  
 Factor A1.4: An (Ir)Responsible Person  
Factor outline.  
Two participants load onto this factor, P2 who is white, male and 29 years old and P4 who is 
white, female and 40 years old. Both are residents in the hostel and both were able to read 
the statements for themselves. Their understanding of intellectual disability is expressed in 
such a way as to mark themselves off from others: “Some people don't learn quickly enough. 
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They take a long time to learn. They have to think before they write or say something. I am 
quick to pick things up. I can learn all the songs for the choir even the difficult ones” 
(Comment, P4).  
 
Factor description. 
In this account a distinction is made between more competent and less competent 
intellectually disabled people. A double perspective of intellectual disability is indicated 
with a positive image of a keen, motivated learner who takes responsibility for their own 
learning and an irresponsible person who exhibits anti-social behaviour. The distinguishing 
statements from Table 8 figure intellectually disabled people as not treating other people 
with respect (S32: -2) and as being incapable of having a long-term relationship (S11: -2). 
Intellectual disability is associated with irresponsible behaviour: “Some of them have got 
money and they save it up and then go to the office and keep it there. They use it all up in 
one day on sweets. But I am good at saving up” (S40: +1, P2). Parents and doctors should 
decide for them (S30: -3), as they are not able to take responsibility (S18: -2): “If some of 
them can't think, the doctors and nurses must decide for them. Others who can decide, then 
they must think for themselves” (S30: -3, P2). They are not able to manage their money 
(S40: +1) and they can never have their own home (S9: +1).  
 
In contrast to the irresponsible person, there is a responsible intellectually disabled person 
who is willing to learn (S15: +3) and can be successful with the right kind of teaching (S35: 
+3). This group wants to learn how to read and write ( S15: +3) and can learn to do most 
things for themselves (S35: +3). There are two classes of intellectually disabled people, 
those who take responsibility and those who do not. They can become competent if they try 
hard enough: “If they take time and try hard then they can do something about themselves” 
(S35: +3, P4) and learning is something that one can choose to do: “They can learn if they 
want to. They must choose to learn” (S16: +1, P2).  
 
This factor emphasises competence over social inclusion, suggesting that competence is a 
precursor to inclusion and something that one earns through being responsible about 
learning. The potential for leading a normal life is not necessarily determined by organic 
impairment and professional treatment (S5: -1, S12: 0) but rather by the extent to which the 
individual applies him or herself to self-improvement.  
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Factor A1.5: A Person Discriminated Against 
Factor outline. 
Factor A1.5 accounts for 12% of the variation and has an eigenvalue of 2.62. There are five 
participants who load onto this factor and they represent a diverse group, across dimensions 
of race, gender, age and disability. P1 is a white male of 35 years with a good literacy level. 
He attends the workshop for the intellectually disabled on a daily basis but lives at home 
with his family. He has a physical disability and identifies himself as physically, rather than 
intellectually, disabled. P9 is a white female, 46 years old, , also with good literacy levels, 
who lives in the hostel. She states that she knows she has a disability because she gets a 
disability grant. P15 is a black male, 21 years old who lives with his family and is not 
working. He is unable to read and does not identify himself as having a disability. P17 is a 
black male, 23 years old, who stays at home with his family and attends the workshop on a 
daily basis. He has a physical disability and excellent literacy and language skills. He 
identifies himself as physically disabled. P19 is a ‘coloured’ male,  19 years old, who works 
in the open labour market and lives by himself in rented accommodation. He states that he 
has a disability in that he cannot spell or read very much.  
 
Their understanding of intellectual disability is in relation to what is expected as the norm, 
either in terms of learning or social inclusion. The problem does not reside in the person but 
in what is expected of them and their failure to meet the requirements of being included: 
“Basically intellectual disability is like, nothing to do with speech, but being sidelined as 
something of an outcast and not being involved in anything. If people are having a 
conversation, you try to contribute but you end up being turned away like what you say 
doesn’t matter to them” (Comment, P17). 
Factor description. 
This account places an emphasis on the equivalence of intellectual disability with other sorts 
of problems that people might have. As such it is part of the range of human adversity that 
might affect anyone. It questions why intellectual disability should be singled out for 
exclusion given that everybody has problems and everybody needs support: “Other people 
must be the same as others. They might have some difficulties but not a disability. They 
mustn't think that they are better than the other person because they have also got problems. 
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I am not the only 'bad luck' person with her own difficult problems. They must think of 
themselves before judging other people” (S37: -2, P9). Thus, they are treated unfairly and 
experience discrimination because the type of difficulty that they have is stigmatised.  
 
The distinguishing statements of this account (see Table 8) indicate that much support is 
needed to live a normal life (S12: +3) and that intellectually disabled people want to learn 
without fear of failure (S16: -3). With this support, he or she can do whatever anyone else 
can do. They can manage their own money (S40: -3), and have their own home (S9: -3). 
They are able to stand up for their rights (S10: -2) and pose no special problem for parents 
(S7: -2). They also want to learn how to read and write (S15: +3) and feel confident that they 
can earn money to live on (S39: +3). Just as “normal” people can experience the problems 
that intellectually disabled people experience, so it works the other way around. 
Intellectually disabled people also have problems not associated with that label: “They 
should be taught about relationships and sex because they are mature enough to know about 
their own bodies. They might get information from the wrong sources. They must also learn 
about STD's  (sexually transmitted diseases) and teenage pregnancies and the dangers” 
(S13: +1, P17).  
 
This account is similar to A1.1 in its assumption of competence but differs in its recognition 
of the need for support from professionals and the family and the strong feeling of being 
unfairly treated. This is framed within the context of everybody needing support of some 
kind.  
Factor A1.6: A Stereotyped Person 
Factor outline. 
This factor accounts for 8% of the variance and has an eigenvalue of 1.68. There are three 
participants loading onto this factor. Participant 7 is a white male, 24 years old who works 
on the open labour market as a shelf packer and lives at home with his family. He is not able 
to read, which is a source of great distress to him. He identifies himself as having a disability 
that makes reading and writing hard for him. Participant 13 is a 33 year-old white woman, 
who does not work and lives at home with her family. She was not able to read the 
statements. She identifies herself as having an intellectual disability. Participant 10 is white 
male, 36 years old, with excellent literacy skills. He writes stories in his spare time. He lives 
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at home and attends the workshop for the intellectually disabled every day. He states that he 
has a disability that relates to his coordination but feels that this is improving, as he gets 
older. Participants loading onto this factor identify intellectual disability as a specific 
learning problem that is located within the individual. 
Factor description. 
This factor is concerned with the way in which stereotypical views of intellectual disability 
result in low expectations. The assumption of incompetence by society at large limits the 
opportunities that intellectually disabled people are given. Competence is very important and 
is something that the individual must strive for and they have the right to appropriate support 
and education. The distinguishing statements for this account (see Table 8) indicate that 
parents do not always take into account the disabled person’s wishes ( S19: +2). The  
understanding of being a gift from God (S28: +3) establishes the rights of intellectually 
disabled people and makes external differences unimportant: “This is the most important to 
me. To Jesus we are all the same because he looks inside. We are all different but he made 
us all” (S28: +3, P10). 
 
Competence is highlighted in that they can learn to do most things if taught in the proper 
manner (S35: +3). The intellectually disabled person is motivated to learn but does not have 
enough of the right chances to learn: “I didn't have the opportunity to learn. The years were 
wasted. We had flash cards but we did not have books until my last few years  at school. I 
am willing to learn”(S4: +3, P7). 
 
Their potential is not acknowledged sufficiently since they can do more than people think if 
given the opportunity and the patience required: “Cause I like that. I like patience. I am 
helpful. I make my room neat” (S35: +3, P13) and: “I can go onto the computer and print. I 
can do it by the place on the screen. People out there can give us a chance” (S25: +2, P7). 
Society should be more accommodating by looking for strengths and having high 
expectations rather than focusing on difficulties all the time (S37: +2).  
 
 
 
This account calls for the larger community to know intellectually disabled people better and 
become more accepting and tolerant: “Those words, intellectual disability and intellectual 
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impairment don't sound too bad. Some people don't come here. These people might call the 
people here mentally retarded. They don't take the time to know the person. It does matter. 
They used to call them mentally retarded but now I hear intellectual impairment a lot. 
Sometimes people don't know what to say. Sometimes we get a lot of support here at the 
centre but there are people who hear of McClelland and they don't know how to react. A lot 
of teenagers seem to feel awkward” (S38: -2, P10). 
 
This account is similar to A1.5 in that both recognise unfair treatment of intellectually 
disabled people. The difference lies in the effect of this discrimination. For A1.5 it leads to 
exclusion from social activity whereas for A1.6 it restricts work and employment 
opportunities.  
Summary of Q-study A1 
 A summary of Q-study A1 is presented in Table 9 along the thematic dimensions noted 
above. The most important aspects of Q-study A1 are the family and issues around 
competence and social inclusion. The organic impairment is taken -for -granted as something 
that exists in some cases, but it is not recognised as important in others. Intellectual disability 
is a relational concept that comes into being in interaction, rather than a fixed property of the 
individual. 
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Table 9: Summary of Factors for Q-study A1 
 
 A1.1: A competent 
person. 
   
 
A1.2: A 
person 
dependent on 
their family. 
A1.2A:  A 
vulnerable 
person. 
A1.3 :A person 
requiring special 
care and love. 
A1.4: An 
(ir)responsible 
person. 
A1.5: A person 
discriminated against. 
A1.6:  A 
stereotyped person.  
 
Difference  Same as others. Very different 
to others. 
Different because 
of social 
exclusion. 
Different but 
accepted as such. 
Some are more 
different than 
others. 
Difference is 
stigmatised, leading to 
discrimination.  
Difference leads to 
stereotyping at a 
physical level but 
equal in the eyes of 
God. 
 
Spirituality Not important.  Not important. Important site of 
acceptance. 
Important to 
understanding of 
difference. 
 
Not important. Not essential. Bolsters claims to fair 
treatment. 
Competence Competent to 
achieve most 
things. 
Incompetent . Can be achieved 
with difficulty, 
but not as 
important as 
social inclusion. 
 
Not very important. Something to be 
worked for as a 
moral 
responsibility. 
Everybody needs 
support but people 
with ID need support 
in their competence.  
Very important needs 
all the support and 
opportunity to 
achieve this. 
Social 
inclusion  
Very important. Minimal – 
through 
family. 
Not easy to 
achieve – unfair 
treatment and 
abuse. 
 
To be found within 
church and family. 
Depends on the 
level of 
competence. 
Must be included 
within the normal 
range of diversity. 
Stereotypes restrict 
inclusion. 
Autonomy Important to make 
own decisions with 
support. 
Family must 
decide. 
Must be 
autonomous but 
still vulnerable. 
Family and 
community will 
make the right 
decisions. 
 
Depends on the 
level of 
competence. 
Can be autonomous. Very important. 
Family Can be 
overprotective but 
is supportive. 
Offers 
protection and 
support. 
At best, family is 
absent and at 
worst, abusive. 
Loving and 
supportive. 
Supportive and 
acts in person’s 
best interest. 
Families support as 
they do all their 
members. 
Supportive but do not 
always listen to the 
ID person. 
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Q-study A2: Parents 
The data for the 31 parent participants were analysed as for Q-study A1. The eigenvalues 
and percentage of variance accounted for by each factor is given in Table  10 below. The 
six-factor solution accounts for 54% of the variance with 28 of the 31 participants 
loading significantly at p < 0.01 onto a factor. 
 
Table 10: Variance Accounted for by Factors and Factor Loading of Participants n Q-Study A2 
Factors 1 Eigens % variance accounted for by 
factor 
Number of Q sorts loading onto factor at  
significance level 0.41 and participant 
numbers of loading participants in brackets 
A2.1 4.20 14% 5 (1, 2, 11, 14, 30) 
A2.2 1.80 6% 4 (5, 19, 26, 28) 
A2.3 3.00 10% 6 (7, 12, 20, 22, 23, 29) 
A2.4 1.31 4% 2 (13, 18) 
A2.5 1.50 5% 2 (17, 31) 
A2.6 4.79 15% 9 (3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 15, 21, 25, 27) 
Totals 10.31 54% 28 
 
I have named the factors according to the understanding of the intellectually disabled 
person as follows: 
A2.1:  A citizen with rights. 
A2.2:  An innocent and vulnerable child of God.  
A2.3:  A difficult challenge to their family.   
A2.4: A person with special needs.  
A2.5:  A person to be understood by the community.  
A2.6: A blessing and a gift from God. 
 
The factor loading for each participant is presented in Table 3 in Appendix I  for ease of 
reference. The factor array was generated by the procedure as described in chapter 5 and 
is presented in Table 4 in Appendix I. There are two statistically significant consensus 
statements for Q-study A2, noted in Table 11.  
 
Table 11: Statistically Significant Consensus Statements for Q-Study A2 
Statement A2.1 A2.2 A2.3 A2.4  A2.5 A2.6 
15. They want to learn how to read and write. 1 2 1 2 2 2 
25. They can do more than many people think they can. 2 1 1 2 1 2 
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Both of these statements reflect a moderate to strong belief in the capability and desire to 
learn of the intellectually disabled person. There were no statements that distinguished 
between the factors at a statistically significant level. 
 
As for Q-study A1, I noted statements that showed a considerable degree of consensus 
with a criterion of not more than two points on the rating scale between the highest 
scoring and the lowest scoring statements. These statements are indicated in Table 12 
below.  
 
Table 12: Statements that Reflect Substantial Agreement Across Factors for Q-Study A2 
Statement A2.1 A2.2 A2.3 A2.4  A2.5 A2.6 
2. Their disability is the fault of the mother because of 
something she has done wrong. 
-3 -2 -3 -3 -1 -3 
9. They can never have their own home. -2 -2 -2 -1 -2 0 
32. They treat other people with respect. 0 2 0 1 0 1 
 
These statements reflect a rejection of blaming the mother and an agreement that 
intellectually disabled people can have their own home. A positive dimension of 
intellectual disability is that they treat others with respect.  
 
As for Q-study A1, I adopted the criterion of  five points or more separating the highest 
and the lowest ranking score.  These statements reflect a level of disagreement between 
the factors and are shown in Table 13. 
 
Table 13: Statements that Reflect a Degree of Disagreement Across Factors for Q-Study A2 
Statement A2.1 A2.2 A2.3 A2.4  A2.5 A2.6 
5. Brain damage that makes learning difficult stops them from 
leading a normal life. 
-2 0 2 -3 0 0 
7. It is very difficult for parents to bring up people like this. -1 0 3 0 -2 -2 
11. They can have a long term relationship or get married. 2 -3 -2 0 1 -1 
12. They need speech therapy, physiotherapy and other kinds 
of help to be able to live a normal life. 
-2 1 3 3 1 2 
19. When teachers and parents plan for their future they do not 
include the disabled person’s dreams and wishes. 
1 -3 -2 2 -3 -1 
22. They should be brought up within their families no matter 
what special needs they might have. 
3 -1 -1 -2 1 1 
27. They look the same as other people. 0 0 -1 -2 3 -3 
34. They can be thought of as children in many ways. -3 -1 0 -1 3 1 
36. They are the same as other people in the way they act. 0 -1 -3 -2 2 -1 
38. It does not matter what you call these people, intellectually 
disabled or mentally retarded because the disability is still 
there. 
-2 0 2 3 -2 -2 
39. They can earn money to live on. 0 0 0 0 3 -2 
Note. The shaded cells represent the highest and the lowest ranking of the statement.  
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As with Q-study A1, these relative disagreements between factors will be used to support 
factor interpretation below. The descriptions below are narrative accounts of the patterns 
evident in each factor.  
Factor A2.1: A Citizen with Rights 
Factor outline. 
Factor A2.1 explains 14% of the study variance and has five significantly loading 
participants and an eigenvalue of 4.20. My own sorts are loaded onto this factor as 
Participant 2 and Participant 30, as I completed the Q sort twice (see chapter 5), 
reflecting a high loading that remained relatively constant from the beginning to the end 
of the research (0.92 as P2 and 0.88 as P30). I am a white woman, self-employed with a 
child4
Factor description. 
 of 15 years. I did not include my comments in the Q sort as I felt that my views 
would be adequately represented since I have the voice of the researcher. P1 is a white 
man, 52 years old, parent of a child of 15 and self-employed. P11 is a white woman, 40 
years old with two children with disabilities, one  nine and the other three. She is a health 
professional. P14 is a white woman of 31 years old, with a child of  two years old. She 
describes herself as a housewife.   They define intellectual disability as an interaction 
between the organic impairment of the disabled individual and the context in which he or 
she is expected to function.  
This factor emphasises the potential of the intellectually disabled person to learn (S14: -
3): “Putting a limit on learning is the biggest problem for me, because they cannot 
express themselves well and you can underestimate their understanding” (S14: -3, P11). 
However, they are prevented from participating in “normal” life because they are not 
always treated well (S21: -3) and they are overprotected (S29: +2). The ability to live a 
normal life does not depend on improving skills (S12: -2), or on the organic deficit alone 
(S5: -2): “What is a normal life? If you are happy and can live out your dreams, that is 
normal life” (S5: -2, P11). 
 
                                                 
4 In this discussion, it is assumed that the child referred to is the intellectually disabled child. 
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Intellectually disabled people should be accorded autonomy and the right to choose for 
themselves (S30: +1) but this right is threatened by parents making decisions on their 
behalf (S19: +1) and by their limited ability to stand up for themselves (S10: +1). 
Although the child belongs there (S22: +3), the family limits their potential when it is 
overprotective (S29: +2): “They can do more than we think (S25: +2). We should ask 
from them what they want to do. They know and you cannot decide for them. They don't 
get a chance to say what they want. We don't value their opinions” (S30: +1, P11).  
 
The capability of the individual is emphasised (S11: +2, S25: +2, S35: +3) and difference 
is cast in the light of a positive diversity: “We are all different. You do not have to be like 
other people” (S6: -2, P 11).  Difference, which is rooted in an organic deficit, is 
mediated through social processes that stigmatise and exclude on the basis of this 
difference. This factor does not draw on spirituality or religion in its understanding of 
intellectual disability (S28: -1, 20:0). 
 
This account differs from others (see Table 13) in the strong emphasis placed on getting 
married (S11: +2) and the rejection of gaining competence as a prerequisite for being 
normal (S12: -2). It is closely aligned with a social model understanding of disability in 
distinguishing between impairment and the disabling responses of society.  There is a 
strong appeal to human rights in terms of autonomy and full participation in the 
community (see chapter 2).  
Factor A2.2: An Innocent  and Vulnerable Child of God 
Factor outline. 
This factor has an eigenvalue of 1.8 and accounts for 6% of the study variance. Four 
participants load significantly onto this factor. All of these participants are black. P5, a 27 
year-old woman, is the caregiver of her deceased sister’s child, who is four years old. She 
is unemployed. P19 is a 51 year-old woman who is a senior health professional, with a 
child of 23 years old. P26 is 55 years old, a woman who works as a community worker. 
Her daughter is 30 years old. Finally, P 28 is a 64 year-old man who is unemployed and 
has a child of 11 years.  
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The understandings of intellectual disability expressed by loading participants highlight 
the importance of caring for the disabled person, as a God-given duty: “A gift from God. 
You are supposed to take care of her. We must take care of her and give her a good life 
because it is a gift from God. Because God gives us everything. You are supposed to love 
her” (Comment, P5). 
Factor description. 
Intellectually disabled people are a gift from God ( S28: +3) and are catered for within 
the family and the religious community (S20: +3, S23: +3). This factor is distinct from 
others (see Table 13) in the rejection of long-term relationships (S11: -3) and the belief 
that parents always act in accord with the disabled person’s wishes (S19: -3).  
 
Intellectually disabled people are not able to, nor should be expected to, take decisions 
for themselves. It is best for other people to decide. The powerful sense of duty that is 
imposed by God means that even financial support, in the form of a disability grant, 
should neither be asked for nor expected: “When the child comes you don't think about 
the money. Think about the child as a gift from God” (S24: -1, P6). There is an anxiety 
about relationships (S11: -3, S13: -1), reflecting a rejection of sexuality of intellectually 
disabled people in the light of their vulnerability. They do not know how to stand up for 
their rights (S10: +2) and so must be protected and can only work in sheltered 
environments (S33: +2).   
 
The intellectually disabled person is not hidden from the community (S1: -1) but raising 
an intellectually disabled child can impose a burden on the family (S7: 0) and an 
alternative could be considered (S22: -1): “They have different needs and therefore 
should be treated accordingly — not necessarily at home — taking care of their well-
being. They are definitely not the same as other people”(S22: -1, P19). Difference is 
interpreted in a spiritual sense as ‘specialness’ in the eyes of God: “A gift from God. He 
loves them unconditionally” (S28: +3, P19). 
  
This account offers a limited view of competence as making a contribution in the home: 
“If you learn her, how to do things, like wash the dishes, then she can do it” (S35: +3, 
P28).  Autonomy and independence is extremely limited in this account. An intellectually 
disabled person is a gift from God, and is special in His eyes.  God requires that parents 
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fulfil their duty toward this person by protecting them and preserving their innocence. 
The source of support for the child and the family, as well as the explanation for the 
disability, is to be found in God. This account resonates with some of the reasoning 
behind the institution (see chapter 2). It is philanthropic in its religious emphasis but 
custodial in the strong drive to protect the intellectually disabled person.  
Factor A2.3: A Difficult Challenge to Their Family 
Factor outline. 
This factor has an eigenvalue of 3.00 and accounts for 10% of the study variance. There 
are six participants who load onto this factor at a significant level. The participants 
loading onto this factor are noted in Table 14.  
 
Table 14: Demographic Details of Participants Loading Significantly onto Factor A2.3 
Participant Age  Gender  Race  Employment Age of child 
P7 44 F White Switchboard operator 7 
P12  53 F White Book keeper 20 
P20  50 F Black Health professional Three children, 25,21 and 17 
P22 47 F Black  Unemployed  7 
P23 44 F Black Unemployed 12 
P29 48 M Black Unemployed 7 
 
The participants define intellectual disability as an individual problem with reference to 
the cause, the deficit and the norm, as the following example illustrates: “It is in the 
mind, not in the body or in hearing like deafness. The mind is a little bit slower and takes 
longer to learn, like Williams Syndrome” (Comment, P7). These definitions emphasise 
organic impairment in the brain as the dominant feature of intellectual disability. 
Factor description. 
In this factor the intellectually disabled person is seen as a person very different to the 
norm (S36: -3).  This difference is variously understood within the factor as being a) an 
altogether negative difference: “The conduct of the children is not the same. It is totally 
different to the normal child.  They will cry over nothing and do something funny e.g. 
take things and throw them around the house” (S36: -3, P29), or b)  a neutral fact of life:  
“Intellectually they are not like other people because of the brain damage. The brain is 
the most important part of being intellectual. They are slow in learning; take more time 
to understand than a normal person” (Comment, P22), or c) a challenge that must be 
accepted by families: “It depends on parents/ caregivers. If they have accepted that they 
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are gifts from God, then they will not be hidden. If they have accepted the disability. You 
accept them as they are if you trust God” (S1: -1, P20). 
 
They cannot take responsibility (S18: -3) and hence cannot make decisions and they need 
to be planned for:  “Disabled children need support from doctors. It is doctors and 
parents/caregivers who know exactly their problems. Therefore they should be able to 
decide for their future” (S30: -3, P29). Parents and professionals can be trusted to take 
their views into account: “My planning always takes place around my child. The school 
takes into account what they think. For example, they were concerned about the names 
on the buses, indicating it is a special school because they get teased in the community so 
they take this into consideration” (S19: -2, P12). 
 
This factor values the provision of therapy to make the most of the person’s potential 
(S12: +3), but they are not able to live a normal life since the organic deficit prevents this 
(S5: +2): “You can't lead a normal life with brain damage — that is a fact” (S5: +2, 
P22). Every effort must be made to get the most out of him or her. This puts pressure on 
the parents/caregivers who feel that they should do more (see P7 above). They will do 
whatever they can afford to get help for their child: “I'm not sure if there are places e.g. 
like A., I could take my child there if it is in his best interests. If they can take my child it 
might be better. If you can afford to do it, then you must if it helps him to develop” (S22: 
-1, P22). 
 
 Given the severe restrictions that the biological deficit places on the child, it is irrelevant 
what labels are applied because the deficit is inherently biological (S38: +2). They are 
very likely to be abused (S17: +3):“They are so trusting and do not have the insight into 
hidden motives. They are so gullible. They can be taken advantage of by unscrupulous 
people” (S17: +3, P12). This adds another concern for parenting which requires vigilance 
and protection of the intellectually disabled person and supports the notion that they need 
to have decisions made for them and that the parents/caregivers and teachers are in the 
best position to do this (S19: -2).  
 
The child is a gift from God in the sense that the reasons for intellectual disability are 
obscure but sent as a challenge to parents to fulfil God’s wishes. At the same time, faith 
in God supports parents in this difficult task: “I agree they are a gift from God because 
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we don't know the cause or the reasons so we must trust in God. He cannot give you the 
burden you cannot carry. It goes with trust because you can't throw them away” (S28: 
+3, P20). 
 
An intellectually disabled person is vulnerable and incapable of independence. As such 
they are a challenge to families sent by God. They are very different from others and 
cannot be expected to take any form of responsibility for themselves.  A2.3 is distinct 
from other accounts (see Table 13) in that the organic impairment, brain damage, 
precludes a “normal” life (S5: +2) and makes them very different to other people (S36: -
3). Most notably, intellectually disabled children are seen as posing great difficulties to 
parents (S7: +3), which distinguishes this account from similar religious accounts in A2.2 
and A2.6. It adopts a medical understanding of disability, where there is no distinction 
between impairment and disability and behaviour is seen as biologically determined by 
the organic deficit (see chapter 2).   
Factor A2.4: A Person with Special Needs 
Factor outline. 
This factor has an eigenvalue of 1.31 and accounts for 4% of the study variance. There 
are two participants who load significantly onto this factor. P13 is a black woman, 41 
years old who works as a community worker for disabled children and a sangoma 
(traditional healer). Her child is three years old. P18 is a black woman, 54 years of age, 
who is a teacher and has a child of 21 years.   
 
The loading participants express understandings of intellectual disability that reflect the 
need to develop the limited potential as far as possible through love and patience: “They 
are children that need love, care and development in areas of need. They are 
disadvantaged more than being disabled. Generally they are also human beings that 
have rights to be considered. Patience, love and care can bring good results” (Comment, 
P18).  
Factor description.  
Within this factor, the intellectually disabled person is seen as having definite, quite 
recognisable differences from the norm (S27: -2, S36: -2). The response to this difference 
however, is not to overprotect the person, but rather to ensure that they are prepared for 
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life through the proper training (S12: +3, S13: +2) which focuses on life skills: “The 
child with intellectual disability is not doing very well concerning the brain. Sometimes if 
the child has intellectual disability, she always struggles at school. He has got barriers to 
learning and you must teach the child life skills and self-help, so he can do anything by 
himself” (Comment, P13). 
 
With the correct preparation and with consideration on the part of the community (S37: 
+3), the intellectually disabled person should be able to live a normal life (S5: -3). This 
life would be within the limits of protection from abuse (S17: +1) in sheltered settings 
(S33: +3) and with the ongoing support of the family. The intellectually disabled person 
is seen as having a responsibility to the family by being able to look after themselves and 
doing chores in the home. This is extended to their making a contribution to the family 
through the disability grant (S24: +1). Intellectually disabled people should be given all 
the opportunities to learn (S13: +2, S15: +2) since they are not scared of failure (S16: -3) 
and often they are not given enough learning opportunities (S4: +1).  
 
Factor A2.4 is distinct from other accounts (see Table 13) in its assertion that organic 
impairment does not stop a person leading a normal life (S5: -3) but that normality is 
dependent on receiving all the professional help that they can get (S12: +3), which cannot 
always be provided  within the family (S22: -2). It is also distinct in that it does not figure 
labelling as a negative practice (S38: +3):“It does not matter what you call them because 
they will still have the disability although you can use other words and not retarded. I 
read a book which says we should say mentally challenged or disabled”(S38: +3, P13).  
Factor A2. 5: A Person to be Understood by the Community 
Factor outline. 
This factor has an eigenvalue of 1.5 and accounts for 5% of the variance in this study. 
There are two participants that load significantly onto this factor. P17 is a black woman, 
employed as a development worker working with disabled people. She is 56 years old 
and has a physical disability herself. Her child is 15 years old. P31 is  44 years old and 
has a child of ten years old. She is unemployed. Their understanding of intellectual 
disability emphasises both the limitations that it imposes and the potential that exists for 
overcoming these limitations.  
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Factor description. 
This account proposes a strong positive role for parents/caregivers and teachers as 
knowing and acting in the best interests of the child (S19: -3). They are able to stand up 
for the rights of their intellectually disabled children (S10: -2).  It does matter what labels 
intellectually disabled people are subject to (S38: -2):  “The better wording is people with 
intellectual disabilities, not calling them mentally retarded as it does not sound nice” 
(S38: -2, P17). This account also rejects quite strongly the notion that it is difficult for 
parents/caregivers to raise a child with an intellectual disability (S7: -2).  
 
The intellectually disabled person is like a child (S34: +3) but is not different from others 
at the level of a common humanity since he or she does not look different (S27: +3) or 
manifest difficult behaviour (S36: +2, S8: -2). They are able to learn and the onus is on 
the teachers, parents/caregivers and community to provide the right context for this to 
happen: “They can do things like other children but might need more time and patience 
to understand things first” (S8: -2, P31). Although they are viewed as being able to earn 
money to live on (S39: +3), this should happen under protective conditions, where 
communities are supportive: “They can work in places and also be involved in the 
community projects as long as they are to be supported and be kept in a safe place” 
(S33: +2, P13). 
 
The responsibility for decision -making for the intellectually disabled person rests with 
the family and professionals (S19: -3, S30: -3) and parents/caregivers take this 
responsibility seriously: “Everyone from parent to child should always be considered in 
decision -making about the child's future, both the child and the parent can think and 
make their own decision, like any other person” (S19: -3, P31). Despite their limitations, 
the intellectually disabled person can get married (S11: +1) and have their own home 
(S9: -2): “People with intellectual disability can have their own home by being assisted 
and provided with the necessary support”(S9: -2, P13). 
 
Within this account the intellectually disabled person is normal within the constraints 
imposed by an organic impairment. If one is aware of the limitations that are imposed by 
the impairment, then “normal” behaviour and appearance is defined with respect to the 
realistic expectations placed upon the individual with an organic impairment. There is a 
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community responsibility to be aware of this in that the community must be educated 
about intellectual disability. “Awareness about the disability should be conducted at the 
communities so as to empower society not to abuse them or treat them badly” (S17: 0, 
P13). This account is similar to that of A2.4 in the need for correct training but allows for 
a greater consideration of community integration. The intellectually disabled person is 
qualitatively different from others (see chapter 3) and must be judged accordingly – the 
community must adapt to this difference to provide learning opportunities and support for 
full participation in all aspects of life, including relationships.  
Factor A2.6: A Blessing and a Gift from God 
Factor outline. 
This factor has an eigenvalue of 4.79 and accounts for 15% of the study variance. There 
are nine participants that load significantly onto this factor. Their demographic details are 
presented in Table 15.  
 
Table 15: Demographic Details of Participants Loading Significantly onto FactorA2. 6  
Participant Age  Gender  Race  Employment Age of child 
P3 54 F White Secretary 33 
P4 50 M White Yard manager 33 
P6 49 M White  Administrator 7 
P8 45 F Black  Company director 7 
P10 41 F White Sales rep 20 
P15 41 F White  Personal assistant 9 
P21  47 F Coloured Office assistant Two children: 9, 17 
P25 44 M White Company director Two children: 9, 3 
P27 54 F  Black  Unemployed 12 
 
Overall, the understanding is one that recognises difference and does not see this as a bad 
thing but as overtly positive in some cases: “They can learn to do most things but they 
are different. I feel that every day you learn so much more and they are truly a joy in 
life” (Comment, P3). 
Factor description. 
There is a childlike quality about the intellectually disabled person in this account (S34: 
+1). They enjoy art, music and dance (S31: +3), they are loving (S26: +3) and can learn 
many things with patience and guidance (S35: +3). In their innocence, they are a gift 
from God (S28: +3):“This is the one I agree with the most. The doctor told me at four 
months that she is Down Syndrome. They said I must abort. God chose my womb. He 
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never makes a mistake. I accepted her as a gift from God. Insomuch that I love her” 
(S28: +3, P27) and:  “Our daughters have been a blessing in many ways to many people 
and teach us new lessons of grace every day” (S28: +3, P25). As a consequence of their 
innocent and loving natures intellectually disabled children are not difficult for 
parents/caregivers to raise (S7: -2): “They are easier than normal kids” (S7: -2, P15).  
 
The intellectually disabled person, because of their childlike qualities is unable to take 
responsibility (S18: -2) and is often treated unfairly because of their innocence (S21: -3). 
Parents/caregivers, teacher and doctors have an important role to play in making 
decisions in their lives (S30: -1, S19: -1). There is a fear of exploitation of innocence in 
that the disability grant should not be used for the family (S24: -3): “I don't receive a 
grant. It is nonsense they bring love into a family” (S24: -3, P21) and: “They bring a lot 
more into life than money. They bless us in ways that make us better humans” (S24: -3, 
P25). The parents’ love might be excessive and limit potential through over-
protectiveness or through low expectations: “For instance I can't let her make me some 
tea because I am scared of her burning herself. I have to watch her go to school. It’s 
better when someone else teaches her. I am scared” (S29: +1, P27). 
 
In this account difference is seen as being marked (S27: -3, S36: -1) and the response to 
this difference is to provide as much help as possible (S12: +2, S23: +2) and to enjoy the 
unique contribution that intellectually disabled people can make, especially at a spiritual 
level. This account is similar to Factor A2.2 in that it figures the intellectually disabled 
person as innocent within a spiritual context. However, the emphasis is more on duty in 
A2.2 and more on the benefits and joys of an intellectually disabled child in A2.6. The 
religious element of A2.6 contrasts with that of A2.3 where the intellectually disabled 
person is seen as a challenge and a burden imposed by God. The perspective of a blessing 
of the disabled child is not prominent in my discussion of intellectual disability in chapter 
3. It appears to be a uniquely parental view (held by a large proportion of parents in this 
study) and as such a marginalised account in intellectual disability discourse (see chapter 
4 for the exclusion of parental perspectives).  
Summary of Q-study A2 
Within Q-study A2, one account focuses on human rights and autonomy, with the degree 
of protection and control offered by the family as an important issue. The other accounts 
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make reference to religious and community values of acceptance and tolerance that can 
be contrasted with a fear of abuse and ill-treatment. A summary of factors is presented in 
Table 16.  
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Table 16: Summary of Factors in Q-study A2 
 A2.1: A citizen with 
rights. 
A2.2: An innocent and 
vulnerable child of 
God. 
A2.3: A difficult 
challenge to their 
family. 
A2.4: A person 
with special needs. 
A2.5: A person to be 
understood by the 
community. 
A2.6: A blessing and a 
gift from God. 
Difference  Response to difference is 
the problem rather than 
difference per se. 
Difference is intrinsic 
to the individual and 
requires special care. 
Difference is intrinsic 
and organic. It  
determines everything 
else. 
 
Distinct organic 
difference.  
Distinct organic 
difference that limits 
achievement. 
Distinct organic 
impairment. 
Spirituality Does not draw on this. God given duty to care 
for one who is special. 
God will give support. 
 
Challenge sent from 
God.  
Not a feature. Not a feature. Blessing sent by God. 
Competence Fluid and open-ended. Extremely limited. Extremely limited. Social and life 
skills must be 
developed. 
 
Can develop 
competence for 
community living. 
Not a feature. 
Social 
inclusion  
An important human right. Continue to be hidden 
but need protection in 
society. 
Cannot be included 
because of their 
vulnerability. 
 
Full social 
inclusion.  
Full social inclusion but 
community must be 
educated. 
Not a consideration – 
family and church will 
provide. 
Autonomy An important human right. Extremely limited. Extremely limited.  Not so important 
in a caring 
community. 
Limited decision- 
making but full 
participation in 
community life. 
 
Limited because of 
innocence and 
vulnerability. 
Family Belonging but problems of 
overprotection. 
Source of protection 
and care. 
Pose a difficult 
challenge to the family. 
Less important 
than the broader 
community. 
Source of support and 
educators of the 
community. 
Family benefits from 
the child, 
overprotective. 
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Q-study A3: Professionals  
The data for the 33 professional participants were analysed as for Q-studies A1 and A2. 
The eigenvalues and percentage of variance accounted for by each factor is given in 
Table 17 below. The five-factor solution accounts for 54% of the variance with 31 of the 
33 participants loading significantly at p < 0.01 onto a factor.  
 
Table 17: Variance Accounted for by Factors and Factor Loading of Participants in Q-Study A3 
Factors Eigens % variance accounted for by 
factor 
Number of Q sorts loading onto factor at  
significance level 0.41 and participant numbers 
of loading participants in brackets 
A3.1 3.26 10% 5 (3, 10, 14, 18, 27) 
A3.2 2.96 9% 6 (29, 24, 19, 16, 9, 13) 
A3.3 4.02 12% 7 (7, 8, 15, 17, 21, 26, 33) 
A3.4 3.09 9% 6 (2, 23, 25, 28, 31, 32) 
A3.5 4.64 14%` 8 (1, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 20, 22) 
Totals 17.96 54% 32  
 
I have named the factors below, referring to an intellectually disabled person. It will be 
noted that these factor names imply a desirable course of action in contrast with the more 
descriptive factors of Q-studies A1 and A2.  
A3.1: A person to be understood and advocated for by professionals. 
A3.2: A person to be unconditionally accepted by the community. 
A3.3: A person restricted by a label.  
A3.4: A person with an impairment who requires support. 
A3.5: A person with a condition that is an object of expert knowledge. 
The factor loading for each participant is once again indicated in Appendix I in Table 5 
and the factor array in Table 6. 
 
There are six items in this array that are statistically significant consensus items. These 
are noted in Table 18. 
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Table 18: Statistically Significant Consensus Statements for Q-Study A3 
Statement A3.1 A3.2 A3.3 A3.4  A3.5 
2. Their disability is the fault of their mother because of 
something she has done wrong. 
-3 -3 -3 -3 -3 
9. They can never have their own home. -3 -3 -2 -3 -2 
21. They are always treated well and fairly. -3 -2 -3 -3 -3 
25. They can do more than many people think they can. 3 2 3 3 2 
31. They can enjoy art, music and dance. 2 3 2 3 2 
35.They can learn to do most things for themselves   with 
time and patience. 
2 2 3 2 3 
 
These consensus statements show a rejection of blaming the mother (S2) and assert the 
capability of intellectually disabled people in that they can have their own home (S9). 
However, their abilities are often underestimated (S25) and they are generally not treated 
fairly (S21). With the right kind of teaching, they can learn to do most things (S35).  
There are no distinguishing statements for any of the factors.  
 
In addition to the statistically significant statements, I applied the criterion of two or less 
ranking point’s difference between the highest and lowest ranking to identify statements 
about which there was substantial agreement. These are noted in Table 19 below. 
 
Table 19: Statements that Reflect Substantial Agreement Across Factors for Q-Study A3 
Statement A3.1 A3.2 A3.3 A3.4  A3.5 
5. Brain damage that makes learning difficult stops them from 
living a normal life. 
0 0 -1 -2 -2 
7. It is very difficult for parents/caregivers to bring up people 
like this. 
-1 1 -1 1 1 
11. They can have a long term relationship or get married. -1 1 1 1 0 
13. They should be taught about friendship, marriage and 
having children. 
0 0 1 2 0 
16. They are scared of failing in learning. 0 -2 0 -1 0 
24. They bring something into the family because they can get 
a disability grant. 
0 0 0 -1 -2 
26. They can give and take love. 1 1 3 2 2 
28. They are a gift from God. 1 3 1 1 1 
32. They treat other people with respect. -1 0 1 -1 -1 
38. It does not matter what you call these people, intellectually 
disabled or mentally retarded because the disability is still 
there.  
-2 -1 -3 -2 -2 
40. They cannot manage their own money. -1 -2 -2 0 0 
 
While most of these consensus statements cluster around a neutral position, there is 
general agreement that they can give and take love (S26) and that derogatory labels are 
harmful (S38).  For Q-study A3 there is a much higher occurrence of agreement (six 
statistically significant consensus statements and 11 of substantial agreement) than for Q-
studies A1 (with no statistically significant consensus statements and only three of 
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substantial agreement) and A2 (with two significant consensus statements and three of 
substantial agreement). One reason that I would suggest for this agreement is that 
professional knowledge is formalised as a certain way of knowing with its own forms of 
discourse that constitute a disciplinary knowledge.  
 
There are only three statements reflecting substantial disagreements using the criterion of 
five or more ranking points between the highest and lowest ranking in the factor array.  
These are presented in Table 20. These statements of substantial disagreement will be 
used in factor interpretation below. 
 
Table 20: Statements that Reflect Substantial Disagreement Across Factors for Q-Study A3 
Statement A3.1 A3.2 A3.3 A3.4  A3.5 
20. They are always made welcome in church and 
religious places. 
-3 2 -1 -1 0 
27. They look the same as other people. -1 3 1 0 -2 
33. They can only work in places where they get support 
and are kept safe.  
2 -1 -2 -3 2 
Note. The shaded cells represent the highest and the lowest ranking of the statement. 
 
Factor A3.1: A Person to be Understood and Advocated for by Professionals 
Factor outline. 
This factor has an eigenvalue of 3.26 and accounts for 10% of the study variance. There 
are five participants who load significantly onto this factor, as indicated in Table 21 
below.  
 
Table 21: Demographic Details of Participants Loading Significantly onto Factor A3.1 
Participant Age  Gender  Race  Employment 
P3 37 M “Coloured”  Special school teacher 
P10 45 F Black Special school teacher 
P14 40 M Black Special school principal 
P18 40 F Black  Regular school teacher 
P27  41 F Black Regular school teacher  
 
Participants loading onto this factor understand intellectual disability as a difficulty 
within the individual, affecting their performance relative to the norm with a specific 
organic cause:  
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“Intellectual disability is as a result of brain dysfunction which is as a result of failure of 
some areas of the brain to work normally. This results to a condition that limits the 
individual to perform some of the set standards of normal functioning” (Comment, P14). 
Factor description. 
Intellectually disabled people are vulnerable to abuse and exclusion (S21: -3, S17: +3, 
S20: -3) from all domains, including those that should be most welcoming, the family, 
the church, schools: “You'll find that even in religious places — PLACES OF GRACE — 
still  people with severe disability (PSD) are not treated well and fairly. In black 
communities you still find that people link such issues to witchcraft” (S20: -3, P3). They 
are even excluded from the disability rights movement itself: “They are not always 
treated well or fairly. As such they do not benefit from what is meant to benefit the 
disabled community. Even in organisations for the disabled, they are not known. The 
slogan that 'nothing about us without us' is not real for them” (S21: -3, P14). 
 
They are capable of so much more if given the right opportunities (S4: +3, S25: +3), 
which include professional help as an important element (S12: +3). Without this help 
they will be neglected and abused, as others do not have the expertise and concern of the 
skilled professional. However, their competence is limited as they do not want to learn 
how to read and write (S15: -1) but rather they need to learn life skills (S35: +2). 
Competence does not extend to relationships since they cannot have a long term 
relationship (S11: -1) and do not necessarily need to be taught about relationships ( S13: 
0).  
 
There is an emphasis on the interaction of the disability with the professional help 
offered, so that achievement in life is equally dependent on the extent of their difference 
from the norm and the way that this is dealt with: “PSD are not given enough 
opportunities to experience the world like a normally developing child and subsequently 
this leads to an issue called learned helplessness whereby the PSD/ child with severe 
disability (CSD) does not see the need to do things for themselves — depriving them of 
learning new things, with the result that society views PSD/CSD as unproductive 
members of society and does not see the need to give them TIME and patience to learn or 
do anything. They are regarded as only in NEED  of help and as a person who can't do 
something” (S25: +3, P3).   
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Since they cannot be expected to take responsibility for their actions (S18: -2), they 
should be cared for and protected.  Parents/caregivers and doctors have a role to play in 
making decisions for them (S19: -2, S30: -2). The responsibility of the community is to 
treat them better (S37: +2) and to avoid hurtful labelling practices (S38: -2):  “I wish 
people (parents/caregivers and teachers) can change their attitude towards people with 
intellectual disability because they are also the creation of God” (S28: +1, P18). 
 
Family support is not highly valued in this account with neutral scores for staying within 
the family  (S22: 0) and always needing help from the family (S23: 0). Parents/caregivers 
are seen to be somewhat over-protective (S29: +1). Decision-making and child rearing 
with the support of professionals is given more validity than that of parents/caregivers 
alone and a position of advocacy for intellectually disabled people is adopted. The 
distinctive differences of intellectually disabled people expose them to the dangers of an 
ill-informed and sometimes abusive family and community. The difference that is based 
in organic impairment can be ameliorated by the development of limited competence 
through the application of professional skill. The notion of psychological expertise (see 
chapter 2) is apposite here as a superior form of knowledge that is highly valued. It has 
an ethical intention in protecting the disabled person from abuse.  
Factor A3.2: A Person to be Unconditionally Accepted by the Community 
Factor outline. 
This factor has an eigenvalue of 2.96 and accounts for 9% of the study variance. There 
are six participants who load significantly onto this factor and they are described in Table 
22.  
 
Table 22: Demographic Details of Participants Significantly Loading onto Factor A3.2  
Participant Age  Gender  Race  Employment 
P9 34 F Black Community worker 
P13 54 F Black Special school teacher 
P16 49 F Black Principal regular school 
(FSS) 
P19 59 F Black  Regular school teacher 
(FSS) 
P24 44 F Black Regular school teacher 
P29 37 M Black Regular school teacher 
 
The understanding of participants loading onto this factor refers to the place of the 
disabled person in the school and the community with respect to the prevailing 
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expectations in these settings. Intellectual disability is viewed as a problem that is already 
there in the community, affecting large numbers of children: “It refers to children being 
unable to concentrate on their work, or of having the feeling of satisfaction, unable to 
speak properly (lapse of words), unable to solve problems related their level of age. Of 
paramount importance is for teachers who stay with children for longer hours to be 
trained about intellectual disability. Mostly we tend to think of disability in terms of 
physical. In our school almost about 60% fall in the category of intellectual disability” 
(Comment, P29). 
Factor description. 
In this account, there is a rejection of difference as a feature of intellectual disability 
(S27: +3, S36: +2, S6: -2, S8: -2): “They are the same as normal because they have 
feelings, can relate with others and play with other children” (S27: +3, P29). Difference 
exists at a superficial level and this does not affect the common humanity of all people in 
the eyes of God: “God created people as his image. They are human beings” (S28: +3, 
P13). As such they are an integral part of the community and they are made welcome in 
community spaces (S20: +2):“Children with disability are a part of our communities. 
They are not taken away, even the schools that help them learn are part of our 
communities” (S1: -3, P29).  
 
While issues of difference are played down, there is a concern that these children are not 
always treated well (S21: -2, S17: +1) and that they will always need the care and 
protection of their family (S23: +2).  They are credited with the competence to have their 
own home (S9: -3) and long term relationships (S11: +1) as full community members. 
They need professional help (S12: +3) to help them to do more than generally expected 
(S25: +2) and to learn when taught appropriately (S35: +2). Expertise and differentiation 
are played down in this account and belonging is emphasised.  
Factor A3.3: A Person Restricted by a Label 
Factor outline.  
This factor has an eigenvalue of 4.02 and accounts for 12% of the study variance. There 
are seven participants who load significantly onto this factor and these are described in 
Table 23.  
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Table 23: Demographic Details of Participants Significantly Loading onto Factor A3.3 
Participant Age  Gender  Race  Employment 
P7 42 F White Health professional 
P8 40 F Black Community worker 
P15 49 F White Health professional 
P17 38 F Black  Regular school teacher 
(FSS) 
P26 37 F Black Regular school teacher 
P33 46 M White Regular school teacher 
 
The understanding of intellectual disability of participants who load onto this factor 
demonstrates a rejection of intellectual disability as a fixed and unproblematic category 
and the emphasis is on support required rather than intrinsic deficit: “The person with 
intellectual disability can achieve as much as any other persons without the disability 
with all passion, patience and perseverance to do something. Others can assist with 
positive attitude towards the persons with intellectual disability” (Comment, P8). 
Factor description. 
This factor strongly rejects organic impairment as the reason for limited achievement. 
There are external limitations placed on the potential of people with intellectual disability 
(S14: -3) and labelling practices have a negative impact (S38: -3):“A person who is not 
able to function 'normally' according to the level expected of a class (according to the 
law/rules as laid down by higher bodies). I however do not agree with this as I don't 
believe they should be labelled as this leads to negative labels e.g. stupid, ‘dof’ [dumb], 
special class” (Comment, P33). 
 
The capability of the person with the disability is emphasised (S33: -2, S40: -2, S9: -2, 
S8: -2, S39: +2, S35: +3): “Given a chance they can be anything, because they have their 
own intelligences that are being ignored by most people. Their strengths need to be built 
on so that they can be independent” (S35: +3, P17). Capability does not always develop 
into competence because they are not always well treated (S21: -3) and they are forced to 
conform in ways that are difficult for them: “They are always treated as outcasts in our 
communities. It is not them who should try to be accepted, it is the community that is 
supposed to understand their situation” (S6: -2, P26). They can be overprotected by their 
families (S29: +2) but this is where they belong (S22: +2), with the appropriate 
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support:“To take any person away from their family is tragic and cruel. Systems should 
rather be put in place to help everybody cope better” (S22: +2, P21).  
 
Within this factor, the identification of intellectual disability as a category is a 
problematic action, fraught with the danger of making people conform to a category that 
highlights difference rather than similarities. An emphasis on similarities rather than 
difference means that everyone should be treated in the same way: “Our similarities need 
to be highlighted and our differences set aside. After all that is how civilisation evolves 
positively and how our meaning of humanness and human divinity are defined” (S37: +3, 
P33). At the same time, there needs to be recognition of diversity within categories as 
well: “These statements are all generalisations. They stereotype and box people with a 
variety of strengths and challenges into a convenient label. Just as all so-called ‘intell-
able’ people have strengths and weaknesses so too do people categorised as ‘intell-
disabled’. One cannot actually make these statements 'en masse' - they may be true or 
false depending on the individual, ‘intell-abled’ or disabled” (Comment, P21). 
 
This account approaches claims of intrinsic difference with a high degree of scepticism 
reflecting a concern with labelling that constructs categories that come to be viewed in a 
negative light and limit the potential of human beings. This account is associated with a 
social model of disability as it distinguishes between impairment and the way in which it 
is dealt with. It goes further than this in figuring labelling practices as constructive of 
impairment and allowing for heterogeneity within the classification of intellectual 
disability. The account is similar to that of A2.1 but lays a greater emphasis on support 
than on human rights. 
Factor A3.4: A Person with an Impairment who Requires Support  
Factor outline. 
This factor has an eigenvalue of 3.09 and accounts for 9% of the study variance. Six 
participants load significantly onto this factor, see Table 24.  
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Table 24:  Demographic Details of Participants Significantly Loading onto Factor A3.4 
Participant Age  Gender  Race  Employment 
P2 51 F White Special school teacher 
P23 46 F White Regular school teacher 
P25 44 F Black Regular school teacher  
P28 38 F White Health professional 
P31 54 F White Regular school teacher 
P32 51 F White Health professional 
 
The understanding of intellectual disability of loading participants is of an organic deficit 
in the child but the way that it is dealt with by the community and parents/caregivers 
either mitigates or exacerbates its effect: “I hated to put a child in a box of intellectual 
disability and I was sceptical when the teachers say the child is stupid. There are 
different ways of learning but when I attended the conference in 2001 I understood better 
the reality of intellectual disability. Physical disability you can adapt for but intellectual 
disability you can't see. They are still learning. They are not cabbages. The concept of 
disability is like giving up hope so it bothers me” (Comment, P31). The comment above 
is interesting in that it reflects a shift from a labelling perspective (similar to that put 
forward in the account of A3.3) to acknowledging the “reality” of intellectual disability, 
with it’s effect of  “giving up hope”. 
Factor description. 
This account acknowledges the existence of an organic difference that impacts on 
learning. The organic impairment is exacerbated by negative attitudes: “Brain damage 
makes learning difficult — that part I agree with but it does not have to stop anybody 
from leading a normal life. People's attitudes stop others from leading a normal life” 
(S5: -2, P2). 
 
The likelihood of abuse is rated very high (S17: +3): “If you look at the media you will 
find many reports of rapes and abuse and sometimes you will find a social worker 
fighting for the chained child” (S17: +3, P25). It is not only restricted to physical and 
sexual abuse but is seen to include a lack of educational opportunity: “Teachers and 
parents/caregivers have low expectations from these children. They do not provide 
challenges” (S25: +3, P2) and a disregard for their point of view (see P23): “Other 
people make decisions for them and treat them as if they cannot do anything in the way 
they think” (S21: -3, P23).  
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However, despite this level of capability, they are unable to take responsibility for their 
actions (S18: -2):“Of the learners that I have taught, most were unable to take 
responsibility for their actions, often they would blame someone else or fabricate a 
story” (S18: -2, P23). This lack of responsibility should not prevent them from making 
their own decisions in their relationships with guidance where necessary (S13: +2, S30: 
+2, S11: +1): “They need more guidance for some it comes naturally but others it 
doesn't” (S13: +2, P28). 
 
The effect of impairment is unfair treatment and abuse in the community and within 
families. The individual therefore needs to be taught how to protect themselves and 
supported in becoming autonomous, rather than acquiring specific skills. It is similar to 
Factor A3.3 with the major difference lying in the understanding of the limitation that the 
organic impairment imposes and the degree of abuse that the individual is subject to. 
A3.4 envisages a limit to learning (S14: +1), which is rejected outright in Factor A3.3 
(S14: -3). The account of A3.4 rates the likelihood of abuse very high (S17: +3) whereas 
A3.3 is neutral. This account is very closely aligned to a social model of disability, but 
relies to some extent on notions of  professionalisation and expertise.  
Factor A3. 5: A Person with a Condition that is an Object of Expert Knowledge 
Factor outline. 
Factor 5 has an eigenvalue of 4.64 and accounts for 14% of the study variance. There are 
seven participants who load significantly onto this factor, as indicated in Table 25. It is 
worth noting that all of these participants have considerable professional experience in 
working within intellectual disability.  
 
Table 25: Demographic Details of Participants Significantly Loading onto Factor 3.5 
Participant Age  Gender  Race  Employment 
P1 34 F “Coloured” Special school teacher 
P5 30 F White Special school principal 
P6 61 F White Special school principal 
P11 38 F Black  Special school teacher 
P12 54 F Black Special school teacher 
P20 59 F White District psychologist 
P22 45 F “Coloured” Health professional 
 
The understanding of intellectual disability expressed by loading participants tends to be 
norm referenced and several refer to the therapeutic action required. The problem of 
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intellectual disability is located in the learning capacity of the individual, which is 
deficient. This factor also makes reference to degrees of severity in their definitions:  
“There are varying degrees of intellectual disability. Persons with mild-mod intellectual 
dysfunction NEED early assessment and intervention. Community integration is NB so 
that persons with intellectual disability may lead as near to normal lives” (Comment, 
P22). 
Factor description. 
There is a concern about abuse and ill-treatment that informs this factor (S17: +3, 21: -3): 
“Because they often look and act differently and are expected not to understand what is 
happening to them, they are often abused”(S17: +3, P20). The family is implicated in 
abuse (29: +3, 19: +1) in not making the correct decisions for their children. People with 
intellectual disability are not considered to be responsible for their actions (S18: -3): 
“Their level of cognitive functioning often excludes understanding the consequences of a 
decision” (S18: -3, P20).  However, this should not justify overprotection on the part of 
parents/caregivers, which is seen to be problematic in this account (S29: +3): 
“Parents/caregivers often tend to be overprotective. Where children have an intellectual 
disability, parents/caregivers may not consider their children as independent but 
consider them as children even into adulthood” (S29: +3, P22).  
 
Because of their vulnerability and the fact that they do not know how to stand up for 
themselves (S10: +2), they need to be protected and kept safe  (S33: +2). There is an 
acknowledgement of difference that should be accepted as a reality in dealing with 
intellectually disabled people (S37: +3, S27: -2, S36: -1,S6: -3): “Why should the 
responsibility [for changing themselves] lie with the person with a disability? Everyone 
should be respected for who they are. Equal unique individuals” (S6: -3, P22). 
 
Since they are subject to abuse and the family cannot be counted upon, it falls to 
professionals to offer some protection. The importance of autonomy in this account 
relates to the important role of the professional which is to train and support the 
intellectually disabled person to monitor and protect themselves. This account favours the 
intervention of the professional in limiting abuse and designating the correct levels of 
protection and independence because they know about the disability: “If colleagues in a 
work place do not understand intellectually impaired people, it could lead to problems. 
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They need support as they may have to be told over and over again what is permissible 
and what is not” (S33: +2, P1). 
 
This position is based on knowledge about the “true” nature of intellectual disability: 
“Disabled candidates will never make a successful marriage because of their low 
mentality, low self-esteem and some are physically weak to bear children and can not 
manage themselves, even their monies. They are a danger to themselves” (S11:0, P12).  
 
This account is similar to that given in A3.1 but differs in that it ascribes a range of 
characteristics to intellectual disability as a specific condition that require certain 
therapeutic interventions. It also offers strong views on individual autonomy independent 
of the family, who might not act in the best interests of the intellectually disabled person. 
Intervention is based on knowledge about the “truth” of intellectual disability and the 
best therapeutic actions to be taken. This account therefore justifies claims to decide 
appropriate aspirations for competence and independence, given a relatively hostile and 
ignorant community and family, through recourse to a superior knowledge of intellectual 
disability. There is an element of advocacy for the rights of the intellectually disabled 
person within this account as the “truth” needs to be disseminated amongst the ignorant 
parents/caregivers and community.  
Summary of Q-study A3 
In this study there is a concern with the impact of organic impairment in Factors A3.1, 
A3.4 and A3.5. Factors A3.2 and A3.3 provide little consideration of impairment 
focusing on community and labelling practices respectively. There is a cross cutting 
concern with ill-treatment by families and communities. The summary is presented in 
Table 26.  
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Table 26: Summary of Factors in Q-study A3 
 
 A3.1: A person to be 
understood and advocated for 
by professionals. 
A3.2: A person to be 
unconditionally accepted by 
the community. 
A3.3: A person restricted 
by a label. 
A3.4: A person with 
an impairment who 
requires support. 
A3.5:  A person with a condition 
that is an object of expert 
knowledge. 
Difference  Organic difference is 
compounded by unfair 
treatment. 
Difference is only 
superficial within a shared 
common humanity. 
Difference is constructed 
by the way we categorise 
and label. 
Disability is ‘real’. It 
places limitations on a 
person. 
Impairment of different severity 
with different impact. 
Spirituality They require but are often 
refused spiritual care. 
Claim to equality, fair 
treatment and belonging as 
God’ s children. 
Not a feature.  Not a feature. Not a feature. 
Competence Limited competence can be 
developed. 
With professional help, they 
can be competent to live in 
the community. 
Fluid and open-ended 
depending on 
opportunities.  
Limited by the 
disability. 
Depends on severity.  
Social 
inclusion  
High degree of exclusion and 
abuse. 
Integral part of the 
community. 
Limited due to negative 
labelling and societal 
attitudes.  
Limited due to 
negative labelling and 
societal pressures. 
High degree of abuse requiring 
protection. 
Autonomy Very limited. Must be protected from 
unfair treatment. 
Restricted by negative 
views of intellectual 
disability.  
Restricted due to the 
disability. 
Self-governing individual must be 
developed for a better quality of 
life. 
Family Family does not always act in 
best interests. They need 
professional guidance. 
Community is more 
important than family. 
Overprotective and 
needing support. 
Viewed as neutral. Can be abusive. Professionals know 
the truth about intellectual disability 
and must educate others. 
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Q-study A4: Second order factor analysis 
As was noted in chapter 5, the second order study serves as a means of comparing the Q-
studies conducted using Q-set A, that is Q-studies A1, A2 and A3. The factors from these 
studies were entered as Q-sorts for the second order study. I excluded Factors A1.2 and 
A1.2A because they each had only one significantly loading participant and have been 
exhaustively discussed in the section on Q-study A1. The resulting factors are described 
as for Q-studies A1, A2 and A3.  
 
A four factor solution was preferred for this study as providing significant factors, 
accounting for an adequate percentage of variance and allowing all the Q-sorts to load 
significantly onto a factor.  The second order study yields a new factor array that 
provides the best estimate of the loading of the various first order factors. It represents a 
reduction in the variation that was reflected in the three first order studies. The factors 
with eigenvalues, variance and number of Q sorts loading is shown in Table 27: 
 
Table 27: Variance Accounted for by Factors and Factor Loading of Participants in Q-Study A4 
Factors Eigens % variance accounted for by 
factor 
Number of Q sorts loading onto factor at 
significance level 0.41. The Q-sorts are factors 
from the first three studies. They are listed in 
brackets. 
A4.1 1.62 10% 3 (A1.1, A1.4, A2.5) 
A4.2 1.96 12% 3 (A2.1, A3.3, A3.4) 
A4.3 3.9 24% 7 (A1.3, A1.6, A2.2, A2.3, A2.6, A3.1, A3.5) 
A4.4 1.70 11% 3 (A1.5, A2.4, A3.2) 
Totals 9.18 57% 16 
 
I have named the factors as follows, referring to discourses rather than accounts 
Factor A4.1: Interactive discourse.  
Factor A4.2: Social model/human rights discourse. 
Factor A4.3: Medical model/religious discourse.  
Factor A4.4: Community/religious discourse.  
 
The factor loading for each of the Q-sorts and the factor array for this study are presented 
in Table 7 and 8 respectively, in Appendix I. There are seven consensus statements for 
Q-study A4, presented in Table 28. These statements represent the common 
understanding held by all the participants in all three studies.  
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Table 28: Statistically Significant Consensus Statements for Q-Study A4 
Statement A4.1 A4.2 A4.3 A4.4  
2. Their disability is the fault of their mother because of something 
she has done wrong.   
-3 -3 -3 -3 
7.It is very difficult for parents/caregivers to bring up people like 
this.                                 
0 0 0 -1 
8. They often find it hard to behave or act in the right way.                                             -2 -2 1 -2 
25. They can do more than many people think they can. 2 3 2 2 
31. They can enjoy art, music and dance. 3 2 3 3 
32. They treat other people with respect.                    1 0 1 1 
35. They can learn to do most things for themselves with time and 
patience. 
2 2 3 2 
 
There is general agreement that the mother is not to blame and a neutral stance about 
whether it is difficult for parents/caregivers to raise a child with intellectual disability. 
There is general disagreement that they find it hard to behave in the correct way. An 
overall positive image of intellectual disability is presented where they are able and 
willing to learn with the right kind of instruction. There are no differentiating statements 
for any of these factors. As an aid to factor interpretation I also present statements where 
there is substantial agreement (no more than  two ranking points between the highest and 
lowest scoring factors for each statement) in Table 29 below.  
 
Table 29: Statements of Substantial Agreement across Factors in Q-study A4. 
Statements  A4.1 A4.2 A4.3 A4.4 
  4. They have not had enough of the right chances to learn.                                                 -1 1 1 -1 
  5. Brain damage that makes learning difficult stops them from leading a 
normal life.                       
-1 -2 0 -1 
  6. They must try very hard to be more like other people.                                                0 -2 -2 -2 
  9. They can never have their own home.                     -1 -3 -3 -3 
11. They can have a long term relationship or get married.                                               0 1 -1 1 
13. They should be taught about friendship, marriage and having 
children.                                   
1 2 0 1 
14. They will reach a limit to what they can learn.      -1 -2 -1 -2 
15. They want to learn how to read and write.           3 1 1 2 
21. They are always treated well and fairly.        -1 -3 -3 -1 
22. They should be brought up within their families no matter what 
special needs they might have.          
2 2 0 0 
34. They can be thought of children in many ways.             1 -1 0 0 
 
It is clear that there is a much higher degree of agreement for this study than for any of 
the others, since there are no statements with a high degree of disagreement. The above 
consensus indicates general agreement across all four factors that intellectually disabled 
people should be able to have their own home (S9), that their ability to learn is not 
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limited (S14) and that they do not have to be like others (S6). However, they are 
generally subject to unfair treatment (S21).  
Factor A4.1: Interactive Discourse 
Factor outline. 
This factor has an eigenvalue of 1.62 and accounts for 10% of the study variance. There 
are three Q-sorts (factors from Q-studies A1, A2 and A3) loading onto this factor:  
A1.1: A competent person. 
A1.4: An (ir)responsible person. 
A2.5: A person to be understood by the community. 
The overall connotation of the above is that competence and social inclusion have a 
specific relation to each other. Competence is created in social contexts, depending on 
both the application of the intellectually disabled person to the task and the support 
offered by the community.  
Factor description. 
This factor emphasises the desire to learn (S15: +3, S13: +1) and the capability of people 
with intellectual disability (S31: +3, S35: +3, S39: +3, S25: +2). They are able to have 
their own home (S9: -1) and are not likely to be poor (S3: -3) because they can earn and 
manage their own money (S39: +3, S40: -2). They are fully-fledged community 
members, entitled to participate in all arenas of community and family life.  However, 
competence is not easily attained since they are scared of failing in learning (S16: +1).  
 
Social inclusion does not depend on the autonomy of the individual, who can be thought 
of as a child in many ways (S34: +1), but rather it is the responsibility of parents and 
professionals who consider their needs and wishes (S19: -3). These wishes can be 
expressed since intellectually disabled people can stand up for their rights (S10: -2). For 
this reason, social inclusion within the family is of the utmost importance (S22: +2) and 
intellectually disabled people are not hidden away (S1: -2) but will always need the help 
of their families (S23: +1). While they will always need help from the family and in the 
work place (S33: +1, 23: +1), the disabled person can make a contribution to the family 
with the disability grant (S24: +2).  
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Difference from others is not important as they look and act like others (S27: +2, S36: 
+2) and can be expected to behave in the right way (S8: -2). Organic impairment is not a 
barrier to leading a normal life (S5: -1) and neither is therapeutic help a prerequisite for 
normality (S12: 0). Negative labels are rejected (S38: -2) as they can have a harmful 
effect over and above any organic deficit.   
 
The nature of the impairment is open-ended and dynamic, since with the right kind of 
support, social inclusion and self-application, there is no reason for them not to be 
independent and socially integrated. Thus, support is an important element here, but it is 
not related to expertise.  
 
There are three factors loading onto this second order factor and two of these arise from 
Q-study A1, which was conducted with intellectually disabled people and none from 
professionals in Q-study A3. The greater emphasis on competence and inclusion than on 
autonomy situates the disability as a community and family concern, rather than the 
property of the individual. This is not a professional discourse and looks to families and 
communities in supporting intellectually disabled people. This discourse will be further 
explored in chapter 8 and constitutes a marginalised perspective in the dominant 
understandings of intellectual disability.  
Factor A4.2: Social model/Human Rights Discourse 
Factor outline. 
This factor has an eigenvalue of 1.96 and accounts for 12% of the study variance. There 
are three Q sorts loading significantly on to this factor. These loading Q-sorts (first order 
factors) have been named as follows: 
A2.1: A citizen with rights. 
A3.3:  A person restricted by a label.  
A3.4: A person with an impairment who requires support. 
Factor description. 
The intellectually disabled person is capable (S35: +3, S14: -2) but their competence is 
restricted by prevailing beliefs in their incapability (S25: +3), the way that difference is 
understood (S37: +3) and the lack of learning opportunities (S4: +1). There is no limit to 
their learning potential (S14: -2) but limitations are imposed by society (S25: +3). The 
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impairment itself does not prevent them from living a normal life (S5: -2) and therapeutic 
intervention is not a necessary requirement for normality (S12: 0).  
 
They are autonomous human beings with the same rights and wishes as anybody else 
(S26: +3, S13; +2, S22: +2, S31; +2) but sometimes they are prevented from achieving 
autonomy by over-protective parents (S29: +2) and other people making decisions for 
them (S30: +1). Competence, within this account, is more directed toward the 
achievement of autonomy than with the acquisition of skills. Learning how to read and 
write (S15: +1) is less important than having their own home (S9: -3) and working in 
mainstream settings (S33: -2). It is perhaps for this reason that professional help is not 
highly valued (S12: 0).   
 
The reasons for social exclusion do not lie within the individual’s incompetence but they 
are excluded because they are poorly treated (S21: -3, S17: +1) and because people do 
not always look at their capabilities (S37: +3). Their inclusion is fragile, as they are not 
even made welcome in church (S20: -1). Intellectually disabled people look the same as 
others (S27: +1) and do not find it hard to behave in the right way (S8: -2).  However, 
difference is not entirely denied, as they are not always the same as other people in the 
way that they act (S36: -1) and they do not take responsibility (S18: -1).  
 
In this view, the organic impairment is viewed as existing within the individual (except in 
the one constituent factor, A3.3), but it is not this impairment that constructs the problem 
of intellectual disability. This is created by social practices that stigmatise difference and 
attribute incompetence and dependence to the intellectually disabled person. The 
capability of the disabled person is emphasised and the cause for incompetence is sought 
in low expectations and prejudice. The outcome of this  discourse  is societal change that 
accepts difference and adopts a political agenda to ensure inclusivity regardless of levels 
of competence. This  discourse is closely aligned with the social model account presented 
in chapter 2 and draws on claims to human rights and autonomy for the intellectually 
disabled person. 
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Factor A4.3: Medical Model/Religious Discourse  
Factor outline. 
This factor has an eigenvalue of 3.90 and accounts for 24% of the study variance. There 
are  seven  Q-sorts (first order factors) that load onto this factor. These are listed below: 
A1.3: A person requiring special care and love. 
A1.6: A stereotyped person. 
A2.2: An innocent  and vulnerable child of God.  
A2.3: A difficult challenge to their family.  
A2.6: A blessing and a gift from God.  
A3.1: A person to be understood and advocated for by professionals.  
A3.5: A person with a condition that  is an object of expert knowledge. 
All of these factors view intellectual disability as a thing apart, an object for divine or 
professional intervention.  
Factor description. 
Intellectually disabled people are a gift from God (S28: +3). As such intellectual 
disability is seen in a positive light and they can enjoy arts (S31: +3) and can give and 
take love (S26: +2). They are more competent than they are usually given credit for (S35: 
+3, S25: +2). This competence can be achieved in the face of real difference (S27: -2, 
S36: -1, S8; +1) with professional help (S12: +2) and a lot of help from the family (S23: 
+2), but it is a limited competence that does not extend to relationships (S11: -1, S13: 0). 
 
 They are not expected to take responsibility (S18: -3) so it falls to the parents and 
doctors to decide (S30: -2) and plan for them (S19: -1). This is particularly important 
since there is a high likelihood of ill-treatment (S21: -3) and abuse (S17: +2).  
 
 This discourse highlights the biological constraints that limit the competence of 
intellectually disabled people.  These constraints should be addressed by therapeutic and 
specialised intervention as far as possible. However, the biological impairment precludes 
the assumption of normality and care and protection will be required once the limits of 
possibility are reached. This  discourse accords with the medical model and professional 
expertise is highly valued.  
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The medical model is bolstered by reference to Christian discourses of innocence, duty 
and love. In this sense it is redolent of a philanthropic discourse as noted in chapter 3. 
The will of God is invoked both as an explanation for the random nature of the incidence 
of the disability and as an imperative for providing care and protection. The outcome of 
this  discourse is the construction of protective and therapeutic mechanisms that shelter 
the individual from the rigours of every day life. In this configuration, I discern the 
operation of pastoral power providing an ethical rationale for the discipline of the 
intellectually disabled subject (see chapter 2).  
 
What is also interesting to note is that this is by far the most heavily loaded factor with 
seven first order factors (A1.3, A1.6, A2.2, A2.3, A2.6, A3.1, A3.5) loading onto it. 
These factors are drawn equally from all participant groups, including intellectually 
disabled adults themselves, with Factor A1.6 perhaps being considered as a form of 
resistance to the application of pastoral power.   
Factor A4.4: Community/Religious Discourse 
Factor outline. 
This factor has an eigenvalue of 1.70 and accounts for 11% of the study variance. There 
are  three  Q-sorts loading significantly onto this factor. These are listed below: 
A1.5: A person discriminated against.  
A2.4: A person with special needs.  
A3.2: A person to be unconditionally accepted by the community. 
All of these factors view intellectual disability as calling for special love and care within 
a religious value system. It differs from A4.3 in that love and care are valued above 
professional knowledge. 
Factor description. 
The intellectually disabled person is not different from others in significant ways (S27: 
+2, S8: -2, S6: -2, S36: +1). They are part of the community in that they are not hidden 
away (S1: -3) and they are always made welcome in church (S20: +3). They should be 
able to do all the things that other community members are able to do in having their own 
home (S9: -3) and a long-term relationship (S11: +1). It is therefore essentially similar to 
the relational discourse of A4.1. The difference is the high value placed on religious 
values (S28: +3) and the need for professional help (S12: +3).  The responsibility of the 
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community is to love and care and within this context issues of competence will be 
resolved, with no need for fear of learning (S16: -3). The role of the family is not as 
central as that posed in A4.1 (S24: 0, S22: 0, S19: 0).  
 
Within a religious and community context, difference does not count for a great deal. We 
must learn to accommodate this difference in the caring community. There should be no 
necessity for care and protection if the right community values prevail. The ideal 
outcome of this discourse is a community that is educated about intellectual disability. In 
this sense the concept of ubuntu can be invoked, an African concept of a person’s 
relationship with their community. A person is respected for their humanity whoever they 
may be. Failure to do this diminishes not only the person who is disrespected but also the 
one who is disrespectful (Lorenzo, 2003). This differs from the social model  discourse 
(A4.2) in that there is little emphasis on autonomy and human rights but rather one of 
obligation to care for those less capable members of society. It also differs from the 
medical / religious discourse (A4.3) in its acceptance of difference but draws on religious 
discourse to a large degree in support of community caring, with the church viewed as a 
highly significant community entity.  
Summary of Q-study A4 
Interactive discourse. 
The intellectually disabled person is in the process of becoming competent through 
interaction. The judicious provision of support in this process is paramount and 
supersedes considerations of autonomy and independent decision-making. However, 
intellectually disabled people must also take responsibility for their own learning. Social 
inclusion and interaction is crucial to the development of competence. 
Social model/human rights discourse. 
The intellectually disabled person has a right to education in a socially inclusive context 
regardless of the level of severity of the impairment or their social competence. Since 
autonomy is of the greatest importance, education should be aimed at supporting its 
development. While the existence of impairment is not in doubt, the impact of this on the 
development of competence is not apparent in advance. The likelihood of abuse and ill-
treatment must be combated through education in human rights for those around the 
intellectually disabled person.  
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Medical model/religious discourse. 
The competence of an intellectually disabled person is limited by organic impairment. 
They are likely to be abused and ill-treated because of their innocence and incompetence. 
Education therefore requires the application of specialised techniques to make the most 
of the impaired intellect and then care and protection must be put in place. It is not likely 
that they will develop autonomy and therefore skills in this area are not important.  
Community/religious discourse. 
Everyone in the community has some kind of problem and for an intellectually disabled 
person this problem is limited competence due to intellectual impairment. They still 
belong within the community and they must learn how to conduct themselves as 
community members. This requires the acquisition of skills just as much as education of 
the community to accommodate the difference that intellectual disability makes.  
Discussion 
While I have presented Q-study A4 as a summary and comparison between the accounts 
of intellectual disability from the three groups of participants in Q-studies A1, A2 and 
A3, there are important differences between these groups that need to be highlighted as 
they are not encapsulated in Q-study A4.  
 
Q-study A1 is somewhat difficult to interpret and less clear-cut than the other studies. 
This could be attributed to the language difficulties and incompetence associated with 
those labelled as intellectually disabled. However, I take a different view and suggest that 
these accounts are diffuse in that they are less formalised than dominant discourses of 
human rights or professional expertise. As such, they are a form of subjugated knowledge 
that is not accorded value in terms of its truth claims (Foucault, 1984).  The taken-for-
granted nature of incompetence as an organic deficit is absent from these accounts and a 
struggle for competence, inclusion and fair treatment is evident. Disability is not 
something that inhabits the individual as a distinct entity, rather everyday struggles of 
being human and a community member are foregrounded. There is evidence for this 
understanding of disability in the fact that only six out of 22 participants identified 
themselves as intellectually disabled although they were all recipients of services for 
intellectually disabled people. Perhaps these participants can be seen as “people with 
diverse abilities who do not identify as disabled” (Gabel, 2002, p. 185) rather than simply 
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as “intellectually disabled people”. Resistance to processes of subjectification (the 
imposition of identity from outside – see chapter 2) of intellectual disability is embryonic 
in form and appears in A1.6 as a rejection of stereotyping. All of the other accounts 
represent a subjectivisation of the individual constructing themselves as intellectually 
disabled subjects (see chapter 2). The account of A1.5 resists unfair treatment within the 
parameters imposed by subjectification processes. This will be discussed further in 
chapter 9.   
 
Q-study A2 is notable for its heavy reliance on religious concepts and this will be 
discussed in some depth in chapter 8. The human rights account of A2.1 stands apart 
from the religious view in its emphasis on autonomy. This account is adopted by a 
specific group of parents who belong to the Down Syndrome Association Amathole, all 
of whom are white and economically well off. It can be viewed as an account of privilege 
in terms of the socio-economic status of the participants and their access to formalised 
systems of knowledge, such as inclusive education and human rights practices (see 
chapter 4). None of these accounts destabilise the concept of impairment to a significant 
degree and disability remains a property of the individual, which can be exacerbated or 
ameliorated through social processes. 
 
In examining Q-study A3, the recourse to professional knowledge takes the form of a 
highly expert and differentiated form of understanding in accounts A3.1 and A3.5, 
associated (but not exclusively) with participants coming from special school settings. 
Account A3.3 is notable for the extent to which it undermines the organic impairment, 
referring to labelling as a practice that is productive of impairment.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I presented accounts of intellectual disability drawn on by a range of 
participants in the Buffalo City municipality. I provided a summary and synthesis of 
these accounts in a second order study that identified four discourses. In so doing I have 
addressed the questions of what discourses are deployed in representations of intellectual 
disability. I shall follow the same procedure for educational practices in Chapter 7.  I 
shall examine the effects of these discourses in Chapter 8.   
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CHAPTER 7: DISCOURSES OF EDUCATION FOR 
INTELLECTUALLY DISABLED PEOPLE  
It is not surprising that many people are perplexed by the changes that they have 
been confronted with. After all, the shift from apartheid education to Outcomes-
based Education [OBE] and from special education to inclusive education is 
extremely complex.  Apartheid education and special education were underpinned 
by particular assumptions, theories, models and practices. In order to move towards 
OBE, which is inclusive, one has to understand both the old and new assumptions, 
theories and practices to avoid repeating the old within the new framework. 
(Naicker, 1999, p. 67) 
 
In chapter 6, factor interpretations were presented for a set of four Q-studies on the 
representation of intellectually disabled people. The purpose of that chapter was to 
address the research question relating to representation of intellectually disabled people. I 
shall now move to a discussion of discourses of education of intellectually disabled 
children, noting with Naicker (1999) above that change does not happen readily and old 
ways of doing things can be inserted within new frames.  
 
In chapter 7, the findings from Q-study B are presented, exploring discourses of 
education for intellectually disabled people. As noted in the methodology section, only 
parents and professionals participated in Q-study B.  The results of these two groups 
were combined into one on the premise, based on the interviews conducted, that the 
distinctness of discourses would depend less on the professional/parental status of the 
participants than on other aspects of diversity. The findings presented in this chapter 
address the second research question relating to educational discursive practices: 
2. What discourses are deployed concerning the practices of education of those identified 
as intellectually disabled in Buffalo City, South Africa? 
 
In this chapter I present the factors for Q-study B. I begin by presenting the statistical 
data from the Q-methodological analysis and then give a narrative account of each of 
these factors. I conclude this chapter by providing a summary of Q-study B factors and 
making the link to the third research question that will be addressed in chapter 8.  
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Results 
A six factor solution was adopted as accounting for the largest amount of variance with 
clear factor structure and significant loading of all Q-sorts . The eigenvalues, percentage 
of variance accounted for and the number of loading participants is presented in Table 30 
below.  
 
Table 30: Variance Accounted for by Factors and Number of Loading Participants for Q-Study B 
Factors Eigenvalues % variance accounted for by 
factor 
Number of Q-sorts loading onto factor at  
significance level 0.33 (p<0.01) 
B1 10.38 16% 19 
B2 5.66 9% 15 
B3 2.87 5% 5 
B4 3.02 5% 6 
B5 2.47 4% 3 
B6 2.95 5% 7 
Totals 27.35 44% 55 
 
I have named the factors as follows: 
B1: Inclusion as a human right.  
B2: Special needs require special provision.  
B3: Inclusive education is a dream of the future.  
B4: Excellent special education as a right. 
B5: Effective education must be tailored to the child’s needs. 
B6: Special education keeps children safe. 
 
In Table 9 in Appendix J, the factor loading of participants for Q-study B is presented.  
Significant Q-sort loadings are marked with an asterisk. Insignificant or confounded 
loadings are shaded. There are five confounded loadings (that is, the participant loads 
onto more than one factor at a significant level) and three insignificantly loading Q-sorts. 
These Q-sorts do not appear to arise from participants with common demographic 
features. Factor B3 is bipolar with one negatively loading sort (P26) and four positively 
loading sorts.  
 
The factor array for Q-study B is presented in Table 10 in Appendix J. “Children and 
youth with intellectual disability” is used as the topic of the statements and is abbreviated 
as CYWID. There are no consensus statements for Q-study B. There are distinguishing 
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statements for each of the factors and these will be discussed in the factor descriptions 
themselves.  
 
Each account is given under sub-headings that cluster around the themes derived from 
chapter 4 but slightly different, based on the nature of the data (see chapter 5 for a 
discussion of themes in this study), namely: 
Practices of inclusion/exclusion relate to the significance of educating intellectually 
disabled children in the mainstream schooling system and the associated support issues. 
Practices of special education refer to the application of specialised techniques based on 
a technical knowledge of intellectual disability and can occur both in mainstream and 
special schools. 
Practices of differentiation concern those that separate the intellectually disabled person 
from the norm and the finer distinctions that are made within this category. 
Practices of professionalisation relate to the application of expertise in special or 
inclusive education.  
Practices of family and community involvement concern how parents are located in 
educational practice. 
Practices of advocacy clusters together those practices that aim to address unfair 
treatment of intellectually disabled people. 
 
As an aid to factor descriptions, the comments made by participants loading onto a factor 
from the following sources are used to enhance and support the interpretation of that 
factor:  
1. Responses to the question: “What is your general understanding of education of 
CYWID?” These are reflected as comments in the discussion below. The 
participant number (denoted by P) is given but not statement number, since these 
are general comments.  
2. Explanations of their choices of the statements that they most agreed with and 
least agreed with. These are noted as emanating from a specific participant 
(denoted by P) with reference to a specific statement (denoted by S). 
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Factor B1: Inclusion as a Human Right 
Factor Outline 
This factor has an eigenvalue of 10.38 and accounts for 16% of the study variance. There 
are 19 participants who load significantly onto this factor. I, as the researcher, completed 
two Q-sorts as P34 and P62, both of which load strongly onto this factor despite the fact 
that they were done three months apart, at the beginning and the end of conducting 
participant interviews (see chapter 5). The loading participants present a diverse mix of 
parents and professionals. It is worth noting that all of the parents who load onto this 
factor belong to a parent support group, Down Syndrome Association Amathole. The 
participants are described in Table 31 below. 
 
Table 31: Demographic Details of Participants Loading Significantly onto Factor B1 
Participant Race  Employment Gender  Connection to ID 
P1 ‘Coloured’ Special school educator F Professional 
P3 ‘Coloured’ Special school educator M Professional 
P7  White  Health professional F Professional  
P8 Black  Community worker F Professional  
P15 White Health professional F Professional  
P16 Black Regular school, principal  F Professional 
P18 Black Regular school educator F Professional 
P21 Asian District official/psychologist F Professional  
P22 ‘Coloured’ Health professional F Professional 
P29 Black Regular school educator F Professional 
P32 White Regular school educator M Professional  
P33 White  Health consultant M Parent 
P34 White  Researcher F Parent & professional 
P39 White Switchboard operator F Parent 
P43 White Health professional F Parent & professional 
P45 Black Community worker F Parent & professional 
P46 White  Housewife F Parent 
P57 White Business owner M Parent  
P62 White Researcher F Parent & professional  
 
Factor Description  
There are five statements that distinguish this factor from all other factors, as noted in 
Table 32. 
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Table 32: Distinguishing Statements for Factor B1 
 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 
13. The success of education of CYWID depends more on the approach 
of the particular school and the teachers than on the nature of the 
disability. 
5 1 1 0 0 -2 
18. CYWID in regular schools should be promoted with their peer group. 3 -3 -3 -3 -2 -5 
21. It takes a very special and compassionate person with the right 
attitude to be an effective teacher of CYWID. 
0 5 4 6 6 4 
31. Over time all CYWID will be accommodated in what are currently 
considered to be ‘ordinary schools’. 
1 -5 5 -4 -4 -3 
53. Human rights to equality for CYWID can only be achieved through 
education in inclusive education settings. 
3 -5 -1 -5 -2 -3 
 
This discourse is centred on practices of advocacy for intellectually disabled people (S53: 
+3) that locate the problem of intellectual disability within the school and society rather 
than within the individual (S13: +5).  The requirement for all children to be educated 
together, as a way to overcome past inequality (S31: +1), outweighs technical and 
professional considerations.  Thus teachers do not require special qualities (S21: 0) and 
learners can be promoted with their peers, even though they would not be doing work of 
the same academic standard (S18: +3). The regular school with an inclusive orientation 
that maximises existing supports and rejects deterministic views of disability is the 
preferred option. 
Practices of inclusion/exclusion. 
This  discourse notes both the negative impact of segregation in education (S47: +4) and 
the potential positive impact of inclusive settings (S54: +6). The benefit is not only for 
the disabled child but extends to other children and teachers as well (S54: +6). Education 
of CYWID can improve education in the classroom and even have an impact on the 
broader social context: “They are separated so teachers have a misconception that it is 
difficult to teach them. They are scared that they will fail and then they feel that is a very 
special skill. I don't agree with that. Once they start, they will see that it is not so 
difficult. It benefits the other children as well and makes them more compassionate. In 
the end this leads to a better society with less violence and crime” (Comment, P43). 
 
It is the response of the school that affects educational outcomes more than the disability 
itself (S13: +5). Regular schools can tackle inclusive education adequately (S17: +4), by 
making use of existing supports within the school (S23: +4). There is no reason to expect 
that CYWID would be better served, either academically (S48: +3) or socially (S52: -4) 
in a special school. However, the path to inclusion is not easy and this is a time of 
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transition: “Inclusive education can definitely be positive because teachers learn and 
other kids benefit too. It doesn't mean that it is easy” (S54: +6, P46). Frustration is 
expressed with the slow pace of change in implementing inclusive education: “It 
[education] is a must. They can only benefit. How long will we wait? Nothing gets done. 
It is seven years now since Education White Paper when K. was born. She will be too old 
to be involved” (Comment, P39). 
Practices of special education. 
This discourse rejects practices of special education in favour of a flexible, differentiated 
curriculum that is built on good teaching practices that can (and should be) readily 
provided in the regular classroom. Much can be achieved within the regular curriculum 
with a “positive attitude”, flexibility and making use of available supports (S17: +4, S23: 
+4, S48: +3).  It is schools and teachers that need to change rather than learners 
themselves (S32: +3): “The National Curriculum Statement is their [the teachers’] guide 
and they need to implement it with flexibility. Inclusive education policy is for ALL  
learners who experience barriers to learning to improve the quality of education” (S44: -
5, P7).The content of the curriculum should ensure the same learning opportunities for all 
children: “A lot of people with intellectual disability have the capacity to read and write 
and do so much more than we are prepared to give them credit for and how would you 
know if you didn't try” (S41: -3, P57). 
Practices of differentiation. 
One of the strongest features of this factor is the rejection of difference or “specialness” 
of CYWID (S45: -4, S22: -5, S52: -4). This discourse is not concerned with finer 
differentiations within the category of intellectual disability (S42: -4, S34: -6, S14: -4, 
S13: +5, S27: +5) that would qualify some for certain kinds of educational provision and 
exclude others: “I think you are missing the whole point of inclusion if you only think it is 
for mildly disabled kids, because this means that you will still be excluding” (S14: -4, 
P43). The preferred option is to keep an open mind about what the child is capable of and 
present him or her with the full range of opportunities: “Placing a 'ceiling' on what 
society/educational authorities think a person can do creates a perception in the person 
and their family that that is indeed all they are capable of”(S41: -3, P57).  
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Practices of professionalisation.  
The rejection of difference constitutes intellectual disability as a part of normal diversity 
for classroom teachers (S24: -3, S25: -2) that would not require the application of 
specialist technologies such as IQ tests (S34: -6): “IQ may be one factor to consider but I 
wouldn't rate it as very important-there are many other facets that make up and define a 
human being”(S34: -6, P32).  The skills of classroom teachers are deemed adequate: 
“Admission requirements are not about testing [they are] more like just screening. 
Identify the problem, assessing and support with the consultation of the parents” (S34: -
6, P16). The valued professional skills within this account are those of the regular 
classroom teacher who should be able to differentiate the curriculum for CYWID. 
Practices of family and community involvement. 
The role of the family is central (S2: +6) and parents are seen to support schools to a 
moderate degree (S5: -2):“A family must be together, we are stronger together and a 
child needs family support.” (S2: +6, P39). There is recognition of the difficulty that 
parents have in accessing education (S7: +4) in the context of the existing distinctions 
between special and regular schools. Parents are seen to want inclusion as long as their 
children’s needs can be met (S50: +2). The support of the community is not evident (S10: 
0) but within this  discourse this is an aspect that must be developed through inclusive 
practice that contributes to social inclusion (S53: +3).  
Practices of advocacy.  
Schooling is seen as part of a human rights agenda that aims to minimise exclusion from 
participation in the community  (S53: +3). Thus inclusive education is not an attempt to 
save money but rather an attempt to establish the rights of CYWID (S30: -5).  This is a 
mutually constructive relationship where human rights should ensure that intellectually 
disabled people do receive education and education, in turn, promotes their human rights:  
“The more people mix and recognise each others’ strengths and weaknesses, the more 
tolerant our society will become. Therefore by segregating learners based on disability, 
other children will not learn about the strength there is in diversity” (S47: +4, P7). The 
understanding of human rights within this factor is based on access and participation 
within a much broader social context than schooling alone (see discussion of human 
rights in chapter 2). Inclusive education has as one of its goals full participation of 
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CYWID (S1: +5, S47: +4, S53: +3). The right to education in integrated settings 
regardless of severity of disability (S27: +5, S14: -4) is asserted.  
Factor B2: Special Needs Require Special Provision 
Factor Outline 
This factor has an eigenvalue of 5.66 and accounts for 9% of the study variance. There 
are 15 participants loading onto this factor. Their particulars are noted in Table 33 below.  
 
Table 33: Demographic Details of Participants Loading Significantly onto Factor B2 
Participant Race  Employment Gender  Connection to ID 
P2 White Special school, educator  F Professional  
P4 White Special school educator F Professional 
P5 White Day care centre coordinator F Professional  
P10 Black Special school educator  F Professional 
P11 Black Special school, educator F Professional 
P14 Black Special school, principal,  M Professional 
P23 White Regular school, educator F Professional 
P30 White Regular school educator F Professional  
P31 White Health professional F Professional 
P41 Black Unemployed F Parent 
P42 White Sales rep. F Parent 
P47 White Personal assistant F Parent 
P51 Black Health professional F Parent 
P58 Black Horticultural worker F Parent 
P60 Black Unemployed M Parent 
Factor Description 
There are two items that distinguish Factor B2 from all the other factors. These are 
shown in Table 34. 
 
Table 34: Distinguishing Statements for Factor B2 
 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 
17. Regular schools can cope with the education of the 
majority of CYWID if they focus on a flexible learning 
programme and a recognition of the learners’ strengths. 
4 - 4 0 0 6 2 
20. It is impossible to teach CYWID in large classrooms 
with a linguistically and culturally diverse range of learners.  
 - 3 6  2  - 1  - 4  1 
 
The special nature of teaching children with intellectual disability and the fear that their 
needs will be overlooked when they become one of a diverse group is noted (S20: +6) 
more strongly in this account than in any other. This “specialness” means that even 
changes to the regular school are strongly rejected as an option (S17: -4). In this 
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configuration practices of special education and  professionalisation are highlighted as 
the response to the problem of intellectual disability in education.  
Practices of inclusion/exclusion. 
This  discourse places a premium value on the work of special schools (S58: +6, S31: -5) 
and figures inclusive education as constituting an abuse of children’s rights to an 
appropriate education (S53: -5, S20: +6). Since their needs cannot be met in a setting of 
diversity, it follows that it would be unhelpful to accommodate all learners in regular 
schools (S17: -4, S12: +5, S46: +3). The participant comments below reject ordinary 
schools for intellectually disabled learners on the basis of severity and type of disability 
and the burden they place on teachers: “What happens to the profoundly disabled? How 
will they cope? Not all CYWID can be accommodated in ordinary schools. They will not 
be able to cope as they need to be taught basic skills” (S31: -5, P4).  
 “CYWID have such diverse and often complex problems e.g. physical, communication, 
perceptual (both auditory and visual) etc. that it is extremely difficult to cope with too 
large a group of learners” (S20: +6, P32). 
 “Educators have been placed under immense pressure with changes in assessment and 
moderation. Their administrative duties have increased phenomenally. This leaves very 
little time for the educator to give additional support to the CYWID in an inclusive 
setting” (S48: -6, P23). There will never be a fully inclusive system (S31: -5) because 
this is a system where it is impossible for CYWID to learn (S20: +6). Even in the context 
of change, inclusive education will not work (S32: -1) and even then parents would not 
want it to occur (S50: -2). There will always be insuperable problems such as promotion 
from one grade to the next (S18: -3) because they are unlikely to attain the required level 
of achievement. The impossibility of change is rooted in the static nature of the disability 
that precludes integration in regular settings by its very nature. Therefore special schools 
should be strengthened (S58: +6) rather than developing supports in the regular schools 
(S17: -4, S23: -1).  
Practices of special education. 
This  discourse puts forward the need for a different curriculum for children with 
intellectual disability (S44: +1). Within this curriculum, issues around developing 
responsibility (S38: +2), communication (S39: +4) and providing sexuality education 
(S40: +3) and general life skills (S55: +4) are recognised as important. This type of 
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curriculum must be firmly distinguished from that of the regular school: “Programmes 
required by CYWID are totally different” (S46: +3, P10). 
 
Academic skills are also important (S41: -4) as this  discourse values the development of 
individual competence highly.  However there is recognition of a limit to learning in this 
respect: “Although the academic side of learning is important and should be functional, 
there comes a point in education where it is more important to learn skills that will 
enable the person to live a functional independent life” (S55: +4, P31). The educational 
programme should be structured (S37: +3), delivered in a separate learning site (S46: +3) 
and supported by professional therapy skills (S56: +4). The problem of education of 
CYWID is a technical one that must be addressed through specialised teaching and 
placement (S46: +3, S37: +3).  
Practices of differentiation. 
There is a distinction between those who should be in regular schools and in special 
schools. The severity of the disability is a consideration in the placement of the child in 
specialised settings (S59: -3, S14: +2). CYWID with severe disabilities are better served 
within a medical context than an educational one (S33: +2) and therefore special schools, 
with their focus on an educational curriculum, should not have to admit them (S59: -3).  
 
The differentiation noted here concerns appropriate placement in special schools. Regular 
schools are ruled out as an option for intellectually disabled learners. Therefore the 
distinctions that need to be made are between intellectually disabled and “normal”, and 
between severe to profound intellectual disability and mild to moderate intellectual 
disability. The former require some form of medical care and the latter should be placed 
in special schools. This is in contrast to the fine distinctions of Factor B5 below of 
different levels of disability and need.  
Practices of professionalisation . 
This  discourse places a high value on the specialised settings where the right kind of 
teachers and professionals can ensure the right kind of education for CYWID: “It takes 
dedicated teachers with a real and special interest in helping learners with intellectual 
disability to teach them”  (S21: +5, P4). 
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“Each learner should have an individual learning programme (ILP) to be drafted by the 
educators in consultation with professional support services which would assist the 
educator to be aware of the learners’ areas of strengths and weaknesses to be considered 
when planning. This then will need a lot of planning according to the learners’ needs, 
assessing progress (compiling progress reports) and giving extra lessons to those who 
need more support” (S46: +3, P14). 
The expertise required is the knowledge of disability, the love of such children and the 
ability to move at a slower pace with more tolerance: “The teacher will have a clear 
knowledge of how to deal with this sort of child” (S37: +3, P 60). 
“The teacher must have a very great love for the children. They cannot just teach them” 
(S60: +3, P60). 
“Their teachers need to have a lot more patience, understanding more empathy and more 
tolerant of limitations. They need repetition and slower pace and basic life skills” (S21: 
+5, P42). 
It is this combination of love and knowledge that is more important that any specific 
technical skills (S22: -2). The implication is that teachers of CYWID have special 
qualities and that they are special people made to do this kind of work. These qualities 
cannot simply be acquired through the development of skills. On the other hand, the 
skills of therapists are valued very highly (S56: +4). The implication here is that the 
psychological expertise of teachers lies in compassion and understanding whereas the 
medicalised gaze proper can only be exercised through the authority of the therapists (see 
chapter 2).  
Practices of family and community involvement. 
Statements that relate to the family’s experience and involvement, the community and the 
impact of poverty tend to be valued as neutral within this account (S6: 0, S7: 0, S28: 0, 
S1: 1). The family and community are seen as being ignorant and not in the best position 
to help their children. Parents are minimally involved in their children’s education (S3: 0, 
S5: 0). The special school is the most important resource for CYWID and should be able 
to cater to all their needs: “Mostly among the African parents of intellectual disability 
learners are not aware of or understand that they can get support from professional 
people to alleviate the condition of the child. Educators in this institution have a better 
understanding of intellectual disability and the importance of a collaborative approach 
with all the support service in the classroom of the intellectually disabled learners” (S19: 
 218 
-6, P14). The nature of the disability is the major focus, rather than the community, 
which is a somewhat hostile environment (S10: -3). Other children in regular, community 
schools are often seen to be a negative force in the lives CYWID:“I have seen children 
who were in mainstream schools who have moved to our kind of school. Most of them 
lack confidence and when asked what they disliked most at their previous schools, they 
all say that they did not like being teased by the other learners” (S48: -6). The best 
interests of the child are distinguished from those of the family, who might not always be 
supportive of the child (S2: -1).  
Practices of advocacy.  
This discourse, like that of Factor B1, advocates for human rights but from a different 
premise and to different ends. The logic of human rights, here, is that equality requires 
specialised intervention for a very specific deficit – intellectual disability (see discussion 
of mainstreaming advocacy in chapter 4). Should this intervention, which is best done in 
specialised settings, not be provided then there would be an infringement of human 
rights: “It is most important that CYWID have teachers and therapists that are trained 
and have the right experience to be able to give positively to each learner. Uneducated 
carers and teachers can do more harm than good” (S54: -4, P5). 
 “The fact is that they would learn nothing in inclusive education because they would get 
lost. They need a different pace, more repetition. In inclusive education they would be 
ostracised and outcast. They have the right to the same education but not necessarily in 
the same environment. Their special needs must be catered for” (Comment, P42). Within 
this human rights frame, the right to participation is within “their own kind”.  
Functioning outside of this grouping is deemed to be too difficult and threatening (S52: 
+4). The focus of rights is on accessing services to overcome the deficit. It has a narrow 
educational agenda and does not move outside of schooling.  
 
Factor B3: Inclusive Education is a Dream of the Future 
Factor Outline 
This factor has an eigenvalue of 2.87 and accounts for 5% of the study variance. There 
are five participants loading onto this factor. Their particulars are noted in Table 35. 
These participants are all black and female. P26 loads onto this factor negatively 
therefore articulating an account which is directly at odds with the rest of the participants 
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loading. Since this negative loading on the factor has only one participant, it is of dubious 
value according to the criteria for factor strength adopted in this study (see chapter 5 and 
also chapter 6, where I argue for the interpretation of such factors in Q-study A1). I shall 
therefore only discuss possible interpretations after a thorough analysis of the factor 
presented by the positively loading participants.  
 
Table 35: Demographic Details of Participants Significantly Loading onto Factor B 3 
Participant Race  Employment Gender  Connection to ID 
P9 Black Community worker F Professional 
P19 Black Regular school educator F Professional  
P26 (negatively loaded) Black Regular school educator F Professional 
P52 Black Health professional F Parent 
P63 Black Unemployed F Parent 
 
Factor description 
The distinguishing statement for Factor B3 is presented in Table 36 below: 
 
Table 36: Distinguishing Statement for Factor B3 
 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 
31. Over time all CYWID will be accommodated in what are currently 
considered to be ‘ordinary’ schools. 
1 -5 5 -4 -4 -3 
 
This is a discourse of belief in a goal of inclusive education for all children but 
recognises that it cannot happen now. As such it is both pragmatic and idealistic and 
adopts features of both Factor B1 (in support of inclusion) and Factor B2 (in the value 
given to special educational practices).  
Practices of inclusion/exclusion. 
Within this discourse there is a definite role for the special school (S58: +6) and it should 
be strengthened as a place where children will be accommodated in a transitional process 
toward inclusive education (S31: 5, S15: +3). There is a commitment to inclusion: 
“Inclusive education is a good programme that helps children/adults with special needs 
to be accommodated to mainstream schools” (S30: -6, P9).  Inclusion is a means to 
achieving equality for intellectually disabled people: “They are the same as others and 
separation from others leads to discrimination” (S47: +2, P63).  
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However, in this discourse there are reservations about inclusive education. Children do 
not learn more in inclusive education (S48: -1) and CYWID feel more comfortable in 
special schools (S52: +1). The tension exists between the ideal of inclusion and the 
realities of implementation. Before this ideal can be reached, there is a lot of change that 
needs to happen (S32: +5). Teachers and communities need to be educated before there 
can be a move away from specialised centres: “The teachers in the mainstream schools 
still need to be trained on how to accommodate children with mild intellectual disability”  
(Comment, P9).  
 
The role of the special school is oriented toward the provision of specialised services for 
severely disabled children (S59: +4, 27; +4, S56: +3, S33: -5). While specialised 
equipment and skills might be located within special schools, this does not mean that 
they hold the monopoly on caring and compassion and the necessary psychological 
expertise for CYWID (S60: -4, S21: +4).  
Practices of special education.  
The aim of the curriculum is to prepare CYWID to lead a useful life in sheltered 
employment (S35: +3). Thus reading and writing are not a priority (S41: +1) but learning 
responsibility (S38: +5) and how to communicate (S39: +3) are very important. “It is not 
important for other people/children with disability to learn big numbers (maths) or big 
words. They just need to learn to take on responsibilities for their actions and plans for 
the future” (S38: +5, P9). Dealing with discrimination (S1: +3) and being part of the 
community are valued outcomes in themselves (S47: +2).  
Practices of differentiation.  
This account presents strong support for catering for the education of severely disabled 
children (S33: -5, S27: +4): “They can learn no matter how little they can learn. They 
can learn something so small rather than staying at home not learning anything. The 
state must provide. They deserve education just like the normal ones. They must provide 
relevant education” (S27: +4, P52). Given the view that only children with a mild 
disability can be educated in the mainstream (S14: +4), the special schools would be 
reserved for severely disabled children: “Because not all CYWID belong to the 
mainstream school. Others need to be placed at the resource schools” (S14: +4, P9).  
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This differs from Factor B2 above in that there is a place for children with mild 
disabilities in the mainstream and they can benefit from inclusion. The differentiation 
that is important is between mild intellectual disability and severe to profound intellectual 
disability. The former belong in regular schools and the latter in special schools.  
Practices of professionalisation  
The importance of distinguishing between severely and mild or moderately disabled 
children is reflected in the high value that is placed on IQ tests: “Intelligence test and IQ 
scores of CYWID are useful for developing realistic expectations for the child just 
because as soon as one sees these scores s/he is able to handle the learner in good 
manner as he knows that the child may be in need of support” (S45: +6, P19). The 
professional skills that are valued in this account are not only located in special schools 
but can be found in the mainstream as well. They are just more developed in the special 
school and geared toward the more severely disabled. Critical to this distinction is the 
skill to distinguish between the degrees of severity and thereby to determine the correct 
placement.  
Practices of family and community involvement. 
The place of the family is on the periphery in this discourse (S2: -1). Parents are 
somewhat unsupportive (S5: +1) and tend to have low expectations of their children (S3: 
+1). They are moderately supportive of inclusion in an ideal setting (S50: +2). The nature 
of the community does not have a significant impact on education since poverty is 
rejected as a cause for educational failure of any kind (S4: -6, S16: -5) and social and 
cultural understandings do not impact on education (S9: -2).  
Practices of advocacy. 
Inclusive education policy is strongly supported (S30: -6) with the recognition that unless 
it is done properly, it will not serve a human rights agenda (S53: -1). There is also a 
strong recognition of the rights of severely disabled children to an education (S27: +4, 
S33: -5). This would take place within special schools and thus advocacy in this 
discourse would be directed at both the development of mainstream and specials schools.  
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Factor B3- 
This factor is identified as the polar opposite of Factor B3. As such it prioritises poverty 
as a barrier to effective education of intellectually disabled people (S4: +65
 
) and 
constructs inclusive education as a ploy to get out of allocating proper finance to the 
education of disabled children (S30: +6). This then perpetuates a cycle of poverty as 
children come to be classified as intellectually disabled within poor communities (S16: 
+5). There is recognition of the higher costs of education CYWID (S29: +4). What is 
really needed is the eradication of poverty rather than special provision for severely 
disabled children, which is rated as not very helpful (S45: -6, S58: -6). While this factor 
poses some interesting avenues to explore in terms of the economic interactions with 
disability, I am uncomfortable with drawing  too heavily on this as it is very tenuous and 
the comments from the loading participant are not always coherent. I shall therefore 
exclude this factor from further discussion while noting in passing that the relationship 
between poverty and intellectual disability could well be further explored.  
Factor B4: Excellent Special Education as a Right  
Factor Outline 
This factor has an eigenvalue of 3.02 and accounts for 5% of the study variance. There 
are six participants loading onto this factor. Their particulars are presented in Table 37 
below. 
 
Table 37: Demographic Details of Participants Significantly Loading onto Factor B4 
Participant Race  Employment Gender  Connection to ID 
P24 Black Regular school educator F Professional 
P25 Black Regular school educator F Professional 
P35 White Secretary F Parent 
P36 White Yard manager M Parent 
P54 Black Lawyer F Parent 
P55 Black Unemployed F Parent  
 
                                                 
5 Since this discussion is about the polar opposite of Factor B3, the signs of the ranking are reversed. See 
Chapter 6, Factor A2 and A2A for more.. 
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Factor Description 
The distinguishing statements for Factor B4 are presented in Table 38 below. 
 
Table 38: Distinguishing Statements for Factor B4 
 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 
29. It is more expensive to educate CYWID than other children who are 
not disabled. 
-2 -3 -4 3 -1 -4 
38. Education of CYWID must develop their ability to take on 
responsibility.  
 2 2 5 -4 5 0 
39. An important aspect of education for CYWID is to teach the child to 
communicate with others. 
1 4 3 -4 5 5 
 
A sharp distinction is drawn in this discourse between education that takes place in the 
home and education for the development of skills, that can be useful for employment, 
that  is the responsibility of the school: “It is not an important aspect to teach the child 
with disabilities to communicate with others. That can be taught at home. There is no 
special way of communication. They are responsible enough because they can do more 
than normal people do” (S38: -4, S39: -4, P24). The value of this type of education is 
underscored by the fact that it will cost more than other types of education (S29: +3).  
Practices of inclusion/exclusion. 
The regular school cannot provide the right kind of education for CYWID because they 
will not be able to give the extra help required as they struggle to accommodate a range 
of learners (S22: +5) without teacher aides (S12: +3). CYWID are unlikely to benefit 
from inclusion (S48: -6) and there is no reason to expect that there would be a move into 
inclusive settings (S31: -4). Mainstream schools can also have a harmful impact, as they 
do not cater for specific skills development:“Mainstream schools delay CYWID as they 
do not have options for these children e.g. skills development” (Comment, P55). While 
inclusion is seen as a possibility if it is taken slowly (S51: +4), this is very remote since 
even children with mild disabilities will not benefit in the mainstream (S14: -5) and it is 
not the case that all children will be accommodated in the mainstream one day in the 
future (S31: -4). The mainstream school is seen as a place that is not safe (S11: +5): 
“Disabled children are more safe in special schools than normal schools, especially 
those with severe disabilities because their safety cannot be guaranteed as some cannot 
hear or talk clearly” (S11: +5, P24). The mainstream can also be seen as hostile: 
“Mainstream schools don't want the CYWID. It is as if it is too much work for them” 
(Comment, P36). 
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CYWID are better off in special schools (S52: +4) where there can be a direct focus on 
acquiring the necessary skills. These schools are highly valued (S58: +6) and their 
teachers have the necessary compassion and understanding of CYWID (S21: +6, S60: 
+5): “I believe it takes a special and compassionate person with the right attitude to 
teach these special children” (S21: +6, P35). These schools should not be treated as 
second to regular schools but should be well provided for so that CYWID can get all that 
they need: “Special schools should be strengthened and supported. There should be all 
that is needed for these special children. The staff has a love of these children; you 
cannot take someone who does not understand. The staff there they understand” (S60: 
+5, S58: +6). Given the expertise required, it is more expensive to educate CYWID (S29: 
+3): “All schools must have this high tech equipment. The centres should have the best 
equipment because they cater for children with difficulties” (S29: +3, P54). 
“The cost of fees at special schools is more than mainstream schools” (S29: +3, P55). 
Practices of special education.  
The curriculum for CYWID should have academic learning as its priority since reading 
and writing is of much greater importance (S41: -6) than self-care and communication 
(S55: -1), which can be taught in the home. Aspects that relate to individual growth and 
autonomy are not valued within education (S38: -4, S39: -4). Strict discipline is desirable 
(S36: -5). What CYWID need are structured programmes (S37: +2) and a technically 
skilled teacher (S46: +2) situated within the caring environment of the special school 
(S60: +5). The purpose of education is to teach CYWID as much as possible to enable 
them to work in sheltered employment (S35: +3) and this includes helping them to 
address the stigma that they encounter in the community (S1: +4).  
Practices of differentiation.  
Since this account values academic learning, there is a sharp distinction made between 
levels of disability. More severely disabled CYWID should not be admitted to special 
schools (S59: -2) since they require the attention of nurses and doctors rather than 
schools (S33: +2). Therefore they are not entitled to an education at the cost of the state 
(S27: -3). The differentiation made in this factor is between intellectually disabled and 
“normal” and then between those amongst the intellectually disabled who can acquire 
literacy and numeracy skills and those who cannot.  
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Practices of professionalisation.  
The expertise valued in this discourse is aimed at overcoming the deficit of the individual 
to enable them to read and write (S22: +5). These skills are accompanied by the 
necessary love and compassion (S60: +5, S21: +6). Educational techniques such as 
intelligence testing are valuable tools for guiding educational decisions (S45: +3):“IQ 
scores really play a vital role as the educator can easily plan tasks for the learner 
effectively and really can expect good results especially if the teacher communicates well 
with the parents concerned” (S45: +3, P25). A distinction can be detected between 
psychological expertise in handling the intellectually disabled child and medical and 
technical knowledge that is directed at the organic deficit itself. 
Practices of family and community involvement.  
The priority within this discourse is that CYWID develop skills through the correct 
teaching and communities and families are only a background to this process. The 
community is not a resource for CYWID (S10: -4) and CYWID are not being educated 
for full participation in the community (S35: +3), nor are they really expected to live and 
work in the community (S8: -3). The skills that they acquire in education are not intended 
to prepare them for employment in the community but rather in sheltered workshop 
settings (S35: +3). The intellectually disabled person and their family do not get a lot of 
support whether in the community (S10: -4) or in schools (S22: +5).  
Practices of advocacy. 
Fair treatment of CYWID is not attained though inclusive education (S53: -5). What they 
need is the proper funding of special schools to provide all the technical assistance 
required within a loving environment.  Within this discourse advocacy is for equal access 
to an academic curriculum, which will certainly require additional spending as CYWID 
require professional and technical help that can be very costly. This amounts to a focus 
on providing external support rather than developing the agency and autonomy of 
CYWID themselves.  
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Factor B5: Effective Education Must be Tailored to the Child’s Needs 
Factor Outline 
This factor has an eigenvalue of 2.47 and accounts for 4% of the study variance. There 
are three participants loading onto this factor. Their particulars are presented in Table 39 
below. 
 
Table 39: Demographic Details of Participants Significantly Loading onto Factor B5 
Participant Race  Employment Gender  Connection to ID 
P6 White Special school principal F Professional 
P17 Black Regular school educator F Professional 
P48 White Entrepreneur M Parent 
Factor Description 
There are two distinguishing statements for this factor which are presented in Table 40 
below. 
 
Table 40: Distinguishing Statements for Factor B5 
 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 
10. There are many useful resources in the community that could support 
the education of CYWID in the local school. 
0 -3 0 -4 5 -6 
35. The aim of education for CYWID is to help them lead productive and 
useful lives in places for sheltered employment. 
-1 -2 3 3 -6 4 
 
Overall this is a discourse that resists generalisations about CYWID seeing them as a 
heterogeneous group, mainly on the dimension of severity. Practices of differentiation are 
highly valued since it through these practices that it is possible to determine exactly the 
needs of the particular child. As such, possibilities exist in the community to support 
certain learners (S10: +5) and a narrow view of education as only for sheltered 
employment is rejected (S35: -6).  
Practices of inclusion/exclusion.   
Within the discourse of B5, inclusion is viewed in a positive light (S54: +4), with 
provisos attached. It should proceed gradually (S51: +4) since it is a difficult task (S22: 
+3). Inclusion requires teacher training because there is more work involved (S25: +2) 
and without this training it places an unfair burden on the teacher (S24: +2). Parents 
would want inclusive education if it was done correctly (S50: +2) and it would help to 
reduce the stigma attached to intellectual disability (S47: +3). The key to distinguishing 
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between inclusive and exclusive  practice lies in the grading of the different levels of 
severity.  
 
The good intentions of an inclusive education system are recognised:“I think inclusive 
education is trying to help these learners: to make them part of their communities despite 
their disabilities, to help them to be accepted and be able to achieve in the future and be 
better people who are independent, to build on the intelligences they have” (S30: -6, 
P17). However, there is a sense in which the regular schools are not playing their part:  
“Advocacy is only reaching those who know what it is about in the first place. Regular 
schools are scared of it [inclusion] and feel inadequate” (S7: +4, P6).  
“Schools don't want to take him because of his disability” (S7: +4, P48). It is special 
schools that know the truth about intellectual disability, but the knowledge could be 
transferred into the mainstream, if they were receptive to it, in cases where the disability 
is less severe.  
Practices of special education.  
The content of education has an important focus on life skills that would allow for 
participation in the community (S38: +5, S39: +5). Academic skills are less important 
(S41: -2): “You should try and teach. It [reading] must be tried but this is not the be all 
and end all as they might not be capable” (S41: -2, P6).  The most important aspect of 
education is that it meets the needs of CYWID in an individualised way: “It [education] 
is important and it is a right. It must be tailored and adapted to meet the needs of the 
child in terms of expectations, rate, and the goals of the parents that are realistic. One 
needs to consider a broad spectrum that balances all of these. Parents should be involved 
so as not to be unrealistic” (Comment, P6). 
 
Inclusion is for the less severely disabled (S14: +3) and special schools will always be 
needed (S58: +3) since some CYWID require a different curriculum  (S44: +1) with a 
greater focus on life skills (S55: +1). Education should prepare them for employment that 
can be in the open market:“Disagree with the 'sheltered employment' part of it” (S35: -6, 
P7). 
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Practices of differentiation.  
There is a distinction made between different levels of competence calling for different 
forms of education (S14: +3). Children who are very severely disabled do not belong in a 
special school:“Some children are too severely disabled to benefit from the curriculum 
(NCS) i.e. if they don't have an interest to learn, is it fair to place them where their 
particular needs are for care and stimulation? Such a large demand for places at a 
special school means that you exclude others who can benefit. Social interaction can be 
great but ability to become involved is limited. There must be somewhere to draw the 
line. It is also very difficult with uncontrolled behaviour” (S59: -5, P6). They do not 
require education at the cost of the state (S27: -3) since care is more appropriate than 
education. However, it is not necessarily the case that they should be excluded from 
educational environments (S33: -3) since the educational programme can be 
differentiated within these contexts. Professionals can identify multiple educational 
placements and methods, largely based on the dimension of specific needs of the 
individual. No single placement, such as regular schools will ever be able to 
accommodate all CYWID (S31: -4) because of these highly individualised needs. 
Therefore some CYWID, presumably those with a less severe disability, can be taught in 
large classes (S20: -4) and they do not always require a highly specialised form of 
education (S46: -4).  
 
While severity of the disability or level of competence is important it is not the only 
consideration. IQ testing is not viewed as an important indicator of this competence (S45: 
-5, S34: -1) since it does not always give a fair reflection of the child’s potential: “The 
medical model is not always true because they don't take into consideration the learner’s 
strengths. Given time the learner can progress and the tests remain null and void and the 
child can achieve more than the tests have stated”(S45: -5, P17). However, it does have a 
role in identifying the right learner for the special school, as the mark of an underlying 
incapacity for learning that limits achievement: “IQ is an important factor but not the 
only one. If the child is functioning on a low level and is deprived then it could be that the 
child could do more than they are doing. But if there is a low IQ score that doesn't come 
up with other issues e.g. vision or hearing then they are suitable for our school. IQ can 
show us how she should be performing in school” (S34: -1, P6).  
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This discourse takes the view that special schools accommodate learners who should be 
in mainstream schools (S57: +4). More careful processes are needed for discriminating 
between those who belong in the different settings to ensure that they are properly 
placed. : “In the ex-white department, we had school psychologists who would pick up 
through IQ tests then move kids into special class. Those kids did not come to our school. 
In the black and ‘coloured’ schools, they were not picked up earlier. They did not have 
special classes so they came to our school. FAS (foetal alcohol syndrome) kids are very 
difficult in the regular school. The behavioural problems come from kids who should not 
be here” (S57: +4, P6). Thus social issues are an element of diversity amongst CYWID 
but deserve scrutiny only to the extent that they obscure the truth of an underlying 
biological impairment.  
Practices of professionalisation .  
Professional skills are required from doctors and psychologists to make fine 
differentiations between different degrees of severity and to prescribe appropriate courses 
of action within a tailored educational programme:“The educators need to identify the 
learners’ strengths so that they can build on them. They need to make an individual 
support plan for each learner and support him. They need to work hand in glove with the 
parents so as to know the child holistically and build him” (S17: +6, P17). In addition, 
teachers must have a special compassion (S21: +6) or skills (S22: +3) to teach CYWID 
but the setting in which this takes place is less important (S17: +6, S46: -4, S20: -4). The 
professional is tasked with identifying the true nature of intellectual disability in the 
individual and the judicious provision of educational technology to ameliorate this lack in 
the individual. However, despite all the professional expertise that is brought to bear on 
the individual, the educational provision cannot be expected to outweigh the disability in 
terms of positive outcomes (S13: 0).  
Practices of family and community involvement. 
There is mild agreement that CYWID should not be sent away from their family (S2: 
+1), but this depends on the circumstances:“If a child is brilliant in maths, you would 
send him away to the best school, so too the intellectually disabled child if it is in his best 
interests”(S2: +1, P6). Parents are viewed as not being completely supportive of their 
children’s education (S5: +1) and as having low expectations (S3: +1).   
 230 
Practices of advocacy. 
There is little place for a human rights perspective in this discourse. The problem of 
intellectual disability is a technical one, which requires specific skills in individualising 
learning to an increasingly fine degree so that the perfect match between the learner 
profile and the learning programme can be made.  
Factor B6: Special Education Keeps Children Safe  
Factor Outline 
This factor has an eigenvalue of 2.95 and accounts for 5% of the study variance. There 
are seven participants loading onto this factor. Their particulars are presented in Table 41 
below. 
 
Table 41: Demographic Details of Participants Significantly Loading onto Factor B6 
Participant Race  Employment Gender  Connection to ID 
P12 Black Special school educator,  F Professional 
P13 Black Special school educator F Professional 
P37 Black Unemployed F Parent  
P40 Black Company director F Parent 
P53 “Coloured’ Personal assistant F Parent 
P59 Black Unemployed F Parent 
P61 Black Regular school educator M Parent 
The majority of these participants are black parents and the two professionals loading 
onto this factor are black educators at a special school.  
Factor Description 
There is one distinguishing statement for this factor, which is presented in Table 42 
below.  
 
Table 42: Distinguishing Statement for Factor B6 
 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 
32. Education of CYWID can only take place in the mainstream if there 
is transformation and change throughout the whole education system 
3 -1 5 1 -1 -6 
 
This discourse focuses on the need for protection of CYWID from a hostile community. 
In the light of the factor description below, it appears that this statement reflects a 
 231 
rejection of inclusive education in total. No matter how the system might be transformed, 
it will never be suitable for the education of CYWID.  
Practices of inclusion/exclusion. 
In this account there is a strong inclination toward special schools as opposed to regular 
schools for the education of CYWID. Rejection of regular schools is based on the 
understanding that teachers are not trained and the classes are too big:“They must go to 
special schools, not to normal schools. The teachers in normal schools are not trained 
for the skills for this child. There are so many children in the class. There should be four 
or five because they don't listen. You must be patient” (Comment, P40). For this choice 
to be a reality, there should be more  specialised centres for them: “There should be more 
support for them. More centres for them so they can feel comfortable. Not enough 
facilities for them” (Comment, P53). These new facilities must be run by professionals 
and not parents (S6: -1) because specialised expertise is required.  
 
The safety and happiness of CYWID is not well served in the mainstream (S11: +5, 52: 
+4): “We are not guaranteed safety because other children will laugh at them. My child 
does not speak clearly. Even I cannot understand him all the time. They will laugh and 
not understand” (S11: +5). The special schools should provide therapy (S56: +3): “They 
need the therapic (sic) schools where there is no rush or extensive learning because of 
their handicap/disability” (S56: +3, P12). The teaching skills for education of CYWID 
are significant (S22: +3). The situation in the mainstream presents a bleak picture for 
CYWID (S54: -2), even if parents manage to overcome the difficulty that they experience 
with admission (S7: +3).  
Practices of special education.  
The curriculum aims to teach life skills (S55: +2) that would ultimately prepare the child 
for work in a sheltered environment (S35: +4). CYWID require structured programmes 
(S37: +4):“It is so that they know the goals. I would like to teach my child computer or 
switch board so she can have the skills” (S37: +4, P59). They require strict discipline 
(S36: -3): “CYWID would need more rote learning. Repeat the same things so that the 
child can grasp the concepts being taught. Rigid discipline should be good for them 
because they must make sure that they are strict and strong methods should be applied 
because they don't easily understand things” (S36: -3, P61). 
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The focus of curriculum is to improve skills, such as communication (S39: +5) with 
independence and responsibility being of less significance (S1: +2, S38: 0, S40: -1, S41 -
2) within a carefully constructed programme that provides safety, love and support.  
Practices of differentiation.   
Special schools should accept all children regardless of the severity of their disability 
(S59: +3). There is an implication that they should also accept those with less severe 
disability.  Currently special schools do not have children who should be in the 
mainstream (S57: -3).  
Practices of professionalisation.  
IQ tests are important in guiding both the admission of learners (S34: +2) and developing 
realistic expectations (S45: +2). The compassion and safety in the special school are 
highly valued (S60: +5, S21: +4, S56: +3, S22: +3): “I think one of the reasons that the 
staff of special schools will be well trained, they have got skills and have an 
understanding of how to treat the kids. The children of special schools have problems of 
disability; therefore you need to treat them with care. They also understand that those 
children, they can't cope. They have mental and physical problems. They cannot be harsh 
when dealing with them, rather they must be protected and secure” (S60: +5, P61). The 
above quote highlights the importance of professional skills in “knowing disability” 
above the application of technical skills that might improve the competence and 
independence of CYWID. 
Practices of family and community involvement. 
The family is central in this discourse. The child belongs within the family (S2: +6):  
“They are supposed to be there with their family and to the community” (2: +6, P37). 
“They should never be sent away because they need this support and should not be 
isolated” (2: +6, P53). Special schools are places of choice for these children (S58: +6, 
S60: +5, S52: +4). The importance of the family and the special school arises because 
there is no support in the community (S10: -6) and the mainstream will never be able to 
accommodate CYWID (S32: -6). Parents are highly supportive of the school (S5: -5) 
because this is really the only resource that they have available to them in supporting 
their children: “We are supportive. How can they say that?” (S5: -5, P53). 
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“Here are not so many useful resources to support CYWID. They are still complaining 
about the infrastructure in our schools. They are still in need of transport, not enough 
teaching aids; we also need sports fields for disabled children, now they cannot be 
involved in sport. They don't have special books.” (S10: -6, P61). There is even hostility 
in the community:“There are no resources because in A. there is no support from the 
community. They only cater for normal children. The Indian man at the shop was 
harassing my child at the spaza shop. I told him you could see he is not normal. Why do 
you push him out of the shop? Why do you say to me that I can't look after the child?” 
(S10: -6, P40). 
Practices of advocacy. 
The care and protection of a special school is what is needed. The autonomy of CYWID 
is not an important issue (S40: -1, S38: 0, S1: +2). An overriding desire to protect 
CYWID minimises the importance of autonomy and agency but there is advocacy for the 
right to protection and freedom from abuse for CYWID.  
Summary of Q-study B 
In this chapter I have presented a range of accounts of the education of intellectually 
disabled people. A summary of the resulting factor descriptions is presented in Table 43.  
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Table 43: Summary of Factors in Q-study B 
 
 B1: Inclusion as a 
human right.  
 
B2 Special needs 
require special 
provision 
B3 Inclusive 
education is a dream 
of the future. 
B4 Excellent special 
education as a right. 
B5 Effective 
education must be 
tailored to the 
child’s needs. 
B6 Special 
education keeps 
children safe. 
In/exclusion Inclusion is a human 
right for all regardless 
of disability. 
Inclusion violates the 
child’s rights to 
appropriate education.  
Inclusion is a good 
idea but a long way 
off in the 
implementation. 
Separate but equal 
education is the 
preferred option. 
In/exclusion are 
options to be 
decided on through 
professional 
consideration. 
 
Exclusion from the 
community is 
necessary for their 
safety. 
Special education  Adaptation of good 
teaching practice, not 
special education. 
A different curriculum 
is required.  
Separate curriculum 
for CYWID with 
severe disabilities. 
Different curriculum 
with special 
teaching methods to 
ensure acquisition of 
marketable skills. 
Individualised 
curriculum must be 
developed to meet 
specific child’s 
needs. 
 
Different curriculum 
with focus on life 
skills that prepares 
for sheltered 
employment. 
Differentiation Does not apply to 
individuals because all 
have the same rights. 
Differentiation takes 
place at the level of the 
curriculum.  
Distinguish between 
CYWID and “normal”, 
and between severe to 
profound ID and mild 
to moderate ID. 
Distinguish between 
mild intellectual 
disability and severe 
to profound 
intellectual disability. 
Differentiation 
between CYWID 
and “normal”, 
between CYWID 
who can acquire 
literacy and 
numeracy skills and 
those who cannot.  
Finely differentiated 
according to level of 
need based largely 
on severity of 
impairment. 
Distinction between 
CYWID and others 
but not within the 
group. 
 Professionalisation  Rejected in favour of 
good classroom 
practice. 
Teachers located in 
special schools provide 
love and knowledge, 
therapists provide 
skills. 
Special schools have 
expertise with severe 
disability but skills 
exist in the 
mainstream for mild 
disability. 
Specific expertise 
required to 
overcome the 
organic deficit.  
Expertise to identify 
the real ID in the 
individual and to 
ameliorate this 
deficit. 
Professional 
expertise is required 
to understand 
disability and 
protect with 
kindness and 
compassion. 
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Family and community Supportive families 
and communities must 
be educated.  
Do not have the 
necessary knowledge 
of disability. They 
should be educated by 
professionals. 
Do not receive much 
consideration. 
The acquisition of 
skills is a priority, 
more important than 
family or 
community issues. 
Family and 
community contexts 
obscure, exacerbate 
or ameliorate the 
existing deficit. 
Family and special 
school form 
protective barrier 
against hostile 
community. 
 
Advocacy This is central. 
Education must build 
autonomy. 
Emphasises access to 
appropriate services as 
a right. 
This is not a strong 
element here.  
Focuses on 
providing external 
support and funding 
rather than 
autonomy. 
This is not a strong 
element. 
Professional skill 
rather than 
advocacy. 
Claims humans 
rights at a basic 
level – protection 
from abuse and 
compassionate 
treatment.  
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Discussion  
The discourses presented above configure educational practices differently around 
different understandings of intellectual disability. Before going on to a discussion of 
how this operates and addressing my third research question, I shall compare these 
discourses. Practices of inclusion range from full inclusion regardless of severity (B1) 
to an outright rejection of inclusion in any circumstances (B6). It was noted in B1 that 
all parents loading onto this factor are members of DSAA. Only one of them is black 
and she is an employee of the association. In contrast, the parents loading onto B6 are 
all either black or “coloured”. It is a feature of the South African education system 
that the majority of regular schools in East London catering largely for black learners 
are under-resourced and lack basic infrastructure (McKenzie, 2007). If parents 
envisage their children going to these schools, they have real concerns about the 
provision of education and the safety of these schools. White children, on the other 
hand, can expect to go to better functioning, so-called “former Model C” schools (that 
catered exclusively for white children prior to 1994).  An aversion to inclusive 
schooling is more understandable in this context.  
 
The discourse of B3 embraces elements of full inclusion but sees this as a future 
possibility. This represents something of a compromise between theoretical and moral 
principles and the real world, and is a position that reflects the need for appropriate 
support that will enhance participation. This aligns with Gabel’s (2002) position that: 
“People with diverse abilities may need marked changes in curricula, teacher 
expectations, school buildings, social structures, and classroom organization in order 
to participate in classroom life.” (p. 188). In this view the limitations of the real world 
to meet these requirements must be recognised in fairness to students. While all 
participants loading onto this factor were black and female, the significance of this is 
not clear. 
 
Practices of special education are viewed in the light of whether they are exclusively 
the domain of special schools or can be located in the mainstream. In B5 there is 
readiness to spread these practices far and wide under the proper supervision of the 
authorities, whereas B4 locates them within a properly financed special school. The 
flexibility of B5 is indicative of a carefully regulated practice of inclusion through the 
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importation of special education practice as noted in chapter 4.   The curriculum as a 
central aspect of special education also varies from an emphasis on life skills (as in 
B6) to a demand for academic skills (B4), or a belief in the same flexible curriculum 
for all children (B1). Each of these perspectives has implications – and draws on – 
certain representations of intellectual disability and its relationship to the norm.  
 
Differentiation is a feature of all these discourses, except B1, and varies from gross 
differentiation between those that belong in special schools and those that do not (B6) 
to the highly differentiated account of B5. B1 eschews differentiation of individuals 
entirely and looks to the curriculum for distinguishing between different learning 
needs. The degree of differentiation has implications for dividing practices that 
normalise individuals in the exercise of disciplinary power (see discussion on 
disciplinary power in chapter 2).  
 
 Professionalisation has emerged as a particularly interesting aspect of this study. 
There is a marked distinction in some discourses (B2, B3, B4 and B6) between the 
psychological expertise that is based on compassion and knowledge about the nature 
of intellectual disability and medical expertise that addresses the underlying organic 
deficit. Teachers are the ones who have psychological expertise but it is the therapist 
and the psychologists who have the authority to exercise the medicalised gaze and to 
understand the truth about intellectual disability, bolstered by the technologies of 
intelligence testing and therapeutic techniques. The teacher can address issues that 
arise in the social context, for example, bullying and an inappropriate curriculum. 
These are the domain of social aspects that create disability in the social model of 
disability (see chapter 2). Only the medical gaze has the power to pronounce upon and 
address the impairment itself. 
 
The family and community are variously figured as central to education (B1) and 
potentially harmful in the absence of appropriate education (B2). I have argued above 
that the discourse of B6 is rooted to some extent in the context of limited resources. In 
this perspective, parents’ major concern is with safety and freedom from abuse. The 
knowledge of parents is generally devalued relative to that of the experts, as noted in  
chapter 4.  
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Advocacy is an element of all discourses, except for B5 (which draws on a  
knowledge about the truth of intellectual disability as its ethical force). The discourse 
of B1 (and B3 to some extent) adopts a liberal humanist view of human rights as 
something that everybody is entitled to by virtue of their humanity (see chapter 2). 
These rights are limited to an educational context and access to appropriate 
educational provision in B2 and B4. In B6 these rights are limited to protection from 
abuse.  
 
Quibell (2005) notes two types of rights discourse in her study of community care of 
intellectually disabled people in Australia. The first is what she terms a Formal-Rights 
discourse that makes claims to the official recognition of the individual’s rights, 
usually claims to services and resources in the context of intellectual disability. This 
type of discourse is in evidence in B2 and B4, where special needs constitute a right 
to special resources for education. The second type of rights discourse is that of 
Social-Progress, which makes a claim to social justice to be brought about in 
collective action. This is in line with the inclusive education approach of B1. Rights 
are seen in terms of equality and protection. B6 also makes a claim to human rights 
but this is a claim on negative rights, that is the freedom from abuse as opposed to the 
claim for the autonomy of B1.  
Conclusion  
In presenting the above Q-study I have identified accounts in educational discursive 
practices in Buffalo City. I have also made a comparison between these discourses 
within the themes used in the descriptions. The issues identified in this comparison 
draw on, and have implications for, the way in which the intellectually disabled 
person is represented as a subject for education. This will form the basis of the 
discussion in Chapter 8, in response to my third research question: 
What are the effects of these discourses in constructing the intellectually disabled 
subject and associated educational practice? 
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CHAPTER 8: REPRESENTATIONS AND EDUCATIONAL 
PRACTICES OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: AN 
INTERPRETATION OF THE FINDINGS 
 
In chapters 6 and 7 the notion of educational practice as the application of neutral and 
evidence-based principles to address an identifiable organic deficit within certain 
individuals was destabilised. An examination of a range of discourses revealed 
multiple understandings of the problem of intellectual disability that enable certain 
educational practices with certain power effects and disallow others. In this chapter I 
relate discourses of representation to those of educational practice by considering 
conceptual and theoretical similarities between these two sets of discourses. The 
intent of this discussion is to address the research question:  
3. What are the effects of these discourses [of representation and educational 
practice] in constructing the intellectually disabled subject and associated 
educational practice? 
 
In order to understand the interaction between representation and educational practice, 
I shall begin the discussion by examining how power operates in special educational 
practices, through differentiation and exclusion under the authority of the medico-
psychological gaze. It is argued that these practices are bolstered and packaged for 
deployment in a multitude of educational contexts through a form of psychological 
expertise that I term disability expertise in the study context. However, it is not only 
professional knowledge that informs educational practice. In the current context, the 
salience of a) religious accounts of disability and b) a concern with the rights of 
disabled people and c) the role of community and family have been noted. These 
strands are evident in educational practice and are discussed further below. The final 
section of this chapter entails a consideration of the ways in which constructions of 
impairment constrain and produce certain types of subjects within educational 
practice. Since I shall refer repeatedly to the accounts and discourses identified in 
chapters 6 and 7, I present a summary of these in Appendix K for ease of reference. 
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Professional knowledge and power 
Disciplinary power is exercised through reference to the norm. The individual is 
ranked and given value within a comparative system thereby becoming the subject of 
their own ranking and the object of an overarching comparative system that marks the 
boundary between the normal and the pathological.  The effect of discipline is to 
create docile bodies that are made productive at the same time as being deprived of 
political force (Foucault, 1975/1995). The outstanding features of power in the 
discourses identified in this study are exclusion and differentiation, each of which will 
be discussed below.   
Exclusion 
The roots of exclusion from education have been noted in chapter 4 as arising in the 
context of compulsory education. It was the pragmatic exclusion of problematic 
students from highly regulated classroom settings in the first place that necessitated 
the development of testing instruments to properly allocate individuals into special or 
regular education. Intelligence testing gave a scientific and ethical rationale to this 
exclusion, which both allowed the regular school system to be rid of troublesome 
individuals while at the same time setting the parameters for the educable subject. 
Thus, as noted by Hook (2007), it is not only those who fall foul of the measuring 
system that are disciplined but rather the control of these difficult individuals is 
deployed as a strategy to justify ever increasing controls and surveillance of the entire 
population.  
 
Within the South African context I noted in chapter 4 the exclusion from education 
based on race. This past history makes of separation a “decadent and immoral” 
response to difference (van Rooyen & Le Grange, 2003, p. 11). Exclusion therefore 
requires a strong ethical motivation to cast aside this perspective in the South African 
context. There are three sources for this motivation apparent in the current study that 
inform dividing practices to distinguish the normal from the disabled, namely a) 
professional knowledge, b) provision of love and care, and c) protection from abuse. 
I shall discuss each of these below.  
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Firstly, knowledge about the truth of disability casts exclusion in the best interests of 
the child. Professional knowledge about the nature of disability as an object in the 
world is evident in A4.3: Medical model/religious discourse. This discourse informs 
an educational perspective in which educational options should be decided upon by 
professionals in the child’s best interests, notably B5: Effective education must be 
tailored to the child’s needs, and B2: Special needs require special provision. Both of 
these discourses assume the existence of different types of children who will require 
different forms of education and both endorse the validity of professional knowledge 
in determining who belongs in which category, and who will be included or excluded.  
 
Secondly, exclusion is a product of the Christian morality of care, love and duty 
(A4.3: Medical model/religious discourse, and A4.4: Community/religious discourse). 
This plays out in educational discourses that prize the love and compassion of 
teachers located in special schools (B2: Special needs require special provision, B3: 
Inclusive education is a dream of the future and B6: Special education keeps children 
safe). Intellectual disability imposes a duty of care and protection on the education 
system that is only taken up fully in special schools. This will be further discussed in 
the section on religious discourse below. 
 
A third impetus for exclusion is the vulnerability of the intellectually disabled child 
who must be kept out of harm’s way in separate provision (A4.3: Medical 
model/religious discourse, see especially the accounts of  A1.2: A person dependent 
on their family, A3.5: A person with a condition that is an object of expert knowledge 
and A2.3: A difficult challenge to their family). The concomitant educational practice 
is most clearly expressed by B6: Special education keeps children safe, but also to 
some extent in B2: Special needs require special provision, where safety of children 
is a key feature in the consideration of educational provision.  
 
Disability continues to be a force for exclusion in the current context despite inclusive 
rhetoric. While exclusion on the base of gender or race is abhorrent in the South 
African situation, exclusion of disabled people is based on a scientific knowledge, 
their special needs for care and their extreme vulnerability. These justifications 
obscure the power effects of exclusion and construct it as a disciplinary or ethical 
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matter rather than a potentially political one. The human rights discourse of B1: 
Inclusion as a human right, which will be discussed further below, roundly rejects 
this perspective.  
Differentiation 
The practice of differentiation has expanded from the gross distinction between 
normal and pathological to much finer within-category distinctions, as has been 
discussed in chapters 3 and 4. The effects of differentiation are to individualise the 
subject within a globalising system in such a way that they become visible, given their 
location within a grid of description. The intellectually disabled learner is described in 
detail through the application of disciplinary technologies of intelligence tests, 
assessment and expert knowledge. This study reflects the existence of both a) gross 
distinctions between the normal and the abnormal as in B2: Special needs require 
special provision and B6: Special education keeps children safe and b) much finer 
distinctions, with B5: Effective education must be tailored the child’s needs being the 
most highly differentiated discourse.  
 
The special educational discourse of B6: Special education keeps children safe rejects 
graded practices of differentiation beyond that between the “normal” and the 
“disabled” in that all children, no matter the severity of their disability, should be able 
to be admitted to special schools. The category of “disabled” is thus relatively 
homogeneous, defined by the need for love and care. In this sense a stereotype of 
intellectual disability is created. The account of A1.6: A stereotyped person, can be 
viewed as one of resistance to this stereotypical view of the dependent, vulnerable 
intellectually disabled person.  This account (A1.6: A stereotyped person) expresses 
frustration with the generally low expectations of intellectually disabled people.  
 
In the discourse of B5: Effective education must be tailored to the child’s needs, 
grades of severity are minutely separated from each other since individuals are 
deemed to require different educational practices. This discourse apportions exclusion 
and inclusion conditional on factors, predominantly internal and inherent in the child, 
most prominent of which is the level of severity of the disability. If this professional 
knowledge is not brought to bear on the problem of the correct placement of 
individuals, there is a possibility of harm resulting. As one respondent loading onto 
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B5: Effective education must be tailored to the child’s needs, puts it: “In the ex-white 
department, we had school psychologists who would pick up [mild to moderate 
intellectual disability] through IQ tests then move kids into special class. Those kids 
did not come to our school. In the black and coloured schools, they were not picked 
up earlier. They did not have special classes so they came to our school. The 
behavioural problems come from kids who should not be here” (Q-study B, S57: +4, 
P6). In this view, an incorrect assessment of the child’s inherent potential results in 
behaviour problems that then disrupt the education of those who are correctly placed 
according to their potential. The damage that incorrect placements do is a danger 
evident in the discussion of mainstreaming in chapter 4 and most clearly expressed by 
Alston (2006) where the inclusion of intellectually disabled children is set against the 
burden that they will place on an already diverse system. Thus, within the 
differentiated discourse of B5: Effective education must be tailored to the child’s 
needs presented here, it is in everybody’s best interests that only children with mild 
intellectual impairment that should be given access to the mainstream.  
 
The practice of special education can be viewed as a project of  “disciplining 
difference” (Rose, 1998a, p. 104). The skills that are measured through professional 
technologies form a grid that serves to make the individual difference with respect to 
intelligence and social adaptation, visible and comparable to the norm. The effect of 
this is to stabilise difference and make it orderly within a perceptual frame (Rose, 
1998a). In the case of intellectual disability in South Africa placement options for 
schooling are determined by practices of differentiation.  
 
Prior to the introduction of inclusive education policy, school placement was 
determined by degrees of severity with a heavy dependence on IQ scores (see chapter 
4). The National Strategy for Screening, Identification, Assessment and Support  
(Department of Education, 2008) outlines  the move from differentiation according to 
disability/severity to a more subtle form of differentiation according to levels of 
support needs as demanded by Education White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 
2001). This differentiation of support needs draws on regular teachers’ knowledge up 
to a point but this is exercised under the supervision of the medico-psychological gaze 
discussed below.  
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The Medico-psychological Gaze 
In the early problematisation of intellectual disability, as described in chapter 3, the 
medical profession held the authority to classify, based on physical judgements. 
Subsequently, the intelligence test presented a victory for Psychology in gaining the 
power to pronounce upon intelligence and its lack (see chapter 4). Doctors and 
psychologists (and to some extent, therapists) are given the authority to exercise the 
medico-psychological gaze that is rooted in the claims to truth of expert knowledge 
that makes the body (or the mind) visible so that what was already there, waiting to be 
revealed, is brought into the light of truth (Foucault, 1963/2003). The mastery of 
diagnostic techniques allows them to make visible and pronounce on the specific 
individual’s condition relative to the norm and to prescribe a course of action. In the 
case of special education, lesser authorities (teachers, nurses and parents) are bound to 
accept privileged professional knowledge (Howell, 2006) and comply with the 
prescriptions made.   
 
In the discussion of discourses presented in chapter 7, I noted how some educational 
discourses distinguish between a) the knowledge of teachers and b) that of therapists, 
doctors and psychologists. The medico-psychological authority of the latter group 
grants them powers to pronounce upon the organic deficit (impairment) itself. This 
power is not granted to teachers, who are more likely to possess psychological, or in 
this study disability, expertise, if they have the necessary guidance of the authorities 
on the truth of intellectual disability.  The medico-psychological gaze is directed at 
impairment itself, as the organic element of the disability/impairment binary. The 
disability pole of the binary is the target of disability expertise, which will be 
discussed further below. The adoption of a positivist scientific method in special 
education with its claim to objective knowledge establishes special educational 
techniques as a superior form of knowledge, able to exercise the medico-
psychological gaze, that dominates that of parents, disabled people and regular 
teachers within special education practice (Connor, 2005).  
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In the account of A3.5: A Person with a condition that is an object of expert 
knowledge, professional knowledge that makes the impairment visible is highly 
valued as the truth about intellectual disability. The truth must be communicated to 
parents and to communities in the best interests of the child and to minimise abuse.  
The educational practice of B2: Special needs require special provision relates 
strongly to this conception. The true needs of the child, made visible by the competent 
authorities, must determine educational provision. It is this match that constitutes a 
fair and just treatment of the intellectually disabled child. Should these true needs be 
ignored, there will be a violation of rights. In the discourse of B4: Excellent special 
education as a right, such is the faith in professional knowledge that it is invoked, at 
whatever expense, to address and change organic deficit to the point where the 
disabled child can do what the normal child can.   These discourses prize technical 
skill and diagnostic mastery that can address the very real impairment, the organic 
deficit of the individual body. This is in contrast to (but sometimes in combination 
with) the concept of psychological expertise as a more malleable and diffuse concept 
that is directed toward the effects of impairment, that is, the disability.  
 
Disability Expertise  
Rose (1998a) notes the flexibility of psychology as a discipline that lends itself freely 
to those professions that deal with human conduct in all its troubling diversity and 
pathology. Doctors, nurses, therapists and special education practitioners can draw on 
an expertise that “refer(s) to a particular kind of social authority, characteristically 
deployed around problems, exercising a certain diagnostic gaze, grounded in a claim 
to truth, asserting technical efficacy, and avowing humane ethical virtues” (p. 86). I 
shall argue that special educators apply this form of expertise in particular ways and I 
shall use the term “disability expertise” in my discussion. As a form of psychological 
expertise, it draws on the language and ideas of psychology, since “It appears as if it 
[psychology] can systematize and lend coherence to the ways in which authorities 
visualize, evaluate and diagnose the conduct of their subject – render rational the 
grounds of decision and action” (Rose, 1998a, p. 87). Safely located within this 
legitimate psychological frame, disability expertise gathers an ethical and moral force, 
based on scientific knowledge of the truth of disability.  
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In the discourses that prize the special education enterprise (B2: Special needs require 
special provision, B4: Excellent special education  as a human right, B5: Effective 
education must be tailored to the child’s needs and B6: Special education keeps 
children safe), professional expertise consists of a) mastery of diagnostic technique, 
b) knowledge of disability, and c) understanding of disabled children and love and 
compassion for them. Mastery of diagnostic technique can be distinguished in the 
current discourses as being incorporated within the medico-psychological gaze. This 
is the power to make the impairment visible and definable. The knowledge of 
disability takes different forms for the medico-psychological gaze and for disability 
expertise. For the medico-psychological gaze, disability knowledge is based on a 
scientific knowledge of the truth of intellectual disability. As a component of 
disability expertise, knowledge appears to be more a familiarity with “the disabled”, 
their nature, their habits and their needs. This form of disability knowledge is not 
about making the impairment visible but rather about understanding the disabled in 
ways which are, in many respects, pre-defined by the medico-psychological gaze.  
 
To some extent this form of disability knowledge encapsulated in disability expertise 
is code for an absence of ill treatment and abuse, see for example B6: Special 
education keeps children safe. Where disability expertise is absent, it will not be safe 
for disabled children. However, this is not an expertise that can be easily claimed. It 
requires supervision and sanction. For example, within the discourse of B2: Special 
needs require special provision and B4: Excellent special education as a right, 
understanding and compassion are important, but this is not an ordinary compassion 
since it is lacking in those who do not practice under the auspices of a medico-
psychological authority. Only those who have had special training or the experience 
of working in a special school can lay claim to this authority. The professional 
practice of the regular teacher does not include disability expertise and these teachers 
are disqualified from educating disabled learners unless they receive the required 
training.  
 
There is some debate as to whether disability expertise can only be found in special 
schools (B2: Special needs require special provision and B4: Excellent special 
education as a right) or in regular schools too (B3: Inclusive education is a dream of 
the future). B3: Inclusive education is a dream of the future is of interest in that it 
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suggests that diagnostic mastery that makes impairment visible (the medico-
psychological gaze) is required for the treatment of severe disability and can be 
distinguished from softer skills directed at mild disability (disability expertise). The 
medico-psychological expertise is properly located within special schools, whereas 
disability expertise could possibly be found in regular schools as well. The human 
rights discourse of B1: Inclusion as a human right, on the other hand, rejects any form 
of disability expertise and elevates the professional knowledge (perhaps a form of 
educational expertise) of the regular teacher to the level where it is adequate for all 
children.  
 
These configurations of expertise suggest the arrangement of impairment and 
disability in the following series of interlocking concepts: 
The impairment elicits the medico-psychological gaze that can be exercised by the 
therapist/doctor/psychologist. These authorities possess scientific knowledge and a 
special diagnostic ability to classify the mind and body of the educational subject. In 
so doing, they set the limits of possibility and fix impairment as a static entity 
(sometimes with a number, such as IQ attached), a property of the individual, and on 
this basis they prescribe valid disciplinary responses to impairment. Their presence is 
most required where the level of impairment is severe and their skills are most likely 
to be deployed in specialised or pivotal decision-making settings.  
 
The disability calls for disability expertise, especially familiarity with disability, 
understanding, love and compassion. Disability expertise is distinct from other forms 
of educational expertise since it is an intermediary for, and practiced under, the 
medico-psychological authority. Teachers in regular schools (B5: Effective education 
must be tailored to the child’s needs), parents (A4.3: Medical model/ religious 
discourse) and teachers in special schools (B5: Effective education must be tailored to 
the child’s needs) must be educated about disability. If they are suitably educated then 
they can carry out the prescriptions of the medical/psychological authorities.  
 
Disability expertise, as discussed above, is easily aligned with a representation of 
intellectually disabled people as vulnerable due to their organic deficit (requiring care 
and protection) within a religious frame as evidenced in A4.3: Medical 
model/religious discourse. A convergence of old (Christian) and new (disciplinary) 
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forms of pastoral power (Foucault, 1979) places the special educator as the leader of 
the flock, an intermediary of the superior power of the medico-psychological 
complex, imbued with the moral force of Christian compassion.  As such he or she is 
accountable for the flock, knowing each one in detail through observation and 
assessment (Hook, 2007).  
 
In conclusion of this section on power and the practice of special education, it is my 
contention, based on the discourses examined in this study, that practices of exclusion 
and differentiation in education construct intellectual disability in schools as an 
individual organic deficit. The best interests of the child with the deficit are deemed to 
be served through the technology at the disposal of the medical/psychological 
authorities. The techniques and practices of these authorities are infused throughout 
the education system by means of the application of psychological expertise in a 
specifically disability related form. Disability expertise is a scarce resource that can 
only be found in certain places and under certain authorities, necessitating careful 
placement of individuals. The pervasiveness of disability expertise in educational 
discourse for intellectually disabled people undermines the intent of inclusive 
education since it remains under the jurisdiction of the medico-psychological complex 
and outside of the practice of regular teachers.  
 
In the context of this study, disability expertise has strong religious underpinnings. 
The moral force of acting in the child’s best interests, with knowledge, understanding 
and compassion is bolstered by Christian ethics and will be discussed further below.  
Religious Discourse 
It is useful to explore the religious dimension of disability further because of its 
centrality in the current study. Stiker (2002) notes the association of disability with 
sin in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. In the Old Testament, disability belongs in the 
world of the profane and is excluded from the sacred because of its contamination 
with sin and the impurity that it represents. However, he argues, it is this very 
religious exclusion that placed an ethical and social responsibility on the faithful such 
that “the non-integration of the disabled in religious practice is their precondition of 
their non-exclusion from the culture” (p. 31). He portrays the Old Testament view of 
disability as promoting social inclusion although requiring exclusion from the sacred.  
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The practice of Jesus in healing and relief of disability disrupts this arrangement 
between religious interdiction and social integration. The prohibition of the disabled 
from the sacred is shattered as the marginalised are presented as closer to God and 
most loved by Jesus. Impurity is not to be found in the mark of disability, rather 
impurity lies in the behaviour of one towards other human beings: “Only one thing is 
sacred, and that is human fellowship, which can be profaned by lack of respect, lack 
of love, lack of agape” (Stiker, 2002, p. 34). The integration of the disabled person 
becomes wholly a matter of ethics and individual conscience as a matter of charity.  
 
In terms of representational work, this figures the intellectually disabled person as one 
who is most deserving of compassion and belonging in the church but is not always 
accorded these rights. The disabled person, therefore, needs special intervention.  In 
terms of education, a charitable mode of functioning is called upon. The education of 
intellectually disabled people is not a technical task but rather a Christian duty of 
love. Those who teach intellectually disabled people demonstrate this love and require 
support from the community as an expression of the community’s Christian values.  
 
The medical model is aligned with religious discourses in A4.3: Medical 
model/religious discourse in such a way that the intellectually disabled person is 
figured as an innocent requiring special care within a religious, charitable value 
system. The impairment requires specialised treatment and expertise to maximise 
potential but this expertise cannot overcome the impairment. at this point religious 
values of care and protection will be called upon. This resonates with the educational 
discourses of B2: Special needs require special provision and B6: Special education 
keeps children safe that foreground the vulnerability and need for protection in 
educational practice. Thus it is the love, compassion and understanding that are 
valued in special schools as equal to, or above, technical skills within these 
discourses. The innocence of the intellectually disabled person invokes a religious 
duty of compassion, care and protection. While the person can learn to some extent, 
this is constrained by the impairment and education can only be effective up to a point 
where a charitable response of care and protection would then need to be instigated.  
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According to Stiker (2002), the mysticism of the Catholic church, as embodied in the 
life of St. Francis of Assisi, elevates the marginalised and the disabled above others. 
They are more blessed, and closer to God than the unafflicted. Instead of being cared 
for, they were now glorified and “marginality [became] accepted as a positive value” 
(Stiker, 2002, p. 83). This mysticism is evident in the account of A2.6: A blessing and 
a gift from God (and to some extent in A2.2: An innocent and vulnerable child of 
God) that sees disability as a blessing and is only adopted by parents. It is a highly 
positive account that draws on spirituality as a central feature. It poses a different way 
of understanding intellectual disability as a religious symbol.  
 
The participant comments (see chapter 6) support the contention that the 
representations of intellectual disability are saturated with Christian morality in that a) 
Christian values relate to the acceptance of disability, and b) explanation of the cause 
is offered by reference to Christian belief. I shall discuss each of these further below.  
 
In some accounts the church is viewed as a haven of acceptance for intellectually 
disabled people. For example, within the account A1.2A: A vulnerable person, it is a 
place where intellectually disabled people can be themselves without feeling the 
pressure to hide their disability. On the other hand, the church is also seen as a culprit 
of the same discrimination that is experienced by intellectually disabled people in the 
community at large (A2.2: An innocent and vulnerable child of God and A3.1: A 
person to be understood and advocated for by professionals). Overall, the expectation 
is that the church should be a welcoming place and this is not always borne out by the 
experience of parents and adults with intellectual disability. There are indications in 
the literature that religious beliefs do not necessarily translate into a broad acceptance 
of disability (McNair, 2007; Selway & Ashman, 1998). The account of A3.1: A 
person to be understood and advocated for by professionals is particularly interesting 
in that the professional takes on the role of caring,  is figured as being neglected by 
conventional religion. This suggests the direct assumption of the pastoral role by the 
helping professions in an exercise of pastoral power.  
 
Religious explanations are also given for the cause of disability. Hlongwana and 
Mkhize (2007) note in their study of Christian values within an HIV/ AIDS support 
group in South Africa that  religious values are used to explain the cause of 
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HIV/AIDS as either a blessing or a curse. In terms of intellectual disability, the 
blessing concept is evident where the child is seen as a gift from God. Two of the 
factors in the parents Q-study (A2.2: An innocent and vulnerable child of God and 
A2.6: A blessing and a gift from God) endorse this sentiment and construe it as a 
blessing either because it builds their relationship with God through being tested or 
because it enriches their lives on a daily basis.  The account of A2.3: A difficult 
challenge to their family is more ambivalent since the burden that God imposes is not 
seen necessarily as a punishment but certainly as a challenge. However, this challenge 
is positive to the extent that it serves to strengthen the carer’s relationship to God. 
Contained within this concept of the ‘gift’ is the sense of being chosen to bear this 
burden. This element of being chosen is also evident in the HIV/AIDS literature 
(Hlongwana & Mkhize, 2007).  
 
While the view of disability as punishment does not emerge in the current study, it is 
worth noting that it is reported in other studies in the Eastern Cape. Gara (2007) 
presents accounts of rural mothers of disabled children who highlight the rejection 
that they experienced from their families and partners on the birth of a disabled child. 
They were viewed as being to blame, either through not taking care of themselves or 
through some transgression of a moral or cultural code of conduct.  
 
In a study in the Western Cape some parents saw disability as punishment but others 
saw themselves as being chosen to face the challenge of an intellectually disabled 
child.  God is also called upon to heal and make it better (Masasa, Irwin-Carruthers, 
& Faure, 2005). In terms of education, views taken on the cause of disability can 
affect the course of action to be taken. If it is “the will of God” there could be a 
tendency to focus on the fulfilment of one’s own duty as a parent or professional 
rather than the development of the intellectually disabled person as a human being in 
their own right. Where the child is seen as a punishment, this is even more 
problematic as the child can be hidden away and viewed with shame (Gara, 2007). 
 
The association between discourses of representation and educational practice has 
revealed an interesting aspect of the medical model within the local context. In 
representational discourse, the thread of Christianity is quite marked. In educational 
practice the overt Christian reference is absent. However, it is my contention that the 
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notions of caring, compassion and love are proxies for Christian values in educational 
practice. These religious values contrast with, but also draw on, the more secular 
human rights approaches, which are discussed below. 
Rights and Intellectual Disability 
Human rights concern the individual freedoms that every person should have by 
virtue of being human (see discussion in chapter 2). In this discussion, I examine the 
way in which rights underpin the human rights discourses of A4.2: Social 
model/human rights discourse and B1: Inclusion as a human right. I then examine the 
limited rights perspectives evident in the discourse of B5: Effective education must be 
tailored to the child’s needs and finally the right to protection from harm as expressed 
in B6: Special education keeps children safe.  
Human Rights 
Within the discourse of A4.2: Social model/human rights discourse, an overtly 
political stance is adopted, one of advocacy for those who cannot speak for 
themselves, given their marginalised position. Within this frame, the intellectually 
disabled person is viewed as a victim of social injustice who is deprived of his or her 
autonomy and basic human rights through the attribution of incompetence based on 
organic defect. There is a battle to be fought for the recognition of individual 
autonomy and the right to make choices for oneself. This discourse is strongly linked 
to the social model of disability and adopts an unconditional view of human rights as 
being accorded to every person by virtue of their humanity. Independence and 
autonomy are valued very highly. Practices of care are treated with great suspicion, as 
they are seen as pretexts for the erosion of autonomy.  
 
This perspective is evident in the educational discourse of B1: Inclusion as a human 
right and sits squarely with an orthodox inclusive education position based on the 
social model of disability. Since it is the environment, and not the disabled person, 
that must change, curriculum becomes the site where the problem of intellectual 
disability is addressed. This constructs inclusive education as follows: 
1. All children come to school with diverse needs and thus there are no 
essentially distinct groups of children. 
2. General education is responsible for the education of all children. 
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3. A flexible curriculum and trained teachers are essential to an effective 
response. 
4. The success of inclusive education is measured by the extent to which societal 
change occurs to enable all citizens to participate fully in community life 
(Peters, 2007). 
 
This position specifically undermines the special education enterprise. It equates 
disability with diversity and recognises that the regular classroom is a place where 
diversity must be addressed. Further, disability expertise is not a requirement. Rather  
general teaching expertise is needed, thus loosening the grip of the medico-
psychological authorities. The view of human rights expressed here can be related to 
the Social-Progress discourse described by Quibell (2005) in her Australian study as 
one that: 
constructs intellectual disability as at least in part shaped by their environments 
and the attitudes of others.  Inclusive attitudes and environments are practices 
advocated in this discourse to bring about social change for people with 
intellectual disabilities. (p. 230) 
 
As noted in chapter 2, the rights based imperative to full participation poses a 
dilemma for activists for intellectually disabled people, as agency and autonomy are 
central to the exercise of rights. This dilemma is predicated on the degree to which 
care and support can be balanced with autonomy. To what extent can full autonomy 
be in the best interests of the intellectually disabled person? Do the rights to 
protection and care limit their right to autonomy? The limited rights perspective views 
the best interest of the child as a legitimate guide to drawing the line between 
autonomy and protection.  
Limited Rights 
For B2: Special needs require special provision the rights of the intellectually 
disabled person are best served through the adequate provision of specialised services 
and treatment. Inclusion in society is viewed as dangerous and filled with potential for 
abuse. Education does not have an answer for the problem of society as a whole and 
can only ensure protection and skills development at school. As such education is 
restricted to the present with little preparation for employment and community life, a 
legacy that can perhaps be linked to the notions of ongoing care and support 
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requirements (McConkey, 1998; van Rooyen, Newmark, & Le Grange, 2003). The 
child’s best interests are a salient feature of this account. It is apparent that these 
interests are best identified through professionals who know about intellectual 
disability. After school, they will still face an uncaring community and further 
protective institutions will be required. What is demanded here is the right to 
appropriate services.  
 
The discourse of B6: Special education keeps children safe is vociferous in its 
demand for protection from abuse of intellectually disabled children. In this sense it is 
a right to freedom from harm that is advocated for. The community is hostile and the 
rights of families and children with intellectual disability must be asserted in the face 
of this. This is not so much a right to participation (B1: Inclusion as a human right) or 
to services (B2: Special needs require special provision and B4: Excellent special 
education as a right) but a right to protection. As such it is similar to (but not 
identical with) the Formal-Rights discourse noted by Quibell (2005) as a discourse 
that  “emphasises fixing problems of discrimination and exclusion through the 
enforcement of the formal legal rights of individuals with intellectual disabilities” (p. 
230).  It is here that the harsh realities of intellectual disability in everyday life, 
especially in situations of poverty is brought to light in educational discourse. These 
harsh conditions relate to poverty and unemployment (Emerson, 2007; Erevelles, 
2002; McKenzie, 2007), physical, sexual and emotional abuse (Groce & Trasi, 2004; 
McConkey & Smyth, 2003) and general exclusion from participation in community 
life. In this configuration, the community is seen as a hostile place that, far from being  
a resource for overcoming barriers to learning as suggested by Education White Paper 
6 (Department of Education, 2001), is a danger from which intellectually disabled 
people need to be protected.  
 
These protective, special education discourses are largely absent from inclusive 
education policy debate. This is expressed in one particular comment from a 
participant loading onto B6: Special education keeps children safe: “To my side, I 
don't agree when we go to meetings and they say that we must be in inclusive 
education. It depends on these children and how you feel yourself. I for one do not 
want him there because he has not got care there. It can work if they have a disabled 
in the class from before - not just started now. They are not going to write and read 
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like others. Even I cannot understand him. If he wants to go to the toilet with 40 
learners in the classroom, how will he communicate” (Q-study B, comment, P8). 
The frustration with the advocacy for inclusion and the harsh realities of a regular 
classroom are evident. How can this discourse be understood? It constitutes a 
discourse that is directly at odds with and in fact resists an inclusive education and 
training system. This stubborn resistance is construed in a certain way within 
Education White Paper 6. Van Rooyen, Newark and Le Grange (2003) note that 
within a systems discourse of Education White Paper 6, parents are constructed as 
“those who need to be persuaded not to keep disabled children in ‘dark bedrooms and 
sheds’” (p. 175) and who constitute  barriers to learning in themselves through their 
lack of recognition and involvement with their children. They are a problem to be 
dealt with through the application of information and advocacy campaigns: “The 
home here is constituted as a place of isolation and imprisonment, not of possible 
learning. Parents are constructed as imprisoners, unwilling to see their wrong: they 
need to be convinced. They are constructed as stubborn” (van Rooyen, et al., 2003, p. 
176). 
 
As such, a care and protection discourse is relegated to the margins as well as the 
voices of parents who feel that their children will not receive the resources, care and 
protection that they require in a regular school. Parents are often viewed as 
“overprotective” by professionals in their attempt to balance care and protection with 
exposure to learning and social experiences (McConkey & Smyth, 2003). Given the 
construction of parents noted above, there is no basis for dialogue around the 
concerns that prevent parents from embracing inclusion. These issues are quite clear 
from the discourse of B6: Special education keeps children safe and concern large 
class sizes, inadequate resources, untrained teachers and most significantly a deep 
concern for the safety and happiness of their children.  These concerns are neglected 
and the “problem of parents” is addressed rather by giving information to ignorant, 
stubborn parents (van Rooyen, et al., 2003).  
 
A different view emerges if one listens to the stories told by parents with regard to 
their experiences of accessing education for their children. Gara (2007) describes the 
burden of mothering a disabled child in settings of poverty. The lack of support that 
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these mothers experience from the family and the community engenders a protective 
reaction: 
Nozuko seemed to be frustrated about her child who was abused by other 
children in her neighbourhood. She related how difficult it was for a child to 
tolerate teasing by other children. She emphasised how emotionally demanding 
it was to fight for her child: 
“Pumezo used to cry when playing with others, I became so 
worried because they are taking the chance of his disability. 
(Raising her voice) You must love your baby; you must 
protect him from being abused by others.” (Nozuko, 
17.07.2006). (Gara, 2007, p. 37) 
 
Similarly, McKenzie and Loebenstein (2006) describe the difficulties that parents 
experience in gaining admission for their disabled child into the mainstream where 
the policy implications of Education White Paper 6 have not yet become a reality. The 
extra effort required by parents to maintain their disabled child in a regular school is 
noted in a South African context, indicating that it takes time to develop partnerships 
(Engelbrecht, Oswald, Swart, Kitching, & Eloff, 2005). In the absence of such 
partnerships and the support required to develop and maintain them, the special 
school is constructed as a haven of safety in the discourse of B6: Special education 
keeps children safe.  
 
The rights of the intellectually disabled person coalesce around two poles – that of 
autonomy and agency at one end, and that of protection and care at other. The human 
rights perspective is located on the autonomy end of the spectrum and the limited 
rights fall closer to the protection and care pole. Alternative understandings of the 
balance between autonomy and care can be found in the discourses of A4.1: 
Interactive discourse and A4.4: Community/religious discourse.  These discourses 
have implications for the location of the intellectually disabled person within the 
community and the family, drawing on community resources.  
Family and Community 
To understand the significance of an interactive understanding of intellectual 
disability, I draw on feminist disability studies, specifically as regards the ethics of 
care. This line of research arose from critiques of feminist research examining carers 
and ‘dependents’ in situations where people have to rely on families in order to 
complete their daily tasks.  Morris (2001) noted that a distinction was made between 
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two groups of women, the carers and their dependents, and that the latter were made 
invisible. They were not included in a feminist analysis of women’s experiences. The 
person who was cared for was classed as having needs and carers met these needs. In 
this configuration need became a property of the disabled person. Thus, feminist 
theorising of care focused on the naturalisation of care as women’s work, thereby 
leading to exploitation of women.  
 
The social model of disability, in contrast to feminist research, minimises individual 
needs and the private space, emphasising the independence of the disabled person 
once barriers have been removed. Within this frame care is seen to be disempowering, 
casting the disabled person in a passive dependent role and as a burden to the carer 
who is seen as brave and self-sacrificing (Watson, McKie, Hughes, Hopkins, & 
Gregory, 2004). Neither of these perspectives account for scenarios of ongoing care, 
such as arise in the case of intellectually disabled people, particularly those who live 
in conditions containing multiple and diverse barriers. 
 
Morris (2001) argues for a new ethic that allows for the acknowledgment of the equal 
human value of the carer and the dependent.  The tension between independence and 
needing help has broadened the feminist ethics of care and has led to the exploration 
of interdependence. This explores the ways in which we depend on each other 
through processes of reciprocity and assumes that there is always value in relationship 
no matter how one-sided it might look on first consideration (Rohrer, 2005).   
 
The interactive discourse of A4.1 poses an avenue for exploration of the caring 
relationship.  It was noted as being a non-professional discourse that was associated 
with intellectually disabled adults. It places the intellectually disabled person in 
ongoing interaction with others, requiring and contributing more or less support in 
different situations.  Competence is not an individual property but is distributed 
between individuals depending on the context. In this perspective care is not 
something that is required all the time and in all situations. The need for care or 
support fluctuates as it does for all human beings regardless of disability, but forms of 
support might differ.  
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As such interdependence is valued more highly than independence and constitutes a 
process in which giving and taking care becomes an unexceptional part of daily life:  
The relational qualities of interdependency draw attention to the mutual needs 
embodied in caring activities and caring responsibilities. ….it [is] likely that all 
people will need help, support and care of different kinds at different points of 
the lifecourse. (Watson, et al., 2004, p. 345) 
 
In this account of interdependency both carer and cared for are visible in flexible, 
mutual relationships in which the practice of care shifts over time and across 
situations. Care is no longer a burden but rather a social relationship. The notion of 
human rights is less significant for this understanding than that of human relationships 
with a fluid understanding of competence as constructed in relationship.  
 
My examination of educational discourse suggests that the inclusive education 
discourse of B1: Inclusion as a human right is most closely related to a fluid 
understanding of competence. The principle of curriculum adaptation creates 
possibilities for finding contexts where competence can be displayed. However, I 
would suggest that the interactive discourse of A4.1 goes further than B1: Inclusion 
as a human right in suggesting that the impairment itself is amenable to social 
interaction. This will be discussed further in the section on the construction of 
impairment.  
 
Unlike the interactive discourse, the community/religious discourse of A4.4 locates 
the impairment/need within the individual but the incompetence that results from 
impairment is not seen as an impediment to social inclusion. It only becomes a barrier 
to inclusion where the community itself is incompetent in dealing with disability. The 
intellectually disabled person can fill a number of societal roles but this will not be in 
the same way as normal people. It can only be achieved within the constraints of 
organic deficit.  
 
It is interesting to note that the participants that load onto this factor in the 
professional and parent Q-studies are all black. Without labouring the point beyond 
what it can bear, it offers a basis for reflection on different senses of community 
between racial groups in South Africa. Caring is figured as a community obligation. 
Interdependence exists because the community is made up of its members and will 
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only be in a state of health where it can cater for these members. The strong emphasis 
on community responsibility evokes the concept of ubuntu, as expressed in “an 
African proverb ‘Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu’ meaning ‘a person is a person through 
other persons. (Shutte, 1993, cited in Lorenzo, 2003, p.760)  
 
Values of the community as a whole mean that the person who is different, because 
they are less competent in particular domains, does not forfeit his or her place in the 
community. With this strong sense of belonging, there is minimal requirement for 
individual competence or autonomy. At the same time, the community needs to be 
educated, to be made aware and to develop its competence in dealing with intellectual 
disability.  
 
Lorenzo (2003) highlights the operation of concepts of ubuntu in a group of disabled 
women in the Western Cape: 
Practitioners working in the disability ﬁeld need to re -examine the goal of 
independence in rehabilitation process in the light of the philosophy and values 
of Ubuntu, which seeks to cultivate a spirit of interdependence based on an 
improved self-image. It is this interdependence in meeting physical, emotional 
and spiritual needs as a means of human development that the women have 
spoken of so strongly as the foundation to social and economic development. (p. 
774) 
This scepticism of goals of independence (that are so central to the human rights as 
autonomy discourse) directs attention toward community and group processes. The 
adoption of a community competence or ubuntu aligned discourse lays an emphasis 
on interdependence and the holistic incorporation of the individual into the collective. 
Individual competence is important insofar as it builds community. 
 
A connection of the community discourse to education could also be made through 
further examination of B3 -  (the polar opposite to B3: Inclusive education is a dream 
of the future and a discourse that emphasises the impact of poverty and community on 
educational provision) that I have left under-described due to my reservations about 
its validity. If it could be shown to be valid, it would present intriguing possibilities 
for a community understanding of disability that integrates issues of poverty with 
those of disability. The problem of intellectual disability would thereby be 
reconfigured as a social problem amenable to political action aimed at eradicating 
poverty.  
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The Construction of Impairment and Disability 
I have noted in chapter 2 that the social model account of an impairment/disability 
binary is problematic in that impairment is under-theorised and becomes a problem to 
be addressed through positivist medico-psychological knowledge. The existence of 
impairment as a fixed organic entity is evident in all but one discourse (A4.1: 
Interactive discourse) of representation but the extent of its effects on resulting 
disability varies considerably across discourses.  
 
The human rights discourses of A4.2: Social model/human rights discourse and B1: 
Inclusion as a human right  emphasise social processes as constructive of disability. 
Impairment is fixed but disability is dynamic within social contexts. It appears that 
the impairment is an organic entity, which has the possibility of restricting function. 
Impairment is delinked from possibilities of autonomy and agency, which remain the 
concern of disablement in society. The social model in this respect does not draw a 
line as to where improvement is no longer possible by virtue of organic deficit.  As 
such the monolithic nature of impairment begins to crumble ever so slightly. 
Disability is created by lack of opportunity and stigmatising practices. The 
educational practices within a human rights agenda minimise the relevance of 
impairment and reject practices of differentiation on the basis of impairment (i.e. 
severity). The problem of education of the intellectually disabled person is located 
within the curriculum and the educational system as a whole. Educational failure is 
reconfigured as a consequence of barriers that restrict access and participation. The 
rationale for education is full participation and human rights in society. This overtly 
individualistic view of human rights as belonging to the individual rather than the 
community might clash with more community orientated perspectives, such as that of 
ubuntu discussed in the community discourse.  
 
The protective/religious/medical discourses of A4.3: Medical model/religious 
discourse, B2: Special needs require special provision, B4: Excellent special 
education as a right and B6: Special education keeps children safe verge on 
biologically determinist accounts that attribute the social condition of disability to the 
severity of impairment. Disability remains a static entity that requires special 
intervention rather than social change. The educational discourse of B5: Effective 
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education must be tailored to the child’s needs figures impairment as a static entity 
that can be obscured or exacerbated by community and family conditions. It can also 
have differential effects depending on severity. 
 
As noted above, impairment falls under the medico-psychological gaze. In this light 
impairment/disease inhabits and is completely bounded by the individual body: “For 
us, the human body defines, by natural right, the space of origin and of distribution of 
disease” (Foucault, 1963/2003, p. 1). Impairment is an individual issue. The 
interactive discourse of A4.1 presents an alternative to these views of impairment that 
is worth exploring further.  
 
The discourse of A4.1: Interactive discourse rejects the need to address impairment as 
a prerequisite for a normal life. It focuses rather on support and the distributed 
competence of people in communities who rely on each other in living together. 
Impairment is not a pre-existing object of knowledge but rather a dimension of the 
range of diversity that shapes, and is shaped by, social interaction. Competence can be 
developed in social interaction and the limits of organic impairment are not fixed nor 
do they constrain the ultimate outcomes. Competence is a continuously developing 
attribute that opens new horizons for participation, and develops through social 
inclusion. Autonomy is not valued highly as competence is a work in progress, and 
complete autonomy is unlikely to be achieved by any one regardless of whether they 
are disabled or not. For an interactive discourse, difference is a plastic property that 
changes with societal interaction as well as individual effort. The difference 
(impairment) itself is relatively fluid depending on the context. 
 
Subjectivity 
As noted in chapter 2, the individual is made governable through processes of 
differentiation under the medical gaze and the application of the norm. The question 
then arises as to what forms of subjectivity for intellectually disabled people are 
constructed in the discourses of the current study. In my discussion on subjectivity I 
note that this is in itself a contested term that is debated and theorised in multiple 
ways in the literature. For the purposes of this discussion, I view subjectivity as “that 
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which ties the individual to himself [sic] and submits him to others in this way” 
(Foucault, 1982, p. 781).  
 
The medicalised discourse of A4.3: Medical model/religious discourse with its 
religious overtones constructs a highly restricted subjectivity as an object of 
disciplinary and pastoral power. This is reflected in educational practices (B2: Special 
needs require special provision, B4: Excellent special education as a right, B5; 
Effective education must be tailored to the child’s needs and B6: Special education 
keeps children safe) that place organic deficit at the centre of concern. The operation 
of an individualising technology that identifies impairment and the ranking of the 
individual within the grading systems of intelligence tests, educational tests and so 
forth allows for the exercise of a bio-power that has an anatamo-political application 
and enables a statistical comparison with the population. The lack of normality is a 
taken-for-granted fact, a problem within certain individuals that defines them totally. 
The intellectually disabled person is wholly and entirely encompassed by the 
disability, and the only dimension of diversity within the category is between levels of 
severity. In this sense disciplinary technologies have been effective in rendering the 
individual entirely visible and calculable. There is nothing there but what has been 
revealed through reference to the norm. Within this, there is a cross-referencing of 
incompetence with vulnerability – having rendered intellectually disabled people 
outside of the norm, it is now ethical and humane to protect them, not only from 
others, but also from themselves in their own best interests. The moral force of this 
imperative draws on a Christian ethic of love and charity. 
 
The human rights discourse described above resists this total subjection and makes a 
claim for autonomy and self-representation as ways to reduce vulnerability and 
therefore to reduce the need for protection. The discourses of A4.2: Social 
model/human rights discourse and B1: Inclusion as a human right resist disciplinary 
power and construct a rational, individual and autonomous subjectivity (see chapter 
2). Educational practice is directed at the development of autonomy within the 
individual, regardless of severity of impairment. However, as Erevelles (2002) argues, 
it is precisely this humanist subject that constitutes the intellectually disabled person 
as the irrational other. Resistance is framed in those terms that create otherness in the 
first place such that “the very ideologies that masqueraded as the salvation of these 
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individuals were instrumental in relocating them to the very margins from which they 
had sought to escape” (Erevelles, 2005, p. 61). She warns, though, against a 
discursive theory of subjectivity that fails to address the dismal life circumstances, 
poverty and abuse that many disabled people have to endure.  
 
Within account A4.1: Interactive discourse disabled subjectivity is loosely 
constructed as an ongoing project and part of the fabric of a larger process of attaining 
competence and social inclusion within a community. The factors that load onto this 
second order factor are A1.1: A competent person, A1.4: An (ir)responsible person 
and A2.5: A person to be understood by the community. These factors have in 
common the acceptance of the right to community participation in a range of contexts. 
The consideration of impairment refers rather to the degree of support required than 
the degree of exclusion deemed necessary. In this sense multiple axes of identity are 
possible within community contexts that offer support. At the same time there is 
recognition that these contexts are not readily available to the intellectually disabled 
person.  There is no evidence of an educational discourse aligned with this 
perspective.  
 
While I have explored the processes of subjectification in the above discourses, 
Foucault (1982) reminds us that the process does not only involve being subject to but 
also the subject of government. Government is truly effective only to the extent that 
the individual becomes self-governing. Power is exercised as an action upon an 
action, a productive power that generates ways in which people conduct themselves. 
Thus the question that must be asked is not only about external processes 
(subjectification) but also about the subject’s work on him or herself to become a 
governable subject (subjectivisation) (Hook, 2007). It is at the point of 
subjectivisation  that the current study must come to an end. This is because in Q-
study A1 participants were asked to rank statements about people with intellectual 
disability in general, rather than rank their own views about themselves. While one 
might make the assumption that they would use their own experience as a starting 
point, extending this to talking about subjectivisation would be problematic.  
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I have examined the interactions of representational and educational 
discourses of intellectual disability with respect to their knowledge, power and 
subjectifying effects. I have argued that the pressure for exclusion in education is 
exacerbated through disciplinary power that judges relative to the norm, and allocates 
individuals to their places in the system. The exercise of this power as a force for 
inclusion through the medico-psychological gaze and the deployment of disability 
expertise is problematic for this reason. The construction of disability expertise as a 
scarce, but essential resource, pervades the education system requiring elaborate 
mechanisms to ensure access in broader settings. This acts as an impediment to 
inclusive education which then becomes a problem of allocation of resources and 
shifting expertise from one setting to another (Slee, 2001).  
 
The religious and charity discourse has implications for education both in its form (as 
a Christian duty) and its content (the construction of the Christian subject). Resistance 
to the discourses of care and protection is to be found in a human rights discourse. 
This discourse, it is noted, runs the  risk of silencing the marginalised voice of parents 
as afraid for the safety of their children in poorly resourced and unprepared schools. 
The tension between autonomy and care is at the root of advocacy practices and 
interactive and community discourses offer new ways of looking at how this tension 
can be resolved through consideration of interdependence at personal relations and 
community levels.  
 
Fundamental to the construction of intellectual disability is the way that impairment is 
understood. For the most part, it is viewed as a static entity and this inscribes 
limitations on intellectually disabled subjects. The human rights and interactive 
discourses begin to erode the static nature of impairment, shifting attention to 
“becoming” rather than “being”. The intellectually disabled subject in this 
configuration is not fixed but in process. The nature of this process is obscured by the 
limited exploration of the  subjectivisation of the intellectually disabled person,  and 
possible ways of theorising and researching impairment and subjectivity constitute a 
concern in the final chapter of this dissertation.  
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND 
FURTHER DIRECTIONS 
My motivation for working in the field of inclusive education theory and practice was 
at the outset one of an activist. Inclusive education lent a human rights support base to 
the fight against exclusion of disabled people from schooling and, more broadly, from 
society. As my engagement in the field continued, I became aware of the 
extraordinary resistance to inclusive education, the resilience of special education 
practice and the shifting of special educational strategies into mainstream settings 
under the guise of inclusion. My initial response was to look to the social model as a 
paradigm shift that would underpin real educational change (Naicker, 1999). The 
efforts of activists and parents, I reasoned, should focus on ensuring that a social 
understanding of disability as distinct from biological impairment enters into 
educational discourse. I undertook the current study with a view to establishing the 
extent to which this was happening and how it could be facilitated. My enthusiasm for 
the social model is evidenced in the high factor loadings my Q-sort had on human 
rights discourses of A4.2: Social model/human rights discourse and B1: Inclusion as a 
human right. However, my engagement with the social model of disability through a 
post-structuralist lens destabilised my conception of the notion of impairment as 
unproblematic lack of the body. I was led to question the uncritical adoption of a 
human rights perspective for intellectual disability and a different journey was started.   
 
In this final chapter, I shall present a review of the main findings of this study. These 
relate to a) the medico-psychological gaze and disability expertise, b) human rights 
and c) religious perspectives on disability. On the basis of these findings, I present my 
central argument for a theory of (poss)ability, a neologism that I have found useful in 
expressing the fluidity and interactional nature of disability emerging from this study. 
I shall then look critically at the use of Q-methodology in this study, noting especially 
its application with intellectually disabled people and its use as a discourse analytic 
tool. Before making my final conclusion, I shall make some suggestions for possible 
future research directions 
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The Medico-psychological Gaze and Disability Expertise 
In the current study, the overwhelming truth discourse about intellectual disability is 
that of an individual organic defect, subject to diagnosis by the medico-psychological 
authority that is responsible for overseeing the application of disability expertise in 
educational settings. In the best interests of those classified as intellectually disabled, 
exclusion is rationally and ethically allocated on the basis of differentiating the level 
of competence or the severity of the disability of the individual.  
 
I have argued that intellectual disability in education falls within the domain of a 
medico-psychological gaze that employs multiple agents with varying levels of 
authority in addressing either the organic impairment or the effects of disability. The 
medical, therapeutic and psychological professions diagnose the inherent lack within 
the individual (intellectual impairment), relative to the norm of the average 
intelligence and behaviour that is deemed necessary for participation in regular 
classrooms. This class of professionals pronounces on the limit of possibility through 
techniques of assessment, diagnosis and prognosis. 
 
The diagnosis of intellectual impairment mobilises the need for disability expertise, 
which, as has been noted in chapter 8, is a scarce resource requiring delivery 
mechanisms and special placement. Disability expertise defines members of a 
category of troubling (and often troublesome) individuals who mark the limit of 
success that ordinary teaching can be expected to achieve. Beyond this point lies 
organic impairment, the endpoint that frustrated Itard’s attempts to teach Victor, the 
Wild Boy of Aveyron. The impairment, outside of normal diversity and within the 
domain of the abnormal, can be addressed through the application of professional 
knowledge applied in the spirit of the caring, compassion and religious values. The 
professional becomes the guide for the disabled person in an exercise of Christian 
pastoral power that is authorised by reference to medico-psychological authority.  
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Understandings of Human Rights 
In this study there have been three types of claims to human rights for intellectually 
disabled people. The first one is a right to full participation and autonomy as 
evidenced in social model discourses of A4.2: Social model/human rights discourse 
and B1: Inclusion as a human right. Secondly, there is a right to appropriate 
education in B2: Special needs require special provision, B4: Excellent special 
education as a right and B5: Effective education must be tailored to the child’s needs. 
Thirdly, B6: Special education keeps children safe demands the right to protection 
from harm. The first claim to rights is squarely situated within a disability rights 
movement understanding of the social model of disability and has been discussed at 
some length in chapter 2. However, this understanding of rights has been enhanced in 
this study with the visibility of second and third claims to services (appropriate 
education) and protection from abuse, respectively.  
 
Young and Quibell (2000) distinguish between positive rights and negative rights. 
Positive rights refer to the special treatment required to gain equality and specify what 
should be given in fairness to create equality. In this case claims are made to special 
educational provision. Negative rights refer to an equality of treatment and specify 
what cannot be done to a person. In terms of the current study this would be the basis 
of claims to protection from abuse. Young and Quibell (2000) note that both forms of 
claims have been unsuccessful in making significant gains for intellectually disabled 
people. They suggest that part of the reason for this is that negative rights on their 
own cannot offer protection before the abusive act, only redress afterwards. 
Ultimately they argue that the notion of rights is based on an atomistic individuality 
that uses rights as a form of protection against each other. As noted in chapter 8, the 
intellectually disabled person is viewed as irrational and is disadvantaged since 
“rights cannot be used to empower people whose very participation in a legal 
framework renders them powerless” (p. 753). They require others to stand up on their 
behalf and this undermines the project of human rights at the outset, as one of 
individual autonomy.   
 
What then do we make of rights for intellectually disabled people, particularly with 
regard to education? Young and Quibell (2000) advocate for a process of 
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understanding each other through listening to the stories of “becoming” of 
intellectually disabled people. The project is to build relations rather than rights, 
common interests rather than competing ones, and understanding rather than 
Otherness (understood in this context as the exclusion of a subordinate group as 
distinct from one’s own group and thereby defining what one is not). This is not to 
say that we can afford to abandon the project of human rights for intellectually 
disabled people but that we need to be critical in the application. Firstly, we need to 
acknowledge that the universal subject of human rights marginalises the intellectually 
disabled subject as irrational and incompetent. Secondly, we need to be very aware of 
who is speaking on behalf of intellectually disabled people and be critical of the 
notion of “their best interests”. Thirdly, it is important to acknowledge that unless 
rights are accompanied by an understanding of those to whom these rights belong 
they are unlikely to be helpful (Young & Quibell, 2000).  
 
The rights of intellectually disabled people should be framed within an ethics of care 
as argued for by feminist disability scholars, discussed in chapter 8. This ethic is 
founded on an acknowledgement of interdependent relationships, as opposed to the 
rigid distinction between carer and dependent.  For example, in the accounts of 
disability as a blessing (A2.6: A blessing and a gift from God.), adopted by some 
parents, the contribution of the intellectually disabled person is readily acknowledged 
by parents as a spiritual gift. This erodes the notion of the giver and the recipient and 
acknowledges that interdependence is constructed in many ways, not all of which 
have to do with competence and the rational self.  
 
The strong appeal to the negative right of protection from abuse that is evident in this 
study in discourses of care and protection limits the agency and autonomy of 
intellectually disabled people. This strategy, for which McConkey and Smyth (2003) 
use the term “danger-avoidance” (p. 27), fixes competence at a certain level in the 
interests of safety. The vulnerable person is protected and removed from or not 
exposed to those situations where harm could conceivably arise. McConkey and 
Smyth (2003) note that this restricts the autonomy of the individual. They argue that 
the development of competence in different contexts, each with their associated risks, 
be considered as an interaction between the individual, the context, the collaboration 
with others and the likelihood of harm. In this way competence is viewed as an 
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interactive performance, not merely an inherent property of the individual that calls 
for protection on the basis of human rights.  
 
At the same time, rights are not sufficient to protect intellectually disabled people 
from a hostile community. The concept of ubuntu can be drawn on as a protective 
mechanism. In this view, communities are bound to embrace all who belong within 
them and to accommodate difference through support. This constitutes a search for 
competent communities that enable their members to contribute and to gain support, 
rather than focusing on incompetent individuals. Indeed, as Otto (1999) points out, an 
uncritical adoption of rights discourse can be dangerous.  
Religious Perspectives on Disability 
In chapter 8, I noted the importance of religion in understanding intellectual disability 
in the current study. This significance extends to an understanding of intellectual 
disability in the professional arena and I contend that it is present in the exercise of 
disability expertise. This expertise is easily aligned with a representation of 
intellectually disabled people, within a religious frame, as vulnerable due to their 
organic deficit (requiring care and protection).  This is evidenced in A4.3: Medical 
model/religious discourse. A convergence of old (Christian) and new (disciplinary) 
forms of pastoral power (Foucault, 1979) places the special educator as the leader of 
the flock, an intermediary of the superior power of the medico-psychological 
complex, imbued with the moral force of Christian compassion. The implication of 
such an alliance is that the child’s best interests, as formulated by the disability 
professionals, become intertwined with religious concepts of redemption and sin. 
Resistance to the dictates of a medical authority become imbued with a moral 
waywardness. On the other hand, compliance offers the chance of salvation and moral 
improvement.   
 
Parents draw on religious ethics, as evidenced in the accounts of Q-study A2, both as 
an explanation of the cause of disability and a means of coping with it. It was noted 
that this has either positive (a blessing) or negative (a burden) connotations in 
different accounts. The fact that it is only parents that draw on the notion of a blessing 
is worth exploring further, noting that the experience of parents is generally conceived 
of as a negative one (Stainton & Besser, 1998).  
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The above findings have highlighted the ways in which a notion of impairment as a 
fixed property of an individual underpins educational practice. I propose, therefore, a 
more fluid and dynamic understanding of disability, not as inability, but rather as 
(poss)ability. I shall elaborate on this concept below. 
A Theory of (Poss)ability 
In my examination of discourses of representation and education of intellectually 
disabled people, in all except one discourse (A4.1: Interactive discourse) the fixed 
and static nature of impairment underpinned practices of exclusion and imposed a 
limit on the possibilities open to those classified as “having” impairment. On this 
basis, I concur with Goodley and Roets (2008) that as long as impairment is regarded 
as static or fixed it is “open for power takeovers and always at risk of co-, or multiple 
forms of, morbidity. Disabled people can get disciplined, at any point, by expert 
professionals and their constitutive regimes of ultimate truth and bio-power at play” 
(p. 245). A view of impairment as static has had dire consequences for educational 
practice, restricting opportunity and circumscribing a disabled subjectivity that is 
dependent and vulnerable, and which poses a burden of care on families and 
communities.  Within educational theory, impairment (because of its intractability) 
has fallen largely outside the scope of socially just pedagogies resulting in ever new 
forms of division to deal with a fixed class of impaired individuals (Goodley & Roets, 
2008).  What then are alternative ways of viewing impairment? 
 
In my examination of discourses drawn upon by the intellectually disabled adults in 
this study, I was struck by the irrelevance of impairment to these accounts. It was a 
vague concept, often not even labelled and with a shifting distinction between 
impairment of the mind or the body. Very few (six out of 22 participants) identified 
themselves as having an intellectual disability despite being ongoing recipients of 
services directed at intellectually disabled people. What seemed to be more important 
is what can be done in what contexts, as embodied in the interactive discourse of 
A4.1.  This raises questions as to the static nature of disability and the limitation that 
organic impairment imposes. Competence arises within interaction and organic 
impairment is but one part of a complex array of social meanings that are constructed 
through discursive and social practices. This is not to deny (or to uncritically accept) 
physical realities of impairment but rather to recognise that impairment is always and 
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already saturated with meaning and constructive social practices.  How then can such 
an understanding be expanded within a critical disability studies framework? 
 
Goodley (2007) finds the work of Deleuze and Guattari useful in rethinking 
impairment. He argues that their concept of the rhizome, as a non-hierarchical 
network of be-coming rather than of being, can be applied to the notion of a learner 
who is not fixed in the certainty of impairment but rather in the process of becoming 
and changing without an endpoint in sight. The binaries between disability and 
impairment, between able and disabled, are dissolved in the recognition of multiple 
possible relations (Goodley & Roets, 2008). In this view impairment is not conceived 
of as lack but rather as productive, “constraining and enabling possibilities” (p. 246) 
in an ongoing process of becoming.  I would term this a concern with possibility 
rather than disability and I therefore suggest the neologism (poss)ability to describe a 
fluid conception of  impairment and its proposed concomitant educational practices.  
 
Such a theory entails recognising impairment as a dimension of subjectivity, such as 
gender, race or sexual orientation, that relates specifically to support and care 
requirements for achieving competence and social participation. Impairment becomes 
not an imposition of defect from outside but an integral part of identity that assumes 
positive or negative value with regard to the way in which it is situated within social 
practice. It can be stigmatised, as it is currently, or it can be part of a positive identity. 
It can be included in the daily range of social activity as a feature of diversity that 
calls upon communities to initiate support practices or it can continue to be relegated 
to the dark corners and exclusion as the Other, where the solid line of impairment is 
drawn between the normal and the abnormal.  
 
What would a theory of (poss)ability mean for educational practice? It would align 
with what Kliewer et al.(2006) describe as a moral journey that begins with inclusion 
into contexts where “valued membership and the presumption of citizenship are to be 
found” (p. 187). It is the recognition of belonging and social inclusion that renders 
impairment a dynamic entity in continual interplay with enabling or disabling 
environments. Within this frame, and drawing on the theoretical framework outlined 
in this thesis, specific projects can be identified.  
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Firstly, intellectual disability would become a dimension of diversity to be dealt with 
in regular teaching practice, rather than one that requires the application of a specific 
form of disability expertise. The importance of a familiarity with disability is noted as 
an element of disability expertise and this could be made readily available to regular 
schools and teachers. Similarly, there is no reason why love, compassion and 
understanding should not be found in all schools. An ethics of care that recognises 
multiple ways of contributing to the classroom community and reciprocity of 
relationships moves away from the construction of the perpetually needy “special 
needs child” who is a drain on the resources allocated to more able children. It opens 
up the potential for recognising and encouraging positive contributions to the learning 
environment that are not confined to a narrow academic competence but also embrace 
lessons of learning to live together.  
 
 Secondly, the educational interaction would be closely aligned with practices of 
support that construct competence in varying contexts. In this respect, competence is 
not seen as a property of the individual but a construction of contexts and participants 
– competence is both contextual and distributed across social actors (Biklen, 2000). 
Thus the focus shifts from the inherent limitations of the individual to a continuous 
search for enabling contexts. As Asch (2001) notes: 
Instead of discussing which kinds of people have impairments or disabilities 
and which people do not, instead of saying that some members of society are 
disabled and others are not, we should consider which people cannot perform 
which activities in given environments and question how to modify the 
environments so that they are not disabling. (p. 5) 
 
This would require an educational practice of seeking contexts for competence in 
terms of the types and varieties of activities, the supports required and the 
relationships called upon. Thus it is not individual incompetence that is the focus of 
teaching, but rather the context and the relationships that facilitate competence.  
 
Thirdly, a theory of (poss)ability has implications for curriculum. The static view of 
impairment plays itself out in the curriculum with life skills and functional skills 
taking precedence over literacy. However, Kliewer et al.(2006) argue that the 
continuing non-recognition of the ability for literacy amongst those classified as 
intellectually disabled speaks to a political rather than a scientific project. Illiteracy 
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becomes part of the condition of intellectual disability and there is no attempt to 
overcome disability, since it is seen as “something static, something beheld from afar, 
not complex, not shifting in meaning” (Biklen cited in Kliewer, et al., 2006, p. 175). 
They cite numerous instances of individuals who have made a journey from illiterate 
non-citizenship to literary participation, indicating that (poss)ability  exists where 
previously only (dis/in)ability was seen.  Similarly, education for a wide range of 
community participation does not occur due to the restricted expectations built on a 
static understanding of impairment. One example from this study is the uneasiness 
that surrounds sexuality education that would presume a sexually active adulthood for 
intellectually disabled people. An educational theory of (poss)ability is just that – one 
of possibility not one of assumptions of limitation based on fixed conceptions of 
impairment. The accompanying educational practice is to build competence, both in 
individuals and in their schools and communities that enables individuals to 
participate as full citizens in society.  
 
Fourthly, the education of (poss)ability poses a challenge to the notion of diversity 
and human conduct toward others. It does not only impact on those who are labelled 
as having impairments but expands the notion of diversity for all learners who are 
then freed to explore their own subjectivity (Erevelles, 2002; Slee, 2006). Gabel 
(2002) proposes a practice that strives for an open-ended subjectivity in the pedagogic 
relationship:  
pedagogy must not conceptualize the subject .The subject should not be 
preformed as belonging to a particular race, or sexuality, or (dis)ability, or class 
prior to the pedagogical relationship. Rather, the pedagogical subjects (teacher 
and student) must emerge within inter- actions in the pedagogical community. 
(p. 181) 
 
It has long been an argument within inclusive education that it is not only those 
children classed as disabled that will benefit from inclusion, but also the “typically 
developing” child (see for example The Salamanca Statement, 1994). However, what 
has not been equally acknowledged is the way in which disciplinary measures 
ostensibly directed at children with special needs serve to regulate the entire school 
population. Deviation from the norm, as the basis of mass compulsory education, is 
subject to the medico-psychological gaze and disability expertise. The educational 
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practice that would contribute to this is a move away from differentiation and 
exclusion toward the exploration of multiple learning contexts. .  
 
Fifthly, competence can be more readily located in the community than in the 
individual. Competence is not only located in the individual but also depends on the 
extent to which the community is competent to deal with diversity in its midst. A 
theory of (poss)ability poses the question asked by Touraine (cited in (Slee, 2001, p. 
386): “Can we live together?” The educational discourse of B6: Special education 
keeps children safe assumes an incompetent community whereas the discourse,  A4.4: 
Community/religious discourse envisages a community that can deal with issues of 
support and inclusivity. The focus shifts to an exploration of whether the community 
is competent to include all its members and the support the community needs to 
provide to families and individuals in order to do so.  The educational practice that 
responds to the project of community competence is engagement with the community 
and with families and parents to facilitate contexts for competence and inclusion. The 
notion of parents as either overprotective or abusive runs counter to this aim.  
 
Ultimately the conclusion of this dissertation is that static understandings of 
intellectual disability have been constructed and perpetuated through the 
medicalisation and disciplining of difference. A project of emancipation needs to 
challenge this conception and it can be grounded in a practice of education that 
espouses (poss)ability rather than (in/dis)ability. What research would support this 
project and what methodologies can be used most effectively? I shall address this by 
first looking critically at the application of Q-methodology in the current study and 
then making suggestions as to further lines of exploration.  
 
The Application of Q-methodology 
Quibell (2005) notes that studies that utilise discourse analysis in the field of 
intellectual disability are largely lacking an empirical base and derive in the main 
from abstract theoretical sources. In her study of discourse she adopts the view that:  
research is needed to empirically identify, evidence and explore the intellectual 
disability discourses and how they are expressed in daily life.  This is 
particularly important because different discourses create intellectual disability 
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in distinctive ways, and with these constructions of personhood come unique 
possibilities for resistance and struggle. (p. 84) 
 
Thus I sought, and found in Q-method, a methodology that would capture the 
everyday flux of discourse, derived empirically from participants themselves. As 
noted in chapter 5, I worked within the discourse analysis (DA) school of Q-
methodology. I chose this method on the grounds that it exposed multiple ways of 
speaking of a complex topic (R. Stainton Rogers & Stainton Rogers, 1990) within a 
clearly delineated empirical research methodology. My reflections on the 
methodology that I utilised are highlighted below.  
Engagement of Intellectually Disabled People 
Researchers into intellectual disability have long made the plea for greater 
participation of intellectually disabled people in research, as both participants and 
researchers (Goodley, 2004; Rodgers, 1999; Walmsley, 2004). Significant 
modifications were made to this application of Q-method in order to accommodate 
this need and the benefit of so doing is clear. The accounts deployed by this group of 
participants differed from the dominant individual-social binary and introduced 
relational understandings of impairment, which were apparent in A4.1: Interactive 
discourse. Elements of resistance were also noted in the objection to low expectations 
and stereotyping in accounts A1.5: A person discriminated against and A1.6: A 
stereotyped person.  These accounts became blurred in the second order study and 
therefore did not come up for detailed analysis. This has implications for future 
research, which will be discussed below.  
 
My sense on completion is that I pushed the limit as far as it could go with Q-method 
in its use with intellectually disabled people. The language used and the ranking 
procedures were simplified to such a degree that further simplification could have 
undermined the method itself. It became apparent that even with this degree of 
simplification, the method used excluded intellectually disabled people who might not 
have had adequate communication skills but who can and should be given the chance 
to participate in research about their lives. It would be possible to use items other than 
statements (pictures for example) in order to gain participation of less literate 
intellectually disabled people. However, such an approach might render their results 
incomparable with those of others not similarly challenged. This is not a reason not to 
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explore such a possibility but it also opens up for consideration that other methods 
might be better suited to those with different communication skills.  
Factors as Discourses 
A comparison between discourses emerging in this study and those noted by Quibell 
(2005) suggests that the application of Q-method has yielded comparable results with 
her Foucauldian discourse analysis (see discussion of rights discourse in chapter 8). 
The fact that Q-methodology yields an enormous number of possible configurations 
of the factors (Stenner, et al., 2008) lends a substantial power to the method to reveal 
the unexpected. In this study the strongly religious protective orientation aligned with 
medical discourse (A4.3: Medical model/religious discourse) did not emerge from an 
abstract review of the literature alone. The notion of the child as a blessing to parents 
(A2.6: A blessing and a gift from God) and the fluid accounts of impairment (A4.1: 
Interactive discourse) also present unacknowledged ways of talking of disability and 
perhaps indicate subjugated forms of knowledge that could be further explored.  
 
As a researcher, I have found Q-method an invaluable tool for ordering data in such a 
way that the researcher has to listen to their participants. Factors are not always easy 
to interpret at first glance and may seem to contradict one another. If one then 
examines the configuration in depth and relates this to participant comments, a new 
perspective that was not within the researcher’s previous understanding can emerge. 
For example in account A2.1A: A vulnerable person, the vulnerability and the 
capability of the intellectually disabled person are highlighted. This was difficult to 
understand as they seemed in contrast to each other. The review of comments, though, 
highlighted the mediation role of the family to the community and structured this as 
the crucial element that protected or exposed the intellectually disabled person to 
abuse.   
 
I distinguished between accounts in Q-studies A1, A2 and A3 and discourses in Q-
study A4 and Q-study B. This was largely in an attempt to enable diverse voices to be 
heard (in the accounts) but at the same time to reduce the data for discussion and to 
look for significant commonalities in the discourses. This is a distinction that can be 
further explored in Q-method and comparisons of the method with other forms of 
discourse analysis would be a useful methodological exercise. It can be noted that Q-
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study B combines two groups of participants in one Q-study and identifies discourses 
rather than accounts. The data from Q-study B could quite easily be analysed as for 
Q-study A in two steps, that is two Q-studies, one for parents and one for 
professionals. This could then be compared to the combined study presented in this 
dissertation.  
Additional Issues Relating to the Application of Q-method 
I have noted the limitations of the method with respect to intellectually disabled 
people. These could be overcome to some extent through the development of a Q-set 
and Q-study specifically addressed to their perceived needs. As regards other 
participants, I gained a real sense that the perspectives that they drew on were being 
adequately represented in the factor analysis and resulting discourses. The use of 
additional information such as comments and responses to overall questions was 
tricky to incorporate, as a different order of data from the Q-study outputs, but useful 
in aiding interpretation. Kitzinger (1985) recommended the interviewing of 
participants in the study as an adjunct to the Q-sorting process. Referring back to 
participants is also suggested as a means of validation of the authenticity of the 
factors identified (Curt, 1994).  
 
I believe that the qualitative data from participants and the quantitative data of the Q-
study need to be related to each other in principled ways that depend on the 
researcher’s understanding of discourse. If discourse is understood to be descriptive 
of a certain point of view, then the connection to participants is very important. Who 
are they and why do they adopt this view? If, on the other hand, discourse is seen as 
constructive of subjectivity, then it is the effects of discourse rather than the possessor 
of any one discourse that is of interest. In my view Q-method provided an effective 
tool for empirically identifying available discourses on education of intellectually 
disabled people in the East London education district of Buffalo City. These are not 
the property of individuals but rather delineate the conditions of possibility that 
constrain and construct possible ways of understanding intellectual disability. 
However, I have noted in this study where certain groups of people, for example 
parents belonging to the Down Syndrome Association Amathole (DSAA) or black 
parents, load onto particular factors. Rather than interpreting this as a view that 
belongs to this particular group, I would see these discourses/accounts as deployed in 
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particular constraining and enabling micro- and macro-level contexts. Thus a parent 
support group environment such as DSAA might enable an inclusive type discourse 
as opposed to a context of a special school that makes professionalised discourses 
possible.  
Future Directions 
The research carried out in this dissertation has raised questions about the concept of 
intellectual impairment that can be pursued in further research. These areas are a) 
resistance, b) subjectivisation and c) educational policy and practice. 
Resistance 
The truth that special education poses, imbued with a normalising intent, is that the 
intellectually disabled person is not only fundamentally and irrevocably different 
from others, but also that this is a negatively valued difference that places conditions 
on the subjectivity that intellectually disabled people can adopt. Not for them work, 
friendships, relationships, marriage and having their own families – they are the sheep 
of the flock, who, as a long as they remain docile and obedient, will be entitled to care 
and protection. Resistance to this subject position can be dismissed with reference to 
organic deficit that causes anti-social behaviour and that justifies the application of 
restraining and punitive responses (Rapley, 2004; Yates, 2005). In the current study, 
the moral force of a Christian ethic bolsters this dismissal.  
 
Foucault (1982) argues that it is  resistance and the way that it operates that should be 
examined in order to understand the exercise of power itself. In the current study the 
form of resistance to a disciplinary power of intellectually disabled subjectivity was 
presented in terms of a human rights understanding of a social model of disability but 
intellectually disabled participants did not deploy this discourse. The critical position 
that I adopt on human rights and the absence of the voice of intellectually disabled 
people themselves from this discourse, persuades me that there is a need to explore 
social justice for intellectually disabled people in additional ways.  
 
Gabel and Peters (2004) note that the link that Foucault makes between the 
individualising and totalising effects of power suggest that resistance at the individual 
levels has implications for broader social processes.  As long as there are 
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unacknowledged sites for the practice of disciplinary power and intellectual 
impairment is taken for granted as a thing in the world (as is the case within a social 
model of human rights), then the operation of power remains obscured as a practice of 
truth. The forms of resistance of intellectually disabled people in this study were 
evidenced in accounts of discrimination and stereotyping (A1.5: A person 
discriminated against, A1.6 A stereotyped person). These are concerns with the 
negotiation of competence and the unmasking of power relations, and open up new 
opportunities for resistance that challenge a restricted subjectivity that constitutes a 
justification for forms of control. Research that examines the everyday interactions of 
power and resistance in context where intellectual disability is constructed (see for 
example, Rapley, 2004 and Yates, 2005) will be useful in this regard.  
 
Subjectivisation  
I note with Yates, Dyson and Hiles (2008) that “the ways that people understand and 
form relationships with themselves and their own conduct” (p. 256) is often neglected 
in research into intellectual disability. What would such an investigation look like? As 
I have noted previously subjectification is ineffective if it only operates and is 
maintained from outside. It is the internal processes of making of oneself a fitting 
subject, or subjectivisation, that completes the truth of the individual subject (Hook, 
2007). The data in this study is tenuous regarding subjectivisation but I would like to 
draw two points from it. Firstly, intellectually disabled people deploy dominant forms 
of discourse, except for a human rights discourse. Given that this is a dominant 
discourse in inclusive education and disability rights arenas, this omission is 
somewhat surprising and should be further examined. Secondly, the ways in which 
intellectually disabled people construct themselves as subjects in the educational 
arena is unexamined in this study (they did not complete Q-study B) and should be 
further explored. It is only then that the power effects of educational practice can be 
made visible and therefore challenged.  
 
Any examination of subjectivisation would require flexibility around communication 
capabilities and styles. Intellectually disabled subjects are often disqualified from 
speaking because they do not represent a rational autonomy, particularly if they are 
unable to communicate in immediately  recognisable ways (Erevelles, 2005). It is 
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here that the disbelief in the reflexive capacity of intellectually disabled people would 
have to be suspended to avoid a very easy slippage into constructions of 
incompetence and biological determinism that cast the intellectually disabled person 
once again outside the realm and reach of disciplinary power – a mere biological 
being. Such research would need to explore multiple processes, not all of which 
would be language based, that inscribe the subjectivity associated with incompetence 
even in its most inaccessible forms. This would be both a methodological and a 
conceptual challenge.  
 
Educational Policy and Practice 
The adoption of an inclusive education discourse can act as a legitimating device for 
the unproblematic continuation of special educational practice in new places but 
under the same supervision and with no threat to the traditional professionals. As Slee 
(2006)  notes: “Inclusive education has permitted all manner of thinking, discourse 
and activity to pass itself off as inclusive” (p.111). This is evident in the current study 
in the deployment of disability expertise under the medico-psychological authority. 
The liberatory intent and the human rights agenda of an inclusive education practice 
are vulnerable to the constant slippage back to the medico-psychological and 
disability expertise management of impairment. The concerns of an inclusive 
education based on this understanding are about technical questions of resources, 
placement and the distribution of expertise. The narrow view of human rights that it 
adopts is that of humanitarian aid to a few defective individuals and results in what 
Slee (2001) terms “reluctant schooling” (p. 381) of those at the margins, rather than 
inclusive schooling. It is for this reason that the deployment of expertise within 
inclusive education policy needs to be carefully considered and explored.  
 
Within South African educational policy, it is the solidity of impairment that provides 
the anchor for disability expertise. Van Rooyen and Le Grange (2003) note that 
within South African inclusive education policy (as evidenced in Education White 
Paper 6) “disability itself is not narrated as socially constructed … but [it] is 
constituted as medical/organic with no reflection on how these medical/organic 
differences are read” (p. 154). This is consistent with the version of the social model 
of disability (which is actively espoused within the policy) that was critiqued in 
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chapter 2 and has much in common with the medical model of disability 
understanding of impairment.  
 
The impairment is conceded to the classification and disciplinary systems that address 
organic defect. Assessment, diagnosis and intervention procedures are based on a 
static notion of impairment that requires a form of exclusion at some point and   that 
defines the intellectually disabled subject as one of limited competence and therefore 
capable only of restricted participation and citizenship. Research in education policy 
and practice should consider very carefully the impact of classification systems and 
the deployment of expertise. The development of curricula that enable multiple 
contexts for the construction of competence can also be explored.  
Material Conditions for Intellectually Disabled People and their Families 
The discourses of A4.3: Medical model/religious discourse and B6: Special education 
keeps children safe, with their emphasis on protection, highlight the difficult material 
conditions with which intellectually disabled people and their families have to deal. A 
response to this has been identified as a negative human rights approach (see above), 
and the limitations of such an approach were noted. Research that describes the extent 
and nature of poverty and abusive practices should be supplemented by a critical 
examination of discursive constructions of intellectual disability and the conditions of 
possibility that form this group as objects of abuse. Obviously all legal and protective 
measures to prevent and redress abuse must be continued simultaneously. However, 
for change to occur in communities the need for understanding each other as proposed 
by Young and Quibell (2000) may be more effective in the long term than an appeal 
to rights alone.  
 
Conclusions 
The starting point of this study was the recognition of the resistance of educational 
practice to the inclusion of intellectually disabled learners, despite a strong human 
rights agenda to this end. I adopted a post-structuralist, critical disability studies 
theoretical perspective and framed my research questions with regard to the operation 
of power, knowledge and subjectivity in the construction of intellectual disability in 
educational practice. This entailed a review of representation of intellectual disability 
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and educational practice as constructed within different historical and cultural 
settings.  I chose a methodology suited to revealing a multiplicity of perspectives in 
Q-methodology of the discourse analysis (DA) school. The resulting accounts and 
discourses yielded many interesting insights which have been discussed exhaustively 
in the preceding chapters.  
 
I conclude this thesis with a proposal for a theory of (poss)ability as one that offers 
potential for change, growth and opportunity as opposed to the static notion of 
impairment as biological lack of individual bodies that confines and limits by its very 
definition. My argument is for a change from a discourse of tragedy, limitation and 
disability to one of hope and (poss)ability. To conclude I quote from my then three-
year-old daughter on being told that her baby brother had Down Syndrome, (which 
was explained to her as meaning that he will have difficulty in learning): “Mommy, I 
know that he will be slow in learning but will he still be naughty?” The question can 
be expanded: “Will he play music? Will he fall in love? Will he be a sociable or a 
reserved person? What work will he like to do? Where will he live? Who might he 
marry?”  And a million other questions that come to mind as we imagine the future, 
the be-coming and the (poss)abilities of intellectually disabled people.  
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Appendix B: Letter to School Principal to Arrange Interviews. 
 
                                   
The Principal 
Parkland Special School  
PO Box 15405 
Beacon Bay 
East London  
5205 
18 April 2008 
Dear Mrs Bartlett, 
My name is Judy Mckenzie and I am undertaking doctoral research at Rhodes 
University on intellectual disability. This letter serves as background information to a 
request to interview educators from your school. Permission to conduct educational 
research in the district has been granted by the District Director, Mr. Ngwanya.  
Background information to request the assistance for interviews of educators at 
Parkland Special School  
In this study, educators and district officials will be asked to rate their views, from 
strongly agree to strongly disagree on sets of statements about the education of 
learners with intellectual disability. This will take approximately 60 - 90 minutes to 
finish. The form that they complete will have their name and school on it. However, 
only the researchers will have access to this information. The information will remain 
confidential, although the participant might be asked to clarify their views to the 
researcher at a later date. The information will be put together with that of other 
people and no one individual will be identifiable. The completed forms will be 
shredded once the study is completed. The name of the district will be given in the 
study but the names of the schools will be kept confidential, although they might be 
described in a general way. My request is to interview 5 educators from Parkland 
 5 
Special School. In addition, I would like to be advised by you as to the best way of 
recruiting educators and setting up interviews at their and the school’s convenience.  
The forms that the educators from your school complete will look at issues of 
education of intellectually disabled people. Each participant will sign their own letter 
of consent once they have read the background information. There are no risks to 
him/her or the school in participating in this project, nor if the school decides not to 
participate. The participants from your school will be able to decide not to answer any 
question or to stop participating at any time, and if so, nothing will happen to him/her. 
The results of this study do not benefit the school directly, but will contribute to the 
improvement of the education of intellectually disabled people generally. I would be 
very happy to give feedback to the school once the project is completed in January 
2009.  If you have any concerns about the research, you can also contact my 
supervisor Prof. Macleod, whose details are provided below. 
Thank you 
_____________________    _________________________ 
Judy Mckenzie      Supervisor: Prof. Catriona 
Macleod 
Psychology Department    Psychology Department 
Rhodes University     Phone: 0466038501 
Ph: 043-7265271     e-mail: c.macleod@ru.ac.za 
Fax: 0866154396 
Cell: 0835000464  e-mail: jocada@computronics.co.za 
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Appendix C: List of Documents and Interviews Used in the 
Development of the Q sets 
 Interviews 
1. Inclusion International interviews  
• Interview with parents of intellectually disabled children and adults from the 
Down Syndrome Association Border-Kei (May 2004).  
• Interview with intellectually disabled adults from the McClelland work Centre 
(May 2004).  
• Meeting held at the McClelland Work Centre  (May 2004). 
• Meeting with parents of children with intellectual disability (May 2004). 
• Interview with parents of profoundly disabled children at Foden Centre, East 
London (May 2004). 
• Interview with parent committee of a local branch of the Disabled Children’s 
Action Group in Dukathole village, OR Tambo District Eastern Cape 
(December 2004). 
• Interview with children with disabilities in Dukathole village (December 
2004). 
• Interview with parents of disabled children (Xhosa focus group discussion), 
(December 2004). 
• Interview with manager of Happy Home for disabled children (December 
2004). 
• Interview with Board member and trustee of Happy Home (December 2004). 
• Summary of interview with board members and community members of 
Happy Home (December 2004). 
• Summary of interview with parents of disabled children and community 
members in Nompumelelo, Lusikisiki. (Xhosa focus group discussion), 
(December 2004). 
• Interview in Thabase Village with disabled children (December 2004). 
• Interview with disabled children’s home residents (December 2004). 
• Field notes Whizz Kids (May 2005). 
 
 
2. Disabled Children’s Action Group Interviews undertaken for an  evaluation of the 
development co-operation between Disabled Children Action Group (South-Africa) 
and Norsk Forbund for Utviklingshemmede (NFU), conducted by University of 
Stellenbosch. 
• Interview with country manager of NFU (November 2005). 
• Interview with community leader, (December 2004). 
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 Project reports 
• Field test for the Department of Education conducted by the Sisonke 
Consortium.  
• District Based Support visit No 2 – East London  (October 2007). 
• District report for on site support visits – Mbizana (October 2007). 
• District report for on site support visits - East London (October 2007). 
• District report for on site support visits – Lusikisiki (October 2007). 
• Meeting with DBST -  Lusikisiki  (February 2007). 
• Report for on site support visit 4 (October 2006). 
Media reports from the Daily Dispatch 
• Disbelief, anger as disability grants cancelled 
• Disability pensioners alerted By Adrienne Carlisle, Tuesday, December 12, 
2000. 
Friday, November 14, 1997. 
• Project takes education past disabilities By Justine Gerardy, Friday, May 25, 
2001. 
• Special needs schools audit due next month By Sonja Raasch.  Wednesday, 
June 12, 2002. 
• Outdated attitudes challenged Friday, October 5, 2001. 
• Intellectually disabled want inclusion Friday, October 5, 2001.     
• Hysterectomies forced on handicapped women By Tanya Jonker-Bryce, 
Thursday, October 4, 2001.     
• Call to remove offensive words Saturday, October 6, 2001.     
• FAS under spotlight Saturday, October 6, 2001.     
• EL to host disability conference By Adrienne Carlisle, Tuesday, September 4, 
2001.     
• Down syndrome awareness workshop By Matthew Ramsden, Wednesday, 
October 20, 1999 .    
• McClelland to hold open days By Wendy Sa Joe, Tuesday, March 12, 2002.    
• Inclusive education excluding children with special needs by Ken Alston, 
Tuesday, 30 September, 2008. 
• Tumbling into the mainstream By Toni Muller, Thursday, March 28, 2002.    
• Basic human rights, but only for the able By Sonia Raasch, Saturday, March 
9, 2002.     
Journal articles and policy documents 
All of the references used in chapters 3 and 4 were drawn on in developing the 
concourse for the Q-method study.  See list of references for the main study.  
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Appendix D: Completed grid for Factor A1.1 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
2. Their disability is the 
fault of their mother 
because of something 
that she has done wrong 
1 They are hidden 
away from the 
community. 
 
8. They often find it hard to 
behave or act in the right 
way. 
37. People should look at the ways in 
which they are like other people and not 
look at their difficulties all the time. 
36.They are the same as other 
people in the way they act. 
13. They should be taught 
about friendship, marriage 
and having children. 
 
32. They treat 
other people 
with respect. [ 
14. They will reach a 
limit to what they can 
learn. 
40. They cannot 
manage their own 
money. 
33. They can only work in 
places where they get 
support and are kept safe 
25. They can do more than many people 
think they can. 
18. When they decide to do 
something, they take 
responsibility for their actions. 
7. It is very difficult for 
parents to bring up people 
like this. 
 
31. They can 
enjoy art, music 
and dance. 
19. When parents and 
teachers plan for their 
future, they do not 
include the disabled 
person’s dreams and 
wishes. 
12.They need speech 
therapy, 
physiotherapy and 
other kinds of help to 
be able to live a 
normal life. 
9. They can never have 
their own home. 
21. They are always treated well and 
fairly. 
 
11. They can have a long term 
relationship or get married. 
 
. 
27. They look the same as 
other people.  
 
28. They are a 
gift from God 
 
10. They do not know 
how to stand up for their 
rights - things that all 
human beings should be 
allowed to do or have. 
.30. Other people like 
parents and doctors 
should not decide 
what makes their life 
happy and 
worthwhile. 
5. Brain damage that makes 
learning difficult stops them 
from leading a normal life 
23. They will always need a lot of help 
from their family. 
 
24. They bring something into 
the family because they can get 
a disability grant. 
29. Their parents stop them 
from doing things because 
they are worried about what 
might happen to them. 
15. They want 
to learn how to 
read and write 
[4] 38. It does not matter 
what you call these 
people, intellectually 
disabled or mentally 
retarded, because the 
disability is still 
there. 
4. They have not had 
enough of the right chances 
to learn. 
3. They are more likely to be poor than 
other people. 
20. They are always made 
welcome in church and at 
religious places. 
22. They should be brought 
up within their families no 
matter what special needs 
they might have. 
   
6. They must try very hard to be more like 
other people. 
 
 
[5] 
 
16. They are scared of 
failing in learning. 
 
34. They can be thought of as children in 
many ways. 
39. They can earn money to live 
on 
[5]  
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Appendix F: Letter of information to parents and professional 
participants 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Study on education of intellectually disabled people in South Africa  
 
Dear participant, 
I am undertaking doctoral research at Rhodes University on intellectual disability. I 
am interested in finding out more about different points of view on the education of 
intellectually disabled people.   The results of this study will be used to get an  
understanding of the challenges that exist in education for intellectually disabled 
people.  This study does not benefit you directly, but the answers you give together 
with the answers of all the other people we talk to will be used to find better ways of 
educating intellectually disabled people.  
 
If you agree to participate, you will be asked to rate your views, from strongly agree 
to strongly disagree on sets of statements according to the instructions given. This 
will take approximately 60 - 90 minutes to finish. Only the researchers will have 
access to the information that links you to your answers. They might come back to 
you at a later date to ask you to clarify answers in order to get a better understanding 
of different points of view.  The information will be put together with that of other 
people and no one individual will be identifiable.  
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The forms that you complete will look at issues related to intellectually disabled 
people. There are no risks to you in participating in this project, nor if you decide not 
to participate. You will be able to decide not to answer any question or to stop 
participating at any time, and if so, nothing will happen to you. If you are 
uncomfortable about anything arising from the research, you can contact the 
researcher, Judy Mckenzie or my supervisor Prof. Macleod (see contacts below).  
 
The information gained from the form that you complete will be entered into a 
computer and analysed with other results. While these results will identify certain 
details about yourself e.g. age, gender, educational background, your name will not be 
divulged. The completed forms will be shredded once the study is completed.  
 
Thank you for your time and participation 
Signed: _________________________________ 
Judy Mckenzie 
Psychology Department  
Rhodes University 
Ph/ Fax: 0437265271 
Cell: 0835000464 e-mail: jocada@computroniccs.co.za 
Signed: ________________________________ 
Supervisor:  
Prof. Catriona Macleod 
Psychology Department 
Ph/Fax: 0466038501 
e-mail: c.macleod@ru.ac.za 
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Appendix G: Letter of consent for intellectually disabled participants 
Do you agree to take part in this project? 
 
Judy Mckenzie is a student at Rhodes University. She is 
doing a project about teaching and learning for people 
with intellectual disabilities. 
 
Judy would like to know about what you think about 
teaching and learning. She would like to know how your 
disability affects your life. To find out, Judy would like to 
ask you some questions. 
 
You have been given a letter about the project and what 
we are asking you to do. 
 
If you are happy to take part in this project, please read 
and fill in this form. 
 
Your name____________________________________ 
 
Do you understand that: 
 
1. Judy is a student at Rhodes University. This project 
is part of her studies. 
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2. Judy would like to know what you think about 
teaching and learning. 
 
3. You will be asked some questions about teaching 
and learning. It will take about an hour. You can say 
that you do not want to answer any question. 
 
4. You can talk to Judy if you are worried about taking 
part. She will look into any issues. 
 
5. You can stop anytime. At the moment you are happy 
to take part unless anything changes. 
 
6. Your name will not be given in the project report. 
People will not be able to find out what answers you 
gave.  
  
 
By signing this form you are saying that you are happy to 
take part in this project. 
 
Please sign here:  
 
Judy Mckenzie will sign here:                                                                
                                                                        
A witness will sign here:  
 
 
 
Before starting: 
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Judy will ask you these questions to check that you are 
happy with taking part. 
 
1. What is this project about? 
2. Can you stop at anytime if you want to? 
3. Who will know what you have said? Will it be Judy or 
will other people also know? 
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Appendix H: Letter of consent for parents and professionals 
 
 
 
RHODES UNIVERSITY  
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 AGREEMENT 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE STUDY  
BETWEEN STUDENT RESEARCHER AND RESEARCH 
PARTICIPANT  
 
 
 
I (participant’s name)                                                    consent  to participation in 
the research project of             Judith Anne Mckenzie                                      on 
education of intellectually disabled people. 
I understand that: 
 
1. The researcher is a student conducting the research as part of the 
requirements for a PhD  degree at Rhodes University. 
    
2. The researcher is interested in my views on education of people with 
intellectual disability. 
    
3. My participation will involve completing a questionnaire which will take 
about 60 minutes   I will be asked to answer questions concerning my views 
on education but I  can choose not to answer any questions if I so wish.  
    
4. I am invited to voice to the researcher any concerns I have about my 
participation in the study and to have these addressed to my satisfaction. 
    
5. I can withdraw from the study at any time  -  however I will give my full 
participation unless some unusual circumstances occur or I have concerns 
about my participation which I did not originally anticipate. 
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6. The report on the project will be designed in such a way that I will not be 
able to be identified by the general reader. 
 
 
Signed on (Date):                                                                  
 
Participant:                                                                         
 
Researcher:  
                                                                        
Witness:      
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Appendix I:  Tables of results for Q-studies A1, A2, A3 and A4 
Table 1: Factor loadings of participants in Q-study A1: Intellectually disabled adults 
Note: Calculated at a level of significance of P<0.011
 
. Non-significant and confounded Q sorts are shaded. The numbers in each cell indicate the extent to which the 
individual Q-sort of the participant correlates with the factor denoted in the column heading 
Sort  Participant description and age A1.1 A1.2 A1.3 A1.4 A1.5 A1.6 h²2 
1 White male, 35 25 2 -20 -2 42* 30 38 
2 White male, 29 5 4 10 56* -1 23 38 
3 White female, 34 48* 13 8 33 7 13 39 
4 White female, 40 16 8 28 51* 33 13 49 
5 White female, 54 36 -11 0 29 -1 -8 24 
6 White female, 60 55* -5 -5 -10 11 13 34 
7 White male, 24 -2 -23 -2 25 35 61* 63 
8 White male, 53 -1 25 23 14 17 -10 18 
9 White female, 46 -8 -8 34 20 56* 1  49 
10 White male, 36 5 -16 17 10  -20 56* 43 
11 White male, 32 13 20 66* 17 28 22 64 
12 White female, 30 14 61* 14 22 28 11 56 
13 White female, 33 17 16 17 20 25 61* 57 
                                                 
1 This is calculated at a loading of 0.41 or above for this study by PCQ for Windows. Significant loadings are marked with an asterisk.  
2 h² indicates the communality of the specific Q sort. It indicates the % of the Q sort that is associated with the other Q sorts in the study (Brown, 1980 ) 
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14 White male, 20 56* -2 28 -10 28 20 52 
15 Black male, 21 20 17 23 -17 59* 39 67 
16 White male, 19 56* -4 23 19 14 17 45 
17 Black male, 23 27 -1 26 11 54* 20 48 
18 White female, 23 20 -5 53* -2 17 22 40 
19 Coloured male, 19 30 5 -8 13 64* 14 55 
20 Black female, 20 66* -11 -11 11 32 5 57 
21 White female, 21 41* 19 20 23 52* -5 58 
22 Coloured female, 22 10 3 8 -59* 10 8 14 41 
 
                                                 
3 Negative factor loadings that are significant have been made positive through rotation, since this does not affect their loading onto a factor (see Brown, 1980 for discussion). 
This factor loading is negative since there are two loadings on this factor, but they are in opposition to each other in a bipolar distribution. Hence, this is the only loading that 
is reflected as a negative number in relation to the other loading onto this factor.  
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Table 2: Factor array for Q-study A1: Intellectually disabled adults.  
Note: The statement is noted in the first column and the response of each factor can be read down the columns numbered 1 to 6. The figures indicate the weighted response 
for each factor to the statement, rounded off to a whole number of the rating scale.  
 
Statements  A1.1 A1.24 A1.3  A1.4 A1.5 A1.6 
  1.They are hidden away from the community.              -2 -1 -2 -3 -2 -1 
  2.Their disability is the fault of their mother because of something she has done wrong.               -3 0 -1 -3 -3 -3 
  3.They are more likely to be poor than other people.    0 -1 -2 -3 0 -3 
  4.They have not had enough of the right chances to learn.                                                 -1 1 1 1 0 3 
  5.Brain damage that makes learning difficult stops them from leading a normal life.                       -1 2 1 -1 -1 1 
  6.They must try very hard to be more like other people.                                                0 0 -3 0 0 -3 
7.It is very difficult for parents to bring up people like this.                                 2 -1 0 0 -2 -1 
  8.They often find it hard to behave or act in the right way.                                             -1 3 0 -1 -1 1 
  9.They can never have their own home,                     -1 0 -2 1 -3 -3 
10.They do not know how to stand up for their rights - things that all human beings should 
be allowed to do or have.                                         
-3 -3 -1 0 -2 0 
11.They can have a long-term relationship or get married.                                               1 0 2 -2 0 -1 
12.They need speech therapy, physiotherapy and other kinds of help to be able to live a 
normal life.                                                  
-2 2 3 0 3 1 
                                                 
4 As noted above, this factor is bipolar. The factor scores presented here indicate the positive pole of the factor , A1.2 that reflects  Participant 12 responses. The negative 
pole, Factor A1.2A is represented by changing the sign of each of these scores.   
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13.They should be taught about friendship, marriage and having children.                                   2 0 -1 1 1 0 
14.They will reach a limit to what they can learn.      -3 1 -3 -1 -2 0 
15.They want to learn how to read and write.           3 1 1 3 3 3 
16.They are scared of failing in learning.                 -1 -3 0 1 -3 0 
17.They are very likely to be abused or treated badly.                                                 -1 0 -1 -2 -1 -2 
18.When they decide to do something they take   responsibility for their actions.      1 0 -2 -2 1 -1 
19.When parents and teachers plan for their future, they do not include the disabled 
person's dreams and wishes.      
-3 -1 -2 -2 -1 2 
20.They are always made welcome in church and at religious places.                                      1 -3 2 2 3 1 
21.They are always treated well and fairly.        0 2 -1 -1 2 -2 
22.They should be brought up within their families no matter what special needs they might 
have.          
2 3 3 2 1 0 
23.They will always need a lot of help from their family.                                                0 3 2 3 2 1 
24.They bring something into the family because they can get a disability grant.                           1 3 -1 3 -1 -2 
25.They can do more than many people think they can.        0 -2 -1 2 1 2 
26.They can give and take love.                             1 2 1 0 2 2 
27.They look the same as other people.                      2 1 -3 -1 0 0 
28.They are a gift from God.                              3 -2 3 0 2 3 
29.Their parents stop them from doing things because they are worried about what might 
happen to them.      
2 -3 0 -1 -1 -1 
30.Other people like parents and doctors should not  decide what makes their life happy 
and worthwhile.     
-2 -2 -3 -3 0 -1 
31.They can enjoy art, music and dance.                     3 1 3 1 2 2 
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32.They treat other people with respect.                    3 -1 2 -2 1 1 
33.They can only work in places where they get support and are kept safe. -1 2 2 1 0 -2 
34.They can be thought of children in many ways.            0 1 1 0 -1 1 
35.They can learn to do most things for themselves   with time and patience.   0 -2 0 3 1 3 
36.They are the same as other people in the way they act.                                                   1 0 0 2 0 0 
37.People should look at the ways in which they are like other people and not look at their 
difficulties all the time.   
0 -2 0 0 -2 2 
38.It does not matter what you call these people, intellectually disabled or mentally 
retarded because the disability is still there.                 
-2 -1 0 -1 1 -2 
39.They can earn money to live on.                         1 1 1 2 3 0 
40.They cannot manage their own money.                     -2 -1 1 1 -3 -1 
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Table 3: Factor loadings of participants in Q-study A2: Parents .  
Note: Calculated at a level of significance of P<0.015
 
. Significant loadings are marked with an asterisk. Non-significant and confounded Q sorts are shaded. The numbers in 
each cell indicate the extent to which the individual Q-sort of the participant correlates with the factor denoted in the column heading 
Sort  Participant description and 
age 
A2.1 A2.2 A2.3 A2.4 A2.5 A2.6 h² 
1 White male, 52 79* -14 8 8 8 14 68 
2 White female, 49 92* 0 -2 -2 -11 4 86 
3 White female, 54 7 8 2 8 -11 67* 48 
4 White male, 50 4 -5 14 7 -27 70* 60 
5 Black female, 27 -7 58* 10 -7 5 36 50 
6 White male, 49 28 5 8 36 38 48* 60 
7 White female, 44 27 8 41* 17 14 29 39 
8 Black female, 45 17 33 4 2 32 64* 65 
9 Black female, 52 25 40 5 23 8 28 36 
10 White female, 41 40 -2 38 -4 20 69* 84 
11 White female, 40 69* 4 -17 30 11 14 65 
12 White female, 53 17 2 42* 5 0 27 29 
13 Black female, 41 30 14 39 52* -4 28 61 
14 White female, 31 64* 2 23 13 11 40 65 
15 White female, 41 -14 17 8 7 10 67* 52 
                                                 
5 This is calculated at a loading of 0.41 or above for this study by PCQ for Windows. Significant loadings are marked with an asterisk.  
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16 White male, 30 35 -10 44* 27 2 46* 61 
17 Black female, 56 16 10 36 16 52* 11 48 
18 Black female, 54 4 2 34 54* -11 8 43 
19 Black female, 51 17 44* 25 -4 -4 38 43 
20 Black female, 50 14 28 41* 23 25 38 53 
21 Coloured female, 47 14 22 28 -17 14 55* 50 
22 Black female, 47 -20 -2 66* -8 -25 26 61 
23 Black female, 44 17 36 53* -16 -4 8 48 
24 Black male, 45 -5 14 11 5 -34 14 17 
25 White male, 44 40 -11 7 25 -5 46* 46 
26 Black female, 55 -16 42* 25 0 28 28 42 
27 Black female, 54 -4 39 8 -8 -27 54* 53 
28 Black male, 64 -5 46* 2 28 -5 11 30 
29 Black male, 48 -4 7 75* -4 -5 20 61 
30 White female, 49 88* -2 7 -2 -10 1 79 
31 Black female, 44 -8 16 -25 -11 56* 14 44 
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Table 4:  Factor array for Q-study A2: Parents. 
Note: The statement is noted in the first column and the response of each factor can be read down the columns numbered 1 to 6. The figures indicate the weighted response 
for each factor to the statement, rounded off to a whole number of the rating scale.  
Statements  A2.1 A2.2 A2.3 A2.4 A2.5 A2.6 
  1.They are hidden away from the community.              2 -1 -1 0 -1 0 
  2.Their disability is the fault of their mother because of something she has done wrong.               -3 -2 -3 -3 -1 -3 
  3.They are more likely to be poor than other people.   0 -3 -1 -3 -3 -2 
  4.They have not had enough of the right chances to learn.                                                 3 1 1 1 -1 -1 
  5.Brain damage that makes learning difficult stops them from leading a normal life.                      -2 0 2 -3 0 0 
  6.They must try very hard to be more like other people.                                                -2 2 -1 -2 0 -1 
7.It is very difficult for parents to bring up people like this.                                 -1 0 3 0 -2 -2 
  8.They often find it hard to behave or act in the right way.                                             -1 -2 2 -2 -2 0 
  9.They can never have their own home.                     -2 -2 -2 -1 -2 0 
10.They do not know how to stand up for their rights - things that all human beings should 
be allowed to do or have.                                         
1 2 0 0 -2 1 
11.They can have a long-term relationship or get married.                                               2 -3 -2 0 1 -1 
12.They need speech therapy, physiotherapy and other kinds of help to be able to live a 
normal life.                                                  
-2 1 3 3 1 2 
13.They should be taught about friendship, marriage and having children.                                   2 -1 0 2 0 0 
14.They will reach a limit to what they can learn.      -3 -2 -2 -1 1 0 
15.They want to learn how to read and write.           1 2 1 2 2 2 
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16.They are scared of failing in learning.                 0 -2 1 -3 1 -1 
17.They are very likely to be abused or treated badly.                                                 1 -1 3 1 0 0 
18.When they decide to do something they take   responsibility for their actions.      0 0 -3 -1 1 -2 
19.When parents and teachers plan for their future, they do not include the disabled person's 
dreams and wishes.      
1 -3 -2 2 -3 -1 
20.They are always made welcome in church and at religious places.                                      0 3 0 1 -1 0 
21.They are always treated well and fairly.        -3 0 -2 -1 0 -3 
22.They should be brought up within their families no matter what special needs they might 
have.          
3 -1 -1 -2 1 1 
23.They will always need a lot of help from their family.                                                -1 3 1 0 0 2 
24.They bring something into the family because they can get a disability grant.                           -1 -1 -1 1 2 -3 
25.They can do more than many people think they can.        2 1 1 2 1 2 
26.They can give and take love.                             1 1 0 0 0 3 
27.They look the same as other people.                      0 0 -1 -2 3 -3 
28.They are a gift from God.                               -1 3 3 2 -1 3 
29.Their parents stop them from doing things because they are worried about what might 
happen to them.      
2 1 0 -1 -1 1 
30.Other people like parents and doctors should not decide what makes their life happy and 
worthwhile.     
1 -3 -3 1 -3 -1 
31.They can enjoy art, music and dance.                     1 0 2 1 2 3 
32.They treat other people with respect.                    0 2 0 1 0 1 
33.They can only work in places where they get support and are kept safe. -1 2 1 3 2 1 
34.They can be thought of children in many ways.            -3 -1 0 -1 3 1 
 32 
35.They can learn to do most things for themselves   with time and patience.   3 3 1 -1 3 3 
36.They are the same as other people in the way they act.                                                   0 -1 -3 -2 2 -1 
37.People should look at the ways in which they are like other people and not look at their 
difficulties all the time.   
3 1 2 3 -1 2 
38.It does not matter what you call these people, intellectually disabled or mentally retarded 
because the disability is still there.                 
-2 0 2 3 -2 -2 
39.They can earn money to live on.                         0 0 0 0 3 -2 
40.They cannot manage their own money.                      -1 1 -1 0 -3 1 
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Table 5: Factor loadings of participants in Q-study A3: Professionals 
Note: Calculated at a level of significance of P<0.016
Sort  
. Significant loadings are marked with an asterisk. Non-significant and confounded Q sorts are shaded. The numbers in 
each cell indicate the extent to which the individual Q-sort of the participant correlates with the factor denoted in the column heading 
Participant description and age A3.1 A3.2 A3.3 A3.4 A3.5 h² 
1 Coloured, female teacher at Special 
School (SS), 34 
34 28 23 2 59* 60 
2 White, female teacher at SS, 51 30 8 32 53* 20 52 
3 Coloured, male teacher at SS, 37 56* -20 7 34 33 59 
4 White, female teacher at SS, 46 19 14 -11 40 60* 61 
5 White, female, principal , SS, 30 34 17 17 28 56* 57 
6 White, female principal, SS, 61 1 -11 27 11 51* 36 
7 White, female, health professional, 
42 
26 -8 73* 28 19 74 
8 Black female, community worker, 
40 
2 36 70* 30 13 75 
9 Black female, community worker, 
34 
29 53* 34 25 17 58 
10 Black female, teacher in SS, 45 68* 1 8 0 27 54 
11 Black female, teacher in SS, 38 17 23 10 5 61* 48 
12 Black female, teacher in SS, 54 13 -2 -7 -14 56* 35 
                                                 
6 This is calculated at a loading of 0.41 or above for this study by PCQ for Windows. Significant loadings are marked with an asterisk.  
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13 Black, female, teacher in SS, 54 39 55* 20 11 26 57 
14 Black, male principal, 40 41* 14 5 33 20 34 
15 White female health professional, 
49 
19 -13 60* 39 27 65 
16 Black female principal, Full 
service school (FSS), 49 
17 46* 34 -20 20 46 
17 Black female teacher in FSS, 38 22 0 44* 8 8 25 
18 Black female teacher in FSS, 40 55* 11 20 23 17 43 
19 Black female teacher in FSS, 59 14 44* 14 16 -17 29 
20 White female district official, 59 32 0 -23 39 67* 76 
21 Asian, female district official, 46 19 25 69* 17 8 62 
22 Coloured female health 
professional, 45 
35 -14 40 16 56* 64 
23 White female teacher in RS, 46 39 16 10 42* 17 40 
24 Black female teacher in RS, 44 -2 60* 33 22 5 53 
25 Black female teacher in RS, 44 13 35 16 48* 30 50 
26 Black female teacher in RS, 37 -1 36 41* 11 35 45 
27 Black female teacher in RS, 41 41* 17 11 22 26 33 
28 White female health professional, 
38 
13 0 25 55* 40 54 
29 Black male teacher in RS, 37 -30 72* 13 23 28 77 
30 Black female teacher in RS, 36 53* -2 40 -5 50* 69 
31 White female teacher in RS, 54 17 28 39 55* 39 72 
 35 
32 White female health professional, 
51 
11 -20 35 55* 36 62 
33 White male teacher in RS, 46 28 28 42* 23 40 56 
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Table 6:  Factor array for Q-study A3: Professionals 
Note: The statement is noted in the first column and the response of each factor can be read down the columns numbered 1 to 6. The figures indicate the weighted response 
for each factor to the statement, rounded off to a whole number of the rating scale.  
 
Statements  A3.1 A3.2 A3.3 A3.4 A3.5 
  1.They are hidden away from the community.              1 -3 0 0 1 
  2.Their disability is the fault of their mother because of something she has done wrong.               -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 
  3.They are more likely to be poor than other people.    1 -3 -1 0 -1 
  4.They have not had enough of the right chances to learn.                                                 3 -1 1 -1 0 
  5.Brain damage that makes learning difficult stops them from leading a normal life.                       0 0 -1 -2 -2 
  6.They must try very hard to be more like other people.                                                0 -2 -2 -1 -3 
7.It is very difficult for parents/ caregivers to bring up people like this.                                 -1 1 -1 1 1 
  8.They often find it hard to behave or act in the right way.                                             2 -2 -2 -1 0 
  9.They can never have their own home.                     -3 -3 -2 -3 -2 
10.They do not know how to stand up for their rights - things that all human beings should be allowed 
to do or have.                                         
1 -1 -1 1 2 
11.They can have a long-term relationship or get married.                                               -1 1 1 1 0 
12.They need speech therapy, physiotherapy and other kinds of help to be able to live a normal life.                                                  3 3 0 1 1 
13.They should be taught about friendship, marriage and having children.                                   0 0 1 2 0 
14.They will reach a limit to what they can learn.      0 -1 -3 1 1 
15.They want to learn how to read and write.          -1 1 2 1 0 
16.They are scared of failing in learning.                 0 -2 0 -1 0 
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17.They are very likely to be abused or treated badly.                                                 3 1 0 3 3 
18.When they decide to do something they take   responsibility for their actions.      -2 -1 0 -2 -3 
19.When parents/ caregivers and teachers plan for their future, they do not include the disabled person's 
dreams and wishes.      
-2 0 0 0 1 
20.They are always made welcome in church and at religious places.                                      -3 2 -1 -1 0 
21.They are always treated well and fairly.        -3 -2 -3 -3 -3 
22.They should be brought up within their families no matter what special needs they might have.          0 0 2 0 -1 
23.They will always need a lot of help from their family.                                                0 2 -1 -2 1 
24.They bring something into the family because they can get a disability grant.                           0 0 0 -1 -2 
25.They can do more than many people think they can.        3 2 3 3 2 
26.They can give and take love.                             1 1 3 2 2 
27.They look the same as other people.                      -1 3 1 0 -2 
28.They are a gift from God.                               1 3 1 1 1 
29.Their parents/ caregivers stop them from doing things because they are worried about what might 
happen to them.      
1 -1 2 0 3 
30.Other people like parents/ caregivers and doctors should not decide what makes their life happy and 
worthwhile.     
-2 1 1 2 -1 
31.They can enjoy art, music and dance.                     2 3 2 3 2 
32.They treat other people with respect.                    -1 0 1 -1 -1 
33.They can only work in places where they get support and are kept safe. 2 -1 -2 -3 2 
34.They can be thought of children in many ways.            -2 1 -1 0 -1 
35.They can learn to do most things for themselves   with time and patience.   2 2 3 2 3 
36.They are the same as other people in the way they act.                                                   -1 2 0 -2 -1 
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37.People should look at the ways in which they are like other people and not look at their difficulties 
all the time.   
2 0 3 2 3 
38.It does not matter what you call these people, intellectually disabled or mentally retarded because 
the disability is still there.                 
-2 -1 -3 -2 -2 
39.They can earn money to live on.                         1 0 2 3 -1 
40.They cannot manage their own money.                     -1 -2 -2 0 0 
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Table 7: Factor loadings of Q-sorts in Q-study A4: Second order study 
Note: Calculated at a level of significance of P<0.017
 
. Significant loadings are marked with an asterisk. The numbers in each cell indicate the extent to which the individual 
Q-sort of the participant correlates with the factor denoted in the column heading 
Sort  Label A4.1 A4.2 A4.3 A4.4 h² 
1 A1.1 54* 16 11 39 48 
2 A1.3 26 -16 52* 28 44 
3 A1.4 51* -2 36 8 40 
4 A1.5 40 -4 22 56* 52 
5 A1.6 16 23 56* 40 55 
6 A2.1 5 68* 34 0 59 
7 A2.2 34 -17 58* 17 53 
8 A2.3 -5 -20 70* 20 59 
9 A2.4 -19 1 36 41* 34 
10 A2.5 58* 4 11 19 39 
11 A2.6 7 8 76* 19 62 
12 A3.1 -11 32 65* 1 53 
13 A3.2 23 16 34 68* 67 
14 A3.3 38 78* 34 29 95 
15 A3.4 -14 65* 35 29 66 
                                                 
7 This is calculated at a loading of 0.41 or above for this study by PCQ for Windows. Significant loadings are marked with an asterisk.  
 40 
16 A3.5 -25 36 80* -5 84 
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Table 8: Factor array for Q-study A4: Second order study 
Note: The statement is noted in the first column and the response of each factor can be read down the columns numbered 1 to 6. The figures indicate the weighted response 
for each factor to the statement, rounded off to a whole number of the rating scale.  
Statements  A4.1 A4.2 A4.3 A4.4 
  1.They are hidden away from the community.              -2 1 0 -3 
  2.Their disability is the fault of their mother because of something she has done wrong.               -3 -3 -3 -3 
  3.They are more likely to be poor than other people.    -3 0 -2 -2 
  4.They have not had enough of the right chances to learn.                                                 -1 1 1 -1 
  5.Brain damage that makes learning difficult stops them from leading a normal life.                       -1 -2 0 -1 
  6.They must try very hard to be more like other people .                                               0 -2 -2 -2 
7.It is very difficult for parents/ caregivers to bring up people like this.                                 0 0 0 -1 
  8.They often find it hard to behave or act in the right way.                                             -2 -2 1 -2 
  9.They can never have their own home.                     -1 -3 -3 -3 
10.They do not know how to stand up for their rights - things that all human beings should be allowed to do or have.                                         -2 0 1 -1 
11.They can have a long term relationship or get married.                                               0 1 -1 1 
12.They need speech therapy, physiotherapy and other kinds of help to be able to live a normal life.                                                   0 0 2 3 
13.They should be taught about friendship, marriage and having children.                                   1 2 0 1 
14.They will reach a limit to what they can learn.      -1 -2 -1 -2 
15.They want to learn how to read and write.           3 1 1 2 
16.They are scared of failing in learning.                 1 0 -1 -3 
17.They are very likely to be abused or treated badly.                                                 -1 1 2 0 
18.When they decide to do something they take   responsibility for their actions.      0 -1 -3 -1 
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19.When parents/ caregivers and teachers plan for their future, they do not include the disabled person's dreams and 
wishes.      
-3 0 -1 0 
20.They are always made welcome in church and at religious places.                                      1 -1 0 3 
21.They are always treated well and fairly.        -1 -3 -3 -1 
22.They should be brought up within their families no matter what special needs they might have.          2 2 0 0 
23.They will always need a lot of help from their family.                                                1 -1 2 2 
24.They bring something into the family because they can get a disability grant .                          2 -1 -2 0 
25.They can do more than many people think they can.        2 3 2 2 
26.They can give and take love.                             0 3 2 1 
27.They look the same as other people .                     2 1 -2 2 
28.They are a gift from God.                               0 0 3 3 
29.Their parents/ caregivers stop them from doing things because they are worried about what might happen to them.      0 2 1 -1 
30.Other people like parents/ caregivers and doctors should not  decide what makes their life happy and worthwhile     -3 1 -2 1 
31.They can enjoy art, music and dance.                     3 2 3 3 
32.They treat other people with respect.                    1 0 1 1 
33.They can only work in places where they get support and are kept safe. 1 -2 1 0 
34.They can be thought of children in many ways.            1 -1 0 0 
35.They can learn to do most things for themselves   with time and patience.   3 3 3 2 
36.They are the same as other people in the way they act.                                                   2 -1 -1 1 
37.People should look at the ways in which they are like other people and not look at their difficulties all the time.   -1 3 3 0 
38.It does not matter what you call these people, intellectually disabled or mentally retarded because the disability is 
still there.                 
-2 -3 -1 0 
39.They can earn money to live on.                         3 2 -1 1 
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40.They cannot manage their own money.                    -2 -1 0 -2 
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Appendix J: Tables of results for Q-study B 
 
Table 9: Factor loadings of participants in Q-study B.  
Notes: Significant Q-sort loadings are marked with an asterisk.  
Insignificant or confounded loadings are shaded.  
Factor B3 is bipolar with one negatively loading sort (P26) and four positively loading sorts. 
The participant number in brackets indicates the number of the same participant in Q-set A studies. 
Participant  Label 1 2 3 4 5 6 h² 
1 (A3: 1) Coloured, female teacher, SS 57* 19 28 28 8 -17 56 
2 (A3: 2) White, female teacher, SS 10 50* -11 5 20 17 35 
3 (A3: 3) Coloured, male teacher ,  SS 44* 33 23 5 17 -22 43 
4 (A3: 4) White, female teacher,  SS -30 61* 13 17 -7 8 54 
5 (A3: 5) White, female, principal, SS  -2 73* 8 1 -19 0 59 
6 (A3: 6) White, female principal, SS 13 7 2 20 34* -5 18 
7 (A3: 7) White, female, health  professional 78* -5 -5 -20 0 -20 70 
8 (A3: 8) Black female, community worker 65* -20 -4 -11 23 -20 57 
9 (A3: 9) Black female, community worker 23 8 69* -30 13 1 66 
10 (A3: 10) Black female, teacher,  SS 4 44* -1 7 11 5 21 
11 (A3. 11) Black female, teacher, SS -25 53* 17 13 30 8 49 
12 (A3: 12) Black female, teacher, SS 20 25 20 10 -5 47* 38 
13 (A3: 13) Black, female, teacher, SS 5 17 29 27 17 34* 33 
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14 (A3: 14) Black, male principal -2 66* 22 4 -8 -19 53 
15 (A3: 15) White female health  prof.  68* -8 -23 1 20 -29 67 
16 (A3: 16) Black female principal, RS 53* 0 30 -7 19 4 41 
17 (A3: 17) Black female teacher, RS  17 16 13 -8 54* -1 37 
18 (A3: 18) Black female teacher , RS 58* 2 13 -7 32 25 53 
19 (A3: 19) Black female teacher, RS 17 -2 46* 16 8 -2 28 
20 (A3: 20) White female district official 5 34* 14 54* 8 4 44 
21 (A3: 21) Asian, female district official 73* -14 -11 -5 20 -22 67 
22 (A3: 22) Coloured female health professional.  46* -11 2 1 20 -30 37 
23 (A3: 23) White female teacher, RS -17 46* 1 33 -4 8 35 
24 (A3: 24) Black female teacher, RS -20 -7 4 35* -14 2 20 
25 (A3: 25) Black female teacher, RS -5 5 2 46* 11 20 27 
26 (A3: 26) Black female teacher, RS -29 5 -47* -2 -23 -5 38 
27 (A3: 28)8 White female health   professional  45* 20 5 34* 20 -13 41 
28 (A3: 29) Black male teacher, RS 42* -1 17 28 46* 2 50 
29 (A3: 30) Black female teacher, RS 46* 17 30 8 23 -13 42 
30 (A3: 31) White female teacher, RS 30 54* -20 16 7 2 45 
31 (A3: 32) White female health  prof.  14 65* -1 -22 23 -2 54 
32 (A3: 33) White male teacher, RS 61* -14 19 0 16 -10 47 
33 (A2: 1) White male, 52 69* -11 -26 -11 5 -28 66 
                                                 
8 Participant 27 in Q-study A3 did not complete Q-study B. 
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34 (A2: 2) White female, 49 72* -13 -11 -22 -11 -2 62 
35 (A2: 3) White female, 54 -11 32 8 42* 0 32 41 
36 (A2: 4) White male, 50 23 23 -5 46* -13 23 39 
37 (A2: 5) Black female, 27 23 -10 2 -8 17 39* 25 
38 (A2: 6) White male, 49 27 11 4 0 30 26 25 
39 (A2: 7) White female, 44 81* -14 8 -2 -5 0 70 
40 (A2: 8) Black female, 45 25 2 -2 19 -5 40* 27 
41 (A2: 9) Black female, 52 28 42* 14 20 -27 28 48 
42 (A2: 10) White female, 41 -26 53* 17 8 -8 23 45 
43 (A2: 11) White female, 40 79* -11 -17 -5 19 -23 76 
44 (A2: 12) White female, 53 39* 32 32 36* -14 -27 58 
45 (A2: 13) Black female, 41 55* 22 29 25 -19 30 63 
46 (A2: 14) White female, 31 63* -5 -7 2 32 -27 58 
47 (A2: 15) White female, 41 -20 53* 23 13 -4 19 42 
48 (A2: 16) White male, 30 23 7 -16 7 34* -11 22 
49 (A2: 17) Black female, 56 38* 33 7 2 36* 14 41 
50 (A2: 18) Black female, 54   13 20 28 5 -14 5 16 
51 (A2: 19) Black female, 51 23 40* 22 16 -23 25 40 
52 (A2: 20) Black female, 50 -26 20 34* 17 10 32 37 
53 (A2: 21) Coloured female, 47 25 23 14 33 -20 46* 51 
54 (A2: 22) Black female, 47 11 27 -5 44* 8 13 30 
55 (A2: 23) Black female, 44 -28 1 -14 47* 5 16 36 
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56 (A2: 24) Black male, 45 11 -10 25 23 -5 2 14 
57 (A2: 25) White male, 44 64* -17 -23 -19 17 -20 60 
58 (A2: 26) Black female, 55 17 35* -19 -2 -1 4 20 
59 (A2: 27) Black female, 54 -10 14 23 17 17 35* 27 
60 (A2: 28) Black male, 64 11 40* -2 5 -19 -1 22 
61 (A2: 29) Black male, 48 -5 11 8 23 11 45* 29 
62 (A2: 30) White female, 49 80* -8 -7 -4 -7 -4 65 
63 (A2: 31) Black female, 44 28 -20 34* 0 4 14 26 
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Table 10: Factor array for Q-study B 
 
 
 F 1 F 2 F 3 F 4 F 5 F 6 
1. Education should empower CYWID to challenge the stigma and discrimination that they often face in the community. 5 1 3 4 - 1 2 
2. No child should be sent to school away from their family and community because of their disability.   6 - 1 - 1 2 1 6 
3. Parents/caregivers of CYWID often have low expectations of their children  - 1 0 1 - 2 1 - 2 
4. Effective education of CYWID is impossible when their families are living in poverty.  - 2 - 2 - 6 - 3 - 2 - 2 
5. Parents/caregivers are often unsupportive of the work of the school and educators. - 2 0 1 - 2 1 - 5 
6. Separate community based day care centres run by parents/caregivers are a good option for provision for very severely 
disabled CYWID.   
- 2 0 - 3 1 - 4 - 1 
7. It is very difficult for parents/caregivers to gain admission for their CYWID into regular schools because these schools 
see it as a responsibility of special schools.  
4 0 0 1 4 3 
8. Formal school curricula developed for CYWID are often irrelevant to the context in which these children and youth live 
and will seek work in.   
1 1 - 3 - 3 - 2 - 3 
9. Social and cultural understandings of disability in families and communities have a big impact on educational provision 
for CYWID  
1 3 - 2 2 0 - 1 
10. There are many useful resources in the community that could support the education CYWID in the local school.   0 - 3 0 - 4 5 - 6 
11. The safety of CYWID cannot be guaranteed when they are placed in ordinary schools.   - 1 - 1 - 4 5 - 5 5 
12. CYWID who are in regular classrooms require the additional support of teacher aides.   0 5 - 2 3 0 1 
13. The success of education of CYWID depends more on the approach of the particular school and the teachers than on the 
nature of the disability.  
5 1 1 0 0 - 2 
14. Only children with a mild intellectual disability can be educated in the mainstream classroom.  - 4 2 4 - 5 3 0 
15. It would be harmful if teachers and schools admitted CYWID if they do not have the required specialized skills and 
knowledge of disability.   
- 1 5 3 - 1 0 0 
16. As many as one third of the children in schools in poverty stricken communities can be seen as CYWID, - 1 - 1 - 5 0 2 - 4 
17. Regular schools can cope with the education of the majority of CYWID if they focus on a flexible learning programme 
and a recognition of the learners’ strengths  
4 - 4 0 0 6 2 
18. CYWID in regular schools should be promoted with their peer group.  3 - 3 - 3 - 3 - 2 - 5 
19. It is not the responsibility of the schools to organize the specific care and therapy support the child needs. - 3 - 6 - 3 - 3 - 3 - 5 
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20. It is impossible to teach CYWID in large classrooms with a linguistically and culturally diverse range of learners.  - 3 6 2 - 1 - 4 1 
21. It takes a very special and compassionate person with the right attitude to be an effective teacher of CYWID.  0 5 4 6 6 4 
22. It is a very difficult and highly skilled job to teach CYWID.  - 5 - 2 - 1 5 3 3 
23. Classmates who are coping well at school can give very effective support to CYWID in the classroom. 4 - 1 0 3 1 1 
24. Teaching CYWID in the regular classroom places an unfair responsibility on teachers because they have not been trained 
about disability.  
- 3 2 0 1 2 0 
25. The education of CYWID requires teachers to do much more work such as  planning,  filling in forms and giving extra 
time to the learner.  
- 2 0 0 2 2 2 
26. CYWID continue to be better catered for in the white population than in other race groups.  0 2 - 4 - 1 - 3 - 4 
27. Every CYWID, no matter how severely disabled, can learn and is entitled to an education at the cost of the state 5 2 4 - 3 - 3 0 
28. When CYWID receive an appropriate education, their risk of poverty and exclusion is reduced. 2 0 - 2 - 1 0 - 1 
29. It is more expensive to educate CYWID than other children who are not disabled.  - 2 - 3 - 4 3 - 1 - 4 
30. The inclusive education policy is not in the interest of the CYWID but is only intended to save money for the state.  - 5 0 - 6 0 - 6 - 4 
31. Over time all CYWID will be accommodated in what are currently considered to be ‘ordinary schools’.  1 - 5 5 - 4 - 4 - 3 
32. Education of CYWID can only take place in the mainstream if there is transformation and change throughout the whole 
education system.  
3 - 1 5 1 - 1 - 6 
33. CYWID who are profoundly or multiply disabled need care of nurses and doctors in a safe environment rather than 
education in school. 
- 2 2 - 5 2 - 3 - 1 
34. IQ score is a very important factor in the decision about whether to place CYWID in special or regular schools. - 6 - 5 2 - 4 - 1 2 
35. The aim of education for CYWID is to help them lead productive and useful lives in places for sheltered employment.  - 1 - 2 3 3 - 6 4 
36. Teaching methods that focus on rote learning and rigid discipline are a barrier to effective education of CYWID.  1 1 2 - 5 2 - 3 
37. The best way to teach CYWID is through structured programmes with clear goals and positive reinforcement so that they 
can learn in small steps and experience success.  
2 3 0 2 2 4 
38. Education of CYWID must develop their ability to take on responsibility.   2 2 5 - 4 5 0 
39. An important aspect of education for CYWID is to teach the child to communicate with others.  1 4 3 - 4 5 5 
40. In order to reduce the risk of sexual abuse, CYWID and their parents require education on human development, sexuality 
and sexual abuse prevention.  
2 3 0 - 2 3 - 1 
41. Teaching CYWID to read and write is not a priority as many do not have the intellectual capacity for this.  - 3 - 4 1 - 6 - 2 - 2 
42. Education of CYWID differs according to the medical diagnosis of the child e.g. Down Syndrome, Foetal Alcohol 
Syndrome  
- 4 - 2 - 1 0 0 0 
43. Education of CYWID is the same as for all children but requires a lot of time and repetition  0 - 4 2 - 2 - 2 3 
44. CYWID need a completely different curriculum to other children.  - 5 1 - 5 0 1 - 2 
45. Intelligence tests and IQ scores of CYWID are useful for developing realistic expectations for the child.  - 4 - 1 6 3 - 5 2 
46. Education of CYWID is a highly specialized task that is best carried out in small classes where all learners have similar - 6 3 - 2 2 - 4 - 1 
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problems, separate from the regular classrooms.   
47. Segregated education of CYWID leads to the isolation of children from their peers and society and contributes to  the 
continuing stigma of intellectual disability   
4 - 3 2 - 2 3 1 
48. CYWID learn more in inclusive education   3 - 6 - 1 - 6 0 0 
49. CYWID can do sport and music with the ordinary schools but they need to have their own space for other aspects of the 
curriculum.   
- 3 0 - 3 1 - 3 1 
50. Parents of CYWID would choose to send their children to regular schools of they could be certain that they would be safe 
and have good learning opportunities. 
2 - 2 2 - 1 2 1 
51. Inclusion of CYWID must proceed gradually so that the infrastructure and teacher training is in place when they are 
admitted.  
0 1 - 1 4 4 0 
52. CYWID are treated better and feel more comfortable in special schools and centres amongst people who are like 
themselves.   
- 4 4 1 4 - 1 4 
53. Human rights to equality for CYWID can only be achieved through education in inclusive education settings 3 - 5 - 1 - 5 - 2 - 3 
54. Education in a mainstream school for CYWID can be a positive experience both for the children involved and for their 
teachers. 
6 - 4 1 0 4 - 2 
55. The curriculum for CYWID should focus on the teaching of skills in the area of self-care, domestic skills, use of money, 
language, and communication.  
0 4 - 2 - 1 1 2 
56. One of the most important purposes of special schools is to provide help for children to develop their abilities with the 
support of speech, physio and occupational therapists. 
1 4 3 1 - 1 3 
57. Currently special schools accommodate many CYWID who require minimal support and should ideally be in mainstream 
schools. 
3 - 2 - 2 0 4 - 3 
58. Special schools for CYWID  should be strengthened rather than closed down 0 6 6 6 3 6 
59. The admission criteria of special schools should not exclude any child on the grounds that they are too severely disabled  2 - 3 4 - 2 - 5 3 
60. The staff of special schools have a  special love and understanding for CYWID  - 1 3 - 4 5 0 5 
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Appendix K: Summaries of factors and discourses 
Summaries of accounts from Q-studies A1, A2 and A3  
A1.1: A competent person. 
This account foregrounds the assumption of competence of intellectually disabled 
people and their desire to learn both academic and social skills. Intellectual disability 
has a positive connotation in that they are not different from other people in any 
significant way and have the same aspirations and the potential to achieve these 
aspirations. The role of the family is important but there is an element of 
overprotection.  
A1.2: A person dependent on their family. 
The roots of difference lie in an organic impairment that prevents ‘normal’ 
engagement with the world. This deficit causes the intellectually disabled to be 
incompetent in running their own lives and therefore dependent on the family to make 
decisions for them. Individual autonomy and competence is less valued than the 
protection of the family.  
A1.2A: A vulnerable person. 
The effects of an organic impairment make daily life difficult but do not prevent an 
intellectually disabled person from living a ‘normal’ life. The position of the 
individual with respect to the family and the community is a more important aspect to 
consider with respect to normal life. This factor illustrates a struggle with being 
independent in the absence of family support. There is no protection against abuse 
and ill-treatment. In the absence of family, the role of religion and the church become 
central as a site of belonging and support. 
A1.3: A person requiring special care and love. 
Difference as a feature of intellectual disability and this is not something that needs to 
be overcome. Rather it is the family and society that must accept and work with 
difference as part of our common humanity and religious values. 
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A1.4: An (ir)responsible person. 
A distinction is made between more competent and less competent intellectually 
disabled people. A double perspective of intellectual disability is indicated with a 
positive image of a keen, motivated learner who takes responsibility for their own 
learning and an irresponsible person who exhibits anti-social behaviour.  Autonomy 
of the intellectually disabled people is limited because of their own irresponsibility.  
A1.5: A person discriminated against. 
This account places an emphasis on the equivalence of intellectual disability with 
other sorts of problems that people might have. As such it is part of the range of 
human adversity that might affect anyone. It questions why intellectual disability 
should be singled out for exclusion given that everybody has problems and everybody 
needs support.  
A1.6: A stereotyped person. 
Intellectual disability is an organic problem situated in the context of inadequate 
support and low expectations. The assumption of incompetence by society at large 
limits the opportunities that they are given. Competence is very important and is 
something that the individual must strive for but they have the right to appropriate 
support and education.  
A2.1: A citizen with rights. 
The level of competence that an intellectually disabled person can reach is often 
restricted through overprotection and ill treatment. Their degree of social inclusion 
and autonomy should not be limited by organic impairment since they have the same 
rights as anyone else to participate fully in the community. While they have a strong 
place in the family, there is a negative tendency to overprotection that restricts the 
intellectually disabled person. This is an activist account that mobilises around the 
unfair discrimination based on perceptions of limitations imposed by organic 
impairment.  
 
 
A2.2: An innocent and vulnerable child of God. 
Autonomy and independence is extremely limited in this account. An intellectually 
disabled person is a gift from God, and is special in His eyes.  God requires that 
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parents fulfil their duty toward this person by protecting them and preserving their 
innocence.  
A2.3: A difficult challenge to their family. 
An intellectually disabled child is vulnerable and incapable of independence. As such 
they are a challenge to families sent by God. They are very different from others and 
cannot be expected to take any form of responsibility for themselves.   
A2.4: A person with special needs. 
An intellectually disabled person has an organic impairment that distinguishes them 
from other people. They should therefore be taught useful life skills and make a 
contribution to their family through their life skills and the disability grant.  
A2.5: A person to be understood by the community.  
The intellectually disabled person is “normal” within the constraints imposed by an 
organic impairment. A different frame of reference is imposed within the constraint of 
organic impairment. “Normality” in terms of doing what others in the community do 
can be achieved with support.  
A2.6: A blessing and a gift from God. 
This account is similar to Factor A2.2 in that it figures the intellectually disabled 
person as innocent within a spiritual context. However, the emphasis is more on duty 
in A2.2 and more on the benefits and joys of an intellectually disabled child in A2.6. 
A3.1: A person to be understood and advocated for by professionals. 
The distinctive differences of intellectually disabled people expose them to the 
dangers of an ill-informed and sometimes abusive family and community. 
Professional knowledge can provide protection against this abuse. The difference that 
is based in organic impairment can be ameliorated by the development of limited 
competence through the application of professional skill.  
 
A3.2: A person to be unconditionally accepted by the community. 
Intellectually disabled children belong in the community as the difference imposed by 
their organic impairment is a superficial one. The common humanity of the 
community is more important than this.  
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A3.3: A person restricted by a label.  
This account approaches claims of intrinsic difference with a high degree of 
scepticism reflecting a concern with labelling that constructs categories that come to 
be viewed in a negative light and limit the potential of human beings.  
A3.4: A person with an impairment who requires support. 
An organic impairment impacts on learning. This difference should not affect the 
autonomy of the individual but it will affect competence and therefore they should be 
protected from abuse and provided with appropriate support. .  
A3.5: A person with a condition that is an object of expert knowledge. 
This account sees intellectual disability as a distinct phenomenon with an organic 
basis that is amenable to professional intervention. This intervention is based on 
knowledge about the “truth” of intellectual disability and the appropriate therapeutic 
actions to be taken. This account as such justifies claims to decide appropriate 
aspirations for competence and independence, given a relatively hostile and ignorant 
community and family, through recourse to a superior knowledge of intellectual 
disability. The “truth” needs to be disseminated amongst the ignorant parents/ 
caregivers and community. 
 
Discourses of representation of intellectual disability from Q-study A4 
A4.1: Interactive discourse. 
The intellectually disabled person is in the process of becoming competent through 
interaction. The judicious provision of support in this process is paramount and 
supersedes considerations of autonomy and independent decision-making. However, 
intellectually disabled people must also take responsibility for their own learning. 
Social inclusion and interaction is crucial to the development of competence. 
A4.2: Social model/human rights discourse. 
The intellectually disabled person has a right to education in a socially inclusive 
context regardless of their level of severity or competence. Since autonomy is of the 
greatest importance, education should be aimed at supporting its development. While 
the existence of impairment is not in doubt, the impact of this on the development of 
competence is not apparent in advance. The likelihood of abuse and ill-treatment must 
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be combated through education in human rights for those around the intellectually 
disabled person.  
A4.3:  Medical model/religious discourse. 
The competence of an intellectually disabled person is limited by organic impairment. 
They are likely to be abused and ill-treated because of their innocence and 
incompetence. Education therefore requires the application of specialised techniques 
to make the most of the impaired intellect and then care and protection must be put in 
place. It is not likely that they will develop autonomy and therefore skills in this area 
are not important.  
A4.4: Community/religious discourse. 
Everyone in the community has some kind of problem and for an intellectually 
disabled person this problem is limited competence due to intellectual impairment. 
They still belong within the community and they must learn how to conduct 
themselves as community members. This requires the acquisition of skills just as 
much as education of the community to accommodate the difference that intellectual 
disability makes.  
Educational discourses identified in Q-study B 
B1: Inclusion as a human right. 
Overall this is an account that favours inclusive education as a human rights issue that 
underpins integration into the community. Inclusion does not only benefit people with 
disabilities and their families but benefits the community as a whole insofar as it 
promotes human rights of all citizens. The focus of education should not be on 
specialised technologies directed at individual deficit within the child but rather on 
the development of a curriculum that is flexible and supportive. The ‘specialness’ of 
intellectual disability and its concomitant teaching practices is rejected in favour of an 
account wherein it is one aspect of diversity within a classroom and it can be dealt 
with by adapting the school environment. The intellectually disabled child belongs in 
the regular classroom regardless of their level of competence. The emphasis is not on 
what they need to be able to do in order to get into the classroom but what support 
they will need to develop competence. Within this understanding the severity of the 
disability is immaterial because it does not affect the obligation to provide an 
inclusive learning environment.  
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B2: Special needs require special provision. 
In this account inclusion is not desirable even if substantial changes were to take 
place in the education system as a whole. On the contrary, inclusion represents a 
violation of disabled children’s rights because regular school classrooms are too big, 
their teachers are not trained and other children will bully them. Special schools are 
preferable because it is here that you will find teachers who are caring and 
compassionate and an educational programme that is suited to the needs of CYWID, 
which are very different to ‘normal’ children. Different educational placements apply 
to different categories of learners according to severity of disability or competence 
levels. While the family and community are not perceived as helpful, compassionate 
teachers can meet their needs.  
B3: Inclusive education is a dream of the future.  
Inclusive education is desirable but difficult to achieve. This is largely because 
children who are seen to have very severe disabilities cannot be accommodated in the 
mainstream. They need specialised skills and technologies that are only available in 
the special school system.  
B4:  Excellent special education as a right. 
Education for CYWID should focus on the development of marketable skills, rather 
than life skills that can be taught in the home. This is best done through special 
schools that are separate but equal to ordinary schools. Extra resources might well be 
required to ensure that they receive the additional technical skills and equipment that 
they need to learn on account of their disability. There is little support in the 
community and it falls to special schools and families to meet the needs of CYWID. 
There are different levels of competence and some CYWID are too severely disabled 
to be able to benefit from education.   
B5: Effective education must be tailored to the child’s needs.  
This account does not treat CYWID as an homogeneous group with identical needs. 
Diversity within the group is acknowledged and the necessity of tailoring educational 
provision to specific individual needs is highlighted. The major dimension of 
diversity within the category is severity of the disability. This requires the provision 
of a range of placements, from a care environment for the most severely disabled to 
the mainstream for the more competent. Change needs to occur within regular schools 
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to increase inclusion.  Families and communities are not central to this account.  Of 
central importance is the understanding of the unique needs of each individual and 
meeting these needs through careful consideration and the development of appropriate 
curricula.  
B6: Special education keeps children safe. 
This account presents a strong rejection of inclusive education because the classes are 
too large in regular schools, the teachers are untrained and know little about disability 
and CYWID will not be safe in these schools. In contrast, special schools provide 
therapy, expertise and a compassionate understanding of disability. In these schools 
severity of the disability should not be a consideration and all CYWID should be 
taught life skills that will prepare them for sheltered employment. The family is 
central to this account as it is within the family and the special schools that CYWID 
will find love and support in the face of a hostile community.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
